THE 9/11 ENCYCLOPEDIA

Stephen E. Atkins



The 9/11 Encyclopedia

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Preface

Few events in American history have rivaled the September 11, 2001, attacks for impact on American society. Before that date most Americans had a hazy idea that the U.S. government was engaged in a war against terrorism, but there was little concern as long as terrorism was only a threat abroad. As the sole remaining superpower, the United States had few enemies that constituted a present danger to the American mainland. The collapse of the Soviet Union had ensured this. Although the United States and its government's policies were not universally beloved in the international community, Americans felt safe behind its two oceans. This all changed on that fateful day of September 11. Much as December 7, 1941, was a day that transformed the history of the United States, September 11, 2001, has become a date that is a watershed in American history.

Little did most Americans realize that Islamist extremists had considered themselves at war against the United States for more than thirty years. Americans had been targets abroad of kidnappings and assassinations. The most obvious case was the killing of 241 marines in Beirut, Lebanon, by Hezbollah during the Reagan administration. Eighteen American servicemen were killed in a single incident in Somalia during the Clinton administration. There were other attacks against Americans in Saudi Arabia, in Yemen, and in Africa. Representatives of the U.S. government had long been targets. American diplomats were not immune from assassination—the U.S. ambassador to Sudan, Cleo A. Noel Jr., and his chargé d'affaires, George C. Moore, had been assassinated in 1973.

One thing that characterized early terrorism was that much of it was state sponsored, so pressure could be applied by the United States against regimes aiding terrorists. This pressure worked particularly well against Libya and its mercurial leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi. With other states pressure was less successful, Iran being the most noticeable failure. Even the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) responded to pressure. But in the last twenty years a new brand of terrorism espoused by Islamic fundamentalists, or Islamists, has made its appearance. Adherents to this religious ideology have operated in independent nongovernmental organizations, making it more difficult for counterterrorism forces to isolate and overcome. The most obvious example has been Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

Osama bin Laden's hostility toward the United States began during the Afghan-Soviet war in the late 1980s. This hostility intensified as American troops were based on the soil of Saudi Arabia beginning with the 1991 Gulf War. He issued two documents declaring war on the United States—one in 1996 and another in 1998. But none of al-Qaeda's early acts of terror took place on American soil. Most experts on terrorism, including CIA intelligence analysts, knew that it was only a matter of time before there was an al-Qaeda operation on American soil, but none of them could pinpoint an actual date or act. The fact that the terrorists devised a plan to use commercial aircraft as guided missiles surprised everybody in the intelligence and political community. Although there were hints of al-Qaeda interest in using aircraft as a weapon in the mid-1990s, this information was never acted upon. In a comedy of errors and lost chances, the agencies of the U.S. government did little to prevent the September 11 plot from succeeding. All of this lack of attention to Islamist terrorism changed on September 11.

There has been a lack of objective resources available on the events surrounding September 11, 2001. Most objective have been inquiries by Congress, the 9/11 Commission, and a handful of journalists. They have pointed out major deficiencies in how government agencies handled intelligence about al-Qaeda operations prior to September 11, 2001. Besides establishing weakness, the inquiries have been most interested in reforming the American intelligence community so that there will be no future September 11ths. Despite these lengthy inquiries, questions still arise on how the September 11 plot was carried out so successfully.

Several noteworthy books have appeared on Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the hijackers, and they have been able to fill in some of the gaps of information about the September 11 attacks and the U.S. government's reaction. Less trustworthy books have also appeared, questioning the accepted facts. A growing industry of books has been published trying to debunk the official positions on the events of September 11. Conspiracy theories have proliferated at a lively rate. In the last few years these books have overshadowed the few accounts of the events of the day that reflect well on the victims of that day.

Opinions vary on who was responsible for the September 11 attacks, and the debate is growing. There are five major theories, with the debate extending from the extreme right to the extreme left with variations in the middle.

1. Official Position of the U.S. Government: No one was responsible because there was no credible evidence available that such an attack would take place. American intelligence knew something was up with al-Qaeda, but no one envisaged such an attack on American soil.
2. 9/11 Commission Thesis: The members of the 9/11 Commission and its *9/11 Final Report* believed that the plot should have been discovered except for intelligence failures—in the Bush and Clinton administrations, the CIA, the FBI, the FAA, and other government agencies—to cooperate and find out about terrorist operations both in the United States and abroad. September 11 was preventable, but systemic failures in the U.S. government allowed it to happen.
3. Systemic Bungling Thesis: The actions of the U.S. government were negligent before September 11 because of turf wars between agencies, bureaucratic bungling, and over-dependence on lawyer's rulings prevalent in

the U.S. government. There was also a cozy relationship between aviation regulators and the airline industry, as well as interference from politicians over the years on ways to improve aviation safety. Those responsible for the bureaucratic bungling and sometimes deceitful conduct have never been held accountable, and in many cases received post–September 11 promotions.

4. They Allowed It to Happen Thesis: There is the belief in certain circles that the Bush administration knew about the September 11 plot and allowed it to happen so that there would be a plausible excuse to expand American military might in the Middle East. The special target would be Iraq, but the Taliban in Afghanistan was also a prime candidate for removal. This thesis has been especially popular with the American and international extreme left. They blame everything on the neoconservatives surrounding President George W. Bush. These left-wing adherents also believe that it was allowed to create an opportunity for the Bush administration to weaken American civil liberties.
5. They Made It Happen Thesis: This thesis abandons the role of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda for the September 11 attacks and places all the blame on the U.S. government. In the eyes of these conspiracy theorists, agents of the U.S. government carried out the attacks in a methodical manner in the pursuit of President George W. Bush's objectives on foreign and domestic policies. Believers of this thesis have concocted various schemes of how the U.S. government carried out the attacks that verge on the incredible.

The events of September 11 have produced a mass of data. This two-volume work is an attempt to bring some order to an otherwise undifferentiated mass of conflicting information. The A-to-Z section of this set contains entries on people and events leading up to September 11, what actually took place on September 11, and the aftermath of September 11. This means that the participants in the September 11 plot are covered in some depth. The sequence of events on the day itself are covered in detail in various citations. Finally, the reasons why American intelligence and law enforcement agencies were unable to prevent September 11 are covered in considerable depth. Also of interest are the various conspiracy theories that have emerged in the last five years. The goal is to present to the reader a comprehensive look at all aspects of September 11 so that it can be understood in its context.

This work is intended to be as inclusive as possible. In total, there will be 158 entries, a lengthy chronology of events surrounding September 11, 42 primary documents, and an annotated bibliography. Each entry ranges from around 300 words to nearly 3,000 words, with the average entry being around 850 words. Each entry has suggested readings for further research. As a convenience there is a cross reference to the document that covers come of the same material as the entry.

A note needs to be made of spelling of Arabic names and groups. I have been uniform in the spelling of names, but other forms appear in the documents and in the quotes. In the course of the book, Osama bin Laden is also transliterated into Usama bin Ladin, or in another variation Osama bin Ladin. This is also true of al-Qaeda, which is referred to as al Qaeda, al Qaida, or al-Qida in other sources. Regarding alphabetization of the encyclopedia, for individuals or groups with

names prefixed by *al-* or *el-* those prefixes are ignored. In other words, Jamal al-Fadl is alphabetized in the text and the List of Entries as "Fadl, Jamal al-," and the entry appears in the "F" section.

Normally, I dedicate a book to an individual or a group of individuals. This encyclopedia I dedicate to the victims and families of September 11, 2001. They became victims of a war that they had no part in. Let us hope that another September 11 will never happen.

The 9/11 Encyclopedia

A

Abdel Rahman, Sheikh Omar (1938–)
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman is the spiritual leader of radical Islamists' war against the United States. His reputation as a religious leader and his renowned militancy have made him influential among many Muslims, to whom he issued two fatwas, or religious rulings, that justified war against the United States. His band of Islamist militants participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. American authorities were eventually able to tie him to another plot to blow up facilities in New York City, sentencing him to life in solitary confinement without parole.

Abdel Rahman has spent most of his life as an Islamist militant. He was born on May 3, 1938, in the small village of al-Gamalia in the Nile Delta region of Egypt. When he was ten months old, he lost his eyesight, probably because of diabetes. After demonstrating early scholastic ability by memorizing the Koran at age 11, he was sent to an Islamic boarding school. He excelled there, and his academic achievements allowed him to enter Cairo University's School of Theology. There, and later, at the prestigious University of al-Azhar, Abdel Rahman earned degrees in Islamic jurisprudence. At al-Azhar, he was a good, though not brilliant, student, finding it an excellent place to establish contacts with others in agreement about the need for an Islamist state in Egypt. Abdel Rahman's compatriots shared the same agenda—an Islamic society created unilaterally and, if necessary, forcefully. One of Abdel Rahman's compatriots at al-Azhar was Abdullah Azzam.

Soon after leaving university, Abdel Rahman, who had become a religious scholar with a militant Islamist agenda, started preaching against the secular regime of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. In 1965 he preached at a small mosque on the outskirts of Fayoum about sixty miles south of Cairo, but his attacks against Nasser's regime led to his dismissal from his religious teaching post in 1969. This setback only intensified his hatred of Nasser and his regime. He then found work teaching at a girls' school south of Cairo, in Assiut. Perturbed by his mounting attacks, Egyptian authorities arrested him in 1970, and he spent eight months in Citadel Prison. After his release, Abdel Rahman was awarded a post as professor of theology at the University of Assiut, but, still under police surveillance, he decided to go into exile in Saudi Arabia.

Abdel Rahman helped launch the terrorist group Islamic Group (al-Gama'a Islamiyya) in 1976 with the goal of overthrowing the Sadat regime and establishing a theocratic Islamic state. This group began carrying out terrorist attacks in Egypt, and Abdel Rahman returned from exile in 1980. He was arrested a month before the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in October 1981. Because members of the Islamic Group had participated in the assassination, Abdel Rahman was tried for conspiracy to overthrow the Egyptian government; but, because the evidence was circumstantial, he was acquitted. He promptly sued the state for torturing him in prison, a suit eventually settled for $10,000. Despite his acquittal, the Egyptian government kept him under house arrest for the next six years, in 1985 allowing him to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. After his release from house arrest, Abdel Rahman's attacks on the Mubarak government continued, but gradually he turned his attention to preaching against the Soviets in Afghanistan. By this time Abdel Rahman had become, according to T. Bowyer Bell's *Murders on the Nile*, famous throughout the Middle East as the "spiritual mentor of the righteous gunmen of the new jihad."

Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman's Concept of Terrorism

No, if those who have the right to have something are terrorists then we are terrorists. And we welcome being terrorists. And we do not deny this charge to ourselves. And the Koran makes it, terrorism, among the means to perform jihad for the sake of Allah, which is to terrorize the enemies of God . . . who are our enemies too.

Quoted in Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 15–16.

After Abdel Rahman's release from house arrest, he made a visit to Afghanistan, where Abdullah Azzam introduced him to Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden held him in high respect for his spirituality.

Although Abdel Rahman had achieved recognition as one of the leading Islamist scholars in the international Islamist movement, he faced difficulty in Egypt. A movement among other leaders of the Islamic Group tried to replace him because of his blindness. This attack did not prevent him from issuing a fatwa legitimizing the murder of Coptic Christians. Fearful of losing influence in the Islamic Group in Egypt, and finding the political atmosphere in Egypt too oppressive, Abdel Rahman moved to Sudan in April 1990. After bin Laden left Sudan, two of Abdel Rahman's sons went to Afghanistan to work with al-Qaeda.

Abdel Rahman decided to relocate to the United States, where recruits and money were available to advance the Islamist cause. Despite his reputation as a sponsor of terrorism, he obtained a visa in Khartoum without problem, arriving in the United States in July of 1990. In the United States, he found loyal supporters, but he also ran into dissidents, some of whom were unhappy with Mustafa Shalabi. At first Abdel Rahman supported Shalabi, but then the two disagreed over how to use the money they raised. Shalabi insisted that the funds go to Afghanistan to build an Islamist state there, but Abdel Rahman wished to finance efforts to overthrow the Mubarak regime. This disagreement ended with the murder of Shalabi. His murder case has never been solved. Shalabi's removal left Abdel Rahman in charge, and, in March 1991, Abdel Rahman received a permanent residence visa from the United States.

Abdel Rahman lived on the edge of several conspiracies. Several of his most militant supporters participated in the 1993 bombing plot that tried to bring down the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center complex in New York City.

American authorities questioned him, but his involvement was mostly circumstantial. He claimed to have known Ramzi Yousef only briefly. His role in the plot to bomb other New York landmarks, however, was more pronounced, and he was arrested in August of 1993. American authorities charged him with a seditious conspiracy to wage a terrorist war against the United States. In January 1996 a New York City court sentenced him to life imprisonment in solitary confinement without chance of parole. Since then, Abdel Rahman has been held in a variety of maximum-security prisons in Missouri and Minnesota. Even in prison, however, he has been charged with directing activities of his followers through his lawyer and translators. In 1998, he had a fatwa smuggled out of prison urging his followers to cut all ties with the United States and wage war against it. This fatwa gave religious justification for the September 11 attacks. His lawyer received a jail sentence for passing on information to Abdel Rahman's followers.

Abdel Rahman is still regarded as one of the leading figures in the Islamist movement. Although he had no role whatsoever in the planning for September 11, or knowledge of it beforehand, his religious rulings offered justification for it. His association with Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and, more indirectly, Osama bin Laden, helped produce the atmosphere that led to September 11.

See Also

Azzam, Sheikh Abdullah Yussuf; Bin Laden, Osama; New York City Landmarks Bombing Conspiracy; World Trade Center Bombing (1993); Yousef, Ramzi Ahmed; Zawahiri, Ayman al-

Suggested Reading

J. Bowyer Bell, *Murders on the Nile: The World Trade Center and Global Terror* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003); Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); Peter Lange, *1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003).

Fatwa of the Prisoner Sheikh Doctor Omar Abdel Rahman

America is in the process of eliminating the ulema (clergy) who are speaking the truth. And America has suggested to its clients in Saudi to imprison Sheikh Safar al Hawali and Sheikh Salman al Awdah, and all the others who speak the truth . . . . And the Koran has made a decree upon these Jews and Christians, which we have forgotten or allowed to be forgotten: Allah said, "If they could, they will continue to kill you until they make you run away from your religion." And so all Muslims everywhere. Cut off all relations with [the Americans, Christians, and Jews], tear them to pieces, destroy their economies, burn their corporations, destroy their peace, sink their ships, shoot down their planes and kill them on air, sea, and land. And kill them wherever you may find them, ambush them, take them hostage, and destroy their observatories. Kill these Infidels. Until they witness your harshness. Fight them, and God will torture them through your hands, and he will disgrace them and make you victorious over them, and the national of the believers is on the verge of creation, and the rage will go from them. Your brother Omar Abdel Rahman from inside American prisons.

Quoted in Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 204–205.

Able Danger

Able Danger was a highly secret military intelligence program whose leaders have claimed to have identified Mohamed Atta and three other members of the September 11 plot well before September 11, 2001. General Hugh Shelton, the

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a directive in early October 1999 to establish an intelligence program under the command of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to be directed specifically against al-Qaeda and its operatives. The commander of Able Danger was Navy Captain Scott Philpott, who commanded a unit of twenty military intelligence specialists and a support staff. The chief analyst of Able Danger was Dr. Eileen Priesser.

The purpose of Able Danger was to identify al-Qaeda members and neutralize them before they could initiate operations against the United States, much like a military version of the CIA's Alec Station. The data-mining center was at the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA)/Information Dominance Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. In the summer of 2000, the LIWA was transferred to Garland, Texas.

Members of this unit began intelligence operations seeking to identify al-Qaeda operatives both in the United States and abroad. Its computer analysts set up a complex computer analysis system that searched public databases and the Internet for possible terrorist cells. One of the terrorist cells so identified contained the name of Mohamed Atta and three others who were later implicated in the September 11 plot. Atta's name, as well as the others', was supposedly placed on a chart of al-Qaeda operatives.

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, a reserve officer attached to the Pentagon, and Able Danger's liaison with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), as well as others, decided to inform the FBI about the threat posed by the al-Qaeda operatives. Three potential meetings with the FBI were postponed because of opposition from military lawyers in the Pentagon. The apparent reason for the opposition from the U.S. Special Operations Command of the Department of Defense (DOD) was fear of controversy that might arise if it was made public that a military intelligence unit had violated the privacy of civilians legally residing in the United States. Another possible reason was that the lawyers believed the program might be violating the Posse Comitatus Act of using the military against civilians.

The leaders of Able Danger then decided to work their way up the military chain of command. In January 2001, the leadership of Able Danger briefed General Hugh Shelton, still the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on its findings. Shortly afterward, the Able Danger unit was disbanded, its operations ceasing in April 2001. DOD lawyers had determined that the activities of Able Danger violated President Reagan's Executive Order 12333, intended to prevent the Pentagon from storing data about U.S. citizens. A direct order came from the DOD to destroy the database; 2.4 terabytes of information about possible al-Qaeda terrorist activities were destroyed in the summer of 2001. A chart identifying four hijackers, including Mohamed Atta, was produced by Able Danger and presented to the Deputy National Security Advisor, Jim Steinberg, but nothing came of it.

Able Danger was a military secret until its story surfaced shortly after the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, or the 9/11 Commission, issued its report, which stated categorically that the U.S. government had no prior knowledge about the conspiracy that led to the September 11 attacks. Keith Phucas, a reporter for the *Times Herald* (Norristown, Pennsylvania), broke the story of Able Danger on June 19, 2005, in an article entitled "Missed Chance on Way to 9/11."

When the story about Able Danger became public, it erupted into a political controversy. On June 27, 2005, Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) and the vice

chairman of the House Armed Services and House Homeland Security committees brought the Able Danger issue to the national limelight. In a speech before the House of Representatives, Weldon accused the U.S. government of negligence in its failure to heed the information gathered by Able Danger.

Despite some lapses of information (and a tendency to blame the Clinton administration for the lapse), Weldon summarized many of the features of Able Danger without disclosing its nature as a secret military intelligence initiative run from within the Department of Defense. Weldon also disclosed that the information about Able Danger had been reported to the staff of the 9/11 Commission.

Congressman Weldon's Remarks before the House of Representatives

Mr. Speaker, I rise because information has come to my attention over the past several months that is very disturbing. I have learned that, in fact, one of our Federal agencies had, in fact, identified the major New York cell of Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11; and I have learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September of 2000, that Federal agency actually was prepared to bring the FBI in and prepared to work with the FBI to take down the cell that Mohamed Atta was involved in New York City, along with two of the other terrorists. I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that when that recommendation was discussed within that Federal agency, the lawyers in the administration at that time said, "You cannot pursue contact with the FBI against that cell. Mohamed Atta is in the U.S. on a green card, and we are fearful of the fallout from the Waco incident." So we did not allow that Federal agency to proceed.

Congressional Record—House June 27, 2005. 109th Congress. 1st Session. HRH5244.

Members of the 9/11 Commission responded to these charges with a series of denials. Lee H. Hamilton, former Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission, admitted learning about the Able Danger program but denied hearing anything credible about a possible identification of Atta or other skyjackers in the 9/11 plot. This argument contradicted the testimony of Shaffer that he had communicated Able Danger's findings about Atta in a meeting with the commission's executive director, Philip Zelikov, at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, in late 2003. Leaders of the commission then requested and obtained information about Able Danger from the DOD, but there had been nothing about Atta in the information provided. They also admitted that Navy Captain Philpott had mentioned something about Atta only days before the final report came out.

This denial of prior knowledge by members of the 9/11 Commission drew the attention of Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer. In an interview on August 15, 2005, Shaffer told the story of Able Danger, and he indicated that he had been at the "point of near insubordination" over the refusal to pursue the information about Atta. Furthermore, Shaffer insisted that he had talked to the staff of the 9/11 investigation in October 2003, in Afghanistan, where his next tour of duty had taken him. Captain Philpott and civilian contractor J. D. Smith confirmed Shaffer's claim about Able Danger's knowing about Atta.

The controversy has continued because the participants have felt left out of the investigation of the events surrounding September 11. Many of them have placed their careers in jeopardy by countering the government's version. Colonel Shaffer had his security clearance pulled by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and his personal records of Able Danger destroyed. In September 2006 the DOD's Inspector General issued a report denying that Able Danger had identified Atta by

calling the testimony of witnesses inconsistent. Weldon criticized the report and investigation as incomplete. Although Weldon was an effective spokesperson in Congress who kept the story alive, his loss of office in the 2006 election deprived him of that important forum. Nevertheless, the last word has not been said about Able Danger and about whether information about Atta and others was stored in a government database.

See Also
Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Clinton Administration; Hamilton, Lee H.; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States; Weldon, Curtis

See Document
Document #38

Suggested Reading
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Abouhalima, Mahmud (1959–)

Mahmud Abouhalima was one of the principal conspirators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. He was a devoted follower of the militant Islamist imam Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, serving as his guide and driver. When Ramzi Yousef took charge of the plot to bomb the World Trade Center, Abouhalima, his friend, became his chief assistant.

Abouhalima never fit into any community he lived in until he became an Islamist. Born in 1959 in the small town of Kafr Dawar, about fifteen miles south of Alexandria, Egypt, he was unhappy about his lack of career prospects in Egypt and left school early, immigrating to Munich, West Germany. There he lived among fellow Arabs, working first as a dishwasher and later in the meat department of a grocery store. Although he disliked Germany, he married a German woman. When his German visa expired, Abouhalima decided to move his family to the United States.

Abouhalima and his wife arrived in the United States in 1986. Soon after arriving in New York City, he found a job as a taxicab driver. His career as a cabbie had its ups and downs. Because he drove his taxi without license or registration, Abouhalima was often in trouble with police because of traffic violations. His most common offense was running red lights, but his income allowed him to live in Brooklyn with his wife and four children.

Abouhalima became a convert to the extremist theology of Islamists while in the United States. He left New York City in the late 1980s to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets. Besides gaining combat experience, he received a strong dose of Islamist propaganda that culminated in his conversion. While there, he became friendly with expert bomb maker Ramzi Yousef.

Abouhalima returned to the United States, determined to carry the religious fight to the secular West.

The arrival of Abdel Rahman in July 1990 gave Abouhalima a spiritual mentor. Most of Abouhalima's nonwork activities revolved around the al-Farouq Mosque and the al-Kifah Refugee Center. Abouhalima became Abdel Rahman's principal guide and driver. When the militants began to plan terrorist operations, Abouhalima participated in discussions and volunteered his services. When El Sayyid Nosair decided to assassinate the Israeli extremist Meir Kahane, Abouhalima was to provide his escape transportation. However, a mistake kept Abouhalima and his transportation from arriving. Nosair shot Kahane and tried to escape but was wounded in the throat and captured. Abouhalima's role in this conspiracy was never discovered by the police until much later.

Abouhalima played a major role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, helping Yousef build the bomb. On February 23, 1993, Abouhalima drove a car escorting the bomb van. After the terrorists parked the Ryder van in the underground garage of the World Trade Center, Abouhalima and the others awaited the results of the explosion but were disappointed when the North Tower failed to collapse and fall into the South Tower. The day after the bombing, Abouhalima flew to Saudi Arabia. After a brief stay, he decided to visit family in Egypt but, on entering the country in March of 1993, was arrested and turned over to Egyptian interrogators. Abouhalima soon confessed to his role in the World Trade Center bombing.

Egyptian authorities turned Abouhalima over to American authorities for trial. Despite evidence of a large terrorist conspiracy, Abouhalima and his fellow plotters were tried as criminals rather than as national security concerns or an intelligence matter, in keeping with FBI policy. After five months of testimony, Abouhalima was found guilty on all counts on March 4, 1994. Abouhalima and his three co-defendants received a sentence of 240 years that he is now serving at a maximum-security federal prison. Unfortunately, this bombing was only the first salvo in a continuing war by Islamist terrorists against the United States.

See Also

Abdel Rahman, Sheikh Omar; Kifah Refugee Center, al-; Nosair, el Sayyid; World Trade Center Bombing (1993); Yousef, Ramzi Ahmed

Suggested Reading

J. Bowyer Bell, *Murders on the Nile: The World Trade Center and Global Terrorism* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003); Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999).

African Embassy Bombings

The biggest and most lethal al-Qaeda operation against the United States before September 11, 2001, was the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa. As early as 1993, Osama bin Laden had his military commanders study the feasibility of a major terrorist act in Africa. The Egyptian American soldier, Ali Mohamed, scouted out targets in Nairobi, Kenya, for al-Qaeda. Mohamed surveyed American, British, French, and Israeli embassies as potential targets and reported to bin Laden that the best target was the American embassy in Nairobi. Bin Laden, then living in Khartoum, Sudan, agreed in a personal report. Reluctant at that time to approve a bombing mission in Africa with retaliation so close at hand, he kept the operation under advisement.

Several years later, bin Laden decided to give permission to carry out the bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In the meantime, al-Qaeda operatives assisted the Saudi group Hezbollah al-Hijaz in carrying out the bombing of the Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996, in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing nineteen American servicemen and wounding hundreds of others. Bin Laden denied direct participation, but his statement was disbelieved by American authorities. After issuing his declaration of jihad in 1998 against Americans for occupying sacred Saudi soil, bin Laden proceeded with preparations for the African embassy bombings as previously planned.

Al-Qaeda prepared methodically. Early in 1995, agents had been sent to Kenya and Tanzania to establish cells there. The mastermind of the operation was Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah. Mohamed Odeh arrived in Mombasa, Kenya, where he set up a fishing business as a cover. To maintain further cover, he married a Kenyan woman. He was soon followed by al-Qaeda's military commander, Abu Ubaidal al-Banshiri, who died in a ferry accident on Lake Victoria in the spring of 1996. His successor was Haroun Fazil, who stayed with bin Laden's former secretary, Wadih el-Hage. Fazil rented a villa in Nairobi, where the bomb was assembled, and a Nissan truck was purchased to carry the bomb.

One of the two men selected for martyrdom in Nairobi was Mohamed Rashed al-Owhali. Al-Owhali was born in 1977 in Liverpool, England, but he never cared for English life. In 1996, he traveled to Afghanistan where he underwent al-Qaeda training and was selected for a martyrdom mission in Nairobi, Kenya. Al-Owhali arrived in Nairobi on August 2, 1998, just five days before the mission. Al-Qaeda's Egyptian bomb expert, Abdel Rahman, had already built the bomb. Leaders of the Kenyan cell were already leaving for Afghanistan at the time of his arrival. Al-Owhali soon met his fellow martyr, a Saudi named Azzam. On August 5, 1998, they scouted out the embassy target.

The Nairobi bombing was scheduled for Friday, August 7, 1998. The explosion was timed to take place before 11:00 a.m. when observant Muslims would be at prayer. Azzam was to be the driver, and al-Owhali's job was to persuade the guards to let them close to the embassy. Unable to persuade the gate guard, he threw a homemade stun grenade and ran away before exploding the bomb. The bomb, which was large, exploded at 10:30 a.m. on a workday, producing horrible casualties.

The Nairobi embassy building sustained considerable damage. Prudence Bushnell, the American ambassador to Kenya, had previously cabled and written Madeleine Albright, then Secretary of State, and the State Department about the vulnerability of the embassy in its location on a busy thoroughfare in the middle of Nairobi, close to the street. Twelve Americans and two hundred one Kenyans were killed. Four thousand others were wounded—some seriously.

Nine minutes after the Nairobi bombing, a bomb exploded at the American Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Less is known about this operation; indeed, what little is known comes from a low-level al-Qaeda operative, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, who was trained in an al-Qaeda training camp and was then sent back to his home in Dar es Salaam. An al-Qaeda leader approached him several years later to help find a place to build a bomb and a way to transport it to the target. Al-Qaeda's Egyptian bomb expert, Abdel Rahman, built this bomb also. Mohamed's sole responsibility was to guide the bomb's driver, Hamden Khalif

Allah Awad—also called Ahmed the German—to the target, leaving before the bomb went off. The bomb exploded at exactly 10:39 a.m.

The bombing at the Dar es Salaam embassy caused less damage and fewer casualties than the Nairobi bombing. Because the embassy was better protected, the bomb did less structural damage to the embassy. No Americans were killed, but eleven Tanzanians died—most of them Muslims.

American intelligence had been following an al-Qaeda cell in Kenya for over a year before the bombings. But agents were caught by surprise by the plot—an astounding thing in light of the warning of an Egyptian defector from al-Qaeda, Mustafa Mahmoud Said Ahmed, who informed Nairobi embassy intelligence officers of a plot to bomb the embassy, using stun grenades to allow a truck loaded with a bomb close to the embassy. This warning was given nine months before the bombing, but nothing was done by the American agents to guard against such an event.

One of the leaders of the African bombing plot, Odeh, was arrested in the Karachi Airport when returning from Africa. Odeh was detained because of discrepancies in his passport, but soon Pakistani officials suspected him of participation in the African embassy bombings. They turned Odeh over to Pakistani intelligence, and he soon confessed to his role in the bombings. Another member of the plot, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, was arrested in Cape Town, South Africa, in October 1999.

Another break for American intelligence was the arrest of al-Owhali while receiving medical treatment for injuries sustained at the bombing. His wounds were all in his back, causing speculation that he had been running away from the bomb explosion. Kenyan officials arrested him on August 12, 1998, and immediately turned him over to American intelligence officials. It took only a few days for al-Owhali to confess to his role in the Nairobi embassy bombing.

Once it was established that the African embassy bombings were an al-Qaeda operation, President William Clinton authorized retaliatory attacks on alleged al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired with limited effect at six al-Qaeda base camps around Khost, Afghanistan, and at an alleged chemical-weapons al-Shifa plant in Khartoum, Sudan. Al-Qaeda leaders had been expecting retaliation and made preparations, but an addition warning about the date gleaned from Pakistani intelligence made certain that damage to al-Qaeda would be minimal. The death toll at the Khost was lessened further because two of the cruise missiles failed to explode.

At the time of the missile attacks, the movie *Wag the Dog* portrayed a president who started a war to mitigate the effects of a sex scandal. Critics of the Clinton administration seized upon the theme of this movie and accused him of misjudgments in his fight against terror. This criticism seemed to make Clinton less aggressive in his operations against bin Laden and al-Qaeda during the remainder of his administration.

Those arrested in Kenya, Pakistan, and Tanzania were extradited to the United States for trial as terrorists. Four members of the African embassy bombing plot—Wadih el-Hage, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, and Mohammed Saddiq Odeh—were tried before a Manhattan federal court beginning February 5, 2001. Odeh and Mohamed faced the death sentence, but Odeh and El-Hage faced life in prison. A jury of seven women and five men

declared the men guilty in May 2001. At a July 2001 death penalty hearing, however, the jury refused to bow to prosecutors' demands for death sentences for Odeh and Mohammed. All four men were sentenced to life imprisonment without parole on October 18, 2001, only weeks after the September 11 attacks. Jurors later explained that they didn't want to risk portraying Odeh and Mohamed as martyrs.

See Also

Bin Laden, Osama; Clinton Administration; Qaeda, al-; *Wag the Dog*

Suggested Reading

Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War; Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Free Press, 2001); Benjamin Weiser, "Going on Trial: U.S. Accusations of a Global Plot; Embassy Bombings Case," *New York Times* (February 4, 2001), p. 29; Benjamin Weiser, "A Jury Torn and Fearful in 2001 Terrorism Trial," *New York Times* (January 5, 2003), p. 1.

Alec Station

Alec Station was the U.S. government–sanctioned CIA program designed to hunt down, capture, or kill Osama bin Laden. Two members of the Clinton administration, Tony Lake (the National Security Advisor) and Richard Clarke (the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism) met in late 1995 with the head of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center to discuss the need for a unit to concentrate solely on Osama bin Laden. Soon afterward, the director of the CIA, George Tenet, approved just such a unit. The plan called for Alec Station to run only a couple of years before merging completely with the Counterterrorism Center, but as bin Laden became a greater and greater threat, Alec Station continued its operations for more than a decade.

When the CIA began Alec Station, on January 8, 1996, bin Laden was mostly known as a financier of terrorism. Soon afterward, it became apparent that bin Laden had declared open warfare against the United States and its allies, and the campaign against bin Laden was stepped up. Mike Scheuer, a veteran CIA agent, was placed in charge of the program when it was founded; although the formal title of the program was the Usama Bin Laden Issue Station (UBL), it soon took the name Alec Station, after Scheuer's adopted Korean son, Alec. Alec Station functioned as a subunit of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC). Sponsors of this program set it up as an interagency unit running agents from both the CIA and the FBI. The plan was for this unit to fuse intelligence disciplines into one office—including operations, analysis, signals intercepts, overhead photography, and covert action. As the unit developed, its strength lay in analysis. It started out as a small unit with a staff of only about fifteen analysts, mostly young women. It was not considered a choice assignment. Alec Station was a low-profile operation and was at first housed outside Langley until it moved to the CTC.

By 1998 Scheuer was convinced that bin Laden posed an ongoing danger to the United States, but he had difficulty convincing his superiors—partly because of his difficult personality, which managed to alienate even those who agreed with him. After Scheuer learned that bin Laden had attempted to acquire nuclear materials, he had difficulty making his superiors accept the information and use it to inform others in the government. Scheuer believed that bin Laden constituted a clear and present danger, and he became increasingly frustrated by the lack of action taken toward bin Laden.

Scheuer also had difficulties with the FBI. Although Alec Station had been set up as an interagency operation, the FBI often refused to share information with the CIA. The most notorious member of the FBI in this regard was John O'Neill, the FBI's top counterterrorism expert. O'Neill possessed a notebook captured from an al-Qaeda operative that he refused to turn over to Alec Station for a year. In another instance, an FBI agent was caught raiding CIA files with the intent of taking their contents back to the FBI. Scheuer has claimed that Alec Station sent 700 to 800 requests for information to the FBI but never received answers to any of them.

Alec Station planned to capture bin Laden after he moved to Afghanistan in May 1996. For the first time, the CIA knew where bin Laden and his family lived—in the Tarnak Farm compound twelve miles outside Kandahar. Beginning in 1997, plans were made with Afghan tribal leaders to kidnap bin Laden and take him to an Arab country or the United States for trial. The CIA even staged four rehearsals for the operation in late 1997 and early 1998. Then, on May 29, 1998, George Tenet, the head of the CIA, called off the operation. Scheuer's reaction was swift. He complained that the CIA had enough intelligence against bin Laden and al-Qaeda to eliminate both, and he couldn't understand why the U.S. government had failed to take the chance to do so. The Clinton administration responded that it feared collateral damage and any negative publicity that might follow a less-than-perfect operation.

It was only after the bombings, on August 7, 1998, of the two U.S. embassies in East Africa that the attention of the Clinton administration was redirected toward bin Laden in the August 20, 1998, attack on an al-Qaeda Afghanistan training camp near Khost and on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, in which seventy-nine Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from U.S. Navy ships in the Arabian Sea. However, warnings from Pakistani sources made certain that bin Laden escaped the missiles, and the Sudanese plant proved a harmless pharmaceutical plant. Several other plans were made to either capture or kill bin Laden, but they were cancelled each time because of one difficulty or another. Most cancellations were caused by a lack of confidence in intelligence sources and information.

The most promising opportunity was in February 1999. CIA agents learned that bin Laden was going to join a number of sheikhs from the United Arab Emirates at a desert hunting camp in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Satellite pictures identified the camp on February 9. CIA operatives confirmed bin Laden's presence and requested a missile strike. Over the next several days, the Clinton administration debated a missile strike without deciding before learning that members of the United Arab Emirates royal family were also present at this camp. Because of foreign policy complications with the U.A.E. (a provider of gas and oil supplies), nothing happened, and Scheuer was furious. His e-mails expressing his unhappiness traveled around government circles.

Tenet removed Scheuer from his position as head of Alec Station in the spring of 1999. Scheuer's inability to work with superiors and the FBI led to his dismissal. His critics intimated that he had become dysfunctional because of his vendetta against Osama bin Laden. CIA analysts at Alec Station blamed John O'Neill for the firing of Scheuer because the dispute had reached the level of the agency heads of the CIA and FBI—Tenet and Freeh. Scheuer's replacement was a key assistant

on Tenet's staff and a Middle East specialist, but he lacked Scheuer's drive. By this time, Alec Station had grown from twelve analysts to twenty-five. Most of these analysts were women, something that hurt their credibility in the male-dominated CIA. There was a feeling in the Counterterrorist Center that others in the CIA ridiculed members of the Alec Station for their zeal in tracing the actions of bin Laden.

The status of Alec Station became more precarious after September 11. Some of the criticism directed against the CIA for failing to uncover the September 11 plot descended on Alec Station, and Scheuer reappeared as a senior analyst at the Station after September 11. Members of the Alec Station adamantly insisted that little, if any, connection existed between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, something they communicated to Tenet. However, this stance made them enemies in the Bush administration, which wanted the CIA to provide justification for the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Hussein. Those in the CIA who opposed the invasion became enemies. Personnel were transferred out of Alec Station until only twelve analysts remained. Scheuer protested this action, resigning from the CIA on November 12, 2004. Not long afterward, the CIA disbanded the Station entirely.

See Also

Bin Laden, Osama; Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Freeh, Louis; O'Neill, John; Tenet, George

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Al-Fadl, Jamal. *See* Fadl, Jamal al-

Al-Hazmi, Nawaf. *See* Hazmi, Nawaf bin Muhammad Salim al-

Al-Kifah Service Center. *See* Kifah Refugee Center al-

Al-Mihdhar, Khalid. *See* Mihdhar, Khalid al-

Al-Qaeda. *See* Qaeda, al-

Al-Quds Mosque. *See* Quds Mosque al-

Al-Shehhi, Marwan. *See* Shehhi, Marwan Yousef Muhammed Rashid Lekrab al-

Al-Shibh, Ramzi bin. *See* Bin al-Shibh, Ramzi

Al-Zawahiri, Ayman. *See* Zawahiri, Ayman al-

American Airlines Flight 11

American Airlines Flight 11 was a Boeing 767-223ER that was the first aircraft to crash into the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex in New York City on September 11, 2001. The pilot of the aircraft was John Ogonowski, a fifty-two-year-old Vietnam veteran from Massachusetts, and its First Officer was Thomas McGuinness. Flight 11 departed from Boston's Logan International Airport

nearly 14 minutes late, at 7:59 a.m., bound for Los Angeles International Airport. It carried slightly more than half its capacity of 181—81 passengers and a crew of 11—and had a full load of 23,980 gallons of aviation fuel at takeoff, which was routine.

The leader of the terrorist team, and its designated pilot on board Flight 11, was Mohamed Atta. Atta and other members of the hijack team Satam al-Suqami, Waleed al-Shehri, Wail al-Shehri, and Abdul Aziz al-Omari had bought first-class seats, which research conducted on other flights convinced them gave them the best opportunity to seize the cockpit and gain control of the aircraft. Two of the hijackers sat near the cockpit and two near the passenger section. Atta sat in 8D, whence he could command both teams.

The hijackers had little trouble passing through checkpoint security. American Airlines' security checkpoints at Logan International Airport were operated by a private company, Globe Security, which operated these checkpoints under a contract with American Airlines. Because American Airlines' desire was for passengers to be harassed at checkpoints as little as possible, the hijackers had no difficulty in passing through the checkpoints carrying box cutters and mace.

Instructions had been given by al-Qaeda trainers to the hijackers to seize the aircraft by force within 15 minutes of takeoff. Around 8:14, they did so, killing two attendants and a passenger, Daniel Lewin, immediately. Lewin, formerly an officer in the elite Sayeret Matkal unit of the Israeli military, was seen as a threat. The hijackers, who had apparently identified him as a potential air marshal, killed him as soon as possible. To allay suspicions, the hijackers lulled the passengers and crew into a false sense of hope by giving the impression that the plane would land safely and that the passengers would be used as hostages, a successful tactic of hijackers in the past.

Air traffic controllers received information from the cockpit via Ogonowski's radio, over which they heard a conversation between the pilot and a hijacker in the cockpit that made it evident that a hijacking was in progress. More ominously, they also learned from a hijacker's comment about plans to seize control of other aircraft. This information was the first indication of a plot to hijack numerous aircraft in flight.

The first concrete information about the hijacking came from Betty Ong, a stewardess on Fight 11, who contacted the American Airlines Flight Center in Fort Worth, Texas, and related that two flight attendants had been stabbed and that another was on oxygen. A passenger, she said, had been killed, and the hijackers had gained access to the cockpit, using some type of mace-like spray to neutralize the crew.

Once the hijackers gained control of the aircraft, they took precautions to control the passengers, securing the first class section by intimidation, mace and pepper spray, and threats to detonate a bomb. The rest of the passengers, in coach, were led to believe a medical emergency had occurred in the first class section. The hijackers also told the passengers that the aircraft was returning to the airport. Another attendant, Madeleine Sweeney, contacted authorities and confirmed Ong's earlier message to the American Flight Services Office in Boston. She reestablished communication and was in fact on the line when the aircraft approached the North Tower of the World Trade Center. By the time the passengers realized what was happening, it was too late to do anything about it. Many

hurriedly called their loved ones and said goodbye either by talking with them or by leaving messages.

The aircraft crashed at about 378 miles per hour between the ninety-fourth and ninety-eighth floors of the North Tower. The crew, passengers, and hijackers all died instantly from the force of the explosion and the fire that accompanied it. The force of the explosion alone shattered the aluminum wings and fuselage of the aircraft into pieces the size of a human fist.

The impact of the crash and the prolonged burning of aviation fuel weakened the structure of the North Tower, trapping those people above the ninety-eighth floor, who had no chance of escape. Those threatened by fire and smoke began to jump from the building. The North Tower collapsed on itself shortly after the South Tower fell.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Lewin, Daniel M.; Ogonowski, John; Ong, Betty Ann; World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading

Stefan Aust et al., *Inside 9–11: What Really Happened* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001); Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, from Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002); Olga Craig, "At 8:46 AM, the World Changed in a Moment," *Sunday Telegraph* [London] (September 16, 2001), p. 14; 9/11 Commission, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (New York: Norton, 2004); Susan B. Trento and Joseph J. Trento, *Unsafe at Any Altitude: Failed Terrorism Investigations, Scapegoating 9/11, and the Shocking Truth About Aviation Security Today* (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2006).

American Airlines Flight 77

American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757-223, was the third aircraft seized by hijackers on September 11, 2001. It left Dulles International Airport, near Washington, D.C., at 8:20 a.m., bound for Los Angeles International Airport with fifty-eight passengers and a crew of six. The pilot was Charles Burlingame and the First Officer David Charlebois. Because of problems at the security gate, the flight was ten minutes late taking off. The security checkpoint at Dulles International Airport was operated by Argenbright Security under a contract with United Airlines. Passenger screeners at Dulles International Airport were 87 percent foreign-born and mostly Muslim. Three of the hijackers failed the metal detector test, but, after passing hand-wand screening, were permitted to enter the aircraft. There was no indication that any of them were carrying prohibited weapons.

The five-person terrorist team was led by Hani Hanjour, who was also the team's designated pilot. Other members of his team were Nawaf al-Hazmi, Salem al-Hazmi, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Majed Moqued, who had all bought first-class tickets to gain better access to the aircraft's cockpit. The hijackers used knives and box-cutters to gain control of the cockpit sometime between 8:51 and 8:54 a.m., after which Hanjour, the designated pilot, turned the aircraft around and headed for Washington, D.C. Like the hijackers of American Airlines Flight 11, the hijackers of Flight 77 calmed passengers by convincing them that the plane would land, after which they would be used as hostages.

Although by this time it was known that other aircraft had been seized and turned into flying bombs, authorities in Washington, D.C., were slow to respond.

Two passengers, Renee May and Barbara K. Olson, the wife of the United States Solicitor General, Theodore Olson, made phone calls reporting the hijacking. Olson made two calls to her husband, giving him details of the hijacking. He told her the news of the two aircraft crashing into the World Trade Center.

By this time the Dulles air controllers were aware of an approaching unauthorized aircraft coming at high speed toward Washington, D.C. They had been able to obtain a visual confirmation from a military transport, a C-141, as the hijacked aircraft headed toward the Pentagon. Between 9:37 and 9:40 a.m., Flight 77 crashed at 530 miles per hour into the ground at the base of the west side of the Pentagon, killing all passengers. Although much of the crash site contained recently renovated, unoccupied offices, the explosion and the resulting collapse of parts of the five-story building killed 125 people. The explosion did its greatest damage to the three outer rings of the Pentagon, but the two inner rings sustained damage as well.

Eyewitness Account of Pentagon Attack by Terry Morin from Federal Office Building #2 Parking Lot

I can't remember exactly what I was thinking about at that moment, but I started to hear an increasingly loud rumbling behind me and to my left. . . . One to two seconds later the airliner came into my field of view. By that time the noise was absolutely deafening. I instantly had a very bad feeling about this but things were happening very quickly. The aircraft was essentially right over the top of me and the outer portion of the FOB (flight path parallel the outer edge of the FOB). Everything was shaking and vibrating, including the ground. I estimate that the aircraft was no more than 100 feet above me (30 to 50 feet above the FOB) in a slight nose-down attitude. The plane had a silver body with red and blue stripes down the fuselage. I believed at the time that it belonged to American Airlines, but I couldn't be sure. It looked like a 737 and I so reported to authorities.

Within second the plane cleared the 8th Wing of BMDO and was heading directly towards the Pentagon. Engines were at a steady, high-pitched whine, indicating to me that the throttles were steady and full. I estimated the aircraft speed at between 350 and 400 knots. The flight path appeared to be deliberate, smooth, and controlled. . . . I could only see the tail of the aircraft. The tail was barely visible when I saw the flash and subsequent fireball rise approximately 200 feet above the Pentagon. . . . At once there was a huge cloud of black smoke that rose several hundred feet up. Elapsed time from hearing the initial noise to when I saw the impact flash was between 12 and 15 seconds.

Quoted in Accounts of Survivors at Tools for Coping with Life's Stressors (http://www.coping.org/911/survivor/pentagon.htm).

See Also

Burlingame, Charles Frank "Chic" III; Hazmi, Nawaf bin Muhammad Salim al-; Mihdhar, Khalid al-; Olson, Barbara; Pentagon Attack

Suggested Reading

Stefan Aust et al., *Inside 9–11: What Really Happened* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001); Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, from Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002); 9/11 Commission, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (New

York: Norton, 2004); Susan B. Trento and Joseph J. Trento, *Unsafe at Any Altitude: Failed Terrorism Investigations, Scapegoating 9/11, and the Shocking Truth About Aviation Security Today* (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2006).

American Society of Civil Engineers Report

A committee of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) issued a report in the late spring of 2002 concerning the reasons for the collapse of the buildings of the World Trade Center complex on September 11. ASCE was founded in 1852 and is the oldest organization of its type in existence—and one of the most prestigious. After receiving a $1 million grant from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a twenty-two member committee was formed that contained specialists on metallurgy, fire, structural dynamics, and other relevant fields. Some of the biggest names in civil engineering participated in this study.

The chair of the ASCE committee was W. Gene Corley, senior vice president of an engineering research facility north of Chicago, whose PhD is in civil engineering. Corley had been the leader of the official engineering review of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. He had a reputation as a fair and independent investigator of building failures.

The final report of the ASCE committee was never intended to definitively analyze the entire situation but rather to understand how and why the buildings at the World Trade Center collapsed. Other pertinent issues, such as crowded stairwells and lack of egress for those above the damaged areas, were not included in the scope of the investigation. The investigators visited the World Trade Center complex site, but they found it too chaotic for normal surveying of materials. Even an examination of the steel proved disappointing. Instead, the investigators used known facts and computer simulations.

The investigators soon learned that the Twin Towers had been designed for lightness and efficiency—not for strength. The towers were essentially 1,362-foot-tall tubes. The architects had designed the buildings to withstand winds of 150 miles per hour, and the decision to anchor them in bedrock gave them even more strength. There was some give in the building, and in strong winds people noticed some sway. Most of the support columns and elevators were in the middle of the building. The floors were built on thin steel trusses covered in concrete. The total weight of each tower, discounting people, furniture, and equipment, was around 600,000 tons.

The investigators came to understand the dynamics of the collapse of the South Tower best. It was relatively easy to calculate the force of impact of a Boeing 767 fully loaded with aviation fuel. The hijacker pilot, Marwan al-Shehhi, crashed the Boeing 767 at a speed of nearly 590 miles per hour into the south side of the South Tower, three-fourths of the way up the building. Because of its speed, the aircraft penetrated deeply into the building, severing as many as half the columns in the central core. The building might have survived except for the fire fueled by the aviation fuel. ASCE's final report claims that the South Tower would have remained intact even with the aviation fuel fire if the fire had not reached flammable material, such as furniture and paper, that intensified it, spreading it to six different floors. Molten aluminum began to flow down the building.

The investigators noted that the fire began to degrade the strength of the steel. Although the report ignored the issue, detractors had long charged that the fireproofing of the Twin Towers' steel was inferior. The fire burned at about 1,500

degrees. Structural steel begins to weaken at 300 degrees and at 1,100 degrees loses half its strength.

The fire could not be stopped. The building's sprinkler system was destroyed in the crash and would not have been powerful enough to put out such a fire anyway. Firefighters were eager but lacked equipment and a water supply sufficient to put out such a disastrous high-rise fire.

Fifty-six minutes after the aircraft crashed into the South Tower, it collapsed, beginning with the southeast corner of the eightieth floor, whose collapse triggered the progressive collapse of the entire east side of the building. As supports gave way, the collapse began to accelerate. The upper sections fell east and south, damaging the Bankers Trust Building, and the lower sections fell north and west, damaging the Marriott Hotel.

The investigators knew less, however, about the collapse of the North Tower. The Boeing 767 that hit it traveled about 100 miles per hour slower than the one that crashed into the South Tower and severely damaged thirty-six of the sixty-one columns on the north face of the building. Damage was done to all three stairways, and the sprinkler system was knocked out. Parts of the aircraft blew through the building. A massive fire broke out, fueled first by aviation fuel and then by the furniture and paper contained in the offices. Because the aircraft hit high in the building, it bore a lighter load as the fire degraded the steel on the four floors. After nearly two hours of high-temperature fires, the building finally collapsed for the same reasons as the South Tower.

The other buildings in the World Trade Center complex also suffered severe enough damage that they also collapsed. Most mysterious was the burning and eventual collapse that evening of Seven World Trade Center. This building was situated away from the Twin Towers but caught fire nonetheless. Eyewitnesses report that the fuel oil storage unit caught fire at the base of the building. By this time the firefighters were so demoralized by their losses from the collapse of the Twin Towers that the leadership of the New York Fire Department (NYFD) refused to risk any more men. Building Seven collapsed from the bottom by early evening. A probable contributing cause was a fuel storage unit just outside the building, which caught fire. The fire intensified fed by furniture and paper in the building until the structure, undermined, collapsed.

The final report explained the process that contributed to the collapse of the buildings at the World Trade Center complex but left room for further study. Despite earlier criticism of the architectural design and the building materials to build the World Trade Center complex, the committee defended the construction of the buildings while expressing concern about the centralized columns and stairways and recommending that new structures be capable of withstanding the type of airliner crash experienced on September 11.

See Also

Firefighters at Ground Zero; World Trade Center

See Document

Document #25

Suggested Reading

David Bianculli, "NOVA: Why the Towers Fell," *Daily News* [New York] (April 30, 2002), p. 91; William Langewiesche, *American Ground: Unbuilding the World Trade Center* (New York: North Point Press, 2002).

Argenbright Security Company

An economic and political casualty of the September attacks was the Argenbright Security Company. Before that date it was the largest and most successful of the private security companies employed by American commercial airlines. Frank Argenbright had founded the company and made it successful before selling it to the British Securicor for $175 million, after which he remained associated with the company in a gradually diminishing role before his replacement in the summer of 2001.

Argenbright Security manned the security screening stations at Dulles International Airport in Arlington, Virginia. Because it had difficulty finding security screeners, most of its screeners were foreign-born Muslims. Turnover among personnel was high. Despite these difficulties, the screeners at Dulles had a good track record of catching those trying to take forbidden items through airport security. On September 11 the hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 passed the security screeners only with difficulty. They were challenged over their baggage but had nothing on them that violated FAA rules.

After September 11, Argenbright Security became a convenient scapegoat. Government agents descended on Dulles and closed down the airport. They then began to interview everybody at the airport. Employees of Argenbright Security received special scrutiny. Teams of officials wanted Argenbright employees to confess to violations of FAA rules. Some of the employees disappeared into government hands, never to reappear at Dulles. Many were deported and others lost their jobs in the aftermath of the investigations. The government needed a scapegoat, and Argenbright Security was available. Information about alleged deficiencies began to be leaked to the media.

Efforts to Make the Screeners the Scapegoat for the Events of September 11

For Nelson [Ed Nelson—administrator for Argenbright Security at Dulles International Airport] nothing the FBI and INS agents were asking his people made sense. "They were not asking about the hijackers—they were focusing in on what my screeners might have done wrong. It was as if they were working off a script," he says.

According to FBI agents assigned to Dulles that day, who agreed to speak only if their names and office assignments were not published, that is precisely what they were given by supervisors at several Washington-area FBI offices. The orders came from headquarters through the local Washington-area FBI field offices and the Joint Task Force on Terrorism. The teams of agents were told to "get the screeners to admit they had violated FAA recommended procedures," one of the FBI supervisors says.

Susan B. Trento and Joseph J. Trento, *Unsafe at Any Altitude: Failed Terrorism Investigations, Scapegoating 9/11, and the Shocking Truth about Aviation Security Today* (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2006), p. 36.

An earlier brush with the authorities in 1999 made Argenbright Security susceptible to scapegoating. An employee had been arrested for drug possession in January 1999, leading to an investigation by the Philadelphia FAA security staff. A screening text revealed that some of the employees had not received mandatory training. A subsequent investigation revealed that a supervisor had falsified records, and he ended up in jail. This black mark made the Philadelphia FAA suspicious of Argenbright Security and its screening procedures, suspicions that resurfaced after September 11.

Argenbright Security and other private security companies were unable to survive the

aftermath of September 11. Despite some efforts by Republican congressmen to preserve the private security system, Congress passed legislation creating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), a bill that President Bush signed into law. Almost all employees of the private security companies were excluded from employment with the new organization.

See Also
American Airlines Flight 77

See Document
Document #35

Suggested Reading
Susan B. Trento and Joseph J. Trento, *Unsafe at Any Altitude: Failed Terrorism Investigations, Scapegoating 9/11, and the Shocking Truth about Aviation Security Today* (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2006).

Atef, Mohammad (1944–2001)

Mohammad Atef was al-Qaeda's head of military operations during the planning and implementation of the September 11 operation. At that time Atef was number three in the al-Qaeda hierarchy, behind Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Atef made decisions about the events of September 11 from the beginning, assisting Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in the final stages of the plot.

Atef converted to Islamist extremism early in his career. Born in 1944 in Menoufya, Egypt, in the Nile Delta, about thirty-five miles north of Cairo, he was named Sobhi Abu Sitta. After graduating from high school, he served his required two years of military service in the Egyptian Army. Reports that Atef was a policeman in Egypt have been denied by the Egyptian government, but nearly all sources state that he was. In the late 1970s, Atef joined an Egyptian terrorist organization, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Evidently a low-ranking member, he didn't meet with its leader, al-Zawahiri, while both were in Egypt. Despite his involvement in this group, he escaped arrest after the crackdown on extremists that followed the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. In 1983 Atef left Egypt for Afghanistan to fight with the mujahideen against Soviet forces, where he first met al-Zawahiri, who then introduced him to bin Laden. Atef and bin Laden became close friends. Atef also became acquainted with Abdullah Azzam and admired him greatly, but in the subsequent battle between Azzam and al-Zawahiri for bin Laden's support, Atef supported al-Zawahiri. In 1999 Egyptian authorities sentenced Atef to a seven-year prison term in absentia for his membership in the Egyptian Islam Jihad, but Atef never returned to Egypt.

Atef's close personal relationship with bin Laden made him an important member of al-Qaeda. When bin Laden founded al-Qaeda, Atef was a charter member. Ubaidah al-Banshiri was al-Qaeda's head of military operations, and Atef assisted him. He was active in organizing Somali resistance to American military presence in 1992, but some evidence suggests that his stay there was not entirely successful. Atef also served as bin Laden's chief of personal security. Al-Banshiri's death in a boat accident in Africa allowed Atef to replace him in 1996. From then until his death in 2001, Atef was in charge of military operations for al-Qaeda. All military operation came under his oversight, but he always remained subordinate to bin Laden even after bin Laden's eldest son married one of Atef's daughters in January 2001.

Mohammad Atef's Explanation of the Attack on the USS Cole

I will tell you one thing. We did [the USS] Cole [attack] and we wanted [the] United States to react. And if they reacted, [we thought,] they are going to invade Afghanistan and that's what we want. We want them to come to our country, and then we know that they would have bases in Pakistan, in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan. And they are going to hit Afghanistan from these countries. And then we will start holy war against the Americans, exactly like [we did against the] Soviets.

Quoted in Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 255.

Atef was aware of the September 11 plot from its beginning. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed outlined the plan to bin Laden and Atef as early as 1996. Bin Laden finally agreed on the basics of the plot in 1998. It was Atef's job to search al-Qaeda's training camps for suitable candidates for a martyrdom mission that required operatives to live unnoticed in America. Once the members of the Hamburg Cell were picked and recruited by bin Laden, Atef explained to Mohamed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ziad Jarrah, and Marwan al-Shehhi the outlines of the plot.

Al-Qaeda avoided having its leaders at a single site except for particularly special occasions, a policy prompted by fears of American assassination of al-Qaeda's leaders. Bin Laden announced that in case of his death or capture, Atef would succeed him as head of al-Qaeda. Once the United States began military operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, it became even more important for al-Qaeda's leaders to be at separate locations. Atef was at a gathering in Kabul on November 18, 2001, when a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle fired Hellfire missiles, killing Atef and those with him—something for which the United States had been offering a $5 million reward. The loss of Atef was a blow to al-Qaeda, but he was soon replaced as military commander by Abu Zubaydah.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Bin Laden, Osama; Bin al-Shibh, Ramzi; Jarrah, Ziad Samir; Hamburg Cell; Qaeda, al-; Shehhi, Marwan Yousef Muhammed Rashid Lekrab al-

Suggested Reading

Khaled Dawoud, "Mohammed Atef; Egyptian Militant Who Rose to the Top of the al-Qaida Hierarchy," *Guardian* [London] (November 19, 2001), p. 1; MATP, "Iron Fist Reaches from Far Side of the Globe," *Australian* [Sydney] (November 19, 2001), p. 8.

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed (1968–2001)

Mohamed Atta was the commander of the al-Qaeda team that hijacked four American commercial aircraft and used them as guided missiles on September 11, 2001. He had been recruited by al-Qaeda for this mission after being trained by al-Qaeda trainers. Only the most highly motivated individuals were selected for martyrdom missions, and Atta met this requirement.

Atta had a strict family upbringing. He was born on September 1, 1968, in the village of Kafr el-Sheikh in the Egyptian delta. His father was a middle-class lawyer with ties to the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood. Atta's family moved to the Abdin District of Cairo in 1978 when Atta was ten. His father, who had a dominating personality, insisted that his children study, not play. Atta's family life

allowed him few friends. After attending a local high school, he enrolled in the Cairo University in 1986. As usual in the Egyptian system, Atta's admittance to the university was based on his exam scores, and he was assigned to a specialty—the architecture section of the engineering department. At his graduation in 1990, his grades were not good enough to admit him to graduate school. On the recommendation of his father, he then planned to study town planning in Germany. In the meantime, he worked for a Cairo engineering firm. After learning German at the Goethe Institute in Cairo, Atta traveled to Hamburg, Germany, in July 1992 to begin studying town planning. He applied first to study architecture at the University of Applied Science but, after being turned down, migrated to the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg to study the preservation of the Islamic quarters of medieval cities in the Middle East. During his coursework, Atta interacted very little with fellow students, earning a reputation as a loner. His classmates also noted his strong religious orientation. He traveled to Turkey and Syria in 1994 to study old Muslim quarters. After receiving a German grant, Atta and two fellow students visited Egypt to study the old section of Cairo that was called the Islamic City. They were appalled at what the Egyptian government was doing to this old part of the city. Up to this point his life, Atta appeared to be an academic preparing for a career as a teacher at a university.

In 1995, however, he became active in Muslim extremist politics. After a pilgrimage to Mecca, he initiated contact with al-Qaeda recruiters. Atta was just the type of individual that al-Qaeda recruiters were looking for—intelligent and dedicated. After his return to Hamburg to continue his studies, he attended the al-Quds Mosque, where his final recruitment to radical Islam took place. There Atta met radical clerics who steered him toward an al-Qaeda recruiter. Muhammad Zammar, a Syrian recruiter for al-Qaeda, convinced Atta to join al-Qaeda. Several of his friends, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah, also joined al-Qaeda. Atta became the leader of the so-called Hamburg Cell of radical Islamists.

In 1998 Atta left for Kandahar, Afghanistan, to receive military and terrorist training at the al-Qaeda training camp at Khaldan. He so distinguished himself during the training that al-Qaeda leaders decided to recruit him for a future suicide mission. Atta ranked high in all the attributes of an al-Qaeda operative—intelligence, religious devotion, patience, and willingness to sacrifice. Atta, Jarrah, and al-Shehhi met and talked with Osama bin Laden in Kandahar. Bin Laden asked them to pledge loyalty to him and accept a suicide mission. They agreed, and Mohammed Atef, al-Qaeda's military chief, briefed them on the general outlines of the September 11 operation. Then Atta and the others were sent back to Germany to finish their academic training.

Difference in Orientation between Mohamed Atta and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh

Although Amir [Mohamed Atta] and Omar [Ramzi Bin al-Shibh] seemed to agree on many things, they had different emphases. Omar was motivated more by religious belief, and Amir by politics. With Amir, it was always hate when it came to the Jews. He was very emotional about the political issues, while Omar was emotional about the religion. Amir saw a worldwide conspiracy at work, bolstered by the Americans, but run always by Jews. He blamed Jews for almost every wrong imaginable.

Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), p. 67.

Atta was a complex individual deeply affected psychologically. He had puritanical and authoritarian views towards women and, despite having two sisters and a reportedly normal relationship with his mother, believed women and sexual intercourse were polluting. Only once, in Syria, did a woman attract him—but he complained that the Palestinian woman was too forward. Atta also held strong anti-American views, disturbed by the Americanization of Egyptian society.

After he finished his degree in 1999, al-Qaeda's leaders assigned him his martyrdom mission in the United States, a mission planned by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Atta arrived in the United States on June 2, 2000. His orders placed him in charge of a large cell, but he, Jarrah, and al-Shehhi were the only members of his cell who knew the details of his mission. Several times Atta flew back and forth between the United States and Germany and Spain to coordinate the mission. Members of his cell arrived in the United States at various times. Atta and key members of the cell received orders to take pilot lessons to fly large commercial aircraft.

Most of Atta's time was spent in pilot lessons in Florida. Before he could qualify for training on large commercial aircraft, Atta had to learn to fly small planes. Most of his flying instruction took place at Huffman Aviation in Sarasota, Florida. He had an attitude problem that hurt his relations with his instructors, but it did not prevent him from earning his small aircraft license in December 2000. Next, he began to use simulators and manuals to train himself to fly large commercial aircraft.

Atta gathered most of the members of his cell together in Florida for the first time in early June 2001. He organized the cell into four teams, each of which included a trained pilot. Throughout the summer of 2001, each team rode as passengers on test flights in which they studied the efficiency of airline security and strategized about the best time to highjack an aircraft. They discovered that airline security was weakest at Boston's Logan International Airport and decided that the best days for hijacking were Tuesdays. They decided that first-class seats would give them better access to cockpits. Although the teams tried to remain inconspicuous, the Hollywood actor James Woods reported suspicious behavior by one of the teams on a flight. He reported his suspicions to the pilot and a flight attendant, who passed them on to the FAA, but nothing came of his report. Atta selected two airlines—American Airlines and United Airlines—that flew Boeing 757s and 767s, aircraft used for long flights that thus held the most aviation fuel. Furthermore, these aircraft were equipped with up-to-date avionics, making them easier to fly.

Atta called for a leadership meeting in Las Vegas, Nevada, in late June 2001. Atta, Ziad Jarrah, Hani Hanjour, and Nawaf al-Hazmi stayed at the EconoLodge Motel in Las Vegas, where they completed plans for the September 11 operation. Atta and Jarrah used a local Cyberzone Internet Café to send e-mails to al-Qaeda leaders abroad.

Atta then traveled to Spain via Zurich, Switzerland, to update his handlers on his final plans and receive last minute instructions. He met with al-Qaeda representatives in the resort town of Salou on July 8, 2001, receiving his final authorization for the September 11 mission. Atta was given final authority to determine the targets and date of the operation. Several times bin Laden had attempted to push the plan forward, but Atta had refused to carry out the mission before he was

ready and was backed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in this. Atta flew back to the United States, and, despite an expired visa, had no trouble getting past the INS agents at the airport.

Atta issued final instructions about the mission on the night of September 10. One-way tickets for flights on September 11 had been bought with credit cards in late August. Atta had made arrangements to have the cell's excess funds transferred back to al-Qaeda on September 4. He traveled to Portland, Maine, with Abdul Aziz al-Omari where they stayed at the Comfort Inn in South Portland. They caught a 5:45 a.m. flight out of Portland International Airport, but Atta's luggage arrived too late to make American Airlines Flight 11 from Logan International Airport. At 7:45 a.m., Atta and al-Omari boarded American Airlines Flight 11. Soon afterward, Atta phoned Marwan al-Shehhi, on board United Airlines Flight 175—also at Logan International Airport—to make sure everything was on schedule.

Mohamed Atta is shown in this photo released Wednesday, September 12, 2001, by the State of Florida Division of Motor Vehicles. (AP IMAGES.)

Atta commanded the first team. Approximately fifteen minutes after takeoff, his team seized control of the aircraft using box openers as weapons. Atta redirected the aircraft toward New York City and the World Trade Center complex, where it crashed into the North Tower of the New York Trade Center at about 8:45 a.m. Other members of the team carried out their attacks successfully except for one flight lost in Pennsylvania.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 11; bin al-Shibh, Ramzi; Hamburg Cell; Jarrah, Ziad Samir; Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh; Qaeda, al-; Quds Mosque, al-; Shehhi, Marwan Yousef Muhammed Rashid Lekrab al-; World Trade Center, September 11

See Document

Document #13

Suggested Reading

Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005); Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, *Masterminds of Terror: The Truth Behind the Most Devastating Terrorist Attack the World Has Ever Seen* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2003); John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

Azzam, Sheikh Abdullah Yussuf (1941–1989)

Sheikh Abdullah Yussuf Azzam was one of the spiritual leaders of the international radical Islamist movement. His ideas of jihad inspired the September 11, 2001, terrorists. Before his death, he traveled around Europe, the Middle East, and the United States advocating religious warfare against the West.

A Palestinian by birth, Azzam devoted his life to building the Islamist movement. He was born in 1941 in the small village of Selat al-Harithis, near Jenin,

Palestine. Most of his early schooling took place in Jordanian religious schools. After graduating from Khadorri College, he taught in the village of Adder in South Jordan. In the early 1960s, he attended the Sharia College of Damascus. Azzam fought with the Palestinians in the Six Day War in 1967 but left the Palestinian resistance movement because he considered it "a political cause insufficiently rooted in Islam." In 1967 he moved to Egypt, where he worked toward a master's degree in Islamic Law at Cairo's famous al-Azhar University. Among his acquaintances was Omar Abdul Rahman, with whom he often talked about the creation of an Islamist state. After graduation, Azzam taught for a couple years before returning to al-Azhar University to study for a PhD in Islamic jurisprudence. Azzam received his doctorate in 1971, after which he took a teaching job at the University of Jordan. In 1980 he was dismissed from the university because of his activity with the Palestinian movement. He found a job leading prayers at the school mosque at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Among his students at King Abdul Aziz University was Osama bin Laden. Azzam refused to return to Palestine because of his continued unhappiness with the secularism of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Later, when his views crystallized, he helped start Hamas in December 1987 to serve as a counterweight to the PLO.

Azzam was a proponent of the use of holy war, or jihad, to liberate the Muslim world from what he considered the tyranny of the secular West. He wanted to reestablish the Caliphate by any means possible. J. Bowyer Bell described Azzam's tactics as use of "jihad and the rifle alone; no negotiations, no conferences, no dialogues." Azzam taught this doctrine of jihad at every turn at King Abdul Aziz University. Although his teachings made the Saudi government nervous, it left him alone. After the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Army in 1979, Azzam decided to place his Islamist doctrine and himself at the service of the Afghan fighters. At the same time, Saudi authorities expelled him from his teaching post. In November 1981 he found a position teaching Arabic and the Koran at the International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan, but he soon found the war in Afghanistan more important than his teaching.

Azzam moved to Peshawar, Pakistan, to organize the mujahideen fighters in their operations against the Soviets. He traveled throughout the Arab world—and even Europe and the United States—recruiting fighters and raising money. His former student, bin Laden, who was also in Pakistan, began working with him. They founded the Mujahideen Services Bureau (MSB) in 1984, Azzam providing the inspiration and theology and bin Laden the funding (from his personal fortune). It was also in 1984 that Azzam issued a fatwa making it obligatory for every able-bodied Muslim to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Azzam made frequent trips into Afghanistan to preach global jihad, but he avoided the fighting. His sermons and other discourses reached most of the 16,000 to 20,000 Afghan War veterans. He also made several trips to the United State looking for money and recruits for the war. While in the United States, he established branches of the MSB. Both abroad and in Pakistan he constantly preached the necessity of jihad, expressing himself best in his own works explaining his doctrine of jihad.

Azzam's ideas became more radical as the war in Afghanistan progressed. He became convinced of a conspiracy on the part of Pakistan and the United States to

weaken the Islamist cause. In 1987 he conceptualized an Islamist vanguard, or al-Qaeda al-Sulbah (the Solid Base) to carry the creation of a purified Islamist society. It was this concept of an Islamist base organization that Osama bin Laden later developed into al-Qaeda.

Azzam and bin Laden's relationship deteriorated because they disagreed over the strategy of exporting terror. Azzam first wanted to concentrate on building an Islamist society in Afghanistan. He opposed launching a terrorist campaign against Arab regimes before consolidating affairs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Azzam was not adverse to the idea of rolling back Christian encroachment on formerly Muslim lands, but he opposed internal Muslim infighting. In contrast, bin Laden aimed to liberate the Muslim community everywhere—including in Muslim countries. Al-Zawahiri, who was even more radical in his views than bin Laden, used his close contacts with bin Laden to undermine Azzam. This open disagreement between Azzam and bin Laden led bin Laden to break with Azzam in 1987, something partly caused by Azzam's increasing closeness with Ahmad Shah Massoud. Azzam believed that Massoud was a possible future leader of an Islamic Afghanistan. Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri violently disagreed with Azzam over this. Azzam's career ended abruptly on November 24, 1989, when a bomb exploded under his car in Peshawar, killing him, two of his sons, and a companion. He was killed shortly after a meeting where he had been forced to justify his spending on Islamist operations. At first, suspicion centered on Pakistani security forces as the killers, but there is no satisfactory evidence of who planted the bomb—although the person who benefited most was al-Zawahiri. Regardless of the intent of the assassins, Azzam's stature in the Islamist movement remains strong because his backers have continued to advance his cause.

Azzam's Position on Jihad

Sheikh Azzam's fatwas, which are still widely quoted in the responses of today's radical ulama, call for continuous jihad "until all of Mankind worships Allah." He did not, however, stop at determining jihad as the primary means for achieving Allah's rule; jihad became a moral goal in itself. In his preaching and writing he reiterated, "A few moments spent in jihad in the Path of Allah is worth more than seventy years spent in praying at home." Waging jihad was, for Azzam and his followers, a way to imitate the Prophet and his Companions by reenacting the events of the seventh century—belief, emigration from infidel society (the hijrah of the Prophet from Mecca), and finally jihad for spreading Islam. The implicit goal, in Sheikh Azzam's view, was reestablishing the caliphate through jihad (ultimately offensive jihad) until Islam holds sway over the world.

Shmuel Bar, *Warrant for Terror: The Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty to Jihad* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p. 39.

See Also

Abdel Rahman, Sheikh Omar; bin Laden, Osama; Qaeda, al-; Zawahiri, Ayman al-

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J. Bowyer Bell, *Murders on the Nile: The World Trade Center and Global Terror* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003); Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Knopf, 2006).

B

Bahaji, Said (1975–)
Said Bahaji was an active member of the Hamburg Cell, and served as its administrative secretary. This role gave him access to all the planning for the September 11 conspiracy. He also served as a conduit between the Hamburg Cell and al-Qaeda.

Bahaji was a product of mixed cultures. He was born on July 15, 1975, at Haselunne, Lower Saxony, Germany. His father was Moroccan and his mother German. The father ran discotheques in Germany, but was never successful. Bahaji lived in Germany until age nine, when the family moved to Meknès, Morocco, where his father became a farmer. In Meknès Bahaji attended the local school. After graduation he returned to Hamburg, Germany, to continue his education. With a desire to study electronics, Bahaji enrolled in an electrical engineering program at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg (TUHH) in 1996. He became an excellent computer programmer. Because Bahaji was a German citizen, he had a military obligation to fulfill. He served with the 72nd Tank and Rifle Battalion in Hamburg's Fischbek district, although his tour of duty ended with a military discharge after five months because of asthma and allergies. Bahaji married a Turkish woman in 1999, and they had a son.

Bahaji held pro-Western views until he began attending the al-Quds Mosque. Mounir el-Motassadeq introduced him to Mohamed Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh. Within weeks of this introduction, Bahaji began making militant Islamist remarks. Shortly after meeting Atta and bin al-Shibh, Bahaji decided to share an apartment with them at 54 Marienstrasse. They soon formed what came to be known as the Hamburg Cell. Each member of the cell had a job. Bahaji's job was as administrative secretary, paying bills and handling the cell's administrative duties. His computer skills were invaluable. He made certain that the cell's bills were paid on time to attract as little attention as possible. Bahaji was never considered a candidate for the September 11 plot team, but continued to conduct support activities from Hamburg. He was in frequent contact with the leaders of the September 11 conspiracy, providing them with money and with instructions from their al-Qaeda contacts.

Preparing for the backlash of September 11, bin Laden ordered al-Qaeda personnel to destroy records and return to his protection in Afghanistan. Responding to these orders, Bahaji left Germany on September 4, 2001, for Afghanistan. His whereabouts since then are unknown. His mission to supply logistical support for the Hamburg Cell had been successful.

Personality of Bahaji

Bahaji was an electrical engineering student at TUHH and an able computer programmer, according to his bosses at a company where he worked part-time. In many ways, he was a typical computer nerd—an autodidact, as one man describes him—who seemed more at ease at a keyboard than in social situations.

Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), p. 64.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Hamburg Cell; Quds Mosque, al-

Suggested Reading

Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005).

Beamer, Todd Morgan (1968–2001)

Todd Beamer was on United Airlines Flight 93 on September 11, 2001, and was one of the passengers who attempted to regain control of the aircraft from the hijackers. Beamer and others burst into the cockpit and contested the hijackers for control of the plane. The fact that the attempt to regain control of the cockpit was unsuccessful does not detract from the effort. Beamer and his fellow passengers kept the hijackers from crashing the airliner into a Washington, D.C., building—probably the U.S. Capitol.

Beamer has been described by his wife as an ordinary man. He was born on November 24, 1968, in Flushing, Michigan, near Flint. His father worked for several large corporations, and the family moved several times, ending up in Chicago. Beamer attended a private elementary school in Glen Ellyn—Wheaton Christian Grammar School. For three years he went to Wheaton Christian High School, until his father was transferred to California. In his senior year Beamer attended Los Gatos High School in Los Gatos, California, where he was a starter on the basketball and baseball teams. After graduation from high school, he entered California State University–Fresno, but the aftereffects of a car wreck and his inability to make the nationally ranked baseball team as a walk-on led him to transfer to Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois, where he did become a member of the baseball team. After graduating from college with a business degree, he started work on an MBA at DePaul University, which he earned in 1993. He found a job as an account manager for the Oracle Corporation, and over the next eight years he made steady progress up the corporate hierarchy. He worked long hours, and his job required constant travel. On May 14, 1994, Beamer married Lisa Brosious. By September 2001 he and his wife had two young sons and she was five months pregnant. They had just returned from an Oracle Company–sponsored vacation in Rome.

Beamer took United Airlines Flight 93 on September 11 because he had an important business meeting in San Francisco with high-level representatives of Sony Corporation. Beamer wanted an early morning flight in order to keep his 1:00 p.m. appointment in San Francisco.

Beamer has become one of the more famous of those who tried to regain control of UAL Flight 93. Soon after the hijackers seized control of the plane at 9:45 a.m. Beamer contacted Lisa Jefferson, the GTE Airfone operator, to inform her that the aircraft had been hijacked. He reported that one passenger had been killed, and that a flight attendant had told him the pilot and copilot had been forced from the cockpit and may have been wounded. From the other passengers Beamer had learned that the hijackers were on a suicide mission. When hijacker Ziad Jarrah turned the aircraft around, Beamer and the others decided to try to regain control by attacking the hijackers. He teamed with Mark Bingham, Thomas Burnett, Jeremy Glick, and others to fight for control of the airliner. Beamer was under no illusions, and he told the Airfone operator that he knew he was going to die and asked her to pray with him. First they recited the Lord's Prayer. Then they recited the 23rd Psalm, and other passengers joined in the prayer. He also asked the operator to relay a message to his wife and their two sons: "Tell her I love her and the boys." Beamer was still on the phone with Lisa Jefferson when his last audible words were heard: "Are you guys ready? Let's roll." By this time all of the hijackers had retreated into the cockpit area. The passengers had coffeepots full of hot water prepared by the flight attendants to use as weapons, and they took a cart of food trays to crash into the cockpit area. A struggle ensued, with the hijackers close to being overpowered. To keep from losing control of the aircraft, hijacker Jarrah crashed it into the ground near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Beamer has since become famous for the expression, "Let's roll," which became the battle cry of soldiers fighting al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Comments about Todd Beamer by His Wife Concerning His Last Moments

The information confirmed to me that Todd was "who he was" right to the very end of his life. It was a tremendous comfort to know that in his last moments, his faith in God remained strong, and his love for us, his family, was at the forefront of his thoughts. I was glad to know that Todd felt he had some control of his destiny, that he might be able to effect change even to the end. The words "Let's roll" were especially significant to me. Just hearing that made me smile, partially because it was "so Todd," but also because it showed he felt he could still do something positive in the midst of a crisis situation.

Lisa Beamer and Ken Abraham, *Let's Roll! Ordinary People, Extraordinary Courage* (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2002), p. 187.

Beamer has received several honors since his death. School authorities named a high school in Federal Way, Washington, after him: Todd Beamer High School. His name was given to a post office in Cranbury, New Jersey. His college, Wheaton College, named their student center the Todd M. Beamer Student Center. Finally, his wife, Lisa, wrote a book with coauthor Ken Abraham titled *Let's Roll!: Ordinary People, Extraordinary Courage*. She also established a nonprofit foundation in his name in October 2001—The Todd M. Beamer Foundation—to help the families of victims of September 11 with young children.

See Also

Bingham, Mark Kendall; Burnett, Thomas Edward; Glick, Jeremy; United Airlines Flight 93

See Document

Document #16

Suggested Reading

Lisa Beamer and Ken Abraham, *Ordinary People, Extraordinary Courage* (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2002); David Flores, "Heroism of Ex-Athletes on Flight 93 Inspiring," *San Antonio Express-News* (September 10, 2002), p. 7C; Lisa Jefferson and Felicia Middlebrooks, *Called: "Hello, My Name Is Mrs. Jefferson. I Understand Your Plane Is Being Hijacked?"—9:45 AM, Flight 93. September 11, 2001* (Chicago: Northfield Publishing, 2006); Jack Kelly, "Flight 93 Uprising Saved Countless Lives in Capital," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* (June 18, 2004), p. A1; Charles Lane, Don Phillips, and David Snyder, "A Sky Filled with Chaos, Uncertainty and True Heroism," *Washington Post* (September 17, 2001), p. A3; Jeer Longman, *Among the Heroes: United Flight 93 and the Passengers and Crew Who Fought Back* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002); Jim McKinnon, "The Phone Line from Flight 93 Was Still Open When a GTE Operator Heard Todd Beamer Say: 'Are You Guys Ready? Let's Roll,'" *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* (September 16, 2001), p. A1.

Biggart, William (1947–2001)

William Biggart was a working photojournalist covering the World Trade Center attack on September 11 when he was killed by the collapse of the North Tower. He was walking his dog with his wife when he first heard about an aircraft crashing into a building in the World Trade Center complex. Biggart immediately grabbed his cameras and dashed to cover the action two miles away.

Biggart had always wanted to be a photojournalist. He was born on July 20, 1947, in the West sector of Berlin, Germany. His father was in the U.S. Army stationed in West Berlin. He was the second of twelve children in an Irish American family. At the early age of fourteen, Biggart acquired a camera and began working as an apprentice to commercial photographers. Becoming a freelance photojournalist with a small independent agency, he traveled around the world taking pictures at trouble spots. His photographs of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Wounded Knee incident, and the collapse of the Berlin Wall gave him a reputation for covering international affairs. His photographs appeared in all sorts of publications. Some of his most famous photographs were of Gerry Adams, the leader of the Irish Republican Army. His access to Adams had been helped by the fact that he held American and Irish citizenship.

Biggart arrived at the World Trade Center complex on September 11 and started taking pictures. He talked briefly on his cell phone with his wife Wendy shortly after the collapse of the South Tower. Part of his reputation as a photojournalist was getting close to the action. He was working beside the firemen when the North Tower collapsed on top of him.

Biggart's body was found in the debris on Saturday, September 15, 2001. Recovery workers found him next to several firefighters. They also located his three cameras, two camera bags, his notes, and his press credentials. In the camera were 290 images (seven rolls of film and 150 digital images). His last shot was taken at the very minute (10:28 a.m.) that the North Tower collapsed.

See Also

World Trade Center, September 11

See Document

Document #18

Suggested Reading

Newseum, Cathy Trost, and Alicia C. Shepard, *Running toward Danger: Stories Behind the Breaking News of 9/11* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002); Conor O'Clery,

"Bill Biggart, an Irish-American, Was the Only Journalist to Be Killed in the Collapse of the World Trade Centre Towers," *Irish Times* [Dublin] (December 23, 2001), p. 62.

Bingham, Mark Kendall (1970–2001)

Mark Bingham was one of the passengers on United Airlines Flight 93 who attempted to regain control of the cockpit of the aircraft on September 11, 2001. Bingham was an athlete and had played on several national championship rugby teams at the University of California–Berkeley. He was also a mainstay of the San Francisco Fog, a rugby union team. His teammates described him as brave and competitive. Bingham was also gay, and he been made into the icon of the gay community.

Bingham had an active youth. He was born on May 22, 1970, in Phoenix, Arizona. His mother, Alice Hoglan, had married at 19 and divorced at 21, while she was a student at Brigham Young University. Soon after her divorce she moved to Miami, Florida, to be close to her family. Hoglan moved from town to town before ending up in Monterey, California, in 1980. For most of this period she was out of work, until finding a job as a secretary for a legal firm. She moved with her son to Redwood Estates, near Los Gatos, California. Later, Bingham's mother became a United Airlines flight attendant. He attended Los Gatos High School, where as a junior he began playing rugby. A good student, he gained admittance to the University of California–Berkeley. He enjoyed college life, joining a fraternity and playing rugby. At six foot five and weighing 225 pounds, he was not only an impressive looking rugby player, but also aggressive and fast for his size. He helped the university win two rugby national championships. In his senior year he was captain of his rugby team. He was also elected president of the Chi Psi fraternity. Bingham kept his sexual orientation a secret until just weeks before his graduation.

After graduation from the university, Bingham entered the world of business. At first he found a job with the high-tech public relations firm Alexander Communications. His promotions were rapid, taking him from intern to senior account manager in less than a year and a half. In 1997 Bingham left Alexander Communications for a high-profile job at another high-tech public relations firm, Burson-Mastellar, but stayed for only about a year before accepting another position at 3Com Corporation's mobile communications division. Unhappy with corporate hierarchy, he started his own public relations firm, the Bingham Group, representing clients in the Silicon Valley. His business prospered, and he traveled frequently. By the summer of 2001, however, his business had dropped sharply because of the dot-com bust, and he was beginning to consider other business options.

Bingham had always been more interested in business than politics, but he held libertarian political views. He was conservative on economic matters and liberal on social matters. The politician to whom he was most oriented was Senator John McCain (R-AZ), and he had worked on McCain's 2000 presidential bid.

Bingham almost missed his flight on September 11, 2001. He was visiting a friend, Matt Hall, in Denville, New Jersey, and he overslept. His reason for returning to San Francisco was to be an usher at a fraternity brother's wedding. Rushing to the Newark International Airport, he barely made United Airlines Flight 93. He was the last passenger to board. Soon after the aircraft took off, the four hijackers

seized control of the cockpit. Ziad Jarrah became the pilot after the pilot and copilot had been killed or rendered unconscious. With the other passengers, Bingham was herded to the back of the plane. He contacted his mother via the GTE Airfone and explained the situation. From cell phone calls, news spread of the other hijacked aircraft and of their suicide missions. Armed with this knowledge, several of the male passengers, including Bingham, decided to go down fighting. Bingham teamed with Todd Beamer, Thomas Burnett, Jeremy Glick, and others in planning an attempt to regain control of the airliner. In the meantime the hijackers had retreated to the cockpit area. The passengers charged the cockpit with a food tray container and broke into the cockpit area. They struggled with the hijackers. Rather than lose control of the aircraft, hijacker Jarrah crashed the airliner into the ground. There were no survivors. Bingham, along with the other passengers, became instant heroes for having prevented another crash in the Washington, D.C., area—probably into the U.S. Capitol or the White House.

Bingham's mother has become his biggest champion. She ended her twenty-year career as United Airlines flight attendant with bitterness, which she has expressed in unambiguous terms (see sidebar).

Reaction to Bingham's Death by His Mother

Yes, I'm mad, and I'm determined to stay mad. . . . People ask me, do you want closure? And I tell them no. I want to go to my grave tortured by the events of September 11. I want to spend the rest of my life speaking out. I'm mad at the airlines and the airline lobbies that have held up safety programs, mad at the regulatory agencies in the United States that have allowed the circumstances of 9/11 to play out the way they did. I also want to speak out on the ignorance surrounding gay and lesbian issues, for the importance of patriotism in its proper sense and for the importance of healing the rift we have with Arab countries.

Quoted in Jane Ganahl, "Two years Later: A Steely Resolve, Born of Anguish; Alice Hoglan, Mother of Flight 93 Hero, Turns Focus on Airlines, Gay Acceptance," *San Francisco Chronicle* (September 10, 2003), p. D1.

The Hoglan family and friends have set up a scholarship—the Mark Bingham Leadership Fund—at the University of California–Berkeley that awards scholarships of between $8,000 and $10,000 each year. An annual rugby tournament was named for Bingham—the Mark Kendall Bingham Memorial Tournament. Singer Melissa Etheridge dedicated the song "Tuesday Morning" to Bingham's memory in 2004.

See Also
Beamer, Todd Morgan; Burnett, Thomas Edward; Glick, Jeremy; Jarrah, Ziad; United Airlines Flight 93

See Document
Document #16

Suggested Reading
Jon Barrett, *Mark Bingham; Hero of Flight 93* (Los Angeles, CA: Advocate Books, 2002); Lisa Beamer and Ken Abraham, *Let's Roll; Ordinary People, Extraordinary Courage* (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2002); Christopher Heredia, "Proud Mom of Hero," *San Francisco Chronicle* (June 28, 2002), p. A19; Evelyn Nieves, "Passenger on Jet: Gay Hero or Hero Who Was Gay," *New York Times* (January 16, 2002), A12; Doug Saunders, "A Hero for All Times," *Globe and Mail* [Canada] (February 16, 2002), p. F3; James Sullivan, "Gay Rugby Tournament to Honor Mark Bingham," *San Francisco Chronicle* (June 23, 2002), p. 49.

Bin Laden, Osama (1957–)

Besides status as the most notorious terrorist leader in the world, Osama bin Laden's approval of the plan for the September 11 attacks has made him America's public enemy number one. He was born on July 30, 1957, in the Malazz neighborhood of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, into a wealthy Saudi family. His father, Muhammad bin Oud bin Laden, was from Yemen, and he became fabulously wealthy because of his close contacts with the Saudi regime. He won construction contracts, beginning with road contracts and culminating in the contract to restore and reconstruct the holy sites in Mecca and Medina. He was also strongly anti-Israel.

Bin Laden was part of a large extended family. He was the only son of his father's fourth wife. His mother was from Damascus, Syria, and was never one of his father's favorite wives, leading to a divorce. Altogether the father had twenty-one wives and reportedly had fifty-four children, of which twenty-four were sons. Bin Laden was the seventeenth son, and members of the family have advanced the theory that his position on the fringe of the family rankled him. Bin Laden's family moved several times in Saudi Arabia and ended up in Jeddah, where he attended Jeddah's best school—al-Thagr. Standards were high at this Western-style school, which several sons of Saudi royalty also attended. Even as a boy bin Laden showed such a strong religious streak that it alarmed his family. Bin Laden also had some familiarity with the West through vacations in Sweden and attendance at a summer class studying English at Oxford University. His father died in the crash of his Cessna aircraft in 1967, leaving an estate of around $11 billion. Bin Laden's inheritance has been described as between $40 million and $50 million. At age seventeen he married a cousin of his mother's, who was fourteen. Beginning in 1977, bin Laden studied economics and management in the Management and Economics School at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. Bin Laden was a mediocre student, in part because he neglected his studies to work for the family construction firm. He left school in 1979, and there is considerable disagreement among scholars regarding whether or not he graduated. His initial interest after leaving school was to become involved in the bin Laden family businesses, but he was blocked by his older brothers. By the late 1990s the Saudi Binladen Group (SBG) employed 37,000 people and was worth around $5 billion.

As a youngster bin Laden had a solid religious training as a Sunni Muslim but beginning around 1973 he became even more religious. One of his first actions was making contact with the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood. There is evidence that he joined the Muslim Brotherhood while in high school. He later admitted that his first interaction with the Muslim Brotherhood was in 1973. At the university, he took courses taught by Muhammad Qutb, the brother of the famous martyred Islamist writer Sayyid Qutb, and he had contact with the advocate of jihad Sheikh Abdullah Yussuf Azzam. Furthermore, two events radicalized bin Laden even more. First was the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by a group of Islamists under the command of Juhayman ibn-Muhammad-ibn-Sayf al-Taibi. The religious faith and the martyrdom of these Islamists impressed bin Laden. Next, and ultimately more significant, was the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979.

Bin Laden's participation in the Afghan-Soviet War was a turning point in his life. His immediate reaction was to go to Afghanistan and join in the fighting. In

1979 he made a quick visit to Pakistan to meet with Afghan leaders Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdul Rasool Sayyaf. Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia, but began planning to help in Afghanistan. He was one of the estimated 10,000 Saudis to flock to the Afghan war. In contrast to most, however, he brought construction machinery with him when he came—bulldozers, loaders, dump trucks, and equipment for building trenches. Soon after arriving in Pakistan, he learned that his organizational skills were needed more than his skill in combat.

In Pakistan bin Laden renewed his association with Sheikh Abdullah Yussuf Azzam. They had previously met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in summer 1984. Together they formed the Mujahideen Services Bureau (Maktab al-Khidanet, or MAK) in 1984 to recruit and train Afghan fighters. Most of the early expenses of this organization came out of bin Laden's personal finances. Later, funds came from other sources, and in the end several billion dollars flowed through the MAK. Bin Laden used his Saudi contacts in the mid-1980s to bring more heavy construction equipment to protect the Afghans and mujahideen fighters from Soviet artillery and air strikes.

In 1986 bin Laden extended his activities to the battlefield. He joined an Arab mujahideen unit in the field, and participated in the 1987 Battle of the Lion's Den near Jaji. This brief combat experience raised his prestige among Afghan Arab compatriots. Despite his battlefield experience, bin Laden's most significant contribution to the war was in assisting Azzam in radicalizing the Afghan Arab fighters. Bin Laden also met with Ahmed Shah Massoud, the best military leader among the Afghans, but he had closer ties with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rasool Sayyaf.

By 1987 bin Laden's relationship with Azzam became strained over differences of jihad strategy. Bin Laden had developed ties with Ayman al-Zawahiri, the former head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and an open enemy of Azzam. By 1988 bin Laden had broken with Azzam and sided with al-Zawahiri and his Egyptians. Azzam's mysterious assassination on November 24, 1989, cleared the way for bin Laden to play an even greater role in Islamist politics. Although bin Laden had adopted Azzam's argument in favor of a holy war against the enemies of Islam, he differed from his mentor in his belief that it should be extended to an international holy war to be carried out throughout the world. It was also in fall 1989 that bin Laden first organized the al-Qaeda (the Base) organization. The existence of al-Qaeda was announced at a meeting at which those present were required to sign a loyalty oath (*bayat*).

Personality of Osama bin Laden, Described by a Saudi Journalist

To be honest, the man is likable. He is really nice. You don't see him as somebody who will be the arch-terrorist, who will be the most dangerous man in the world. He doesn't strike you as charismatic. You are with somebody who you feel you knew for maybe ten to fifteen years; you don't feel a stranger when you meet him for the first time. And he doesn't try to impress you. I met a lot of Palestinian leaders. They try to impress you. This man does not try to impress you. Maybe this is his strength. Maybe this is his style. He was extremely natural, very simple, very humble and soft-spoken. You feel he is shy. He doesn't look at you eye to eye. Usually when he talks to you he talks by looking down. His clothes are very, very humble, very simple.

Quoted by Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 168–169.

After the end of the Afghan-Soviet War, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia as a war hero. Both the Saudi regime and the general populace acclaimed him. Shortly after his return to Saudi Arabia he approached Prince Turki al-Faisal, head of Saudi intelligence. Bin Laden offered to use Arab irregulars to overthrow the Marxist government of South Yemen, but Turki turned his offer down. Bin Laden settled down in Jeddah working for his family's construction firm until Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 21, 1990. Bin Laden opposed Saddam Hussein's invasion, and he went to the Saudi government offering to lead a mujahideen army against Saddam. But when the Saudi government opted to accept U.S. troops on Saudi soil to regain Kuwait, bin Laden turned against the Saudi regime. Bin Laden was unalterably opposed to the stationing of U.S. troops on Saudi soil, contending that the presence of non-Muslims on holy ground was a sacrilege. His vocal opposition led the Saudi authorities to place him under house arrest for a period of time.

Bin Laden's opposition to the Persian Gulf War led him to leave Saudi Arabia in 1991. To escape possible retaliation from the Saudi security forces, bin Laden and his family moved first to Pakistan and then to Sudan. Bin Laden had been considering a move to Sudan for several years, and he had been buying property in and around Khartoum. This change had both political and religious implications among Muslims. Husan al-Turabi, an Islamist religious and political leader in Sudan, invited bin Laden and his family to stay in Sudan. Bin Laden moved the bulk of his financial assets to Sudan, and there he established a series of businesses, including a road building company. He acquired a near monopoly of many of Sudan's principal commodity businesses, which ventures only added to his personal fortune.

It was from Sudan that bin Laden launched a propaganda campaign against the Saudi royal family, portraying them as false Muslims. Bin Laden's continuing attacks on the Saudi royal family and religious leadership led to the loss of his Saudi citizenship on April 7, 1994, and to the freezing of his financial assets in Saudi Arabia. This meant bin Laden lost $7 million of his share of the family business. In addition to attacking the Saudi regime, bin Laden made it plain in his publication *Betrayal of Palestine* on December 29, 1994, that he included Israel among the enemies of Islam.

Bin Laden used his secure political base in Sudan to organize the terrorist activities of al-Qaeda (the Base). He had established the outline of this organization in 1989, but in Sudan it became a full-fledged terrorist organization. His goal for al-Qaeda was for it to serve as an incitement to Muslims to join a defensive jihad against the West and against tyrannical secular Muslim regimes, and to help train and lead those Muslims who volunteered to participate in the defensive jihad. He established a training camp for al-Qaeda operatives at Soba, north of Khartoum. In 1992 bin Laden sent advisors and military equipment to Somalia to oppose the American mission there. This mission proved successful for bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The first operations of al-Qaeda were directed against Saudi Arabia and the American forces stationed there. A car bomb exploded in Riyadh on November 13, 1995, killing five Americans and one Saudi and wounding more than sixty others. This attack was followed by a truck bombing at al-Khobar in Dhahran on June 25, 1996, killing nineteen American servicemen and wounding hundreds.

Pressure from the governments of Saudi Arabia and the United States threatened bin Laden's status in Sudan, so he moved his operations to Afghanistan in

This televised image released by Al-Jazeera on October 5, 2001, shows Osama bin Laden (right) and his top lieutenant, Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri (left). Al-Jazeera said the scene was believed to capture a celebration of the union of bin Laden's al-Qaeda network and al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad. (AP IMAGES/Courtesy of Al-Jazeera via APTN.)

May, 1996. The Sudanese government had no choice but to ask bin Laden to leave, much to his displeasure. Bin Laden left Sudan virtually penniless, as the Sudanese government offered him only pennies on the dollar for all of the property he owned in Sudan. Bin Laden has claimed that his $300 million investment in Sudan was lost. There is some evidence that he hid some of his assets in various companies through partial ownerships.

Afghanistan was a natural haven for bin Laden and al-Qaeda because of the victory of the Islamist Taliban and because of bin Laden's personal relationship with the head of the Taliban, Mohammed Omar. They had met in Pakistan during the later stages of the Afghan-Soviet War. There are even reports that bin Laden bought Omar a house in Karachi. Although Taliban leaders welcomed bin Laden as a hero of the Muslim world, they were nervous about his terrorist activities and their reflection on the Taliban regime. Responding to this welcome, bin Laden arranged financing from the Arab world for the Taliban regime. In return, the Taliban government allowed bin Laden to organize a series of training camps in Afghanistan to train a cadre of terrorists to carry out operations worldwide. Cementing this alliance, bin Laden's al-Qaeda forces joined Taliban military units fighting the Northern Alliance Army of General Ahmed Shah Massoud.

Once bin Laden had firmly established his organization in Afghanistan, he started an international campaign against those he considered to be enemies of

Islam. The top target was the United States. On August 23, 1996, he issued a call for jihad against the Americans for their occupation of Saudi Arabian territory. Then in February 1998 he formed the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. Bin Laden followed this up with the announcement on February 23, 1998, of a global jihad against all enemies of Islam. At the top of this list of enemies of Islam is the United States because bin Laden considers the United States to be "the root of all evil—theologically, politically and morally—and the source of all the misfortunes that have befallen the umma (Muslim world)." In a 1998 interview with an American journalist, bin Laden expressed this viewpoint.

Osama bin Laden's Interpretation of the War between the Islamic World and the West

I say that there are two sides in the struggle: one side is the global Crusader alliance with the Zionist Jews, led by America, Britain, and Israel, and the other side is the Islamic world. It is not acceptable in such a struggle as this that he [the Crusader] should attack and enter my land and holy sanctuaries, and plunder Muslims' oil, and then when he encounters any resistance from Muslims, to label them terrorist. This is stupidity, or considering others stupid. We believe that it is our legal duty to resist this occupation with all our might, and punish it in the same way as it punishes us.

Quoted by an Al-Jazeera reporter in December 1998. Bruce Lawrence (ed.), *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005), p. 73.

Bin Laden is the political head of al-Qaeda and he is responsible for its operations, but there has always been an on-site command that plans and carries out operations. Because al-Qaeda is an umbrella organization, it is extremely decentralized and has as many as thirty separate extremist groups affiliated with it. Bin Laden's role is to coordinate operations without participating in them. After receiving the go-ahead from bin Laden and al-Qaeda's leadership, the on-site commander makes the tactical decisions. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed presented the outline of the plan for the September 11, 2001, operation to bin Laden and the top leaders of al-Qaeda sometime in 1996. Bin Laden approved the plan in principle, but he left the implementation of it to Mohammed and his subordinates. Both bin Laden and Mohammed knew that the failure of the Group Islamique Armé (GIA) to carry out its mission to fly a hijacked aircraft into the Eiffel Tower in December 1994 meant that they needed trained pilots to carry out this mission in the United States.

It is evident that bin Laden was interested in attacking the United States for economic reasons as much as for political ones. Bin Laden's training in economics and business allowed him to see the total picture. In his homage to the nineteen martyrs, bin Laden justified the September 11 attack by stating that "it is possible to strike the economic base that is the foundation of the military base, so when their economy is depleted they will be too busy with each other to be able to enslave poor peoples."

After his establishing the principles of the plan, the operation proceeded on its own with little or no input from bin Laden. He learned five days before the September 11 attack on what day it would take place. Bin Laden expected a vigorous American response after the end of the attacks in the United Sates, but he counted on the harshness of the response to mobilize Muslims worldwide against the United States and the West. His anticipation of a vigorous U.S. response

proved correct, but the rest of his calculations went array. Bin Laden was reluctant to assume any responsibility for September 11, but he did praise the hijackers in the following words.

Osama bin Laden's Praise for the 9/11 Hijackers

Those young men did a very great deed, a glorious deed. God rewarded them and we pray that their parents will be proud of them, because they raised Muslims' heads high and taught America a lesson it won't forget, with God's will.

Announced to Al-Jazeera on December 26, 2001. Bruce Lawrence (ed.), *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005), p. 153.

The collapse of the Taliban to the Northern Alliance with the assistance of the United States was a major setback for bin Laden. Both the ease and the quickness of the Taliban's fall were unexpected. Bin Laden retreated to the mountain complex of Tora Bora, where he stayed until December 10, 2001, before escaping into northwest Pakistan, where there was strong support for him. Evidently he sustained a wound to his left arm in the American bombing of Tora Bora. Despite efforts by American intelligence in the years since the overthrow of the Taliban, searchers have been unable to locate his whereabouts. Most intelligence sources place him somewhere along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where he has strong civilian support. Since this border runs approximately 1,500 miles, he could be anywhere along it. Even with reduced capacity to carry out terrorist operations, bin Laden is considered a hero by many Muslims for having stood up to the United States. Muslims not only respect bin Laden, but they love him. He has become a symbol of Muslim resistance to what they consider American imperialism in the Middle East. A positive view of bin Laden is shared by many Muslims. A 2004 Pew Global Attitudes Project opinion poll showed that 65 percent of Pakistanis, 55 percent of Jordanians, and 45 percent of Moroccans view him favorably. There is no indication that these approval ratings have decreased.

By making bin Laden enemy number one, the Americans have elevated his stature in the Muslim world to new heights. As Mick Farren expresses it, "Short of

Muslim Reactions to Osama bin Laden

The public reaction to Osama in the Muslim world after September 11 has been divided but increasingly sympathetic to him. Opinion polls taken in early 2002 revealed that most Muslims in the Middle East did not believe the 9/11 attacks were carried out by their fellow believers, and chose instead to attribute them to Mossad or the CIA. As the symbol of resistance to the US, bin Laden has become a hero among many Muslim communities, from Pakistan to Indonesia and from Nigeria to Egypt. Osama memorabilia—cassettes, CDs and DVDs of his speeches, to posters, T-shirts, pens, and sweets bearing his imprint and booklets and magazine articles about him—have proliferated. As the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East have prevented their manufacture and distribution, so they have become widely available in South and Southeast Asia. The Osama T-shirts, produced mostly in Pakistan, Thailand and Indonesia, are being sold all over South and Southeast Asia, including countries with small Muslim populations.

Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 52.

Osama being captured alive, or exhibited as a very identifiable and well-preserved corpse—in the way Che Guevara's hunters had showed off their trophy—he could, in theory, continue indefinitely as a martyr to the cause." Even in death, and regardless of the means, bin Laden will have accrued enough prestige that his martyrdom will continue to serve as an inspiration throughout the Muslim world.

Popularity of Osama bin Laden, Described by a Saudi Journalist

[The United States] didn't find Osama bin Laden for one reason: Osama bin Laden is a humble man. He can live on a little food. He can live without any luxury, and he is like millions who are in that part of the world in Afghanistan or Pakistan. And also he is loved by the people who move around or among them, wherever they are, whether inside Pakistan or Afghanistan. And I don't believe they will surrender him. He's adored by the people around him. For them, he is not a leader. He is everything. He's the father; he's the brother; he is a leader; he is the imam. He is a good example: a man who sacrificed all his wealth to come and live with them, among them, and to fight for their causes. He is different and he [is] not corrupt and so he represents the pioneers of Muslim early Islamic history—The Prophet Muhammad's companions.

Quoted by Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 380–381.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Azzam, Sheikh Abdullah Yussuf; Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh; al-Qaeda; World Trade Center, September 11

See Documents

Document #2; Document #3; Document 22; Document #23

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Bin al-Shibh, Ramzi (1972–)

Ramzi bin al-Shibh was one of the chief planners of the September 11 attacks in the United States. He was an active member of the Hamburg Cell. Frustrated in his inability to obtain a visa to participate in the September 11 attacks, bin al-Shibh stayed in Hamburg, Germany, where he continued to provide logistical support for the conspirators until the eve of the attack.

Bin al-Shibh was a Yemeni. He was born on May 1, 1972, in Ghayl Bawazir, in the province of Hadramaut, Yemen. His father was a merchant. The family moved to the city of Sana'a in northern Yemen when Bin al-Shibh was a small boy. His father died in 1987 when his son was sixteen. Bin al-Shibh was an enthusiastic child, and from the beginning he was more religious than the rest of his family. After finishing his schooling, he began working as a messenger boy at the International Bank of Yemen. For a time he studied at a business school before deciding to leave Yemen. In 1995, he applied for a U.S. visa, but his application was turned down. Determined to leave Yemen, bin al-Shibh then traveled to Germany, where he claimed to be a Sudanese citizen seeking political asylum using the name Ramzi Omar. German authorities were suspicious of his claim for polit-

ical asylum, and it was initially turned down. Germany received more than 100,000 political asylum seekers annually, most wanting access to Germany's generous welfare system that would guarantee free health care and money for food and lodging almost indefinitely. Bin al-Shibh spent two years at a special camp, the so-called Container Camp, awaiting his appeal. During the period pending the appeal of his asylum claim, he joined the al-Quds Mosque in Hamburg, where he met Mohammed Atta and other Islamist militants. After his appeal was denied by the German government, bin al-Shibh returned to Yemen in 1997. Shortly thereafter, he returned to Germany, this time using his true name. This time bin al-Shibh enrolled in a school in Hamburg, although academic problems led to his expulsion in September 1998.

Bin al-Shibh was an active member of the Hamburg Cell. There he was known by associates as Omar. He roomed with Atta and al-Shehhi beginning in 1998. In summer 1998, bin al-Shibh traveled to Afghanistan for special training at one of al-Qaeda's training camps. He was obviously a top student because leaders of al-Qaeda selected him for a special mission. A fellow recruit testified that bin al-Shibh had extensive contact with bin Laden while in Afghanistan. Along with Atta, Ziad Jarrah, and al-Shehhi, he was recruited by bin Laden for a special martyrdom mission. Mohammed Atef, the military commander of al-Qaeda, gave them a briefing on the outlines of the September 11 plot. After returning to Germany, bin al-Shibh joined with Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi in working at a warehouse packing computers for shipping.

Bin al-Shibh's personality and abilities made him one of the leaders of the Hamburg Cell. He became one of the chief recruiters for the Hamburg Cell because he was better liked and more influential in the Muslim community than Atta. Bin al-Shibh also traveled extensively throughout Germany, and was able to recruit others for the Hamburg Cell.

Bin al-Shibh also served as the cheerleader for the Hamburg Cell. He gathered cassette tapes of jihad activities in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Kosovo and played them all over Hamburg to Muslim audiences. The longer he was active in the cell, the more militant his beliefs became. He believed that the highest attainment in life was to die for the jihad. Only bin al-Shibh's inability to obtain a visa prevented him from joining Mohamed Atta's suicide team on September 11. Four times he sought a visa—three times in Berlin and once in Yemen. Bin al-Shibh was turned down each time because consular officers believed that, being Yemeni, he might be an unlawful immigrant. He even tried using other people's names, but with no luck. Instead, bin al-Shibh provided logistical support and money from Germany. He kept in close contact with Atta, and served as his banker. He also protected the men of the Hamburg Cell by keeping them registered as students. Bin al-Shibh was the only member of the Hamburg Cell to attend the January 2000 Kuala Lumpur meeting where al-Qaeda mid-level operatives discussed future operations.

Another of bin al-Shibh's responsibilities was recruitment.

Bin al-Shibh's Attitude toward Jihad

It is the highest thing to do, to die for the jihad. The mujahideen die peacefully.

They die with a smile on their lips; their dead bodies are soft, while the bodies of the killed infidels are stiff.

Quoted by Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), p. 62.

He recruited Zacarias Moussaoui into al-Qaeda. Bin al-Shibh gave Moussaoui funds for pilot training in the United States. Although Moussaoui was not a part of the Hamburg Cell and the September 11 plot, he was being considered for a future martyrdom mission.

When bin al-Shibh finally learned the date of the attack on the World Trade Center complex, the Pentagon, and the U.S. Capitol or White House in late August 2001, he began to shut down operations in Germany. He was aware the all members and anyone affiliated with the Hamburg Cell would be subject to arrest. In early September bin al-Shibh fled to Pakistan, where he thought he would be safe from American reprisal.

Bin al-Shibh was captured in an apartment complex in Karachi, Pakistan, on September 11, 2002, after a gunfight with Pakistani security forces. On September 16, 2002, the Pakistani government turned bin al-Shibh over to American security officials, who moved him out of Pakistan to a secure interrogation site. Since his arrest, bin al-Shibh has been cooperative in providing intelligence on the nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities of al-Qaeda, as well as on how the al-Qaeda organization functions. Despite this cooperation, bin al-Shibh has expressed no regrets about his involvement with al-Qaeda; had he not been captured he would still be an active participant. In August 2006, bin al-Shibh was transferred to the

This undated combo shows Ramzi Bin al-Shibh (left) and Said Bahaji (right). Bin al-Shibh and Bahaji along with suspected hijackers al-Shehhi, Atta, and Jarrah—as well as other people as yet unknown—were suspected of "forming a terrorist association in Germany and jointly planning the four attacks in the United States." (AP IMAGES/Winfried Rothermel.)

Guantánamo Bay Detainment Camp with thirteen other high-profile terrorist suspects. The Bush administration announced in March 2007 that he would face a military tribunal as an enemy combatant.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Guantánamo Bay Detainment Camp; Hamburg Cell; Jarrah, Ziad Samir; Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh; Moussaoui, Zacarias; Qaeda, al-; Shehhi, Marwan Yousef Muhammed Rashid Lekrab al-

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Bojinka Operation. *See* Operation Bojinka

Bucca, Ronald (1954–2001)

Ronald Bucca was a fire marshal with the Fire Department of New York City's (FDNY's) Bureau of Fire Investigation. His military intelligence training made him a counterterrorist expert. Bucca's problem was that the Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF) had no place for a firefighter despite his expertise. He became convinced that al-Qaeda was a threat to New York City, and his fate was tied to the World Trade Center, where he died fighting a fire on September 11, 2001.

Bucca had two loves: the FDNY and the U.S. Army. He was born in 1954 in New York City. His father was Sicilian, and his mother was Swedish. After high school, Bucca joined the U.S. Army in 1973, serving in the 101st Airborne. He served a tour in South Vietnam as a helicopter door gunner. After leaving active duty, Bucca joined the Fire Department of New York City. He remained in the U.S. Army Reserves, reaching the rank of Special Forces First Sergeant. Bucca was seriously injured in a five-story fall at a fire on September 16, 1986, but made an amazing recovery from a back injury. He resumed his career as a firefighter with the famed Rescue 1 Company. After winning several medals for bravery, he joined the Bureau of Fire Investigators in 1992. His job from then on was to investigate the origins of fires.

Still active as a firefighter, Bucca remained in the U.S.

Last Moments of Bucca's Life in the South Tower of the World Trade Center Complex

Back inside the South Tower, Ronnie Bucca had made it up to the seventy-eighth floor. Radio broadcasts recovered later showed that he had linked with Oriole Palmer, a battalion chief. . . . As the radio broadcasts indicate, Palmer and Bucca actually found a standpipe with water pressure and began fighting the blaze. There were bodies strewn across the seventy-eighth–floor lobby. Between fifty and two hundred people lay dead or dying. Burning jet fuel poured down elevator shafts. . . . At one point Ronnie took off his flame-retardant turnout coat and used it to cover some crash victims huddled in a corner. He returned to the hose, and did his best with Chief Palmer to advance it.

Peter Lance, *1000 years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI—The Untold Story* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003), pp. 417–418.

Army Reserves. In 1999 he transferred to the 242nd Military Intelligence Detachment. Later Bucca transferred to a warrant officer slot in the 3413th Military Intelligence Detachment of the 800th Military Police. In this position, Bucca had access to Top Secret military intelligence. On weekends, he would travel to Washington, D.C., where he studied military intelligence reports on the growing threat of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

Bucca remained convinced that terrorists would return and attack New York City again. After a tour of duty with a special fire department counterterrorist unit, Bucca resumed his career as a fire marshal investigating fires. On September 11, 2001, he was in his office when the report came in about a plane crashing into the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex. Bucca headed to the scene of the disaster, arriving shortly after the second aircraft hit the South Tower. Although not a member of a fire suppression unit, his first instinct was to the fight the fire. Bucca ran up the stairs to the seventy-eighth floor, where he began fighting the fire alongside Battalion Chief Or[iole] Palmer. They were engaged in fighting the fire when the South Tower collapsed, killing both of them. Bucca's body was found one month later. His fire-retardant coat had been taken off to shield some of the office workers from the fire. He was the first fire marshal to die in action in New York City history.

See Also

Firefighters at Ground Zero; Joint Terrorism Task Force; World Trade Center, September 11

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Burlingame, Charles Frank "Chic" III (1949–2001)

Charles "Chic" Burlingame was the pilot of the American Airlines Flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. He spent his entire professional life as a pilot, first in the U.S. Navy for eight years and then with American Airlines for seventeen years. Even his marriage was related to flying, as his wife was an American Airlines flight attendant.

Burlingame never considered anything but a flying career. He was born on September 12, 1949, in St. Paul, Minnesota. His father was in the U.S. Air Force, so the family traveled extensively. Most of Burlingame's childhood was spent in England and California. He graduated from Anaheim High School in California. After graduation, he attended the U.S. Naval Academy, where he majored in aeronautical engineering. A member of the class of 1971, Burlingame's first assignment was flying F-4 Phantom jets. He was an honors graduate from the Navy's Top Gun fighter pilot school in Miramar, California. After reaching the rank of captain, Burlingame left active duty in 1979 but remained in the Naval Reserves. He was recalled during the Persian Gulf War to participate as a Navy pilot in 1991. Most of his reserve duty was as a liaison officer in the Pentagon. In 1996 Burlingame retired as a Navy Reserve Captain.

Most of Burlingame's civilian flying career was with American Airlines. Soon after leaving the Navy in 1979, he took a pilot's job with American Airlines. Early in his career with American Airlines he flew regular routes to South America.

When he had achieved enough seniority, Burlingame began to fly routes in the United States. He had a reputation for strict adherence to the rules, and knew the dangers of flying from his experiences landing Navy F-4 Phantom jets. Burlingame had selected the September 11 flight because he and his brother, Brad, had plans to celebrate Burlingame's birthday at an Anaheim Angels baseball game.

Bradley Burlingame's office in Los Angeles, full of memorabilia of his brother, Captain Charles Burlingame, who piloted American Airlines Flight 77. The flight was bound for Los Angeles, where Burlingame was to celebrate his fifty-second birthday the next day by going to an Anaheim Angels baseball game with Brad. (AP IMAGES/Krista Niles.)

The American Airlines Flight 77 on September 11, 2001, was a routine flight from Dulles International Airport to Los Angeles International Airport until the hijackers seized the aircraft. The flight was ten minutes late taking off because of problems at the security gate. Once in flight, the hijackers used knives and box cutters to gain control of the cockpit sometime between 8:51 and 8:54 a.m. In the process of seizing the cockpit, Burlingame was murdered. Hani Hanjour assumed control of the pilot's seat and turned the aircraft around to the Washington, D.C., area. At 9:37:40 a.m. Hanjour crashed the aircraft into the Pentagon.

Burlingame has been honored for his sacrifice on September 11 by burial in Arlington National Cemetery. This honor did not come easily. At first the U.S. Army refused to bury him at Arlington because he had died as a reservist before age sixty. Political pressure from Republican senators and congresspersons led the Secretary of Defense to overturn this decision. Burlingame was buried at Arlington National Cemetery on December 12, 2001, not far from the graves of his parents. Since his death, Burlingame's sister, Debra Burlingame, has been active in September 11 politics. Several times she has clashed with other political figures in the families of September 11 movement by defending the actions of the Bush administration. In 2003 the Burlingame family launched a nonprofit foundation with the goal of providing college scholarships for those wishing to pursue careers as officers in the U.S. armed services.

See Also
American Airlines Flight 77; DCA

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Burnett, Thomas Edward (1963–2001)

Tom Burnett was one of the passengers on United Flight 93 who attempted to retake control of the aircraft on September 11, 2001. The fact that Burnett and his companions did not succeed does not detract from their courage in making the attempt. Burnett was a devoted family man, and his motivation was to survive to return to his family.

Burnett had a typical American upbringing. He was born on May 29, 1963, in Bloomington, Minnesota. His father was a high school English and Literature teacher and a Korean War veteran, and his mother was a real estate agent. He had an older and a younger sister. His family was Catholic and Burnett was raised in that faith. Burnett's entire youth was spent in Bloomington, and he attended Ridgeview Elementary School and Olson Middle School before graduating in 1981 with honors from Thomas Jefferson High School. Burnett played football as a quarterback, and in 1980 his team made it to the state semi-finals. His prowess as a football player led to several scholarship offers from small colleges. Burnett obtained an appointment to the Air Force Academy, but after a few weeks there he decided that a military career was not for him. He then attended Saint John's University in Collegeville, Minnesota, for two years, playing football until a shoulder injury caused him to give up the game. After transferring to the Carlson School of Management at the University of Minnesota, he obtained a BS degree in finance. Burnett was also elected president of the Alpha Kappa Psi fraternity in his senior year.

Shortly after graduation, Burnett entered the business world. His first job was with Calicetek, a manufacturer of dental implants. He became sales director and traveled around the United States and the world beyond. In August 1996 he took a job in California with Thoratec Corporation, a company that builds medical devices, headquartered in Pleasanton, California. Starting at the bottom of the corporate ladder, Burnett worked his way up to vice president of the company, eventually becoming its chief financial officer. During this rise up the hierarchy, he earned an MBA from Pepperdine University.

Burnett's job responsibilities called for him to travel around the country. He had married in April 1992, and he and his wife, Deena, had three daughters. Deena had worked as a flight attendant for Delta Airlines, but retired from her job before the birth of their twin daughters. Traveling was tough on Burnett because he liked family life with his wife and daughters. He also was fond of hunting, fishing, and golfing.

On September 11, 2001, Burnett was returning to California from a business trip to New York City. He had called his parents from the New York Marriott Hotel near Times Square on the night of September 10. Wanting to catch an earlier flight, Burnett rushed to Newark International Airport and caught United Airlines Flight 93. Burnett had reserved a first-class seat. There was a forty-one-minute delay caused by airport congestion.

Nothing about the early flight of United Airlines Flight 93 was out of the ordinary until the hijack team went into action. The team of Ziad Jarrah seized control of the aircraft at approximately 9:28 a.m. Passengers were restricted to the rear of the aircraft. Burnett and others began to make calls to inform authorities that the aircraft had been hijacked. He called his wife at around 9:30 a.m. to tell her of the hijacking. It was a short conversation and Deena had no opportunity to tell him about the other aircraft. He called again and reported that the hijackers had knifed and killed one of the crew. At this time Deena was able to tell him that the other aircraft had been on suicide missions. Burnett relayed the news to the other passengers. In a third conversation Deena told him about the Pentagon crash. In between calls, Burnett and the other passenger began to discuss regaining control of the cockpit. In the fourth conversation with his wife, Burnett told her they were waiting until the aircraft was over a rural area before taking back the plane. He also made it plain that they had no choice. Among others, Burnett, Todd Beamer, Mark Bingham, and Jeremy Glick charged the cockpit. They came close to regaining control of the aircraft, but Jarrah crashed the plane in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing everybody aboard.

The news of what the passengers on United Airline Flight 93 had tried to do made them national heroes. Jarrah and his team of hijackers had been prevented from crashing the airliner into the U.S. Capitol, or possibly the White House. When family members later listened to the cockpit tapes, they could hear the desperate struggle. All the bodies were obliterated in the crash, and could be identified only by DNA analysis. Medical technicians were able to find and identify some of Burnett's remains for burial at the Fort Snelling National Cemetery on May 24, 2002. Because he had been accepted to attend the Air Force Academy, Burnett was eligible to be buried at a national cemetery.

Since Burnett's death, his wife has been active in the families of September 11 movement. She was instrumental in the FBI release of the flight records of what happened in the cockpit of United Airlines Flight 93. Knowing that there were unanswered questions, Burnett's wife and parents filed a lawsuit against United Airlines and Argenbright Security Company on August 5, 2001. Then a week later they filed a $1 trillion lawsuit against the financial supporters of terrorist networks. One hundred and fifty defendants were named in this suit, ranging from individuals to charities. Hundreds of others also signed on to this lawsuit. Most of them knew that no

Commentary from Tom Burnett's Boss and CEO of Thoratec Corp.

He'd call it hyperbole, but it's true. Knowing what I know of Tom, I would expect him to die as he lived—with honor, principle, and dignity. He was solidly rooted in the strength of his convictions of right and wrong.

Quoted in Sam McManis, "Passenger's Act of Courage No Surprise," *San Francisco Chronicle* (September 14, 2001), p. A10.

money would be forthcoming, but the families are most interested in exposing the supporters of terrorism. Besides lawsuits, the Burnett family started the Tom Burnett Family Foundation in September 2002, with the goal of educating youth to become active citizens and tomorrow's leaders.

See Also
Beamer, Todd Morgan; Bingham, Mark Kendall; Glick, Jeremy; Jarrah, Ziad Samir; United Airlines Flight 93

See Document
Document #16

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Bush, George W. (1946–)

President George W. Bush had been president less than nine months when the events of September 11, 2001, transformed his administration. Bush had won the presidency in one of the closest races in American history in November 2000, but he came into office determined to repudiate the policies of former President William Clinton. President Clinton had pursued an aggressive but lackluster campaign against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Various efforts had been approved to either assassinate or capture bin Laden, but nothing had come of them. The new Bush administration wanted to reexamine all of Clinton's activities, and members of the Bush administration had priorities that ranged from building a "Star Wars" missile defense shield to fighting domestic crime. Before the attacks, counterterrorism was something of a priority for the Bush administration but was nowhere near the top of the agenda. Several on the administration team had complained openly about overemphasis on bin Laden and al-Qaeda by the Clinton administration. Attorney General Ashcroft made it plain that he wanted to focus attention on organized crime families and on the trade in street drugs. Counterterrorism also assumed a lower priority for the Justice Department and the FBI.

Of the government agencies, only the CIA tried to warn President Bush about the danger of terrorism. George Tenet, the director of the CIA, gave Bush daily intelligence briefings in which he frequently warned Bush about the danger of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Bush developed a good personal relationship with Tenet, but he listened only, and took no action. In an interview with Bob Woodward after September 11, Bush acknowledged that he knew bin Laden and al-Qaeda were a menace, but that he had felt no sense of urgency before September 11. Bush was waiting for a comprehensive plan that would bring bin Laden to justice, and he was willing to sign off on such a plan.

All of this changed on the morning of September 11. President Bush was in Sarasota, Florida, scheduled to attend a media event at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida. After an early-morning jog, Bush left for the school. He was in the classroom when American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. His chief advisor, Karl Rowe, informed Bush of the crash, but he decided to continue with the program at the elementary school. Bush did contact the White House, where National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice gave him more details about what was happening in New York City. After consulting with Andrew H. Card, Jr., Chief of Staff, Bush returned to the classroom. Shortly after his advisors learned of the crash into the South Tower they informed Bush. The first crash could have been an accident, but the second meant that the United States was under attack. After contacting Vice President Dick Cheney and the head of the FBI, Robert Mueller, Bush wanted to return to Washington, D.C., although his advisors opposed a return. It was at this time that Bush authorized Vice President Cheney to order the Air Force to shoot down any hijacked commercial aircraft. Advisors began to look for a safe place for the president.

By 9:55 a.m. Air Force One was in the air with President Bush and his entourage. The Vice President suggested that Bush fly to Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska. Offutt Air Force Base was the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command, and had all the facilities necessary for the president to keep up on what was going on. After a brief stop at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, where Bush made a brief public statement, Air Force One proceeded to Offutt Air Force Base. It arrived at Offutt Air Force Base at 2:50 p.m. After communicating with other government leaders, President Bush insisted, despite opposition from the Secret Service, that he return to Washington, D.C. Winning the argument, Bush and his advisors arrived in Washington, D.C., at 7:00 p.m.

President Bush took charge after September 11. He asserted himself by making it clear that the country was embarking upon a war with few restraints. He focused on results, and put pressure on the CIA and FBI to produce results. His relationship with Tenet became even closer because the CIA was the only agency that had information on Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The CIA had contacts in Afghanistan, whereas the U.S. military had no assets there. By presidential authority the CIA was given complete freedom to conduct covert operations. President Bush was determined to end bin Laden's sanctuary in Afghanistan, even if it meant overthrowing the Taliban regime. Soon American support started flowing to the Northern Alliance.

President Bush had two foreign policy options in his administration after September 11. One was the traditional international diplomacy using the United Nations. Two groups in government supported this option—the U.S. State Department and Colin Powell, and the CIA leadership. The other option was advocated by a small group of neoconservatives whose goal was to use America's preeminent military power to transform the world order—in particular, the Middle East. Vice President Cheney, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Chairman of the Defense Policy Advisory Committee Richard Perl were the leaders advancing these views. After much soul-searching, Bush accepted the neoconservative position; the invasion of Iraq was a product of this conversion. Once this decision was made, intelligence operations directed at al-Qaeda and

other terrorist groups were redirected toward Iraq. Foreign language experts and special operatives were reassigned, and anti-terrorism intelligence programs were terminated. The main thrust of Bush and the Bush administration was now the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and the hunt for bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders had less urgency.

See Also
Bin Laden, Osama; Bush Administration; Qaeda, al-; Tenet, George

See Documents
Document #11; Document #18; Document #24; Document #31

Suggested Reading
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Bush Administration

President George W. Bush showed considerable interest in the activities of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda during the early days of his administration, but the rest of his administration less so. They had criticized the Clinton administration for its failure to end the al-Qaeda threat, but most high officials in the Bush administration had other priorities. These were missile defense, military reform, China, and Iraq. Most of these priorities were intended to enhance the ambitions of the President Bush and his chief administrators. Even those who knew something about Afghanistan—and they were few indeed—had ties to Pakistan. Pakistan was a supporter of the Taliban, who in turn were protecting bin Laden. Briefings about the importance of terrorism and bin Laden given by the existing Clinton administration to the incoming Bush administration were ignored.

Perhaps the least enthusiastic member of the Bush administration was Attorney General John Ashcroft. Ashcroft had higher priorities for the Department of Justice—guns, drugs, and civil rights. He made counterterrorism a third-tier issue. Requests for increased funding for counterterrorism were turned down. Efforts to talk to Ashcroft about counterterrorism were futile. An FBI request for an increase to its counterterrorism budget by $58 million had been turned down by Ashcroft on September 10, 2001. This proposal had called for 149 new counterterrorism field agents, 200 additional analysts, and 54 extra translators. Ashcroft's refusal to consider counterterrorism as a priority changed dramatically after September 11.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was no more enthusiastic about bin Laden and al-Qaeda than Ashcroft. Rumsfeld had been briefed on counterterrorism activities in the Defense Department by outgoing Secretary of Defense Cohen, but he has since stated that he remembered little of this briefing. Responsibility for counterterrorism in the Defense Department was given to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC). This post had not been filled by September 11, 2001. Rumsfeld's major concern upon taking office had been the building of a missile defense system and development of an advanced weapons system. For this reason a request to allocate $800 million more to counterterrorism was turned down by Rumsfeld, and the funds were

diverted to missile defense. Counterterrorism was simply not a part of Rumsfeld's agenda. This is also why a weapon useful against al-Qaeda, the Predator unmanned aircraft and its Hellfire missile system, was allowed to languish behind other projects.

Another leading figure in the Bush administration who showed little interest in Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda prior to September 11 was Condoleezza Rice. In an article in *Foreign Affairs* published before she took office, Rice criticized the Clinton administration for focusing on terrorism rather than on the few great powers whom she considered dangerous to peace. It was her thesis that American power and prestige had been frittered away by the concentration on issues like terrorism. She carried these ideas into her role as National Security Advisor to President Bush. Richard Clarke, the holdover counterterrorism expert, tried to persuade Rice of the danger posed by bin Laden and al-Qaeda in a January 2001 memorandum, but Rice took no action. In a meeting on July 10, 2001, George Tenet, the head of the CIA, warned Rice of the strong likelihood of an al-Qaeda strike against the United States, possibly within the United States. Rice listened to Tenet's arguments, but several times afterward when Tenet brought up the subject she was unable to recall either the meeting or the subject of the meeting. It was only in October 2006 that this meeting and its subject matter surfaced in Bob Woodward's book *State of Denial*. Even then Rice stated that she has difficulty remembering the meeting.

Bush's neoconservative advisors were much more attracted to overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq than to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense, complained that too much attention had been devoted to the activities of bin Laden. In his view, bin Laden was overrated as a threat. Bin Laden was far down on the neoconservatives list of priorities. Only President Bush showed much curiosity about bin Laden and al-Qaeda, ordering intelligence reports sent to him daily about al-Qaeda's activities.

Opposition to Clinton administration policies also extended to economic matters. The previous administration had attempted to control the flow of money to Osama bin Laden. Efforts were made to embarrass those countries with loose banking regulations into tightening them up. More than thirty countries were participating in this effort when the Bush administration assumed office. The Clinton administration had also proposed the creation of the National Terrorist Asset Tracking Center as part of this campaign. Paul O'Neill, the new Secretary of the Treasury, disapproved of any attempt to interfere in the banking industry, even as regards banks and financial institutions that were supporting terrorist activities. Consequently, O'Neill shut down anti–money-laundering operations, and the National Terrorist Asset Tracking Center was dismantled because of lack of funding.

After September 11, 2001, the Bush administration made a complete reversal, and resources now poured into counterintelligence. President Bush gave the CIA complete authority to carry out covert operations against terrorists and terrorist organizations. Once it became apparent that the Taliban regime would not give up Osama bin Laden, an American-sponsored war was unleashed to overthrow it. But soon the earlier desire to overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq became paramount, and this diverted the attention of the Bush administration away from bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

See Also

Bin Laden, Osama; Bush, George W.; Clinton Administration; Qaeda, al-

Suggested Reading

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C

Cantor Fitzgerald

The huge financial brokerage firm Cantor Fitzgerald suffered the largest number of casualties of any company in the World Trade Center complex on September 11. About one thousand employees worked for Cantor Fitzgerald on the eve of September 11. The company was housed in the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex between the 101st and 105th floors. Employees for the firm handled transactions worth about $200 billion of securities a day, and in the neighborhood of $30 trillion a year. For all intents and purposes it served as the New York Stock Exchange's handler of bonds. Bernie Cantor had founded the firm, and besides a shrewd businessman he had been a collector of Rodin sculptures. There were some eighty pieces of Rodin's sculpture on display in the North Tower. After Cantor's death, Howard Lutnick became the company's chairman, and he held that position on September 11, 2001.

The September 11 attack on the World Trade Center complex hit Cantor Fitzgerald particularly hard. Shortly after the American Airlines Flight 11 hit the North Tower near the 93rd floor, it became apparent that those on the upper floors had little if any chance of escape. Because the roof was locked and the stairwells were blocked, those in the floors above the 93rd floor had no recourse but to resign themselves to their fate. It became more apparent what their fate would be when the South Tower collapsed. As the fire and smoke threatened them, some began jumping to their deaths rather than burn to death. Some of the jumpers were holding hands as they fell. Others called their loved ones to tell them of the hopelessness of their situation. In the end, Cantor Fitzgerald lost 658 employees, including the brother of the company's chairman. Several of the survivors were badly burnt, and one, Renee Barrett-Arjune, died of burns in October.

The members of Cantor Fitzgerald that survived had luck on their side. Lutnick was taking his young son to his first day of kindergarten. Others were on vacation or preparing for vacations. Some had gone to lower floors on individual tasks, thus saving their lives. Lutnick arrived at the World Trade Center complex at about the time that the South Tower fell, and he ran to save his life like so many others.

In the aftermath of the attack, Cantor Fitzgerald was on the verge of ruin. It had lost nearly two-thirds of its employees, its offices were gone, and its computer system was down. There was pressure to reopen the bond market earlier than the September 17 reopening of the New York Stock Exchange. The decision to reopen the bond market on September 15 threatened to bankrupt Cantor Fitzgerald because its competitors were eager to take away its business. Its only hope was that the London office, which was much smaller than the New York office, could absorb New York office's business as well as conduct its own business. Despite immense difficulties, Cantor Fitzgerald did manage to open its doors on Monday, September 17, saving the firm.

Howard Lutnick's Feelings about September 11

The people I worked with at Cantor were people I respected and liked. I had recruited and promoted them, become part of their lives. We built a place that was bound tightly together. And in many ways the 1993 bombing was the catalyst for that. We emerged from that crisis stronger, closer . . . . Policemen and firemen—as awful as the thought is—begin their days knowing there's a chance they might not make it home at night. Their occupation is built upon bravery, and, by definition, puts them in harm's way. My men and women never told their spouses "Today I'm going to work, and tonight I might not make it out." Because for them, they were just going to the office.

Tom Barbash, *On Top of the World: The Remarkable Story of Howard Lutnick, Cantor Fitzgerald, and the Twin Towers Attack* (London: Headline, 2002), pp. 273–274.

In the meantime, family members of those missing began to show up demanding services. At first they were concerned about finding out what had happened to their loved ones. Then grief took over, rendering family members almost helpless. Grief counselors were called in to help the families cope. Finally, family members reconciled themselves to their loss and began to consider financial matters, such as insurance, death certificates, bonuses, and salaries.

In the aftermath of September 11, Lutnick became a controversial figure. To save his company, he stopped paying salaries for the deceased employees after September 11. In the place of salaries, Lutnick promised the families 25 percent of the profits of Cantor Fitzgerald. The problem was that earning that profit took time, and the national media started attacking Lutnick for financially mistreating the bereaved families. It became especially vicious on Bill O'Reilly's TV show *The O'Reilly Factor* on FOX News. After Lutnick announced his plan to give the 25 percent of profits for the next five years, health insurance for ten years, and $45 million in bonuses for the families, some but not all of the pressure came off. There were still attacks on him from the media. In the end, Lutnick's efforts to assist the families of lost members of Cantor Fitzgerald have proven beneficial. As of June 30, 2004, Cantor Fitzgerald had paid more than $145 million to the families.

Cantor Fitzgerald has also prospered financially. Lutnick decided to concentrate on core issues, and to transform more of his functions to an electronic trading company system, eSpeed. Much of 2002 was spent rebuilding technology and the company's infrastructure. He has also been involved in litigation over attempts of other companies to take over some of his business in the aftermath of September 11.

See Also

World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading

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Casualties of September 11

The explosion of the crashing aircraft, the fire, and the final collapse of the Twin Towers produced massive casualties. The goal of the hijackers was for casualties to be in the hundred thousands range. It was known that there were around 150,000 people at any one time during the day at the World Trade Center complex. This total included people who worked in the complex, around 50,000, and tourists who shopped at the many stores there, about 100,000 daily. The World Trade Center complex was a popular place to visit and shop.

Casualties would have been much higher except for the evacuation supervised by the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) firefighters, New York City and Port Authority police, and security people for the various companies. Their efforts saved countless lives, but it came at a high cost. Collapse of the Twin Towers caught firefighter, police, and Port Authority police by surprise. In the South Tower there were only seconds to respond to a call to evacuate. The North Tower took longer to fall, but communications were so poor that information about the collapse of the South Tower and a recall order was difficult to spread. The FDNY firefighters took the brunt of the casualties with 343. Employees of the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey suffered 74 dead, and the New York City police lost 37.

Only eighteen survivors of the collapse were recovered on September 11, 2001. Rescuers found two policemen early on the first day. Later the same day, sixteen others were found. Twelve firemen, one policeman, and one civilian office worker were saved from the ruins of the North Tower. Finally, late in the day, two Port Authority employees were rescued from the North Tower. There were no survivors from the collapse of the South Tower.

The losses on September 11, 2001, were devastating to all these agencies. All of those looking for

Port Authority Police Lieutenant William Keegan Jr. on the Attitude of Those at the Cleanup of Ground Zero

In this place and time we were operating under different rules. Here, this was what success meant. We understood the pain. We took comfort in being able to alleviate it. We felt the suffering. We took solace by ending the suffering of others. The work at Ground Zero was a cause, a righteous cause. There are not many of them anymore. One more person was leaving this place and going home to family, friends, and loved ones, for whatever closure that gave. He was a dead cop, and a dead friend, but those of us at Ground Zero began to glimpse another truth as we worked, one that touched even the hardest cop or operating engineer or firefighter. Could the selfless devotion of so many change part of the evil caused by the worst of us into something reflecting a part of the best of us?

William Keegan Jr., *Closure: The Untold Story of the Ground Zero Recovery Mission* (New York: Touchstone, 2006), p. 114.

remains developed a special attitude toward the fallen. Port Authority police lieutenant William Keegan Jr. described it as a sacred trust that impacted psychologically on those at Ground Zero (see sidebar).

Loss of Paramedics and Emergency Medical Technicians

We lost eight paramedics and EMTs on September 11. What the people in EMS did that day was to go down there to help people, knowing that it was dangerous, knowing that we could die. Janice volunteered to go. I volunteered to go, and a lot of other women volunteered to go. There is a perception that women don't do dangerous things. The truth is that women do do dangerous things. We just do them differently than men do sometimes.

Lieutenant Amy Monroe, Emergency Medical Services Command FDNY, quoted in Susan Hagen and Mary Carouba, *Women at Ground Zero: Stories of Courage and Compassion* (New York: Alpha Books, 2002), p. 143.

The various New York agencies were fiercely protective of the remains of their own fallen. NYFD firefighters, New York City police, and Port Authority police wanted only their representatives to handle the bodies, or body parts. For example, once a firefighter's body was found, the body was placed in a body bag and put on an orange plastic stretcher. An American flag was then placed over the body bag. The firefighters would then have a chaplain lead them in prayer. After acknowledging the sacrifice by saluting the fallen firefighter, six firefighters would carry the stretcher several blocks to the morgue. Along the way people would stop working and take off their hard hats to show respect. The New York City police and Port Authority police treated their fallen comrades in much

The flag-draped body of a victim of the World Trade Center attacks is taken from the rubble by members of the New York City Fire Department on January 10, 2002, in New York. (AP IMAGES/Beth A. Keiser.)

the same way. There has been criticism, however, that civilian remains were not treated with commensurate respect and that their remains were sometimes handled more carelessly.

Early estimates of total casualties at the World Trade Center complex ranged from thousands to as many as tens of thousands. It may be that an accurate figure will never be determined, but as of February 2005 there had been 2,749 death certificates issued by the City of New York as a result of the World Trade Center attack. Of the total of 2,749, it has been determined that 2,117 (77 percent) were males and 632 (23 percent) were females. Only 1,585 (58 percent) had been forensically identified from recovered physical remains when the identification process stopped in February 2005. Median age of the victims was thirty-nine years with the range from two to eighty-five. A total of sixty-two countries were represented among the dead at the World Trade Center complex. Although the overwhelming majority of the dead were American citizens, a significant number of the dead were non-citizens—exactly how many will probably never be known.

Nature of the Search for Remains

The nature of the search for human remains necessarily underwent changes as the geography of the pile itself did. But a basic template for the process was established early. Normally there were seventy-five firemen on recovery duty at a time, supplemented by equal numbers of police officers from both the city and the Port Authority. They came in on one-month tours, and worked twelve hour shifts according to a schedule that gave them every third day off, resulting in a pattern by which each searcher worked a total of twenty days. Though a few firemen signed on for multiple tours, most did not. This created a visible cycle at the site, between the overeager and incautious searching by teams at the start of their tours and the calmer, more efficient work that was performed later.

William Langewiesche, *American Ground: Unbuilding the World Trade Center* (New York: North Point Press, 2002), pp. 132–133.

Identification of the dead has been difficult. Most of the identifications have been made from body parts, because only 174 whole bodies had been found as of September 11, 2006. By that same date 19,948 body parts had been located and sent to the morgue for identification. More than 800 victims were identified by DNA alone. But even identification by means of DNA was difficult because the high-temperature fire and changes in temperature caused DNA tissues to deteriorate. This fact meant that the doctors had to experiment with ways to preserve tissue for DNA analysis.

Impact on City Morgue

The morgue was at Bellevue Hospital, and it was somewhat of an assembly line because of the number of bodies and body parts coming in. A small truck would come through the barriers, and you'd know that these were new bodies coming in. During the first few days, the bodies were coming in very quickly. They were finding 600 body parts a day—arms, legs, scalps. It was horrendous stuff to see.

Comment of Police Officer Maureen Brown in Susan Hagen and Mary Carouba, *Women at Ground Zero: Stories of Courage and Compassion* (New York: Alpha Books, 2002), p. 172.

The official date for closure on identifying victims of September 11 was in the middle of February 2005. New York City's medical examiner's office began notifying families that they had been unable to identify their loved ones. In an attempt to identify victims in the future, nearly

10,000 unidentified parts have been freeze-dried and vacuum-sealed for preservation and placed in a memorial. Part of the problem of identification was that fierce fires and pressure from collapsing buildings made it difficult for scientists to extract usable DNA.

See Also
Ielpi, Lee; Von Essen, Thomas; World Trade Center, September 11

See Document
Document #21

Suggested Reading
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Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) record prior to September 11 was emblematic of the pressures placed upon it in a changing world. Its central problem was the transition from the Cold War to international terrorism, and then to stateless terrorism that could strike the United States at any time. Surveillance against terrorism in the continental United States was the responsibility of the FBI, but the CIA had responsibility for international intelligence gathering. In any case, its record was found to be lacking.

The leaders of the CIA had over the years limited human intelligence assets. In the early and mid-1990s the CIA had reduced its human intelligence capability through a reduction of its staff by 20 percent. By the late 1990s the agency lacked the agents, the language skills, and the organizational flexibility to spot a conspiracy in the making. Instead, the CIA depended on intelligence reports from friendly intelligence services and political departments. Even when it had a human intelligence source, the CIA was slow to react to warnings coming from that source. A case in point is that the CIA had an aggressive agent in Germany monitoring the activities of the Hamburg Cell, but no additional resources were placed at his disposal.

Bureaucracy often threatened the efficiency of CIA operations. Its agents were reluctant to share information with the FBI for fear of losing control of the case. Part of this fear was an incompatibility of function between the two institutions. FBI had the task of bringing lawbreakers to justice. They approached a case by accumulating evidence that could stand up in a court of law. CIA agents were less interest in prosecuting than intelligence gathering. They wanted to follow the leads to see where they would go. This meant that the CIA was unwilling to share crucial information because such sharing might compromise intelligence sources.

The decision by John Deutch, director of the CIA from 1995 to 1996, to call for prior approval from CIA headquarters before recruiting any person as an

intelligent asset with a criminal or human rights problem, made it difficult for the CIA to recruit intelligence agents. This decision came after a controversy involving the CIA's employment of a paid informant in Guatemala who had been involved in the murders of an American innkeeper and the Guatemalan husband of an American lawyer. Hundreds of paid informants were dismissed from the rolls of the CIA. Almost all of the human intelligence assets in the Middle East were terminated in this purge. This restriction was still in place on September 11, 2001.

The CIA had been monitoring the activities of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda through its Counterterrorism Center. CIA agents had been able to recruit thirty Afghans operating under the codeword GE/SENIORS to monitor bin Laden's activities in Afghanistan since 1998. They each received $10,000 a month for this mission. Numerous times during the Clinton administration analysts in the Counterterrorism Center and its Alec Station unit proposed operations to neutralize bin Laden using Afghan agents or missile attacks, but none of these operations received approval. Part of the problem was that bin Laden was so elusive, traveling at irregular times. There was also the fear of collateral damage that would outrage domestic and international public opinion. The Clinton administration became paralyzed by indecision caused by its lack of confidence in CIA intelligence and the ongoing political difficulties of President Clinton's Lewinsky scandal.

George Tenet, who succeeded Deutch, was able to make the transition from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration. He had been constantly warning both administrations about the danger of bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Although the Clinton administration came to recognize the truth of the terrorism threat, the Bush administration was slow to accept it until September 11, 2001. Tenet had been able to establish a good working relationship with President George W. Bush, but he was unable to get him to act quickly on al-Qaeda. After September 11, however, the Bush administration left nothing to chance in fighting against terrorism. According to Seymour Hersh in *Chain of Command*, it unleashed the CIA to undertake covert action against terrorists with no restrictions but deniability for the president. The support for the Northern Alliance led to the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and ended safe sanctuary for bin Laden and the other leaders of al-Qaeda. But bin Laden and most of al-Qaeda's and the Taliban's leaders were able to escape. Part of the reason for the escape was the reluctance of the Bush administration to commit American forces until it was too late.

CIA's Inspector General Summary Report Conclusions on CIS's Efforts against Al-Qaeda

"Agency officers from the top down worked hard" against al-Qaeda but "they did not always work effectively and cooperatively," the investigators concluded. While finding no "silver bullet" or single intelligence lapse that might have prevented the Sept. 11 attacks, the report identified numerous "failures to implement and manage important processes" and "follow through with operations." The report said (George) Tenet bears "ultimate responsibility" for the CIA's lack of a unified, strategic plan for fighting al-Qaeda. The intelligence community "did not have a documented, comprehensive approach" to al-Qaeda, the document said, and Tenet "did not use all of his authorities" to prepare one.

Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, "CIA Finds Holes in Pre-9/11 Work," *Washington Post* (August 22, 2007), p. A1.

In the middle of the hunt for bin Laden and the wiping out of al-Qaeda's leadership, the Bush administration decided that Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction were greater threats. Even prior to September 11 it was known in the CIA that the Bush administration was eager to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Their reasoning was that deposing Hussein and establishing a favorable government in Iraq would produce a base of support in the Middle East for the United States, because it was apparent that there was no solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Extreme pressure from the neoconservatives in the Bush administration, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, for the CIA to produce intelligence justification to go to war with Iraq resulted in widespread dissatisfaction among CIA analysts. Many of them believed that an Iraqi war would hinder the hunt for bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. They believed that the United States should concentrate exclusively on Afghanistan and the al-Qaeda network. Those analysts who were too vocal with their dissatisfaction were fired, got transferred, or were severely criticized. Despite warnings from these CIA analysts about the lack of concrete intelligence, Tenet assured President Bush and his advisors that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The failure to find these weapons of mass destruction ended Bush's confidence in Tenet. In the meantime, the rank-and-file of the CIA had become critics of the Bush administration. They issued a series of intelligence reports that contradicted or were critical of the premises of the Bush administration's occupation of Iraq. Many of these reports were leaked to the news media.

After Tenet's resignation, Bush appointed former Florida congressman Porter Goss to head the CIA. He had worked for the CIA in the 1960s, but most of his knowledge of the CIA came from his seven years as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. President Bush gave Goss a mandate to bring the CIA back to Bush's political team. A short time after Goss came into Langley headquarters, senior CIA officials began to leave in droves. In April 2005 the CIA inspector general's report surfaced that presented detailed criticism of the performance of more than a dozen former and current CIA officials. Goss quashed the recommendation that there be accountability boards to recommend personnel actions against those charged in the report. Despite this action, the clash between Goss's team and CIA veterans reached epic proportions. In the long run, however, it was Goss's inability to work with his nominal boss, John Negroponte, the director of national intelligence, that led to his demise. President Bush asked for and received Goss's resignation on May 5, 2006. His successor was U.S. Air Force four-star General Michael Hayden, the former head of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the number two person under Negroponte.

See Also

Alec Station; Counterterrorism Center; Goss, Porter J.; Tenet, George

See Documents

Document #11; Document #27

Suggested Reading

Robert Dreyfuss, "The Yes-Man: President Bush Sent Porter Goss to the CIA to Keep the Agency in Line. What He's Really Doing Is Wrecking It," *American Prospect* (November 2005), p. 18; Tyler Drumheller and Elaine Monaghan, *On the Brink: An Insider's Account of How the White House Compromised American Intelligence* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2006); Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004); Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before

and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, *Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 2 vols.; John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Timothy Naftali, *Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2005); James Risen, *State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration* (New York: Free Press, 2006); George Tenet and Bill Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007).

Chomsky, Noam (1928–)

Noam Chomsky has long been an active critic of the U.S. government and its policies, and his views on the events surrounding September 11, 2001, resonate in radical left circles in the United States. A distinguished academic in the field of linguistics, he has devoted much of his career as a self-appointed commentator on the failures of the American government. Chomsky is not an advocate of conspiracy theories, but he has a unique perspective that sometimes gets him into political difficulty. Chomsky belongs to no political party, and his critiques have been equally harsh on both sides of the political spectrum.

Chomsky is the product of an anti-Zionist Jewish background. He was born December 7, 1928, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His father was a Hebrew scholar and a member of the radical labor union International Workers of the World (IWW). Both parents were from Russia: his father was from the Ukraine and his mother from Belarus. Chomsky grew up immersed in Hebrew culture and literature. He attended and then graduated from Central High School in Philadelphia in 1945. That same year he started studying philosophy and linguistics at the University of Pennsylvania. Shortly after graduation from the University of Pennsylvania, he married fellow linguist Carol Schatz. Chomsky continued graduate work in linguistics, receiving his PhD in 1955. During the period from 1951 to 1955 he was a Harvard Junior Fellow working on his dissertation. Soon after graduation, he found a teaching position at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). His 1957 book *Syntactic Structures* began to revolutionize the study of linguistics. His growing renown led to his appointment in 1961 as full professor in MIT's department of modern languages and linguistics. In 1966 he received the Ferrari P. Ward Professorship of Modern Languages and Linguistics, which he held until 1976, when he received appointment as institute professor. He remained a professor at MIT until his retirement. He is now a professor emeritus of linguistics at MIT.

Chomsky was famous worldwide for his contributions to theories on linguistics, but he began a lifelong involvement with politics in the 1960s. His first engagement in politics was as a vocal critic of the Vietnam War. After the Vietnam War ended, Chomsky continued his critique of the U.S. government. He asserted that the foreign policy of the United States promoted a double standard by preaching democracy and freedom for all but at the same time supporting and allying itself with nondemocratic and repressive states and political groups. He has also been critical of the American capitalist system and big business. His political views can be loosely defined as a libertarian socialist. Although he is opposed to most wars, Chomsky is not a pacifist: he has stated that he thought World War II was a just war.

In his comments on the September 11 attacks, Chomsky has acknowledged that it was an al-Qaeda operation, but he still questions government actions taken before September 11. He considers September 11 an atrocity, but he is more concerned about the reasons for the attack. He chronicles a series of missteps by the U.S. government in the last thirty years that led to the attack on the United States. It is his contention that the United States is a terrorist state, and it should not be surprising that the American government should be so hated in the Muslim world.

Chomsky's Response to a Question about the Bush Administration's Role in Orchestrating the September 11 Attacks on October 6, 2006

I think the Bush administration would have had to be utterly insane to try anything like what is alleged, for their own narrow interests, and do not think that serious evidence has been provided to support claims about actions that would not only be outlandish, for their own interests, but that have no remote historical parallel. The effects, however, are all too clear, namely, what I just mentioned: diverting activism and commitment away from the very serious ongoing crimes of state.

ZNet Blogs, "9-11: Institutional Analysis vs. Conspiracy Theory" (http://blogs.zmag.org/node/2779).

Chomsky warned that the Bush administration would take advantage of the September 11 attacks to embrace an adventurous foreign policy. He was critical of the invasion of Afghanistan, but the invasion of Iraq has brought forth a barrage of articles and talks critical of this action. Chomsky does not defend Saddam Hussein, but he notes that most of the atrocities of Saddam's regime were committed when he was an ally of the United States. Chomsky believes that the United States has overextended itself in a region that is unstable.

Chomsky frequently agitates right-wing supporters of the Bush administration. They have called him a traitor and a madman. His biographer Robert F. Barsky has commented that Chomsky's ideas have "led people to idolize him, debate about him, arrest him, utter slanderous comments about him, and censor his work." Chomsky responds to his critics in the same way that he addresses his supporters—by careful reasoning and facts. It is interesting to note that in a poll conducted by the British magazine *Prospect* Chomsky was ranked as "the world's greatest intellectual." Chomsky is more modest than this, but he does confess to holding the United States to a higher standard of conduct because it is a free society.

See Also

Conspiracy Theories; World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading

David Barsamian, "The United States Is a Leading Terrorist State," *Monthly Review* 53.6 (November 2001), p. 1; Robert F. Barsky, *Noam Chomsky: A Life of Dissent* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Robin Blackburn and Oliver Kamm, "For and against Chomsky," *Prospect* [London] (October 20, 2005), p. 1; Noam Chomsky, *9/11* (Seven Stories Press, 2001); Shane Hegarty, "Lighthouse of the Left," *Irish Times* [Dublin] (January 14, 2006), p. 5; Stan Persky, "Who Loves You, Noam Chomsky," *Globe and Mail* [Canada] (February 15, 2003), p. D2.

Churchill, Ward (1947–)

A professional casualty of September 11 has been the radical leftist professor Ward Churchill. His intemperate writings following September 11 produced such a controversy that he has been terminated as a tenured professor at the University of

Colorado at Boulder. He had always been a controversial figure because of his constant left-wing criticism of the policies of the American government and society.

Churchill was born on October 2, 1947, in Elmwood, Illinois. Churchill claims that he was one-sixteenth Cherokee Indian, but there is some doubt about this claim. The Keetoowah Band of Cherokee classified him only as an honorary associate member, not a member of the tribe. After graduation from Elmwood High School in 1965, he was drafted into the United States Army in 1966. His military records show that he was trained as a projectionist and light truck driver, but Churchill has claimed that he went to paratrooper school and served a ten-month tour as a member of a long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP). Churchill's claim has never been substantiated. Churchill has also maintained that he worked with the Students for a Democratic Society and the Weather Underground in the late 1960s, but again confirmation has not been forthcoming. What is known is that Churchill attended Sangamon State University (now the University of Illinois at Springfield), where he received a BA and MA in communication. His next known job was as an affirmative action officer at the University of Colorado at Boulder beginning in the late 1970s.

Churchill's academic career has been controversial. He was hired as an associate professor in the department of ethnic studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder in 1990. This appointment was unusual because Churchill did not have a PhD. Nevertheless, he received tenure in 1991; such a rapid granting of tenure was contrary to usual practices. Then he was promoted to professor in 1997. Both in the granting of tenure and the promotion to professor, his credentials as a researcher were examined and not found lacking. He was serving a term as chairman of the ethnic studies department until he resigned under fire in January 2005. Helping these promotions was a prolific publication record on both Indian affairs and American foreign policy.

Churchill was also active in the American Indian Movement (AIM). He became involved with AIM in the mid-1980s. He has served as the co-director of the Denver-based American Indian Movement of Colorado. When some of the chapters broke with the national AIM leadership in 1993, Churchill stayed with the dissidents. Churchill has remained active in AIM, and he has been arrested several times for anti–Columbus Day demonstrations.

Churchill was tolerated as a radical leftist professor at the University of Colorado at Boulder until his essay in September 2001 about the September 11 attacks appeared first on the Internet and then in a print publication. His essay entitled "Some People Push Back: On the Justice of Roosting Chickens" appeared on the Internet in September 2001. In this essay, he charged that the attack on September 11 was a consequence of atrocities committed by Americans in the Middle East. The employees of the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, he wrote, were legitimate targets—those in the Pentagon because they belonged to the American military-industrial complex, and those in the Twin Towers because they were part of "a technocratic corps at the very heart of America's global financial empire." Then he referred to those working in the Twin Towers as "little Eichmanns." The essay continued by attacking the atrocities committed by the U.S. government in the form of collateral damage.

It took time for these writings to filter out, but by 2005 the controversy was in full bloom. People were outraged, and soon Colorado and national politicians began to intervene with calls that Churchill be fired. On February 1, 2005, the

Republican governor of Colorado, Bill Owens, wrote a letter to the College Republicans at the University of Colorado at Boulder calling for Churchill's resignation (see sidebar).

The university administration at the University of Colorado at Boulder took action after receiving this political pressure. After the president of the university affirmed Churchill's right to academic freedom, the university's Standing Committee on Research Misconduct formed a panel of five members to investigate Churchill's research and publications. Three members of the panel were from the University of Colorado at Boulder, one from the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State University, and one from the Center for Mexican-American Studies at the University of Texas at Austin. Two were professors of law (one a specialist on criminal law, and the other a specialist on Indian law), one a historian (not on native American subjects), one a sociologist (capital punishment specialist), and one a Mexican American studies specialist. In a 124-page report, they concluded that there was evidence in seven cases of scholarly misconduct that warranted either his firing or suspension of up to five years. The university took this panel's findings and initiated procedures to fire Churchill. His lawyer made it plain that if the University of Colorado at Boulder fired Churchill, there would be a lawsuit.

Letter from Governor Bill Owens Calling on Churchill to Resign as Professor at the University of Colorado (February 1, 2005)

All decent people, whether Republican or Democrat, liberal or conservative, should denounce the views of Ward Churchill. Not only are his writings outrageous and insupportable, they are at odds with the facts of history. The thousands of innocent people—and innocent they were—who were murdered on September 11 were murdered by evil cowards. Indeed, if anyone could possibly be compared to the evildoers of Nazi Germany, it is the terrorists of the 21st century who have an equally repugnant disregard for innocent human life.

No one wants to infringe on Mr. Churchill's right to express himself. But we are not compelled to accept his pro-terrorist views at state taxpayer subsidy nor under the banner of the University of Colorado. Ward Churchill besmirches the University and the excellent teaching, writing and research of its faculty.

Ideas have consequences, and words have meaning. If there is one lesson that we hope that all Coloradans take from this sad case—and especially our students—it is that civility and appropriate conduct are important. Mr. Churchill's views are not simply anti-American. They are at odds with simple decency, and antagonistic to the beliefs and conduct of civilized people around the world. His views are far outside the mainstream of civil discourse and useful academic work.

His resignation as chairman of the Ethnic Studies Department was a good first step. We hope that he will follow this step by resigning his position on the faculty of the University of Colorado.

Letter issued from the Office of the Governor of Colorado.

The panel's findings have not escaped scrutiny. Cathryn Hazouri, executive director of American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), came to the defense of Churchill with the statement that "death threats, canceling speaking engagements and threats of losing his job are not appropriate responses to Ward Churchill's opinions, even if you believe they are outrageous." The panel's report drew attention to just six pages from Churchill's production of more than twenty books and one hundred articles. There were also complaints that all charges were brought by

Interim Chancellor Phil DeStefano, who served as both judge and jury of the case. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) also concluded that the research misconduct charges might have been politically motivated (see sidebar). There have been concerns expressed by faculty at other universities as well. An open letter to the *New York Times Review of Books* by eleven prominent professors, including Noam Chomsky of MIT and Richard Falk of Princeton University, charged that the actions of the University of Colorado at Boulder constituted a threat to academic freedom.

It is notable how differently the University of Colorado acted in the Ward Churchill case from how Northwestern University has handled the notorious Holocaust denier professor Arthur Butz. Butz has remained controversial, but no panel has ever been established by Northwestern University to study his academic credentials and research on denying the Holocaust.

Official Statement of the American Association of University Professors about Ward Churchill

Freedom of faculty members to express views, however unpopular or distasteful, is an essential condition of an institution of higher learning that is truly free. We deplore threats of violence heaped upon Professor Churchill, and we reject the notion that some viewpoints are so offensive or disturbing that the academic community should not allow them to be heard and debated. Also reprehensible are inflammatory statements by public officials that interfere in the decision of the academic community.

Statement released by the AAUP on February 4, 2005 (http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/newsroom/prarchives/2005/Church.htm).

In the meantime, Churchill has been active on the speaker's circuit. He is quite popular with a large segment of the student population. His difficulties with the University of Colorado at Boulder have made him a martyr in left-wing circles. His fee for speaking has now risen to around $5,000 an appearance.

See Also
World Trade Center, September 11

See Document
Document #29

Suggested Reading
Jennifer Brown, "CU Moves to Fire Churchill," *Denver Post* (June 27, 2006), p. A1; Jennifer Brown, "Panel on Churchill: Fire or Suspend Him; CU Prof Strayed from the Truth," *Denver Post* (May 17, 2006), p. A1; Matt Labash, "The Ward Churchill Notoriety Tour," *Weekly Standard* [Washington, DC] 10.30 (April 25, 2005), p. 1; Michelle Pascucci, "Professor's Essay Sparks Free Speech Debate at Cornell U.," *Cornell Daily Sun* (March 14, 2007), p. 1.

Clarke, Richard A. (1951–)

Richard A. Clarke was the chief counterterrorism advisor on the U.S. National Security Council on September 11, 2001. He was a career specialist in intelligence and counterterrorism. He was one of the few carryovers from the Clinton administration that the Bush administration had retained, but he had difficulty in making the case that al-Qaeda was a major danger to the United States.

His entire career was in government service. He was born in 1951 in Boston, Massachusetts. His father was a blue-collar factory worker at a Boston chocolate factory, and his mother was a nurse. After a divorce, Clarke was raised by his mother. He won a competitive exam to attend the prestigious Boston Latin School, where

he graduated in 1969. His undergraduate degree was earned from the University of Pennsylvania in 1972. He then attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he earned a degree in management. His first job, beginning in 1973, was with the U.S. Department of Defense as a defense analyst counting Soviet nuclear warheads. After a series of appointments, he was promoted in 1985 to the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence in the Reagan administration. By this time Steve Coll asserts that he had earned a reputation as being a "blunt instrument, a bully, and occasionally abusive." He continued to work with the George H. W. Bush administration and helped on security affairs during the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War. In 1992 James Baker, the Secretary of State, fired him for his apparent defense of Israel's transfer of U.S. technology to the People's Republic of China. Clarke then moved to the National Security Council in the White House, where he began to specialize in counterterrorism. Clarke was also held over in the Clinton administration, continuing as a member of the National Security Council from 1992 to 2003.

Clarke's preoccupation was with counterintelligence. Among his contentions was that Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda was a growing threat to the United States. President Clinton agreed with this assessment, but he was engaged in a series of controversies that distracted him and his administration. Clarke lobbied for a Counterterrorism Security Group to be chaired by a new national security official, the National Coordinator for Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism. President Clinton approved this office by signing Presidential Decision Directive 62 on May 22, 1998.

Clarke presided over a working group that included the counterterrorism heads of the CIA, FBI, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Departments of Defense, Justice, and State. But the National Coordinator for Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism had a limited staff of twelve and no budget; moreover, operational decision making could come only from the departments and agencies of the intelligence community. As Clarke has pointed out, he had the "appearance of responsibility for counterterrorism, but none of the tools or authority to get the job done." Nevertheless, Clarke was in the middle of several counterterrorism operations. He was involved in the decision making about the CIA's snatch operation against Osama bin Laden in 1998. An Afghan team was to capture bin Laden at his residence at Tarnak Farms near Kandahar. This raid was called off because there was a lack of confidence that it would succeed by CIA leadership, the White House, and Clarke.

Clarke continued his position on the National Security Council during the early years of the Bush administration. He proposed a plan to combat al-Qaeda that included covert aid to the Afghan leader of the Northern Alliance, Massoud, spy flights of the new Predator, and ways to eliminate bin Laden as a threat to the United States, but there was little enthusiasm for this report by the Bush administration. Becoming frustrated, Clarke decided to resign from government work in November 2001. In the interval, the events of September 11, 2001, transpired, changing the American political landscape. On September 12, President Bush instructed him to try to find evidence that Saddam Hussein was connected to September 11. Clarke sent a report to the White House stating categorically that Hussein had nothing to do with these terrorist attacks, but there is no evidence indicating whether President Bush read the report. The report was sent back to be updated and resubmitted, but nothing came of it.

Clarke left government service in 2003. He then became an outspoken critic of the Bush administration and its policies prior to September 11. This led the White House to engage in a character assassination campaign against him. Clarke testified for twenty hours during the 9/11 Commission hearings. He made national headlines for his apology that the government had failed to prevent the September 11 attacks (see sidebar). In the middle of the 9/11 Commission hearings, Clarke published his book *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*, which gives his side of the controversy.

In his book Clarke was especially critical of the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq. Most of his criticism stems from his belief that, by redirecting attention away from bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the Bush administration has allowed al-Qaeda to reconstitute itself into an ongoing threat to the United States. In his eyes the invasion of Afghanistan was so half-hearted in its commitment of American forces that bin Laden and nearly all of the al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders easily escaped. By not committing the necessary resources to rebuild Afghanistan, Clarke wrote, the Bush administration has allowed both al-Qaeda and the Taliban to threaten the pro-American Afghanistan state, all to depose Saddam Hussein.

Clarke's Apology to the Families of the Victims of 9/11 before the 9/11 Commission

I welcome these hearings because of the opportunity that they provide to the American people to better understand why the tragedy of 9/11 happened and what we must do to prevent a recurrence.

I also welcome the hearings because it is finally a forum where I can apologize to the loved ones of the victims of 9/11. To them who are here in the room, to those who are watching on television, your government failed you, those entrusted with protecting you failed you, and I failed you. We tried hard, but that doesn't matter because we failed.

Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004), p. 293.



Former White House counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke addresses the American Library Association's annual convention in Orlando, Florida, in 2004 while promoting his book *Against All Enemies.* (AP IMAGES/Bruce Weaver.)

See Also
Bush, George W.; Bush Administration; Clinton Administration
See Documents
Document #8; Document #31
Suggested Reading
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002); Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004); Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004); Timothy Naftali, *Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism* (Basic Books, 2005).

Cleanup Operations at Ground Zero

Almost immediately after the attacks on the World Trade Center, cleanup operations started at Ground Zero. The collapse of the Twin Towers meant that there was little chance of survivors, but the effort had to be made. New York Fire Department (NYFD) firefighters, New York City police, Port Authority police, and others from federal agencies began looking for survivors. Only a handful of survivors were found the first day and none thereafter. For the first few days there was chaos as the bucket brigades were ineffectual and barely scratched the surface of the debris. The problem was that the debris from the buildings had fallen into four different sectors that were almost cut off from each other. At first, heavy equipment could not get into the site because of the fallen pedestrian bridge on West Street, so the only debris that was recovered on the first couple of days was by hand.

There was also a cloud of accumulated dust and fumes hanging over the scene of destruction. This air was toxic because, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), "Ground Zero inhalation tests of ambient air showed WTC dust consisted predominantly (95 percent) of coarse particles and pulverized cement, with glass fibers, asbestos, lead, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHS), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), and polychlorinated furans and dioxins." Thousands of police, firefighters, paramedics, and construction workers worked at the site for several months and breathed this air. Many of them began the hacking cough that soon earned the name "the World Trade Center cough."

Search and rescue teams started clearing the site and recovering as many body parts as possible. Four temporary tent morgues were set up on the site at the World Trade Center complex. Later, body parts were taken to a centralized morgue. It was a slow, grueling job recovering bodies and body parts, and it sometimes turned out to be dangerous. Fortunately, there were few major injuries at the site.

Complicating the early days of the rescue and recovery work were calls from family members stating that their loved ones were still alive. Firefighters and police followed up on these calls in the first days after September 11. Then they realized that the calls had been triggered by the backed up communication system. So many cell phone calls had been made on September 11 that the overloaded communication system could not transmit them all. These messages were stored and sent later, when the communication system went back on line. Families then received messages that their loved ones had made before they died on September 11, confusing them and everyone else.

Within days, more than 1,000 construction workers began clearing debris alongside the emergency workers. Four companies participated in the cleanup: Bovis

Company, Turner Construction Company, Tully Construction Company, and Amec Construction Management. They used more than 150 pieces of heavy equipment, including twenty cranes and the Caterpillar 345 Ultra High Excavator for difficult jobs. Work was slow because of frequent interruptions to recover bodies and body parts of victims.

The construction workers received instructions not to be involved in body removal. After ascertaining that there were no bodies or body parts in a particular area, they loaded debris onto semis and dump trucks and took it to a wash and inspection station for inspection by FBI and Secret Service agents and then washed it down. The debris was then hauled down to a pier for loading onto a barge. This barge carried it to the Fishkill Landfill on Staten Island. There the debris was searched again before being added to the landfill.

As the debris removal picked up steam, another serious problem surfaced. In the construction of the World Trade complex, a wall had been built to keep out water from the Hudson River. This wall had been built because half of the sixteen-acre site had extended Manhattan Island 700 feet into the river. The problem was that this wall had been weakened in the collapse of the buildings. This wall had to be reinforced, or Hudson River water would have flooded much of lower Manhattan, causing a catastrophe greater than the World Trade Center attack. So a delicate balance had to be maintained between debris removal and bringing in material to reinforce the wall. This balancing act was successful, so no flooding took place.

Soon after the arrival of the construction workers, a controversy developed over the number of firefighters who were to remain working at Ground Zero. This issue had great importance to the firefighters because they were interested in finding bodies and body parts. The construction workers were more concerned about cleaning up the debris. What made the firefighters particularly assertive about finding any remains was that many of the missing victims were Catholic. Unless there was a body part, the Catholic Church refused to perform a funeral mass. Ultimately a compromise was worked out, with a significant number of firefighters staying at the World Trade Center site until the last part of the debris was removed in May 2002.

Importance of the Slurry Wall

The operation to secure the slurry wall lasted nine months, and meanwhile every day at Ground Zero we faced the possibility we could drown if the wall collapsed. It was another reason why security was so tight. We all feared a second terrorist attack. If terrorists breached the slurry wall, they would finish the job they started on 9-11 and destroy New York City itself.

William Keegan Jr., *Closure: The Untold Story of the Ground Zero Recovery Mission* (New York: Touchstone, 2006), p. 11.

Another significant problem was that decision making for the World Trade Center site was by committee. Representatives from twenty-six federal, state, regional, and city agencies made the major decisions. New York City's Department of Design and Construction had been given overall control of the site, but it had only one representative on the committee. A representative from each agency had an equal vote on decisions, but decisions were not made by majority rule. Some agencies had more clout than others, and this clash of interests and opinions made for chaotic decision making.

Throughout the cleanup the presence of fire made work difficult. These fires were entirely under the pile and the workers rarely saw them. Only when the piles

were penetrated did the fires' cherry red glow become visible. The fires received their oxygen from tunnels and underground areas, and they burned at a temperature from 1,000 to 1,800 degrees. At times the workers stood in areas where their boots began to melt. Attempts to attack the fires by pouring water on them were ineffective because of the densely packed debris. Water hit the fires and produced steam and smoke, making for two more hazards.

Another hazard of the cleanup was unexploded ammunition. Evidently there had been 1,700 live rounds scattered around World Trade Center Building 6. This ammunition had belonged to the U.S. Customs Service. Although there were no fatalities caused by this loose ammunition, there was one slight injury when a workman set off a round accidentally.

One issue that was unknown by anyone at the site was the gold and silver bullion stored at the World Trade Center complex and owned by Scotiabank. There was $110,000,000 worth of gold bars and $120,000,000 of silver bars in a vault under World Trade Center Building 4. A Port Authority police officer located the vault on October 17, 2001. Scotiabank officials were then notified of the finding of the vault. During a four-day period, all of the gold and silver bars were moved under the authority of the Port Authority police. It took 133 trucks to complete the transfer.

By mid-November a new threat to the site appeared in the form of Freon gas. Underneath the former North Tower was the main chiller plant, which had refrigeration units capable of holding 24,000 pounds of Freon gas. If the units had leaked, the gas would have filled voids in the underground before rising to the surface to kill as many as hundreds of workers. Another danger was that the Freon gas might come into contact with open flames, producing poison gas resembling mustard gas used in World War I. In this case the casualties could be in the thousands. There was also an increasing danger that one of the large construction machines might puncture the Freon gas storage unit. A special team went underground to explore the condition of the chiller plant. This team discovered that the Freon gas had already vented, and the danger had passed without casualties.

One ongoing problem on the cleanup site was the failure of the firefighters, police, and workers to wear their personal protective equipment. This failure was particularly noticeable in the failure to use respirators, despite safety officials' attempts to persuade those working in the debris to wear them. The most stubborn were the firefighters. Their reasoning was that they needed to be able to smell to find the dead bodies. This safety deficiency was reported to the New York City's Department of Design and Construction and to the Committee of twenty-six representatives of the agencies time and again, but nothing was done. The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and other safety officials had no authority to enforce safety rules.

The cleanup at Ground Zero officially ended on May 30, 2002, with a ceremony. The "Last Piece of Steel" was to be ceremoniously carried by truck escorted by an honor guard and signaled by the beat of a single drum. In a meeting it was determined that the Port Authority police would guard and be in charge of the "Last Piece of Steel." Plans came from the mayor's office that the honor guard would be composed of fifteen members of each group that had worked at Ground Zero. Those groups interested in the proceedings, however, decided to ignore this limit, and the honor guard consisted of all personnel still working at the site in May 2002. Family members of the victims of September 11 were also invited to

participate. The ceremony went off without any difficulty, and crowds lined the way, clapping in rhythm to the drum beat.

Since the end of the cleanup at Ground Zero, numerous workers at the site have been experiencing health problems. The most famous case was the death in January 2006 of New York Police Department Detective James Zadroga, at age thirty-four, from a lung disease directly related to his more than 450 hours working at Ground Zero. Of the approximately 30,000 people who worked at Ground Zero, 12,000 had instituted health claims by 2006. Most of the workers have suffered from pulmonary disease, but cancer has also been a factor. By January 2006 there were reports of the deaths of twenty-two other men, most in their thirties and forties. Another 400 NYPD detectives have also been suffering from health-related problems believed to have been brought on by their work at Ground Zero. In a 2002 survey more than 60 percent of the 1,138 responders reported "lower airway breathing problems," and 74 percent "reported upper airway breathing problems."

Many of the sufferers of the Ground Zero cleanup have resorted to lawsuits. These suits have had little impact on the health of those suffering from respiratory illness, however. Numerous others, potentially intimidated by the legal process, may be suffering in silence. The death toll is rising for those who helped in the cleanup; tumors and lung-scarring diseases have been known to emerge between five and twenty years after a toxic exposure.

See Also

Firefighters at Ground Zero; Ielpi, Lee; Von Essen, Thomas; World Trade Center, September 11; Zadroga, James

See Documents

Document #17; Document #19; Document #25

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Clinton Administration

The Clinton administration was no longer in power when the events of September 11, 2001, unfolded, but some of its policies contributed its background. It was during President Clinton's eight years in office that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda emerged as a threat to the United States. Bin Laden twice in 1996 and again in 1998 issued declarations of hostilities against the United States. President Clinton had priorities other than terrorism, such as health care, education, NAFTA, gays in the military, instability in Russia, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the policies of rogue states. Early in his administration President Clinton

dealt with foreign policy issues as they became crises: Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia. Despite these other issues, bin Laden made the Clinton administration pay attention by attacks against Americans around the world.

The lack of attention to terrorism by the Clinton administration led to the weakening of the intelligence capability of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as weak CIA directors were appointed. First, Clinton appointed James Woolsey as the director of the CIA. This appointment was in keeping with Clinton's pattern of keeping his distance from the CIA, which has been described by Steve Coll as "distant, mutually ill-informed, and strangely nonchalant." Woolsey was more interested in scientific and technical programs, particularly spy satellites, than in human intelligence. Consequently, the CIA came to depend on scientific/technical programs and deemphasized human intelligence gathering. It was not all Woolsey's fault; President Clinton only held two semiprivate meeting with Woolsey in his two years as CIA director. The CIA had hindered the FBI on the Aldrich Ames spy case, and this case had long-term negative impact on CIA-FBI relations. Ames, a veteran CIA agent, had been caught spying for the Soviet Union and had betrayed more than 100 CIA agents before being caught in 1994. There had been indicators that Ames was a spy, but the CIA had refused to pass on the information to the FBI. In the course of nearly two years, Woolsey had alienated Clinton, the FBI, Congressional leaders, and the CIA's rank-and-file. He decided to resign on December 26, 1994.

Next, Clinton appointed John Deutch to be director of the CIA. Deutch did not want the job, because he was content in his position as Deputy Secretary of Defense, but Clinton persuaded him to take the job anyway. Even more so than Woolsey, Deutch was a champion of scientific and technical intelligence collection. He belittled the need for human intelligence, and by telling the CIA's analysts his opinion he alienated them. The CIA budget shrank and veteran CIA administrators and analysts were encouraged to retire. Deutch lasted only nineteen controversial months before Clinton fired him.

Several events in 1995 made the Clinton administration aware of the dangers of terrorism. One was the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinrikyo sect on March 25, 1995. The vocal anti-Americanism of this sect of 50,000 members worried counterterrorism officials. The next event was the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995, by Timothy McVeigh and associates. It showed how easily terrorists could acquire bomb-making materials.

The Clinton administration had already introduced the Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Act of 1995 in February, trying to bypass some of the limitations placed on intelligence operations. But even after the Oklahoma bombing, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives refused to bring it to a vote. Disbelieving that a major terrorist threat was on the horizon, Republicans decided to sacrifice any efforts at counterterrorism and instead criticize the Clinton administration for its failures. In 1996 Congress did pass the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, but many of the original provisions involving firearms control were eliminated because of the objections of the gun lobby. Two important provisions were retained: chemical markers on high explosives and legal authority to bar terrorists from entering the United States (Alien Terrorist Removal Court).

During his second term in office, Clinton and his administration became more aware of the threat of both domestic and foreign terrorism. His appointment of

George Tenet helped stabilize the CIA, but Clinton still had reservations about the reliability of intelligence coming from the CIA. The presence of Richard Clarke in the White House brought counterterrorism to the forefront of the president's agenda. Bombings of U.S. embassies at Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in August 1998 were rude wake-up calls. President Clinton authorized cruise missile attacks on an al-Qaeda training camp and on a factory in Sudan. A large meeting of al-Qaeda leaders was scheduled to be held at the Zawhar Kili training camp complex near Khost, in eastern Afghanistan, on August 20, 1998. Osama bin Laden was supposed to be at this meeting. Seventy-five cruise missiles hit the complex, killing at least twenty and wounding scores of others. This attack proved to be a failure, probably because Pakistani security Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) warned al-Qaeda about the attack. (At least this is the evidence provided by Steve Coll in his book *Ghost Wars*.) The other cruise missile attack, at the al-Shifa plant in Sudan, was no more successful. A controversy developed because the al-Shifa plant turned out to be a pharmaceutical factory and not a chemical factory producing chemicals for al-Qaeda.

Several times the Clinton administration proposed special operations to be conducted by the military against terrorist targets. Each time senior generals in the Pentagon were reluctant to undertake special operations against terrorism suspects. Yet Richard A. Clarke reports that these senior generals were eager to let the word spread down through the ranks that the politicians in the While House were reluctant to act. They also communicated this to members of Congress and the media.

Hostile criticism about the missile attacks in 1998 from Republicans cooled the Clinton administration's ardor for further efforts to capture or kill bin Laden. Yet both the CIA and FBI reported intelligence to the Clinton administration that al-Qaeda was planning for terrorist activities within the United States. With these warnings still fresh, the Clinton administration slowly closed down any operations against bin Laden.

After the 1998 embassy attacks, the Clinton administration did attempt to disrupt al-Qaeda's financing. It took legal steps to freeze $240 million in al-Qaeda and Taliban assets in American bank accounts. Assets of Afghanistan's national airline, Ariana Afghan, were also frozen. These actions were inconvenient for al-Qaeda and made it shift its assets into commodities—diamonds and blue tanzanite—and the creation or use of Islamic charities to raise funds. Hindering the Clinton administration was the weakness of the international money-laundering laws. These laws were particularly weak in Kuwait, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Lebanon. Also, the traditional Islamic banking system, the hawala, heavily used in Afghanistan and Pakistan, was cash based, leaving no written or electronic records. These factors brought limited success to the Clinton administration's efforts to restrict the flow of funds to al-Qaeda.

See Also

African Embassy Bombings; Bin Laden, Osama; Clarke, Richard A.; Qaeda, al-

See Document

Document #31

Suggested Reading

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002); Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, from*

Opinion of Richard Clarke on the Clinton Administration's Efforts on Terrorism in Testimony before the 9/11 Commission

My impression was that fighting terrorism, in general, and fighting al-Qaeda, in particular, were an extraordinarily high priority in the Clinton administration—certainly [there was] no higher priority. There were priorities probably of equal importance such as the Middle East peace process, but I certainly don't know of one that was any higher in the priority of the administration.

Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*, paperback edition (New York: Free Press, 2004), p. 293.

Jihad to Ground Zero (New York: Times Books, 2002); Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Vintage Books, 2005); Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004); Timothy Naftali, *Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2005); Gerald Posner, *Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003).

Conspiracy Theories

From day after the attacks on September 11, conspiracy theories appeared and began to spread. A disaster of such magnitude, along with some of the mysterious circumstances surrounding it, promoted such theories. The conspiracy theorists started with a hypothesis challenging the official version and began searching for information to support their theories. Any data that did not conform to their preconceived ideas were discounted, particularly if the data came from government sources, the mainstream media, or social scientists. Americans and Europeans have become susceptible to this type of thinking when building conspiracy theories.

A leading conspiracy theorist was the French left-wing activist Thierry Meyssan. His book *L'Effroyable Imposture: 11 Septembre 2001* (*The Frightening Fraud: September 11, 2001)* charged that it was a plot by the American government to discredit its enemies and to increase the U.S defense budget This book appeared in 2002 and became an immediate best seller. Among his assertions was that the damage to the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., could not have been caused by a Boeing 757 but was instead a missile strike or a truck bombing made to appear as a plane crash. He also challenged eyewitness testimony. His thesis was that the September 11 attacks were part of a military conspiracy in the United States to impose a military regime. Media in both France and the United States have attacked the book for its bizarre claims. Shortly after the publication of his book, the U.S. Department of Defense declared Meyssan persona non grata. This status meant that Meyssan would be unable to enter the United States for any reason. The U.S. government followed in July 2005 with a document from the U.S. Department of State classifying him as a major source of anti-American propaganda in the world.

Another conspiracy theorist is A. K. Dewdney, a professor emeritus of computer science at the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada. His theory, which he calls "Operation Pearl," makes September 11 a U.S. government conspiracy. In his thesis the first three passenger aircraft landed at Harrisburg International Airport, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, where the passengers disembarked. Three remote-controlled aircraft then were launched against the World Trade Center complex and the Pentagon. Passengers were then packed into United Airlines Flight 93 aircraft, which was then shot down over Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The three empty aircraft were flown over the ocean and disposed of in a watery grave.

Dowdney's thesis lacks credibility for a number of reasons. First, there were too many passengers to cram into one aircraft. Second, two videos and numerous witnesses show both American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 crash into the World Trade Center's twin towers. Third, seven witnesses saw a commercial aircraft crash into the Pentagon. Fourth, and most important, it is likely that the U.S. government lacks the capability to carry out such an involved conspiracy without being caught. Richard A. Clarke maintains that conspiracy theorists simultaneously hold two contrary beliefs. The first is that the U.S. government is so incompetent that it can miss explanations the conspiracy theorists can uncover, and second, that the same government can keep a secret of that magnitude.

Conspiracy theories appear at every important event in U.S. history. Marcus LiBrizzi, an English professor at the University of Maine at Machias and an authority on conspiracy theories, however, was shocked at how soon conspiracy theories on 9/11 appeared, because normally it takes a decade or so before conspiracy theories develop enough material to be articulated and to surface.

The leadership of the conspiracy theories on September 11 is a diverse group. The movement's most vocal theorists are David Ray Griffin, a retired professor of postmodern theology; James H. Fetzer, a professor at the University of Minnesota–Duluth; Steven F. Jones, a retired physicist from Brigham Young University; and Jim Marrs, a freelance writer who specializes in conspiracy theories. All of them joined Fetzer's Scholars for 9/11 Truth to coordinate the investigations on the events surrounding 9/11. Soon, however, differences over the interpretation of 9/11 developed between Fetzer and Jones. Jones left the Scholars for 9/11 Truth to form the Scholars for 9/11 Truth and Justice. Even among the leaders of the conspiracist movement, there are wide-ranging views on the nature of the conspiracy. These views range from the impossible to the ridiculous; all, however, blame the U.S. government.

Explanation by Marcus LiBrizzi on Why Conspiracy Theories Proliferate

"In a world that is increasingly fragmented or even alienating and confusing, I think conspiracy theories give us back that sense of connection that is lost. It's even that old stereotype that everything is connected; I think that's one of the reasons we want to believe in them. [These theories] really tap into one of the most dominant fears in contemporary conspiracy theories . . . new world order. It's kind of like [George] Orwell's *1984*, a nightmarish version of a one-world government, of a real totalitarian government."

Ed Balint, "Catastrophic Events of 9/11 Prove a Magnet for Conspiracy Theories," *Copley News Service* (September 8, 2006), p. 1.

See Also

Fetzer, James H.; Griffin, David Ray; Jones, Steven E.; Marrs, Jim; Meyssan, Thierry; Scholars for 9/11 Truth

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Counterterrorism Center

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) decided in 1985 to create a new section to fight against international terrorism. This decision came shortly after intelligence

failures in Lebanon led to 241 U.S. Marines' deaths, and the kidnapping and killing of CIA Section Chief William Buckley. President Reagan placed pressure on the then-director of the CIA, William J. Casey, to do something about terrorism. Casey approached Duane R. "Dewey" Clarridge, a respected veteran field officer, to make a recommendation for a way that the CIA could most effectively fight terrorism. Clarridge recommended an interdisciplinary center in the CIA that had an international reach and could utilize all the capabilities of the CIA. Part of its mission was to launch covert action against known terrorists, so the Special Operations Group (SOG) was transferred to the Counterterrorism Center. It was to be a section staffed by 100 persons with representation from the FBI. Casey accepted Clarridge's recommendation and appointed him as its head. Instead of the original plan for a staff of 100, Casey authorized it at a staffing of 250. The Counterterrorism Center became operational in February 1986.

Clarridge's first target as head of the Counterterrorism Center was the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). In the 1970s and 1980s, the ANO, named after its leader, was the most violent terrorist group in operation and had become the number one terrorist threat. The CIA was able to recruit a source within ANO, and this source provided inside information. Much of this information was published in a State Department publication *The Abu Nidal Handbook*. After this information became public, Abu Nidal became so concerned about penetration of his organization that he ordered the execution of a large number of his followers in Libya. This purge ended the effectiveness of the ANO.

The next target was the Hezbollah (Party of God) in Lebanon. Hezbollah, a Shiite terrorist organization, had killed the 241 Marines in Beirut and had captured a number of Western hostages. Among its victims was William Buckley, the CIA agent in Lebanon, who died from harsh treatment. This campaign against Hezbollah was less successful because it proved impossible to find an agent able to penetrate Hezbollah's leadership. Efforts to launch covert operations were also hampered by a lack of intelligence and the reluctance of the American military to lend support.

Clarridge became frustrated by the lack of support for the Counterterrorism Center. His role in the Iran-Contra scandal also led his superiors in the CIA after Casey's illness to question his judgment. He maintained that Oliver North had misled him in the exchange of hostages from Iran for weapons to be used by the Contras to fight against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Clarridge's goal had been to make the center a proactive force against terrorism. Instead, he found that his boss, CIA director William Webster, who had assumed control of the CIA on May 26, 1987, was averse to risk. This lack of support led Clarridge to leave the Counterterrorism Center later in 1987. Later, in June 1988, he was forced to resign from the CIA by Webster.

Clarridge's successor, Fred Turco, picked the next target for the Counterterrorism Center, and it was Peru's Shining Path. Abimael Guzman, a philosophy professor, had founded the Maoist terrorist group in 1970, and it had opened a war against the Peruvian government. The Counterterrorism Center provided the Peruvian police sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment and training that enabled them to capture Guzman in a Lima suburb in September 1992. They found out that Guzman had a special diet and smoked a particular brand of tobacco. After briefing the Peruvian authorities on these facts, Peruvian police identified the stores that handled these items. By searching garbage, it was established where Guzman was staying.

The Counterterrorism Center's activities assumed more importance in 1993. By this time the new head of the Counterterrorism Center was Winston Wiley, who had assumed control in November 1992. Two events mobilized this activity. First was the murder of two CIA employees in Langley by Mir Amal Kasi on January 25, 1993. Believing the CIA responsible for countless Muslim deaths, Kasi opened fire with an AK-47 assault rifle just outside of CIA headquarters, killing the CIA employees. Kasi was from Baluchistan, and he managed to escape back to Pakistan, where he promptly disappeared. A special CIA unit was set up to locate and capture him. Kasi was finally captured on June 15, 1997.

An even bigger task was the investigation of the conspiracy behind the World Trade Center bombing on February 23, 1993. While the domestic investigation was left up to the FBI, the Counterterrorism Center established a subunit to gather intelligence about the bombing. Information was slow to surface, and at first the Counterterrorism Center suspected that it had been a state-sponsored terrorist operation with Iraq, Libya, and Iran as the prime suspects. Slowly the intelligence analysts came to realize that it was an independent operation led by Ramzi Yousef. In a combined CIA/FBI operation Yousef was capture in Islamabad on February 7, 1995.

The Counterterrorism Center continued to select terrorist groups to fight against. First under Geoff O'Connell and then under J. Cofer Black the Counterterrorism Center planned counterterrorist operations. Black's target was Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. He was also able to count on an expanded Counterterrorism Center. In 1986, the center had 20 analysts, but by early 2001 it had 340 people, of which more than a dozen were FBI agents. Despite the additions, the staffing of the Counterterrorism Center was too low to handle the volume of information flowing into it. Not surprisingly, considering the staffing, the leaders and the staff of the Counterterrorism Center were caught unaware on September 11, 2001.

American pressure on Sudan led bin Laden to move from Sudan to Afghanistan. Bin Laden, family, and retainers caught an aircraft on May 18, 1996, for the trip. The staff of the Counterterrorism Center thought that this presented a golden opportunity to capture bin Laden in transit. A proposal to do so was given to President Clinton, but it never received presidential approval. Members of the Counterterrorism Center were furious over this lost opportunity.

Throughout the late 1990s the analysts in the Counterterrorism Center were monitoring bin Laden's activities from sources within Afghanistan. The problem was that bin Laden was constantly moving, so that tracking him was almost impossible. Bin Laden was never in one place long enough to either capture or kill him. There was also an ongoing debate in the Clinton administration that was never resolved on whether it was legal to assassinate bin Laden. Attorney General Janet Reno made it plain to the head of the CIA, George Tenet, and then-head of the Counterterrorism Center, Geoff O'Connell, that any attempt to kill bin Laden was illegal. All schemes involved capturing bin Laden first and killing him only in self-defense.

Another problem was the issue of collateral damage in an attack on bin Laden. Isolating bin Laden from civilians was almost impossible. Members of the Counterterrorism Center wanted to proceed with covert action that might lead to collateral damage regardless of the consequences. They considered bin Laden too dangerous to the United States to live.

In the middle of the debate over bin Laden, the destroyer USS *Cole* was attacked in its Aden, Yemen, harbor on October 12, 2000. A small boat filled with explosives blew up alongside the *Cole*, killing nineteen American sailors and wounding scores more. This incident shocked the analysts in the Counterterrorism Center because there had been no intelligence indicating that something like this was going to happen. It took awhile for the analysts to find the evidence connecting this attack with al-Qaeda, but the evidence was found. Counterterrorism Center staffers wanted retaliation, but the American military was reluctant to undertake any operations and so advised the White House. To the leadership of the Counterterrorism Center the only option was to support the Afghan leader General Massoud and his war against the Taliban. But the Clinton administration was reluctant to back Massoud and forbade the Counterterrorism Center from increasing aid. The Clinton administration left office with the problem of bin Laden and al-Qaeda unresolved.

The analysts of the Counterterrorism Center continued to be frustrated by inaction of the Bush administration toward terrorism. Reports indicated increased activity by al-Qaeda, but the problem was that there was no evidence of where or what kind of operation it was going to undertake. A series of warnings came out of the Counterterrorism Center that Tenet took to President Bush and other prominent administration figures. These warnings coincided with similar warnings from the FBI. Some of these warning even made the case that al-Qaeda operatives might carry out an operation in the United States. What weakened these frequent warnings was the lack of specific details. The Bush administration listened to the warnings, noted the lack of specifics, and took no action. President Bush wanted more specific intelligence before he would authorize any action.

Tenet ordered the CIA to round up suspected al-Qaeda members to try to find out information on what al-Qaeda was planning. This tactic had two purposes: to gather intelligence and to delay al-Qaeda missions. Several al-Qaeda plots were uncovered, and a massive amount of intelligence material arrived at the Counterterrorism Center. The problem was that there were not enough translators and analysts to handle this mass of material. Frustration was high among the intelligence analysts because they were fearful that important information was being overlooked. In mid-July, Tenet ordered the Counterterrorism Center analysts to search back in its files and its current information on bin Laden's major plots. He was suspicious that bin Laden might be targeting the United States for a terrorism mission. Tenet took what information the Counterterrorism Center had uncovered and presented the report "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in United States" to President Bush at his Crawford, Texas, ranch on August 6, 2001. In early September the Bush administration began to consider a plan to attack terrorism, especially bin Laden and al-Qaeda, but there was no sense of haste.

After September 11, resources flowed into the Counterterrorism Center. By the summer of 2002, George Tenet had expanded its staff to 1,500. This size staff was able to handle 2,500 classified electronic communications a day, and it could produce 500 terrorist reports a month.

The Counterterrorism Center was also given the responsibility for the interrogations of important al-Qaeda prisoners. A series of secret interrogation centers were established in friendly countries. Top al-Qaeda prisoners were kept at an

interrogation center, Bright Lights, the location of which even analysts in the Counterterrorism Center had not been informed of. These interrogations are ongoing, with some of the information making it back to intelligence circles. There have also been reports of CIA interrogators using questionable interrogation techniques, so that the FBI wants nothing to do with these interrogations. Several news reports have confirmed this information, and CIA agents have become increasingly uncomfortable about their legal position over these interrogations. This nervousness about interrogation techniques led to controversy in December 2007, when news surfaced that the secret tapes of CIA interrogations had been destroyed in 2005. This action has been defended by the head of the CIA Michael V. Hayden, but there are congressional efforts to hold hearings on whether this action was illegal.

See Also

Alec Station; Bush Administration; Central Intelligence Agency; Clinton Administration; Tenet, George

See Documents

Document #5; Document #26; Document #42

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D

Dahl, Jason Matthew (1957–2001)

Jason Dahl was the captain of the crew of United Airlines Flight 93, which was hijacked and crashed on September 11, 2001. He had a training position with United Airlines in its Denver training center, but he took the flight on September 11 to keep his flight certification current. He had picked this flight to enable him to be in Denver in time for his fifth wedding anniversary.

Dahl had an unremarkable childhood. He was born on November 2, 1957, in San Jose, California, the youngest child of a family with three boys and two girls. His father was a railroad switchman who later started a milk-delivery business, and his mother was a housewife. Dahl attended Hillsdale Elementary School. When he was in junior high school, one of his older brothers, Army Specialist 4th Class Kenneth Dahl, died in combat in South Vietnam. Dahl graduated from Andrew Hill High School in San Jose.

From childhood onward, all Dahl wanted to do was fly an airplane. At age thirteen he joined the Civil Air Patrol and won a scholarship for flying lessons. By age sixteen, he was flying solo and always trying to find ways to gain flying time. He attended San Jose State University, from which he graduated in 1980 with a degree in aeronautical engineering. After a tour as a corporate pilot, he obtained a job in 1984 with United Airlines. Years of flying later, Dahl became a flight instructor in the Denver training center. His job was training and testing other pilots. This position meant that he had to arrange flights to retain his flying status. After a failed first marriage and a son, Dahl married Sandy Dahl, a flight attendant with United Airlines. Dahl had started a month-on, month-off program so that he could spend more time with his family.

Dahl assumed command of United Airlines Flight 93 with the expectation that the flight from Newark International Airport to San Francisco International Airport would be routine. His first officer was LeRoy Homer. Everything seemed normal until the hijackers led by Ziad Jarrah invaded the cockpit and seized control of the aircraft at around 9:45 a.m. In the scuffle both Dahl and Homer were injured—how seriously nobody knows. There were both restrained when Jarrah turned the aircraft around and headed toward the Washington, D.C., area. Once

the passengers and crew realized from cell phone conversations that the hijackers were on a suicide mission, the passengers revolted and attempted to regain control of the cockpit. There is speculation coming from the black box recording that Dahl and Homer attempted to help, but all of their efforts failed as Jarrah crashed the aircraft into the ground. There were no survivors.

Dahl has been honored as one of the heroes of United Airlines Flight 93. The elementary school he attended was renamed the Captain Jason M. Dahl Elementary School in March 2002. Other tributes to his life from friends and acquaintances have appeared in the succeeding years.

See Also

Beamer, Todd Morgan; Homer, LeRoy Wilton Jr.; Jarrah, Ziad Samir; United Airlines Flight 93

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DCA

Flight attendants have a close-knit community, and the loss of so many flight attendants on September 11 caused American Airlines attendants to form a support group in the Washington, D.C., area. They named this support group the DCA after the codename for Washington National Airport. During the five days when the airline industry was shut down, the DCA set up what the flight attendants called the DCA Gathering Place at a local hotel in Washington, D.C. They rented a room with TV outlets, ordered food, and made sure that the hotel kept away lawyers and the media.

The DCA's first step was to get the word out to flight attendants and pilots of all the airlines who had been stranded to let them know about the DCA Gathering Place. This site became a clearinghouse for stranded flight attendants and pilots needing to contact their families. Members of the DCA also used the place to mourn the loss of close friends. A call went out to counselors and clergy to help provide emotional support. The DCA Gathering Place became a place where attendants could comfort each other and remember their fallen colleagues. Some of the flight attendants brought their children because they did not want to mourn alone. Even some pilots dropped by for help with handling their grief.

American Airlines Flight 77 had taken off from Dulles International Airport, so all of the DCA members knew the pilots and crew. They were particularly upset at the loss of the pilot Charles "Chic" Burlingame, copilot David Charlebois, and the flight attendants Michelle Heidenberger, Renee May, and the married couple, Ken and Jennifer Lewis. The members of the DCA could envision themselves in a similar situation, and they were angry that no training had been provided for suicidal hijackers. All of their training had been to be passive with hijackers until authorities could handle the situation on the ground.

After five days, the airlines started resuming air service, and it appeared that the DCA would terminate activities. On September 15, 2001, DCA flight attendants greeted with flowers the arrival of flights at Dulles American Airlines gates. Afterward, the DCA Gathering Place closed, but one of the members suggested that the DCA continue its activities in other venues.

DCA members decided to continue the DCA by having it donate to charity projects in the names of the flight attendants lost on September 11. The first project was for a Christmas toy drive in the name of Michelle Heidenberger at the St. Ann's Home for Unwed Mothers and Abused Children in Baltimore. Heidenberger had served as a volunteer worker at St. Ann's on her off-duty hours, so this annual drive was a natural. A call went out in December 2001 for teddy bears, and so many arrived that a truck was needed to carry all the bears. The next year, the DCA conducted a similar drive for more toys, a TV, VCR, and DVD player with a video library with more than a thousand titles.

The next DCA project was honoring the memories of Ken and Jennifer Lewis. They had been such a close-knit couple that the flight attendants had named them Kennifer. They had lived in Culpepper, Virginia, so the DCA decided to build a Kennifer Memorial Garden in Culpepper. In September 2002 members of the DCA started to build the memorial with the help of hundreds of volunteers. It took three days to build the garden. There was a formal ceremony to commemorate the garden just before September 11, 2002. It had inscribed on a marble bench the words "KENNIFER: KEN AND JENNIFER LEWIS, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001. AA/77."

Other projects have also been undertaken. A memorial was established at the Walters Museum in Baltimore, in the memory of Renee May. May had done volunteer work there, helping make the building accessible to blind children and soliciting funds to buy books in braille. Members of the DCA are still looking for ways to memorialize other victims on American Airlines Flight 77.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 77; Burlingame, Charles Frank "Chic" III

Suggested Reading

Tom Murphy, *Reclaiming the Sky: 9/11 and the Untold Story of the Men and Women Who Kept America Flying* (New York: AMACOM, 2007).

Department of Design and Construction

The Department of Design and Construction (DDC) of New York City had the overall responsibility for the cleanup of the World Trade Center complex after September 11. Before September 11, the DDC was an obscure department in New York City government. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani had created the DDC in 1996 to oversee the work of building and repairing the municipal infrastructure. By New York City standards the DDC was a small department, with only 1,300 employees. But it had a $3.7 billion design and construction budget. Despite this budget, it was so obscure in the city's administrative hierarchy that the department was not even mentioned in the city's official emergency-response plan.

What made the DDC unique was that its head, Kenneth Holden, and his chief lieutenant, Michael Burton, took charge of the World Trade Center site immediately after the twin towers collapsed and began directing operations. Without authority and without permission, they began to recruit engineers and schedule heavy equipment at the site. Holden was familiar with the construction companies in the New York City area, and he bypassed ordinary bidding procedures to employ four companies: AMEC, Bovis, Tully, and Turner. He made the decision based on personal and corporate reputations. These companies earned immense profits in the cleanup, but they were also at risk financially because the companies

never received adequate insurance for the job. Holden and Burton were so successful in mobilizing resources that Mayor Giuliani assigned the DDC to oversee operations at the World Trade Center complex site.

Explanation Why the Department of Design and Construction Became So Important after September 11

The agency charged with the managing the physical work was an unlikely one. It was the Department of Design and Construction (DDC), an obscure bureaucracy 1,300 strong whose normal responsibility was to oversee municipal construction contracts—for sidewalk and street repairs, jails, and the like—and whose offices were not even in Manhattan but in Queens. The DDC was given the lead for the simple reason that its two top officials, a man named Kenneth Holden and his lieutenant, Michael Burton, had emerged from the chaos of September 11 as the most effective of the responders. Now they found themselves running a billion-dollar operation with the focus of the nation upon them.

William Langewiesche, *American Ground: Unbuilding the World Trade Center* (New York: North Point Press, 2002), p. 9.

The first task of the Department of Design and Construction was to survey the site. At the first survey of Ground Zero, Holden and Burton escorted representatives from the construction firms, and Richard Tomasetti from the well-respected engineering firm of Thornton-Tomasetti. After this initial survey, six engineers spent two weeks mapping the debris pile. They divided the pile into four quadrants. One quadrant each was assigned to AMEC, Bovis, Tully, and Turner. Except for Tully each of the construction companies was a multinational corporation in the high-rise construction business, and they had little equipment at their disposal. Tully was a family-owned New York paving contractor with little experience in building construction, but it had all the necessary trucks and heavy equipment. All of the companies had experience dealing with the DDC. Within a few weeks there were 3,000 construction workers at the World Trade Center site.

Different Ways the Construction Companies Handled the Cleanup

"Four of the world's largest construction companies were onsite doing the debris clean-up. But if you went from corner to corner to corner, they were all doing it differently. Who was the most efficient and who was the best? That's where the debris people came in and said, 'Hey, if you move this to that site, then you won't have to handle it three times' We worked with those kinds of things."

Comment of Major Kally Eastman, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, cited in Susan Hagen and Mary Carouba, *Women at Ground Zero: Stories of Courage and Compassion* (New York: Alpha Books, 2002), p. 240.

Burton also hired a New Jersey outfit, Weeks Marine, to supply barges to haul the debris from the World Trade Center complex. Until this decision, the trucks hauling the debris were overwhelming the city's transportation system. Marty Corcoran, a marine-construction engineer, persuaded Burton to award the job to Weeks Marine. This decision simplified the debris removal.

Running a complex operation like the cleanup at Ground Zero was a thankless task. Holden's job was to find resources for the cleanup, defend the DDC from political attacks, and allow Burton to do his job. Burton had the responsibility of overseeing the practical details of the cleanup. Together they were an effective team, but they were not without their critics. Both Holden and Burton were hard drivers, and their goal was to clear the debris as soon as possible. There was also the task of

meeting with all the representatives of interested parties and coordinating activities. To expedite decision making there were twice-a-day meetings in which each interested party had to appear, because decisions were made and orders given out verbally.

The firefighters were unhappy about the fast pace of the debris removal. They blamed Holden, Burton, and the DDC in general for disrespect for the dead. Holden soon became known as the "Trade Center Czar." This resentment led in part to the riot by firefighters on November 2, 2001. In a meeting on November 12, 2001, families of lost firefighters attacked Burton for the rapid pace of debris removal.

Unhappiness over the pace of debris removal continued until the end of the cleanup in May 2002. Some of the responsibility for the cleanup shifted to private companies beginning in December 2001, but the DDC continued to play a major role in decision making. After May 2002, Holden was reappointed to the DDC, but Burton left for another position. Their personal relationship had never been a happy one, and the tensions of the months after September 11 only intensified the strain of their working together.

See Also

Cleanup Operations at Ground Zero; Firefighters at Ground Zero; Giuliani, Rudolph William Louis "Rudy" III

Suggested Reading

Diane Cardwell, "Workers and Residents Are Safe, Officials Say," *New York Times* (November 2, 2001), p. B10; Greg Gittrich, "Last Hard Days at WTC: Crews Ponder Toll As They Search Few Remaining Piles," *Daily News* [New York] (May 10, 2002), p. 8; James Glanz, "Ground-Penetrating Radar to Aid in Cleanup," *New York Times* (December 5, 2001), p. B8; James Glanz and Kenneth Chang, "Engineers Seek to Test Steel Before It Is Melted for Reuse," *New York Times* (September 29, 2001), p. B9; James Glanz and Eric Lipton, "City Had Been Warned of Fuel Tank at 7 World Trade Center," *New York Times* (December 20, 2001), p. B1; William Langewiesche, *American Ground: Unbuilding the World Trade Center* (New York: North Point Press, 2002); Dennis Overbye, "Experts' Eyes Focus on 'the Bathtub' as Debris Is Cleared," *New York Times* (December 4, 2001), p. F3.

Disaster Mortuary Operation Response Team

The most difficult problem facing the authorities after the recovery of remains of victims of the September 11 attacks was identifying the victims. It was a horrendous business at all three sites—World Trade Center complex, the Pentagon, and the United Airlines Flight 93 crash site. Into this void stepped the Disaster Mortuary Operation Response Team (DMORT) movement. Teams from DMORT were to assist local authorities in the handling and identification of bodies or body parts. In New York City, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) was in charge overall.

In the early 1980s the National Funeral Directors Association saw the need for a rapid deployment of mortuary operations in the event of large-scale disasters. To correspond to this need the association formed the Disaster Mortuary Operation Response Team concept. It was a multidisciplinary, nonprofit organization of forensic practitioners capable of responding in the event of a massive loss of life due to a disaster. In 1996 Congress passed the Family Assistance Act, which augmented the mission of the DMORT. On the eve of September 11, 2001, DMORT

had two specialized Disaster Portable Morgue Units (DPMUs) stationed at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Logistic Centers in Rockwell, Maryland, and in San Jose, California. These DMORT teams had all the specialists necessary to handle a disaster with huge loss of life: medical examiners, forensic pathologists, forensic anthropologists, fingerprint specialists, forensic orthodontists, DNA specialists, mental health specialists, and an administrative staff to coordinate their activities.

DMORT teams operated at all of the September 11, 2001, sites. This meant that the two teams of specialists had to be subdivided into three parts. Reduction in the number of specialists at any one site led the DMORT teams to draw on local medical volunteers. There was no lack of competent medical personnel ready to volunteer their services.

DMORT in Action after September 11

To begin with, even within those short tours, it was possible to make personal friendships with the DMORT teams, similar to the quick relationships forged on vacations or other special occasions. . . . One DMORT member, a woman from Sioux City, Iowa, became so good at reviewing the data input that we named one of the computer screens after her. Others returned more than once, and a few became semipermanent. For them, it was long shifts with no days off. One semipermanent DMORT member observed that life in the conference room consisted of long periods of boredom punctuated by short bursts of panic.

Adrian Jones, "The Days of the Remains," in Yael Danieli and Robert L. Dingman (eds.), *On the Ground after September 11: Mental Health Responses and Practical Knowledge Gained* (New York: Haworth Maltreatment and Trauma Press, 2005), p. 328.

Because of the nature of the crashes and collapsing buildings, most of the identification of victims has come from recovered body parts. Morgue workers systematically processed each body part individually. It was then catalogued and assigned a number, photographed, x-rayed, and examined further for some kind of identifying characteristic. For those that could not be identified from dental records or some distinguishing characteristic other than DNA, analysis was necessary. This process meant taking DNA samples from family members. DNA analysis allowed an amazing number of victims to be identified, especially at the United Airlines Flight 93 crash site near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Ultimately, everyone on that plane was identified from body parts at this site. It was much more difficult at the other sites. It was especially difficult at the World Trade Center because the high-temperature fire and changes of temperature caused the DNA to deteriorate, making identification sometimes impossible.

The huge number of deaths at the World Trade Center and the nature of the deaths made it impossible to identify all of the victims. There were more complete bodies found there, but others were so affected by the combination of high-temperature fires and the weight of the collapsing buildings that they simply disappeared. Even with the help of non-DMORT forensic help in New York City, the task verged on the impossible. Because of the heavy demands on the DNA-processing centers around the country, some of the identification took longer than usual and upset some of the families of the victims, but there was no way to rush the process. Once an identification was made, the families were contacted and given various options on what to do with the remains. Some families wanted to wait and see if more remains could be identified, but other families wanted closure

and accepted the identified remains for burial services. Remains that nobody claimed were disposed of in a dignified way.

One of the problems with the slow identification process was that it caused difficulty for families needing to file legal papers for life insurance and other important legal documents without death certificates. This fact was more of a problem in Pennsylvania than in New York City, because officials there issued an affidavit that expedited death certificates. Two enterprising men from Pennsylvania offered a solution by calling for an Action of Declaratory Judgment that the court accepted after receiving corroborating evidence that there were no survivors on United Airlines Flight 93. It took only a month after September 11, 2001, for the death certificates to be issued.

See Also

Casualties of September 11; Pentagon Attack; United Airlines Flight 93; World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading

Lawrence Hannah, "Sifting through Ground Zero," *Dominion Post* [Wellington, N.Z.] (September 14, 2002), p. 14; Adrian Jones, "The Days of the Remains," in Yael Danieli and Robert L. Dingman (eds.), *On the Ground after September 11: Mental Health Responses and Practical Knowledge Gained* (New York: Haworth Maltreatment and Trauma Press, 2005); Glenn J. Kashurba, *Quiet Courage: The Definitive Account of Flight 93 and Its Aftermath* (Somerset, PA: SAJ Publishing, 2006).

Dog Rescue and Recovery Teams

Dogs were the unsung heroes of the rescue and recovery at the World Trade Center complex site after September 11. More than 300 dogs worked at the World Trade Center site, of which between 50 and 60 were police dogs. All different types of dogs performed the invaluable service of locating survivors and then locating bodies and body parts. The dogs were divided into two types: search and rescue dogs and cadaver-sniffing dogs. The two types were trained differently. Search and rescue dogs reacted negatively to finding bodies or body parts. To the cadaver-sniffing dogs, it was their job to find remains. In the early days a search and rescue dog and a cadaver-sniffing dog would work as a team. Later, when it became apparent that there were no survivors, the cadaver-sniffing dogs took over.

Regardless of the type of dog, the dogs and their handlers climbed up and down over the debris. Some of the dogs had to wear booties to protect their paws from sharp objects and the heat coming from the debris pile. This duty was exhausting, and the dogs often took naps in stretchers, in beds of trucks, or on a pile of firefighting equipment. There was even a hospital trailer to treat the dogs for injuries. Cleanliness was important, and a bath improved the morale of the dog.

The cadaver-sniffing dogs were experts at finding bodies or body parts. A handler and the dog would traverse back and forth over the debris until the dog would stop and sniff. The dog would start pawing the ground. If a cadaver-sniffing dog got excited, digging and barking, there was a good chance a body or body part was nearby. The handler would then notify the firefighters, who would begin digging until the body or body part could be found. Since the dogs could detect any decomposing flesh, one time a dog smelled a side of beef from one of the restaurants in the World Trade Center. Sometimes, to keep up the morale of the dogs, a police officer would hide in the rubble so the dogs would hit upon a live person.

This action helped both search and rescue and cadaver-sniffing dogs from becoming too depressed.

Some of the dogs became celebrities. One such dog was a golden retriever named Bear. His fame came from finding the most bodies in the rubble, including that of Fire Chief Peter Ganci. He was featured in the *Guinness Book of World Records* as "the most celebrated dog in the world." He worked with his human partner, Scott Shields, who worked for a private safety firm. Not long after working at the World Trade Center site, Bear started having health problems. He developed cancer, arthritis, and other ailments associated with his work at the site. His veterinarian fees were $3,000. Bear was twelve years old when he died on September 23, 2002.

Description of One Dog Team at Ground Zero

Marley [black female Labrador retriever] and Bogush [Tampa Fire and Rescue Lieutenant Mark Bogush] were part of a team of eight people and four dogs from Tampa who arrived at ground zero after a long bus ride. . . . The handlers and their dogs worked 12-hour shifts, searching the rubble. Marley and Bogush rappelled down deep into the destruction, Marley riding piggyback on her handler. "The heat and dust was horribly thick," Bogush says. "It was very hard to see outside." Bogush would tend to Marley's needs by giving her plenty of water and flushing debris out of her nose and eyes.

Mimi Rich, "Dogged Hero," *St. Petersburg Times* [Florida] (November 19, 2001), p. 3D.

Besides assisting in finding remains, dogs also provided another service. Fourteen certified teams of trauma-response dogs had come from around the

Scott Shields (right) gives his rescue dog Bear water from a bottle after exiting the World Trade Center disaster site in this September 13, 2001, photo. Bear died in 2002 from injuries incurred during recovery work from the crash site. (AP IMAGES/Beth A. Keiser, FILE.)

country to serve at Ground Zero. Some donor had provided airline tickets for these teams to come from as far away as Oregon. These affectionate dogs gave assistance to distraught workers who needed reassurance.

See Also
Cleanup Operations at Ground Zero; Ganci, Peter J. "Pete"

See Document
Document #17

Suggested Reading
David W. Ausmus, *In the Midst of Chaos: My 30 Days at Ground Zero* (Victoria, BC [Canada]: Trafford, 2004); Nicole Bode, "Human Pals Mourn WTC Hero Pooch," *Daily News* [New York] (October 28, 2002), p. 18; Mitchell Fink and Lois Mathias, *Never Forget: An Oral History of September 11, 2001* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002); Sarah Huntley, "Dog Handler Recounts Search at Ground Zero," *Rocky Mountain News* [Denver] (September 23, 2002), p. 6A.

Downey, Ray Matthew (1937–2001)

Ray Downey was the chief in charge of the Special Operations Command (SOC) in the Fire Department of New York (FDNY); he died at the World Trade Center complex on September 11, 2001. The Special Operations Command was an elite unit that included the Hazardous Materials (haz-mat) Unit, structural-collapse experts, a fire rescue unit, and two squads of elite firefighters. It had its headquarters on Roosevelt Island, and the SOC had its own budget. Downey and his command were natural candidates to be called to the World Trade Center complex on September 11.

Downey spent his entire career in firefighting. He was born on September 19, 1937. Most of his life Downey lived in Deer Park, Long Island. He was an enthusiastic hockey fan, and his favorite team was the New York Rangers. Downey joined the FDNY in 1962. His two older brothers had already joined, so he knew what to expect. Downey worked in several different fire houses in and around Times Square in Manhattan, and in Rescue Company 2 in Brooklyn. In 1972 Downey became a charter member of FDNY's hockey team, and he played on a hockey team until his death. By 1977 Downey had been promoted to captain, and he worked at the training school to create the first special operations squad—Squad 1. His next assignment was to command his former firehouse Rescue Company 2. After a few years there, he was assigned to the Special Operations Command. He became the resident expert in the FDNY on building collapses, and how to conduct rescues from collapsed buildings and those about to collapse. He was also the FDNY's most decorated member, with twenty-one citations for valor.

By the early 1990s Downey had a national reputation in working with building collapses. He was placed in charge of directing recovery work at the 1993 World Trade Center complex bombing. Then he was assigned to lead the FDNY's emergency rescue team that went to Oklahoma City in 1995 to assist with search and rescue efforts. He had long predicted that there would be another terrorist attack, and in May 2001 he had made a statement that "it's not a question of if, but when the next one comes." In late July 2001, the mayor and Downey's colleagues held an appreciation dinner at Gracie Mansion for his many accomplishments while a member of the FDNY. Downey had planned to retire from the department in 2002.

Downey rushed to the site of the World Trade Center complex on September 11, 2001, to help. His driver dropped him off at the command center near the North Tower shortly before the collapse of the South Tower. Using his expertise on collapsed buildings, Downey remarked that he was afraid that the towers might collapse. Soon afterward the South Tower collapsed. Responding to calls for help when the North Tower fell, Downey dove into the rubble and lost his life. It took over eight months to find his body. After a funeral on May 20, 2002, in Deer Park, Long Island, he was buried in a family plot in St. Charles Cemetery.

Personality and Reputation of Chief Raymond M. Downey

Raymond M. Downey was a tough, taciturn man in his late fifties, with piercing eyes, a shock of snow-white hair, and a poker face matched by a dry sense of humor—so dry that you might not know at first when he was joking. Ray was somewhat of an anomaly in our department, a man who had built an outside reputation because of his expertise in special operations such a building collapse. He had overseen the rescue operation after the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and had headed the federal Urban Search and Rescue team that led the recovery following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. His extensive outside network and reputation gave him an unparalleled Rolodex when it came to tapping resources. It also won him the nickname "The Master of Disaster."

Thomas Von Essen, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002), pp. 172–173.

See Also

Casualties of September 11; World Trade Center Bombing (1993); World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading

Michael Daly, "Magnificent Fire Chief's Last Call to Duty, *Daily News* [New York] (September 13, 2001), p. 20; Steve Dunleavy, "There Are a Lot of Legends about Ray—They're All True," *New York Post* (May 21, 2002), p. 20; Jose Martinez, "Finest of Bravest Is Laid to Rest," *Daily News* [New York] (May 21, 2002), p. 8; Michele McPhee and Maki Becker, "9/11 Hero's Remains Are with Kin Now," *Daily News* [New York] (May 16, 2002), p. 9; Elizabeth Moore, "Raymond Matthew Downey: A Legend's Family Keeps Hope for Him Alive," *Newsday* [New York] (September 13, 2001), p. 19; Thomas Von Essen with Matt Murray, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002).

E

Economic Impact of September 11

The financial impact of September 11 was devastating to New York City and to the commercial airline industry. It was this economic damage as much as the physical damage that had appealed to Osama bin Laden. He wanted to attack the United States at its source of strength and cause it economic distress. Bin Laden was partially successful, as property losses, particularly in New York City, were high. Southern Manhattan was the center of the New York City government and international finance, and both were paralyzed. Office buildings were empty, and the subways stopped running. The tens of thousands of people who lived below Canal Street were prevented from going there. All schools and bridges were closed. But where the economic impact was greatest and most long lasting was with the airline industry.

It took the American airline industry nearly five years to recover from September 11. Both American and United airlines lost two aircraft to the hijackers, but insurance covered most of those losses. What hurt the airlines was the loss of customers, many of whom were afraid to fly. Airports had been shut down around the country. Even ten days after September 11 the New York City airports were running 80 percent of their flights but with only 35 percent of passenger seats filled. Lost revenue from the three New York Airports was around $250 million a day.

Compounding the problem was the rocketing cost of oil and the higher aviation premiums from insurers. In the period from September 11, 2001, to September 2004, the airline industry lost $23 billion. In October 2001 airline passenger traffic dropped 23.2 percent in comparison to October 2000. An infusion of $1.5 million of federal aid helped the airline industry, but a series of bankruptcies occurred in the next few years. Only gradually have the airlines begun to creep back to financial health.

New York City had a massive loss of jobs and buildings. Job loss has been estimated at 143,000 a month, with lost wages of $2.8 billion. Nearly 70 percent of the jobs lost and 86 percent of the wages lost were to persons with well paying positions in finance, insurance, and banking. Building loss has been assessed at $34 billion, with only about half of the building loss insured at value. It has been

estimated that the city lost $60 billion in revenue, with $82 million coming from lost parking ticket revenue alone.

The least long-lasting economic impact was with the stock market. On September 11, 2001, the hijacked aircraft crashed into the World Trade Center complex before the opening of the stock market. Damage to communications, evacuation orders, and rescue efforts led to the closing of the market for the next four days. When the stock market reopened on Monday, September 17, there was an immediate sell-off. On September 10, the Standard & Poor's 500 Index had closed at 1,092.54, and when trading closed on September 17 the index was at 891.10. By September 24, however, the stock market was climbing again. On October 11, the index closed at 1,097.43.

The American economy rebounded from the September 11 attacks within months. One reason that these attacks did not have a more lasting impact was that they were concentrated by geography and industry. Whereas New York City and to a lesser extent Washington, D.C., suffered economic dislocation from unemployment and property damage, the rest of the country was left relatively untouched.

See Also

World Trade Center, September 11

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F

Fadl, Jamal al- (1963–)

American intelligence received its first full disclosure about the capabilities of al-Qaeda from a series of interviews with Jamal al-Fadl beginning in 1996. He had been a low-level member of al-Qaeda before he defected to the Americans. Al-Fadl asserted that he had important information to pass to American intelligence in a series of interviews with American intelligence officials in Eritrea. These officials decided that al-Fadl would be a reliable and valuable source of intelligence and sent him to the United States. His interrogation over the next five years produced a gold mine of information about al-Qaeda and its operations up to 1996.

Al-Fadl was a Sudanese from a relatively affluent family. He was born in 1963 in Rufaa City, Sudan, near Khartoum. After graduation from high school, he went to Saudi Arabia, where he lived on the fringes of society. His roommate was apprehended for possession of marijuana, after which al-Fadl looked to move to another country. He immigrated to the United States in 1986. In his new country, al-Fadl held two jobs: working in a grocery store in Brooklyn, New York, and raising funds for the al-Kifah Refugee Services Office, where his boss was Mustafa Shalabi. Another, unofficial part of his job was to recruit fighters for the Afghan side in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

In time, it was al-Fadl's turn to go to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. He traveled to Afghanistan, where he attended an al-Qaeda training camp at Khalid ibn Walid. His forty-five days there were filled with weapons training and religious indoctrination. Next, al-Fadl was sent to other training camps for further training. It was about this time that al-Fadl met Osama bin Laden. After completing his training, he joined a combat unit in Afghanistan.

Most of al-Fadl's later training was aimed at turning him into an administrator. As the war in Afghanistan drew to an end with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, his responsibilities had increasingly transformed his job into an administrative one. Al-Fadl was present at the meeting, in the fall of 1989, where the establishment of al-Qaeda was announced by Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, head of the military committee of the Shura (Consulting) Council. Al-Fadl was the third signatory of the document on which the participants pledged their allegiance to al-Qaeda.

Al-Fadl carried out a variety of tasks for al-Qaeda. Besides performing routine courier work, al-Fadl was also appointed as the point man for Osama bin Laden's move from Afghanistan to Sudan. Because al-Fadl was a Sudanese citizen, it was easy for him to buy property for al-Qaeda in his native country. Another one of his crucial missions was to inquire about the availability of chemical weapons in the international underground market. Finally, he was given the task of finding out the availability of weapons-grade uranium. Both of these missions ended in failure.

By the early 1990s al-Fadl was becoming increasingly discontent with his role in al-Qaeda. He believed that others were being rewarded more for their work than he was. He made his feelings known to bin Laden; however, his complaints fell on deaf ears, with bin Laden simply telling him to get back to work. Al-Fadl's salary as an officer in al-Qaeda was $700 a month with health benefits. Others in the organization with similar responsibilities made much more. In retaliation, al-Fadl began to skim funds off the top of the deals he made on behalf of the organization. He was able to accumulate $250,000 before his peers in al-Qaeda caught on to his scheme in 1995. Al-Fadl promised restitution, but he then went into hiding. Uncertain of his fate if he stayed in al-Qaeda, al-Fadl took the first opportunity to turn himself over to American intelligence officers in Eritrea.

Al-Fadl was too low ranking a member to have useful information about possible future terrorist plots, but his information regarding the inner workings of al-Qaeda has been invaluable. Al-Qaeda's terrorist campaign started in 1995, and al-Fadl was already on the outs with the organization by that time. What he did have knowledge about was how al-Qaeda was organized, its leadership structure, and its philosophy. The 9/11 plot had not yet been contemplated by al-Qaeda, but al-Fadl's testimony showed that al-Qaeda was capable of almost anything.

Al-Fadl has remained under the protection of the U.S. government. He pleaded guilty to multiple counts of conspiracy against the United States, charges that carried a maximum prison sentence of fifteen years. Ultimately, the FBI kept him under house arrest for nearly two years before moving him and his family into the Witness Protection Program. Al-Fadl testified against Wadih el Hage with respect to Hage's role in the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Since September 11, al-Fadl has been in constant demand by intelligence organizations for his extensive knowledge of the operations of al-Qaeda.

See Also

Bin Laden, Osama; Hage, Wadih el-; Qaeda, al-

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John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Timothy Naftali, *Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

Fahrenheit 9/11

Fahrenheit 9/11 is an award-winning documentary by the filmmaker Michael Moore. It is highly controversial because of its pronounced bias against President Bush and his policies. The documentary opened in movie theaters across the United States on June 25, 2004, and it received mixed reviews, which often reflected the political persuasion and beliefs of the reviewers. Moore had a reputation for making documentaries that evinced a liberal bias, and this documentary fits into that category as well.

The film highlights President George W. Bush's conduct before and after the events of September 11. Moore is particularly harsh toward President Bush's passivity and apparent lack of action against the threat of terrorism before September 11. In his documentary, Moore reported that Bush spent 42 percent of his time on vacation in the period leading up to September 11. Moore also spotlighted the close personal and business relationship between President Bush (and his family) and the Saudi regime. This relationship led to the evacuation of the bin Laden family from the United States just after September 11 in such haste there was no time for debriefing by law enforcement and intelligence officials. Moore was also highly critical of the rationale for the invasion of Iraq. Finally, Moore criticized the national media for cheering on the Bush administration's war against terror and the invasion of Iraq.

Even before its appearance in movie theaters, the documentary was so controversial that it had trouble finding a distributor. Harvey Weinstein, the CEO of Miramax Films, had provided most of the $6 million financial support for the documentary. Miramax is a subsidiary of Walt Disney Company, and Michael Eisner, then the CEO of Walt Disney Company, refused to allow Miramax to distribute the film. This decision was made by Eisner despite the fact that he had not yet seen the documentary. Moore claimed that Eisner had been concerned about retaliation from Florida Governor Jeb Bush, the brother of George W. Bush, concerning Disney's real estate holdings and other interests in Florida. In the trade journals it was already common knowledge that *Fahrenheit 9/11* was going to be a hot property and that it would draw interest from a number of distributors. Weinstein discussed the issue with Eisner, but he lost the argument and the documentary was ultimately not distributed by Miramax. Moore then turned to a second distributor, Lions Gate Entertainment Corporation, which was a Canadian distributor based in Vancouver, British Columbia. To handle such a large booking Lions Gate had to conclude a secondary partnership with IFC Films and Fellowship Adventure Group.

The documentary has been fabulously successful financially. During its opening weekend (July 25–27, 2004), it generated box office revenues of $23.9 million in the United States and Canada despite opening in only about 40 percent of the theaters normally available for top-flight movies. In less than a year the documentary had grossed over $120 million in the United States and over $220 million worldwide. Because of its anti-Bush theme and opposition to the Iraq War, the documentary was an international bestseller. Moore decided to release the documentary in a DVD format, which was made available in stores on October 5, 2004. Around 2 million copies of the DVD were sold on the first day.

Besides producing controversy, the documentary has also received some critical acclaim. In April 2004 the documentary was entered to compete for the prestigious *Palme d'Or* (Golden Palm) Award at the 57th Cannes Film Festival. It was received with great fanfare at its first showing. The nine-person panel for the award had four Americans and only one Frenchman on it. They voted for *Fahrenheit 9/11* as the winner of the 2004 *Palme d'Or* award.

Supporters of President Bush and the conservative movement tried in various ways to block the release of the documentary. They were worried that the documentary might have a negative effect on the 2004 reelection campaign of Pres-

ident Bush. Organizations such as Patriotic Americans Boycotting Anti-American Hollywood (PABAAH) launched an anti-Moore campaign. Subsequently, some Bush supporters held an anti-Moore film festival, called the American Film Renaissance, in Texas, showing films that attacked Moore and his views regarding the Bush administration. The key feature was Michael Wilson's film *Michael Moore Hates America*. To counter the charges from conservatives that he distorted facts in his documentary, Moore hired a staff of researchers and two lawyers to check the facts and claims in *Fahrenheit 9/11*. There appeared to have been a backlash against this anti-Moore campaign and the documentary continued to be shown in theaters, attracting more viewers and making money.

Michael Moore's Reaction to the Decision by Disney

Disney joining forces with the right-wing kooks who have come together to attempt to censor *Fahrenheit 9/11* must mean that Dumbo is now in charge of the company's strategic decisions. First, Disney tried to stop the movie from being released, and now it is aligning itself with the very people who are trying to intimidate the movie theaters from showing the movie. Even Daffy Duck would tell you this makes no sense. This latest development only further disproves what Michael Eisner had claimed about "politics" not being behind Disney's decision not to distribute *Fahrenheit 9/11*.

Quoted in Gabriel Snyder, "'Fahrenheit' Foes Put 'Heart' into Disney Doc," *Daily Variety* (June 29, 2004), p. 1.

See Also

Bush, George W.; Bush Administration

Suggested Reading

William Booth, "'Fahrenheit 9/11' Too Hot for Disney?" *Washington Post* (May 6, 2004), p. C1; David Denby, "Michael Moore's Viciously Funny Attack on the Bush Administration," *New Yorker* (June 28, 2004), p. 108; Lawrence Donegan, and Paul Harris, "American Right Vows to Settle Score as Bush's Nemesis Turns Up the Heat," *Observer* [London] (June 27, 2004), p. 18; Patrick Goldstein, "Eisner Fumbles PR Stunt—and Show Biz Politics," *Gazette* [Montreal] (May 14, 2004), p. D1; Gavin Smith, "Michael Moore Gives Much More," *New Statesman* (July 19, 2004), p. 1; A. O. Scott, "Moore's 'Fahrenheit 9/11' Wins Top Honors at Cannes," *New York Times* (May 23, 2004), p. 6; Wendy Stueck, "Lions Gate hits Jackpot with Fahrenheit 9/11 Distribution," *Globe and Mail* [Canada] (June 29, 2004), p. B1.

Families of Victims of September 11

Soon after September 11, 2001, the families of the victims began to organize into support groups. At first the families underwent a period of mourning. Many of the families did not even have the opportunity to give their loved ones a proper burial and achieve closure. Next, the families had to deal with the real-world repercussions of their loss in the form of financial liabilities and uncertainty. Government programs were available, but dealing with government bureaucracy was confusing and troubling for many of the survivors. Some family members were unable to cope without help. Various organizations and support groups were formed to help the families cope with their losses and to teach them how to handle their new responsibilities. Later, these organizations set up a formidable lobbying group to compel Congress and the Bush administration to examine how

the events of September 11 could have happened and how they could have been prevented.

Difficulty of Families Coping with Loss of Loved Ones

I think people don't realize that there's never going to be closure for us. That finding a piece of my husband—I'm the luckiest of the unlucky. But yet I still can't have closure from that because it's not his whole being, and it still brings back the reality of how he died and how devastating it was, and the brutality of it. And I think people don't realize that they're still identifying remains, we're still getting calls. That brings us right back to him dying and his death. As long as that's going on, I always have that fear when somebody calls and I don't know who it is. Is it a telemarketer or is it someone telling me they found more of Patrick? I think it makes it harder when they keep replaying all the tapes. When most people die, you don't get a tape of it that's replayed on national TV. And we have to live with that and we don't have control over that. Most people, fortunately, don't have a tape of their loved one dying.

Interview with Mary Danahy in Julie Scelfo et al., "After 9-11: A Year of Change," *Newsweek* (September 9, 2002), p. 40.

The largest and one of the most active groups in the Families of Victims of 9/11 movement is known as the Voices of September 11. It is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization founded by its current President Mary Fetchet in October 2001. Fetchet, a clinical social worker from New Canaan, Connecticut, lost her twenty-four-year old son in the collapse of the South Tower of the World Trade Center complex on September 11. Headquarters for the Voices of September 11 is in New Canaan. Fetchet and Beverly Eckert, an insurance specialist, started out by setting up an Internet clearinghouse for disseminating information about all aspects of September 11 for the families of the victims. The goal of the Voices of September 11 group has been to serve as an advocate for the 9/11 families. As one of the largest of the support groups for the 9/11 families, with around 5,500 members, it has proven to be a potent lobbying force. Fetchet and her colleagues in other groups fought hard for the creation of the 9/11 Commission. Fetchet has testified before several committees of Congress on the need to investigate what happened on September 11 and to understand why it happened.

Another leading 9/11 family group is the Families of September 11 (FOS11), a nonprofit organization founded in October 2001 by Donald W. Goodrich and Carie Lemarck. Both founders lost relatives on September 11. Families of September 11 attempts to be highly inclusive in its membership by admitting to membership families of the victims of September 11, survivors, and anyone who will support its mission. The primary goals of FOS11 are to support the families of the victims of September 11 by providing information on topics relevant to their situation and to engage in lobbying efforts on issues relating to the domestic and international efforts to combat terrorism. Representatives from FOS11 were active in lobbying for the creation of the 9/11 Commission, and they have campaigned for the Congressional implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations.

The World Trade Center United Family Group, or WTC United, is another important member of the families of 9/11 movement. This nonprofit organization was established shortly after September 11. Its goal was to ensure that the memories and the legacies of the victims of 9/11 are protected. Members are also

active in lobbying the U.S. Congress on issues important to them. All members of the board, except one, lost family members on September 11. The current board chair is Patricia Riley, whose sister, Lorraine Lee, died on September 11. This group has been active in working for the 9/11 Memorial to be built on the former World Trade Center complex site.

Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg appointed Christy Feret as New York City's liaison with various organizations representing the interests of the relatives of the victims of September 11. Her husband had been the executive director of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and he died on September 11. It has been a stormy tenure in office for Feret because the families have been critical of many of the decisions made by the mayor's office. A major source of contention has been the proposed memorial to the victims of September 11 that is to be constructed on the World Trade Center complex site. The 9/11 families wanted the memorial to be built first, but the decision to build the Freedom Tower first was made by Governor Pataki for financial and political reasons. Although the major decision had been made by Governor Pataki, the details of the decision became a source of contention between the mayor's office and representatives of the families. Other issues have also caused friction.

Family members of 9/11 victims testify on proposed intelligence reforms during a hearing by the Senate Government Affairs Committee on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, August 17, 2004. From left to right are Mary Fetchet, who lost her son Brad in the World Trade Center attack; Stephen Push of Washington, who heads Families of September 11 and whose wife died on American Airlines Fight 77; and Kristen Breitweiser, whose husband died in the World Trade Center attack. (AP IMAGES/Scott Applewhite.)

Where the families of 9/11 movement made the biggest impact was in the creation of the 9/11 Commission and the passage by Congress of most of that commission's recommendations. For almost two years representatives from the various groups formed by 9/11 families lobbied the halls of Congress and the White House for the establishment of such a commission. The Bush administration tried to stonewall the request, but eventually President Bush gave in and

agreed to cooperate. President Bush's selection of Henry Kissinger to be the cochair of the commission was unsatisfactory to the families because of his business dealings with prominent Saudi families, including the Bin Laden family. The newly formed Family Steering Committee made it a condition of its support for the commission that members of the committee disclose their business ties, and Kissinger consequently resigned from the commission. Throughout the remainder of the activities of the 9/11 Commission, there was constant agitation by the Family Steering Committee and its subgroup, the Jersey Girls. Their biggest concern was that nobody was being held accountable for what had happened on September 11. Regardless, the Family Steering Committee and the other groups lobbied Congress for passage of the necessary legislation to implement the 9/11 Committee's recommendations.

See Also
Family Steering Committee; Jersey Girls; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States

See Document
Document #32

Suggested Reading
Bob Braun, "Kean Feels the Wrath of Irate 9/11 Families," *Star-Ledger* (February 12, 2004), p. 1; Gail Russell Chaddock, "A Key Force behind the 9/11 Commission," *Christian Science Monitor* (March 25, 2004), p. 3; Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, and Benjamin Rhodes, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Knopf, 2006); Jerry Zremski, "Families of 9/11 Victims Urge Action on Report," *Buffalo News* (August 16, 2004), p. A1.

Family Assistance Center

One of the many tragic events in the aftermath of September 11 was the fact that families had to deal with federal and state agencies in order to receive financial assistance. In a single blow, families had lost their financial providers and bills kept coming in with relentless regularity. To handle this problem, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, with the cooperation of Mayor Giuliani's administration, set up the Family Assistance Center (FAC) on Pier 94 in the weeks following September 11. A large number of booths were set up by ten federal, state, and private agencies, covering an area the size of several football fields. These booths housed agencies ranging from the Red Cross to the Social Security Administration, and there was also a food service area. There were also interpreters available for almost every language imaginable. A second site was set up later at the former location of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. In the period from September 11 until the end of November 2001, more than 26,000 people sought help at one of the two Family Assistance Centers.

The goal of this gigantic financial flea market was to inform bereaved relatives on what financial support they were entitled to and how to obtain it. Many of the original users of the Family Assistance Centers came there seeking information on victims and their loved ones. As it became apparent that there would be no more survivors, people started coming for financial assistance. Red tape was cut to the minimum. One of the most valuable services was provided by the FBI as it offered assistance for defraying travel costs in bringing relatives to New York City to attend funerals.

Although the Family Assistance Center had been established in the weeks following September 11, help was initially slow in coming. Early in the process, the families had to cope with their problems on their own. Representatives from the various agencies were eager to help, and they attempted to make the process as easy as possible. Beginning in late September, Mayor Giuliani arranged to have nearly 500 lawyers appear at the Family Assistance Centers to help explain the legal details of the financial help process to the families. They explained the need for documentation of relationships. Under New York State law, a death certificate cannot be issued without a body unless either three years have passed since the death or a court hearing is held. What the lawyers helped to do was to shorten the legal process by attesting to affidavits on the deceased and having them notarized on the spot. This meant that papers could then be forwarded to a judge immediately for a court hearing. After an affidavit was approved by a judge, the judge then ordered the medical examiner to issue a death certificate.

It was not until early October that the first death certificates began to be issued. These death certificates allowed the widows, widowers, and other family members to begin to claim benefits at various agencies. It was a material and mechanical process because people were awarded benefits based on the nature of their relationship with the person who had died at the World Trade Center complex. Even significant others who could prove cohabitation received compensation. The main problem, of course, was the difficulties associated with attracting people to the FAC in the first place. Certain families were so grief stricken that they were unable to function with respect to processes associated with the demise of their loved ones. They were reluctant to show up even if the compensation they would receive was urgently necessary for paying rent and bills.

Immediate Reaction of Families to the Family Assistance Center

In the beginning, it was just a total sense of numbness with the families. Those first couple of weeks people were really just hanging on to the possibility that their loved ones were still going to be found, and so we would refer to the victims as a missing person, and we were always very careful about how we worded everything with the clients, never wanting to assume that this person was not coming home again. . . . It was also tough wanting to be able to make the process as easy for them as we possibly could, yet having guidelines and rules we have to follow. Dealing with their frustration of: "Why do you need my marriage certificate and if I don't have this do I have to come back tomorrow? I've been here all day waiting." People would say, "This has become my full-time job. This is all I do now: give my DNA sample and come here to file missing-persons reports."

Interview of Christy Gibney Carey, the director of the Family Assistance Center, in Julie Scelfo et al., "After 9-11: A Year of Change," *Newsweek* (September 9, 2002), p. 40.

Firefighter families received special attention from the Fire Department of New York (FDNY). Although firefighters who had died on September 11 were initially kept on the Fire Department's payroll, this was only a temporary solution, and it was not going to last forever. Officers from the FDNY were assigned to the Family Assistance Center to assist the firefighters' families. They guided the families through the process, sometimes with widows having difficulty coping with their loss.

See Also
Firefighters at Ground Zero

Suggested Reading
Nina Bernstein, "The Family Center; On Pier 94, a Welfare State That Works, and a Possible Model for the Future," *New York Times* (September 26, 2001), p. B9; John W. Bloom, "The Family Assistance Center at Pier 94," in Yael Danieli and Robert L. Dingman, eds., *On the Ground After September 11: Mental Health Responses and Practical Knowledge Gained* (New York: Haworth Maltreatment and Trauma Press, 2005); Alan J. Borsuk, "Air Centers Overflow with Attack Victims," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* (November 26, 2001), p. 1A; Shaila K. Dewan, "Death Certificates; A Grim Formality Is Made Easier for Families," *New York Times* (September 27, 2001), p. B10; Kevin Fagan, "Grim Reality Setting In for Survivors," *San Francisco Chronicle* (September 19, 2001), p. A3; John McCole, *The Second Tower's Down* (London: Robson Books, 2002); David Usborne, "The Bereaved—This Was the Day Relatives Finally Accepted Their Loved Ones Were Not Coming Home," *Independent* [London] (September 27, 2001), p. 3.

Family Steering Committee

The Family Steering Committee was an ad hoc group of twelve representatives from the families of 9/11 movement that had considerable influence on the founding and the operations of the 9/11 Commission. Eleven of the twelve members were women: Carol Ashley, Kristen Breitweiser, Patty Casazza, Beverly Eckert, Mary Fetchet, Monica Gabrielle, Mindy Keinberg, Carie Lemack, Sally Regenhard, Lorie Van Auken, and Robin Weiner. They had all lost relatives during the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The only male member of the committee was Bill Harvey, whose wife, Sarah Manley, had been killed at the World Trade Center only a month after they were married.

A subgroup of the Family Steering Committee was the Jersey Girls. This small group of four women from New Jersey (Karen Breitweiser, Patty Casazza, Lorie Van Auken, and Mindy Keinberg) had all lost their husbands at the World Trade Center complex. Three of their husbands had been coworkers at Cantor Fitzgerald, a financial services firm on Wall Street. They had formed their group to lobby Congress and the White House to look more closely into what had happened on September 11. They insisted that there needed to be an inquiry into what had happened on September 11 and what had gone wrong. Members of this group worked the halls of Congress, and their vocal demands in the national media that the Bush administration cooperate finally led to the creation of the 9/11 Commission.

Once it became apparent that there was going to be a 9/11 Commission, the Jersey Girls and representatives of other family groups formed the Family Steering Committee. This ad hoc group took on the responsibility of chief watchdog and critic of the 9/11 Commission. Members had a number of complaints about the composition of the staff of the Commission, and they made their position well-known through the media. Members were particularly unhappy about the close Republican ties of the executive staff director, Philip Zelikow. They also placed considerable pressure on government agencies and the White House to produce the necessary governmental documents for the 9/11 Commission to carry out its investigation. When it became apparent that the White House was purposefully delaying the release of certain documents, the Family Steering Committee first placed pressure on Thomas Kean, the co-chair of the 9/11 Commission, to do something about it, and then the members lobbied for an extension of time for the 9/11 Com-

Patty Casazza (right), whose husband was killed in the 9/11 attacks, flashes a thumbs-up in support of the Intelligence Reform Bill as legislators line up to get cleared for a White House party, December 6, 2004. Others in the picture are Mary Fetchet (second from right) and, from right to left, Carol Ashley, Cane Le Wack, Bill Harvey, and Charles Wolf, all relatives of 9/11 victims. (AP IMAGES/Manuel Balce Ceneta.)

mittee. What disappointed the Family Steering Committee the most about the 9/11 Commission's report was the lack of accountability in its conclusions. The final report pointed out deficiencies, but no one was held accountable for bad decisions or the failure of key officials to do their jobs prior to September 11.

After the *9/11 Report* was issued, the members of the Family Steering Committee began lobbying Congress to pass the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission into law. They used their moral authority to confront members of Congress who were reluctant to act. One of their tactics was to keep a "watchdog list," comprising members of Congress who opposed the Commission's recommendations. When Republicans in Congress wanted to add extraneous antiterrorism language to a bill implementing the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, the Family Steering Committee opposed these additions. After the final passage of a streamlined bill that included most of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the Family Steering Committee disbanded. Its mission had been accomplished, but this did not mean that the former members retired from the fray. They returned to their respective organizations to continue their activism on behalf of the families of the victims of 9/11 at a different organizational level.

See Also

Bush Administration; Jersey Girls; Kean, Thomas Howard; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States

See Document
Document #32

Suggested Reading
Bob Braun, "Kean Feels the Wrath of Irate 9/11 Families," *Star-Ledger* (February 12, 2004), p. 1; Kristen Breitweiser, *Wake-Up Call: The Political Education of a 9/11 Widow* (New York: Warner Books, 2006); Gail Russell Chaddock, "A Key Force behind the 9/11 Commission," *Christian Science Monitor* (March 25, 2004), p. 3; Dan Eggen, "9/11 Panel May Seek Extension," *Washington Post* (November 27, 2003), p. A2; Edward Epstein, "Sept. 11 Families Want Intelligence Reforms, But Not GOP Plan," *San Francisco Chronicle* (September 29, 2004), p. A7; Jerry Zremski, "Families of 9/11 Victims Urge Action on Report," *Buffalo News* (August 16, 2004), p. A1.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has the authority and the responsibility to regulate and monitor all U.S. civil aviation. All functions of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and the Civil Aviation Board (CAB) had been transferred to the FAA by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The FAA has a mandate to both regulate and promote civil aviation in a manner to best foster its development and safety. The FAA's dual responsibility—both to promote development and to provide safety—consists of two competing functions that were never reconciled. The FAA did not receive any Congressional guidelines on how to reconcile these competing functions, so market forces came to dominate the process. In time, the commercial airline industry was regulating the FAA. Even when Congress passed the 1996 Reauthorization Act under Title IV and tried to eliminate the word "promotion" from the description of the FAA's mandate by designating "assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the highest priorities in air commerce," this Congressional mandate was implemented in only a cursory fashion. Before September 11, 2001, the FAA had other concerns that its leadership considered more pressing than international terrorism: safety, consumer service, capacity, and economic issues. Its mission was made doubly difficult by the fact that it lacked both the funding and personnel to enforce its regulations.

Cozy Relationship between the FAA and the Airline Industry

The broader outcome resulting from the minimalization of the FAA as a regulatory body was a disoriented, fragmented, and highly inefficient agency. A culture of compromise festered within the organization for years and came to permeate every level of it. Although isolated pockets of dedicated employees existed throughout the FAA, the majority of the leadership throughout the agency's history had been devoted to making things as easy as possible for the airlines. Even on the rare occasion when the FAA pushed back, the airlines were almost always able to leverage their influence both inside and outside of the agency to get what they wanted. As a result, FAA security policy was treated more as a political issue than a mandated responsibility.

Andrew R. Thomas, *Aviation Insecurity: The New Challenges of Air Travel* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), pp. 55–56.

The FAA also had to face a powerful aviation lobby that wanted as few restrictions on their operations as possible. By 2000, the airline industry was spending $46,020,819 annually on lobbyists. The airline industry also gave large amounts of money to politicians running for Congress, mostly to Republicans. This lobby was particularly powerful on issues relating to regulation that might cost the airline industry money. In the 1960s the FAA had tried to introduce armed federal marshals on flights, but the pilots and the airlines feared the possibility of a shootout more than they feared the prospects of a hijacking. It took a series of aircraft hijackings in the late 1960s and early 1970s to persuade the federal government and the airline industry to set up a screening system for passengers and luggage, which went into effect on January 5, 1973. The FAA was less successful in getting airlines to install bulletproof cockpit doors. Moreover, there were numerous unclassified reports from various government agencies outlining the vulnerabilities of the American domestic commercial aviation system. The findings of these reports had been publicized in the mass media, and the problems they underlined were well-known within the aviation industry.

The commercial airlines tended to ignore warnings from American authorities. American intelligence warned the FAA and the airlines—Trans World Airlines, Pan American Airlines, and Delta—of the danger of a terrorist attack on aircrafts flying from Germany to the United States. Nothing was done by the airlines to institute special screening procedures for those flights. The result was the explosion of a luggage bomb that caused the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 259 crew and passengers and 11 people on the ground. After an exhaustive investigation, it was concluded that agents from Libya had planted the bomb.

By this time, there was a screening process at each airport in the United States, but it was so ineffective as to be considered almost a joke. Several times there had been tests of the security system and the system had failed miserably each time. But any efforts to upgrade the system were fought bitterly by the airline industry, because delays in the processing of passengers and luggage cost them money.

The FAA had a counterintelligence unit, but it had difficulty obtaining information from other government agencies. Its forty-person unit operated twenty-four hours per day collecting information to the extent that the FBI, CIA, and the State Department shared their intelligence with it. These agencies gave out only general information. The FAA had a no-fly list, but none of the September 11 hijackers were on it. In fact, the list had less than twenty names on it. The CIA had a list of suspected terrorists, but it was not shared with the FAA because the list was classified. Although the State Department had a watch list with 61,000 names on it, neither the FAA nor the airlines had access to the list. What is more significant is that the FAA did not want or ask for access to the watch list because the airlines would have been unwilling to check it because of cost and time constraints.

The FAA was completely unaware of any hijacking plots, but civil aviation security officials knew about Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda's interest in plots aimed at civil aviation. They had intelligence dating from the 1990s that al-Qaeda affiliates were interested in hijackings and the possible use of aircraft as a weapon. Moreover, FAA intelligence analysts were aware of the increased intelligence

activity forecasting possible terrorist acts in the summer of 2001. The FAA issued a series of alerts to air carriers about possible terrorist activity directed toward civil aviation operations. However, most of the FAA's concern was related to explosives being smuggled into aircraft. This had also been the main area of focus for the Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, also known as the Gore Commission, which President Clinton had authorized in 1996. That commission had been reluctant, however, to assume the role and duties of screening airport passengers and luggage because it would have meant hiring 50,000 new federal employees at a cost of several billion dollars at a time when the Clinton administration and Congress were busy cutting the number of federal employees and the federal budget.

Federal Aviation Administration starts its check on airline passengers with a process known as prescreening. Passenger prescreening begins with the ticketing process and concludes with the passenger check-in at the airport ticket counter. Prescreening occurs when passenger names are checked against the FAA's list of individuals known to pose a threat to commercial aviation. On September 11, 2001, there were only twelve names on the list, and none of the names of the 9/11 hijackers were on it. This meant that none of the 9/11 hijackers were subjected to extra security measures at the airport. The hijackers did have to go through the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening Program (CAPPS) for examination of luggage for explosives. They all passed the CAPPS inspection because explosives were not part of their plot.

The checkpoint screening system failed miserably on September 11, 2001. Numerous studies had noted various weaknesses in the checkpoint screening system. The FAA had attempted since 1996 to set certification requirements for screening contractors, but these requirements had not been implemented by September 11, 2001. Counteracting these security efforts were FAA's instructions to checkpoint supervisors "to use common sense about what items should not be allowed on an aircraft." This loose definition of what was allowed created confusion among the screeners. Among the items that the nineteen hijackers carried through the checkpoint system were chemical sprays, utility knives, and box cutters. Even though utility knives were permissible under FAA regulations, box cutters and chemical sprays were not. Several of the hijackers set off alarms at security checkpoints; however, all of them were allowed to board their planes.

Two of the hijacked airliners had departed from Logan International Airport. Logan International Airport had long been known as one of the least secure airports in the United

Lack of Attention to FAA's Intelligence Unit by FAA Senior Management

Moreover, the FAA's intelligence unit did not receive much attention from the agency's leadership. Neither Administrator Jane Garvey nor her deputy routinely reviewed daily intelligence, and what they did see was screened for them. She was unaware of a great amount of hijacking threat information from her own intelligence unit, which, in turn, was not deeply involved in the agency's policymaking process. Historically, decisive security action took place only after a disaster had occurred or a specific plot had been discovered.

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: Norton, 2005), p. 83.

States. As the eighteenth busiest airport in the country, it had the fifth-highest number of security breaches from 1991 to 2000. The Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) ran the airport and it had more security violations than any other airport authority in the United States. All of this was well-known before September 11, but nothing was done to rectify the situation. Even an April 2001 memorandum from Massport's Director of Security, Joe Lawless, on the need for Logan International Airport to address its known security vulnerabilities was ignored. Lawless had been a career law enforcement officer, who had worked as a state trooper and then provided security for former Massachusetts Governor William F. Weld. He had tried to institute mandatory criminal background checks on airline employees and subcontractors after discovering that the airline checks had failed to detect the criminal records of some employees. His reward for trying to improve security was to become a designated scapegoat for what happened at Logan International Airport on September 11, and he was subsequently demoted to a lower-level job.

Once the 9/11 terrorists had passed through the screening process and boarded, there were no impediments to a successful hijacking. Because these flights were domestic, federal marshals were not flying on them. Airlines had fought against having air marshals on domestic flights because of the expense and lost revenue of giving up a first-class seat. Cockpit doors had not been hardened; thus the hijackers would have had little difficulty breaking down the door of the cockpit. Although the cockpit doors were locked during the flight, the door was designed to withstand only 150 pounds of pressure.

Besides breaking down the cockpit door, there were two other ways for the hijackers to gain access to the cockpit. All flight attendants were required to carry keys to the cockpit at all times during the flight in case of an emergency. All it would take for a hijacker to gain control of a key was to assault the flight attendant and take the key away from him or her. The other way to gain access to the cockpit was to create such a disturbance that would ensure that the pilot or copilot would open the cockpit door, as required by regulations. Then the hijacker could overpower the pilot and walk into the cockpit without resistance.

The policy of the airlines at the time of the terrorist attacks was for flight crews not to fight against hijackers and to dissuade passengers from interfering. This policy was known as the "Common Strategy," and its premise was to placate the hijackers and get the plane on the ground where law enforcement teams could storm the aircraft. The safety of the aircraft and its passengers was paramount. What this policy failed to take into account was a suicide mission.

The FAA also had a mandate to notify NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) in the event of a hijacking of an aircraft. In the event of a hijacking, a chain of command, which had been established expressly for this purpose, would have to be followed. Commercial pilots were to notify air traffic controllers by radio or a code 7500 transponder message. FAA controllers were then required to report the hijacking up a complicated and time-consuming multilayered chain of command, beginning with the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC). Then the NMCC was to request approval of military assistance to the aircraft involved in the hijacking from the Secretary of Defense. Only after receiving the necessary approval from the Secretary of Defense would NORAD issue orders for jets to scramble toward the hijacked aircraft. A flight of

jets had orders to locate the aircraft and monitor it from a distance of five miles. This standard operating procedure (SOP) had no provision for encountering a hijacked airplane on a suicide mission. It would take a presidential order for the military jets to fire and shoot down an American commercial aircraft.

The FAA's response after the hijackings on September 11 was confused, and there was little reliance on the SOP upon contact with NORAD. The response on the ground was incredulous, confused, and unhurried. Nobody knew what to do. Never having experienced such a situation, the system failed to do anything useful.

As news of the hijackings of the four airlines spread, there were fears and rumors that other aircraft had been hijacked. One such erroneous report was disseminated by the Boston office of the FAA, which reported that a fifth aircraft had gone missing. This missing aircraft, according to the report, was Delta Flight 89. But Delta Flight 89 had not been hijacked and landed safely in Cleveland, Ohio, at about 9:47 a.m. This misinformation only added to the confusion of an already chaotic situation. Ultimately, 3,949 commercial aircraft landed at the closest available airport on orders from the FAA.

There were other irregularities in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. When the Herndon office of the FAA received a request at 9:07 a.m. on September 11 from the Boston Center to warn all pilots about possible cockpit invasions, the Herndon FAA did not send out the warning. Questioned about this by the 9/11 Commission, FAA personnel stated that it was not the FAA's responsibility to relay such a message.

The FAA ended up losing control of aviation security to the new Transportation Security Administration (TSA), but the airline industry's lobbyists made sure that the airline industry survived intact. These lobbyists were so successful that Congress passed and President George W. Bush signed the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, which gave the airline industry $5 billion in grants and $10 billion in secured loans. Title IV of the Act offered 9/11 victims compensation of $1.6 million each in taxpayer money if they signed a waiver forgoing their right to sue the airlines for additional compensation. Title V of the law required the federal government to take over the responsibility and the cost of aviation security. After taking the money, airlines began to downsize, laying off about 20 percent of their staff in the next few years. The airlines also began cutting service to dozens of cities around the United States.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 11; American Airlines Flight 77; United Airlines Flight 93; United Airlines Flight 175

See Documents

Document #9; Document #10; Document #12; Document #35; Document #36

Suggested Reading

Tom Murphy, *Reclaiming the Sky: 9/11 and the Untold Story of the Men and Women Who Kept America Flying* (New York: AMACOM, 2007); Sean P. Murphy, "Logan Security Head Issued Warning: April Memo Noted Terrorist Activity," *Boston Globe* (April 7, 2002), p. 1; Sean P. Murphy, "In Letter before Attacks, FAA Urged Easing Background Checks, *Boston Globe* (December 12, 2001), p. B4; Timothy Naftali, *Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2005); Andrew R. Thomas, *Aviation Insecurity:*

The New Challenges of Air Travel (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003); Susan B. Trento and Joseph J. Trento, *Unsafe at Any Altitude: Failed Terrorism Investigations, Scapegoating 9/11, and the Shocking Truth about Aviation Security Today* (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2006).

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The record of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) prior to September 11, 2001, has been controversial. Numerous times there were solid leads that might have led FBI agents to the Islamist extremists planning the attack, but the FBI failed to take advantage of those leads. Part of the difficulty was that the FBI had an "arrest and convict" mentality before 9/11. Its unofficial golden rule was that, whenever there was a possibility that intelligence gathering would conflict with the making of legal cases, intelligence gathering lost out.

Since the mid-1990s, the FBI has had expanded powers to investigate potential and actual terrorists. A 1995 presidential directive gave the FBI the lead authority in both investigating and preventing acts of terrorism wherever in the world American lives or American interests were threatened. Much like the CIA, the FBI was reluctant to share its intelligence information with other law enforcement agencies. The FBI used Rule 6E of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that information arising from grand jury testimony is secret, as an excuse never to give out investigative information. Another barrier to the free flow of information was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court created in 1979, which served as the arbiter of information that could be shared between government agencies. Like the CIA and the NSA, the FBI avoided the FISA court by simply not asking for permission to share.

The FBI created two units at its headquarters to handle and respond to the growing threat of terrorism in the United States and abroad. One was the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU). The mission of this unit was to research radical fundamentalist activities at mosques and gather intelligence for possible court cases if there was evidence of law breaking. The other was the Usama bin Ladin Unit (UBLU). This unit was more localized, and its mission was to follow the activities of al-Qaeda members in the United States. Both units had a mandate to monitor the activities of possible agents and to prepare court cases against those agents in cases where laws were broken. There was significant overlap between the two units because of the nature of their assignments. Coordination between the two units was always a problem, even though both units resided at FBI headquarters. Another difficulty was that assignment to either unit was not considered a good career move within the FBI, so qualified agents left as soon as possible. Consequently, there was a lack of experienced intelligence gatherers in both units.

The FBI had internal communication problems as well. It had finally developed its own computer system in the mid-1990s, but the system had never worked properly or adequately. At the time of the attacks of September 11, it was a system on which nothing more than the simplest searches could be performed. The system also did not provide access to the Internet. Old-time FBI agents refused to use it. It was a system that had been modeled after the FBI's court-case system, and it was never designed to improve communications between regional field offices and FBI headquarters. People who have used the FBI computer system said

FBI's Risk Avoidance Philosophy

The FBI did not turn itself into a risk-aversive Bureau because it wanted to be that way. It did not turn into an FBI that paraded its political correctness as an all-purpose excuse for not doing its job because that was the kind of Bureau it wanted to be. You can't protect a country that doesn't want to be protected. And for at least a quarter century, we sent every signal to the FBI that we did not want to be protected, and we punished the FBI whenever it tried to protect us.

Richard Gid Powers, *Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI* (New York: Free Press, 2004), pp. 427–428.

to John Schwartz that the "bureau has often intentionally disregarded industry standards, in part because of fears that such systems might be more vulnerable to hackers."

Before September 11, 2001, the FBI had already begun to consider implementing a new computer system. It has ultimately adopted a computer system with the name of "Trilogy," but the system has never become operational, despite $626 million in expenditures. Since 2005 the Virtual Case File System has been in a state of constant upgrades and rebuilding, and it appears that the system will not be ready for use until 2009 and will entail a huge cost overrun.

The FBI's internal system for handling communications created additional obstacles in carrying out its mission. It had a system of assigning communications and memos (called "leads") to individuals at FBI headquarters for further investigation. The problem was that the lead system had been overwhelmed. In mid-2002 the Joint Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. Congress found that the FBI's Counterterrorism Division had 68,000 outstanding unassigned leads dating back to 1995. The Phoenix Memo was a victim of this system.

But of all the reasons why the FBI failed to uncover the September 11 conspiracy, the most compelling one is that the FBI underestimated the terrorist threat. Efforts to assess the counterterrorism efforts of the FBI were met with defensiveness rather than cooperation. When Richard Clarke, the National Security Council's counterterrorism expert, quizzed FBI agents in late 1999 about their counterterrorism activities, he received assurances that the FBI had things under control, even though this was not the case. Dale Watson, the FBI's antiterrorism unit chief, tried to get FBI field offices to concentrate on counterterrorism, but he ended up concluding that too few FBI agents were working on terrorism cases or even knew what to do with regard to terrorism. His efforts proved futile, as shown by the fact that there were fewer FBI agents assigned to counterterrorism activities on September 10, 2001, than there had been in 1998.

FBI's Role in Allowing September 11 Attacks

It [September 11] happened because of the Bureau's ongoing belief that the threat was the work of disorganized zealots who lacked the competence to deliver weapons of mass destruction. It happened because of the Justice Department's treatment of that threat as a series of legal cases to be prosecuted rather than a worldwide conspiracy to be fought from a global intelligence perspective. It happened because a tradition of interagency biases and "need to know" secrecy prevented the vital sharing of intelligence.

Peter Lance, *1000 years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI—The Untold Story* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003), p. 432.

Since September 11, the FBI has been busy reforming its practices to avoid the intelligence

lapses that occurred in the days, months, and years leading up to the terrorist attacks. Intelligence gathering is now a top priority for the Bureau. In fact, the FBI is now being criticized for concentrating its efforts and resources so much on gathering intelligence to prevent terrorist activities that it is neglecting its traditional job of crime fighting.

See Also
Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act of 1978; Phoenix Memo; Tenet, George

See Documents
Document #28; Document #29; Document #30; Document #33; Document #40

Suggested Reading
Louis J. Freeh and Howard Means, *My FBI: Bringing Down the Mafia, Investigating Bill Clinton, and Fighting the War on Terror* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005); Bob Graham, *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, *Hearings Before the Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 2 vols.; Peter Lange, *1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI—the Untold Story* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003); John Miller, Michael Stone, and Christ Mitchell, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Gerald Posner, *Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003); John Schwartz, "[FBI] Computer System That Makes Data Secure, but Hard to Find," *New York Times* (June 8, 2002), p. A10.



File photos showing former FBI Director Louis Freeh, FBI Terrorism Chief Dale Watson, FBI Director Robert Mueller, and FBI Executive Assistant Director Gary Bald. (AP IMAGES.)

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has had a mixed record in dealing with the aftermath of September 11. The legislative mandate for FEMA was to provide direct assistance to those who had been impacted by a natural or man-made disaster. In September 2001 it was a large agency, with 2,600 employees and nearly 4,000 standby reservists. On September 11 Joe M. Allbaugh was the director of FEMA. Allbaugh was a Texan with close ties to President George W. Bush.

Where FEMA excelled was in its prompt response to the disaster. Emergency services personnel from eighteen states responded almost immediately to the sites of the attacks. FEMA sent twenty-eight urban search-and-rescue task forces to the sites of the disasters. Each task force had sixty-two members. The urban search-and-rescue task forces sent to the World Trade Center complex site to locate survivors worked twenty-four-hour days, with the personnel working two twelve-hour shifts. Conditions were horrible, and the dust from the debris made the task extremely difficult for the searchers. They employed portable cameras to spot survivors, sniffer dogs to smell for survivors, and sensitive life-detector sensors to look for signs of life. Despite these heroic efforts, few survivors were found because of the horrendous impact of the collapse of the twin towers. As it became apparent that there would be no more survivors, FEMA started pulling out its search-and-rescue teams. The last to leave was an Oakland, California, unit, which left on October 6, 2001. A spokesperson for FEMA stated that the site had been turned over to the New York City Fire Department and the Army Corps of Engineers.

FEMA also sent in Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) teams to help the workers at the site of the attacks. These teams had psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and professional counselors whose mission was the prevention and mitigation of disabling stress among the personnel working at the World Trade Center site. There were nearly as many members of these CISM teams as there were workers at the site. This caused some difficulty because members of these teams were so eager to help that they became intrusive. They soon earned the nickname "therapy dogs" from workers at the site. Members of these teams undoubtedly helped some of those working at the site, but others resented their constant interference with the urgent job at hand.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency's biggest failure was in its handling of the September 11 disaster relief funds. September 11 had caused the loss of 75,000 jobs and $4.5 billion in lost income. Despite promises of quick financial relief for those who had lost their jobs, FEMA's administrators changed the rules in the aftermath of September 11, making it more difficult for people to qualify for financial relief. Thousands of people were denied housing aid after FEMA decided to limit benefits to those who could prove that their lost income was a "direct result" of the attacks rather than merely the "result" of the attacks, which had been the previous standard. This seemingly minor change in language led to FEMA's rejection of the claims of 70 percent of the people applying for relief under the mortgage and rental program after losing their jobs. Between September 11, 2001, and April 2002, less than $65 million was paid out by FEMA to help families in the disaster area pay their bills, avoid eviction, and buy food.

Decisions on accepting or rejecting claims were made by FEMA agency evaluators (two-thirds of whom were temporary workers) at processing centers in Texas, Maryland, and Virginia. These evaluators had little or no knowledge of New York City or its culture, institutions, or geography. Moreover, the application form had not been changed to make it possible for evaluators to determine whether job losses were directly related to the disaster, and all the forms were printed exclusively in English. It was only on November 14, 2001, that the appli-

cation form was revised and issued in six languages, but even the new forms did not explain how FEMA defined "direct result."

Furthermore, some odd decisions were made by the FEMA evaluators. One applicant provided the name of the restaurant where he had worked in the World Trade Center and his supervisor's telephone number, as required by the application. His application was denied because the evaluator was unable to make contact by telephone with the restaurant, which had of course been destroyed on September 11.

As bad as the situation was in New York City, it was even worse in Virginia. Thousands of workers had been thrown out of work by the closing of Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C., in September, but the evaluators were slow to recognize this fact. Only a handful of applications from those workers had been approved by April 2002.

Criticisms of FEMA reached the halls of Congress. Under pressure from politicians, FEMA reevaluated its program in late June 2002 and eased its eligibility criteria. But the bad feelings were hard to overcome.

The immediate result of the change in direction was that FEMA approved more applications. Between September 2001 and June 2002, FEMA sent $20.6 million to 3,585 households. After June 2002, FEMA dispersed $25.3 million to 3,053 households in less than two months. This relaxation of eligibility rules helped the financial situation for people in New York and Virginia, but there was still widespread distrust of FEMA.

Commentary on the Distrust of FEMA

Thousands of people have lost trust in the agency because of the prior rejections and false promises the first time around. It's going to take more effort and stronger outreach from FEMA to convince those who are now so frustrated with the process that they haven't even considered applying for assistance under the new guidelines.

Comments by New York Democratic Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, quoted in David W. Chen, "More Get 9/11 Aid, but Distrust of U.S. Effort Lingers," *New York Times* (August 27, 2002), p. B1.

See Also
World Trade Center, September 11

See Documents
Document #21

Suggested Reading
David W. Chen, "More Get 9/11 Aid, but Distrust of U.S. Effort Lingers," *New York Times* (August 27, 2002), p. B1; Diana B. Henriques and David Barstow, "Change in Rules Barred Many from September 11 Disaster Relief," *New York Times* (April 26, 2002), p. A1; William Keegan Jr., *Closure: The Untold Story of the Ground Zero Recovery Mission* (New York: Touchstone Books, 2006); Kirsten B. Mitchell, "Government Trying to Decide FEMA's Fate," *Tampa Tribune* (August 7, 2002), p. 1.

Feehan, William M. "Bill" (1929–2001)

Bill Feehan, the Deputy Fire Commissioner of the Fire Department of New York (FDNY), was killed at the World Trade Center complex on September 11, 2001. He was well past retirement age, but Feehan had been retained by the FDNY

because of his contributions to the FDNY and because of the affection of his fellow firefighters. During his forty-two years in the FDNY, he had held every position in the fire department, from firefighter to acting commissioner.

Feehan was slow coming to the Fire Department of New York. He was born on September 29, 1929, on Long Island, and he grew up in Jackson Heights, Queens, New York. After graduating from the local high school, he attended and graduated from St. John's University in 1952. Feehan then served a tour of duty in the U.S. Army in the Korean War. Returning to civilian life, Feehan married in 1956, and he worked as a substitute teacher for ten years. He was a lifelong resident of Queens.

Deciding that his first love was firefighting, Feehan joined the Fire Department of New York on October 10, 1959. Once Feehan joined the FDNY, his advancement was rapid. After serving his probationary period, he held the rank of firefighter until 1963. Feehan became a lieutenant in 1964. He rose in the ranks until Mayor Dinkins appointed him Acting Fire Commissioner in 1993–1994. On the eve of September 11, he was serving as the Deputy Fire Commissioner.

Feehan's life began to revolve completely around the FDNY after his wife died in 1995. He was so preoccupied with fire department work that he neglected other aspects of his personal life. He was completely oblivious to the fact that he qualified for Social Security. His commitment to the fire department made him an indispensable asset to Thomas Von Essen, Commissioner of the Fire Department of New York.

On September 11, 2001, Feehan headed to the World Trade Center complex as soon as he heard about an emergency there. As Deputy Fire Commissioner, Feehan had no command responsibility, but he knew all the fire station chiefs and they respected him. He found his old friend, Chief Pete Ganci, at the World Trade Center site. Ganci was the head of all the uniformed firefighters in the FDNY, and he had command responsibility. Feehan accompanied Ganci when the command center was moved outside of the lobby of the North Tower. Soon afterward the South Tower collapsed. When the North Tower collapsed later, it caught both Feehan and Ganci, who were helping to evacuate the building and rescue the survivors. They died together and were buried under four feet of rubble. Their bodies were found by a dog rescue team less than a day later. Feehan's funeral was held in St. Mel's Church in Flushing, Queens, on September 15, 2001.

See Also

Firefighters at Ground Zero; Ganci, Peter J. "Pete"; Von Essen, Thomas; World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading

Michele McPhee and Steve McFarland, "He Was 'Heart & Soul' of Dept. Everyone Knew Feehan," *Daily News* (September 16, 2001), p. 20; Ronnie Rabin, "William M. Feehan: Feehan Was Fighting Fires Right Up to the End," *Newsday* (September 13, 2001), p. 25; Thomas Von Essen with Matt Murray, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002).

Fetzer, James H. (1940–)

James H. Fetzer is one of the leading conspiracy theorists in the United States and head of the Scholars for 9/11 Truth. His academic training was in philosophy, but he has long had a fascination with government conspiracies, going

back to the assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy. This belief in government conspiracies has made him direct his attention to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Fetzer had a vagabond academic career before landing at the University of Minnesota at Duluth. He was born on December 6, 1940, in Pasadena, California. After attending South Pasadena High School, Fetzer matriculated at Princeton University, where he received a BA in philosophy. He graduated magna cum laude in 1962. Fetzer then entered the U.S. Marine Corps as a 2nd Lieutenant, serving in an artillery unit. In 1966, shortly after reaching the rank of captain, Fetzer resigned his commission to attend graduate school at Indiana University. Four years later, in 1970, Fetzer received a PhD in the history and philosophy of science. His first academic appointment was at the University of Kentucky. Leaving the University of Kentucky without tenure in 1977, he taught at a variety of universities—University of Virginia, University of Cincinnati, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the University of South Florida—before finding an academic home at the University of Minnesota at Duluth in 1987. After obtaining tenure and then becoming a Distinguished McKnight Professor at the university, he stayed there until his retirement in 2006.

Fetzer's area of academic specialty was in the philosophy of science and the theoretical foundations of computer science. His academic research in these fields was productive and he published twenty books as well as numerous articles and reviews. Fetzer also started the international journal, *Minds and Machines*, which he edited for eleven years. He also founded the academic journal *Studies in Cognitive Systems*.

Outside of his academic career Fetzer adopted a conspiracy theorist's view of history. His first venture into conspiracy theories was his investigation into the alleged conspiracy behind the assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963. Fetzer came to the conclusion that the U.S. government had planned and executed the assassination of Kennedy. According to his view, Lee Harvey Oswald was a mere pawn in the conspiracy. Fetzer has spent years proclaiming his thesis at conferences and on talk shows.

Because of his inclination toward government conspiracies, it was easy for Fetzer to embrace the idea that a U.S. government conspiracy had led to the September 11 attacks. In his view motivation for the involvement of the U.S. government in the September 11 conspiracy was political and economic gain. The purported political gain was the needed justification for the invasion of Iraq and the economic gain was reaped by certain friends of the members of the Bush administration. Fetzer has rejected the idea that the hijacked airliners brought down the twin towers, and he has insisted instead that controlled demolitions were used. According to Fetzer, demolitions were also used to bring down Seven World Trade Center. In recent remarks Fetzer has left open the possibility that there may be other valid theories about what caused those buildings to collapse, including the possibility of the use of high-tech weapons.

To spread his conspiracy theories Fetzer founded a group called "Scholars for 9/11 Truth." His cofounder was Steven E. Jones, a former physicist from Brigham Young University. They were able to lead their group together for a year before Jones broke away to form a rival group: Scholars for 9/11 Truth and Justice. Their main source of contention was that Jones wanted to keep

speculation grounded on scientific possibilities, while Fetzer was prone to more extreme speculations.

Fetzer's motivations and actions have attracted critics. His rabid hatred of the Bush administration and his calls for a military coup to overthrow it have hurt his credibility. Moreover, his constant shifts on the subject of how the U.S. government could have pulled off the 9/11 conspiracy cause critics to question his knowledge of the affair. Despite these attacks on his credibility, Fetzer remains one of the leading proponents of the view that a U.S. government conspiracy led to the attacks on September 11, 2001.

See Also

Conspiracy Theories; Jones, Steven E.; Scholars for 9/11 Truth

Suggested Reading

Andrew Cline, "A Conspiracy against Us All," *National Review* (September 11, 2006), p. 1; John Gravois, "Professors of Paranoia? Academics Give a Scholarly Stamp to 9/11 Conspiracy Theories," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 52.42 (June 23, 2006), p. A10; John Gravois, "A Theory That Just Won't Die," *National Post* [Canada] (July 28, 2006), p. A14; Doug Todd, "The 9/11 Truth of Dr. James Fetzer; Boon or Boondoggle: A Review," *Free Press* [Columbus, OH] (February 22, 2007), p. 1.

Fire House 40/35

Firefighters from Fire House 40/35 in mid-Manhattan responded to the September 11 attacks, and in the process of handling evacuations and firefighting, twelve of the thirteen of those responding died. All of the firefighters died in the collapse of the South Tower of the World Trade Center complex. Like many firefighters in New York City, most of the men of the 40/35 came from firefighting families. They had a strong commitment to their jobs and to their unit.

Fire House 40/35 was considered to be one of the better firefighting units in New York City. The strength of the unit was fifty men working in shifts—eleven at any given time. There were eight officers in 40/35—two captains and six lieutenants. This house contained both an engine (Engine 40) unit and a ladder (Ladder 35) unit for both rescue and firefighting operations. There was a lively rivalry between the two units as to whose role was more important.

September 11 started out peacefully enough at Fire House 40/35, but after the news of the aircraft crashes into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center complex, everything changed in an instant. Captain Frank Callahan was the shift commander at the time of the attack. A veteran of almost twenty-eight years in the fire department, he was an old-school firefighter, and he held the men under his command to the highest standards of performance. Callahan had assumed command of Ladder 35 in July 1998. After hearing about the second crash into the South Tower, Fire House 40/35 mobilized and headed for the scene of the emergency at 9:08 a.m. They arrived there and immediately began evacuating personnel and fighting the fire in the South Tower, when it suddenly collapsed on top of them. Of the thirteen firefighters on the scene, only Kevin Shea survived, but he was badly injured. Shea had been blown out of danger, suffering a concussion, a broken neck, and other serious injuries. He was found by Todd Maisel, a photographer for the *New York Daily News.*

The bodies of eleven of the twelve members of Fire House 40/35 were gradually recovered. The first to be found was the body of Bruce Gary. His body was

Firefighters and emergency personnel remove debris from the site of the World Trade Center towers on September 13, 2001. (AP IMAGES/Stephen Chernin.)

found under four stories of rubble some three weeks after September 11. Beside him was a medical bag that he must have been carrying and the bodies of several firemen and civilians. On January 1, 2002, Michael D'Auria's body was located. In early February 2002, two other bodies—belonging to Mike Boyle and David Arce—were found. They had been lifelong friends. Then, on March 21, 2002, searchers found the bodies of Lieutenant John Gintly, Michael Lynch, and Vince Morello. Ultimately, the only body not recovered was that of Steve Mercado.

The loss of so many men from a single firehouse was devastating. Even before most of the bodies had been found, the families had held ceremonies honoring the deceased. Because the families of the firefighters were so close, there was a strong support system. Nevertheless, some of the wives had severe adjustment problems. The families achieved closure, but the loss of their husbands left the wives raising their families as single parents.

See Also
Firefighters at Ground Zero

Suggested Reading
Charles Brice, "Inside Story of New York's Heroes," *Advertiser* [New York] (September 7, 2002), p. W11; David Halberstam, *Firehouse* (New York: Hyperion, 2002).

Firefighters at Ground Zero

Firefighters from the New York City Fire Department (NYFD) immediately responded to the first airliner crashing into the North Tower of the World Trade

Center. American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the tower at 8:46:40 a.m. The NYFD units were in the middle of a shift change. This meant that the maximum number of firefighters (those whose shifts had just ended and those whose shifts were just starting) were able to respond to the emergency. Engine Company 10 and Ladder Company 10 were the first to respond because their firehouse was located across Liberty Street from the World Trade Center. Other fire stations also reacted quickly. Within thirty minutes more than 100 fire trucks had appeared at the World Trade Center complex. Firefighters were on duty fighting the fire and handling survivors when United Airlines Flight 175 hit the South Tower of the World Trade Center at 9:03:11 a.m. Firefighters continued fighting the fire and trying to save survivors until both towers collapsed. One of the problems the firefighters had to overcome was climbing up between sixty and eighty floors while hauling the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), with the pants, jacket, and helmet weighing an additional 70 pounds.

The NYFD is huge. In the five boroughs of New York City there were 2,629 fire officers, 8,599 firefighters, 3,000 emergency technicians and paramedics, and 2,000 civilians. They were organized into 203 engine companies, 143 ladder companies, 5 rescue companies, 7 investigative squads, 3 marine companies, and a hazardous materials (hazmat) company. These units were stationed in 225 firehouses scattered throughout the five boroughs. This demonstrates the extent of the manpower that responded to the crisis on September 11. Some reports have estimated that somewhere around 10,000 firefighters made it to the World Trade Center on September 11.

Two factors hindered the efforts of firefighters to be more effective. One was the failure of the communication systems. Radios did not work, and other communication systems were overwhelmed by the traffic. Almost as serious was the lack of coordination between the firefighters and the police. Distrust between the two agencies had a lengthy history, as firefighters believed that the police department was favored over the fire department by New York politicians. These feelings of hostility were reciprocated by the police, even though both departments had traditionally recruited from the same segments of the population—Irish and Italians.

An example of the way this discord influenced operations on September 11 was the helicopter rescue issue. In the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, police helicopters rescued people from the rooftop by helicopter. Afterward the Fire Department's Chiefs Association claimed that this was grandstanding and complained to the mayor. After some infighting, the Fire Department and the Police Department came to a compromise. Police helicopters would thereafter attempt rooftop rescues only when requested by a fire chief.

At the same time the roof exits on both towers at the World Trade Center had been securely locked by the Port Authority, ostensibly to prevent vandals, daredevils, and suicides from gaining access to the rooftop. New York City building code regulations did call for access to rooftops in emergencies, but the World Trade Center complex was exempt from the code. The New York City Fire Department had agreed with this decision.

On September 11 the rooftop doors remained shut, dooming those unable to climb down the staircases. The rooftop doors could be opened by using the computers on the twenty-second floor, but this system failed because of the explosion

and fire. Moreover, the firefighters were unable to communicate with the police helicopters because of the collapse of the communication systems. Police helicopters flew over the twin towers, but there was no authorization to rescue people from the rooftops even if they had been able to make it to the rooftops of either tower.

The firefighters never had a chance to put out the fire because it was a high-rise fire. A high-rise fire is one that can only be extinguished from inside the building because no ladder truck and no stream of water can reach that high, making it the most dangerous type of fire to fight. In many cases, the only hope is that the building remains standing and the fire burns itself out.

Difficulties in Fighting High-Rise Fires

The best-kept secret in America's fire service is that firefighters cannot extinguish a fire in a 20–30,000 square-foot open floor area in a high-rise building. A fire company advancing a 2½-inch hose line with a 1¼-inch nozzle discharges only 300 gallons per minute and can extinguish only about 2,500 square feet of fire. The reach of the streams is only 50 feet . . . . A fully involved, free burning 20,000 square-foot floor area cannot be extinguished by a couple of firefighters spraying a hose stream from a stairway.

Comments of Vincent Dunne, a retired Deputy Chief in the FDNY in Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, From Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002), p. 210.

A characteristic of the twin towers was that there were large areas of 20,000 to 30,000 square feet on each floor. This fact made firefighting almost impossible, but the firefighters tried their best anyway. Half of the firefighters tried to fight the fire and the other half were busy evacuating people from the burning buildings. The fire chiefs had become concerned about the possibility of the towers collapsing, but too many people were in distress to pull the firefighters out. Consequently, losses among the firefighters when the towers collapsed were horrific. The final tally of firefighters killed on September 11 was 343. Among the dead were the first deputy fire commissioner, the chief of the department, 23 station chiefs, 21 captains, 46 lieutenants, 249 firefighters, 1 fire marshal, 2 paramedics, and 1 chaplain. Others were injured, and some of the surviving firefighters have had serious health problems since. New York firefighters have always had a reputation for bravery, and September 11 was no exception. It was part of a long history of fighting dangerous and deadly fires.

Code of the Firefighters

The fireman's calling is to save people, whoever and however they can, and the chief's duty is to save people while losing none of his own. Firemen run into burning buildings and up smoky staircases with air tanks and masks and fifty pounds of hose over their shoulders because that's the honor and the glory. There is a code. You do everything you can to save people. You never leave another firefighter alone in the burning building. If you're not willing to take the chances firefighters have to take, you should have gone into another profession. A newcomer has to fit in and prove himself, or he will find the rest of the company or squad putting him in for a transfer—to some company or squad where there aren't very many fires.

Philosophy of Peter J. Ganci, FDNY's highest ranking uniformed officer and victim of 9/11, as reported in Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, from Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002), pp. 151–152.

After it became apparent that there would be no more

survivors, the firefighters began searching for bodies and body parts. Even the recovery of a small part of a body meant that DNA analysis would allow the deceased to be identified. The firefighters had a code that they did not leave comrades behind. They worked diligently to recover whatever body parts could be found, but particular emphasis was put on finding the remains of firefighters. When the mayor's office announced that the number of firefighters, police, and Port Authority personnel at the site would be reduced in early November 2001, the firefighters protested to the point of almost rioting at the World Trade Center site. They felt that moving the debris had become more important to the city government than finding the remains of the victims. Bad feelings developed between the firefighters and Mayor Rudy Giuliani. Only after a direct appeal by firefighters who had lost relatives in the attacks did the mayor back down and allow more firefighters to search for body remains.

Frustration of a Firefighter at Ground Zero

What we were trained to do and what we were able to do that day were two completely different things. The total sense of uselessness I felt all day, knowing that all those people were in those buildings and we couldn't get to them, that we couldn't help them, was unbelievable. And there are still so many people missing. One of the drill instructors I know lost his brother. Every spare moment he has, he goes down there and he digs. Maybe he'll never find his brother, but he's got to do something. It's a total feeling of uselessness, but at least he can say he tried.

Comments of Maureen McArdle-Schulman, quoted in Susan Hagen and Mary Carouba, *Women at Ground Zero: Stories of Courage and Compassion* (New York: Alpha Books, 2002), p. 39.

The efforts and sacrifices of the New York City firefighters have been recognized. On June 10, 2006, a bronze memorial was dedicated to the memory of the dead firefighters with names listed on the memorial according to rank. It begins with First Deputy Commissioner William F. Feehan and ends with Paramedic Ricardo J. Quinn.

The toll on the New York City firefighters was extreme. Besides the heavy loss of experienced personnel and the loss of ninety-one vehicles, there were still 415 members of the department on medical leave or light duty six months after September 11. Stress-related problems have been particularly severe. To replace the lost firefighters the department lowered entrance requirements for its recruits. One firefighter said, "It is going to take us a couple of generations, at least, to get the Fire Department back to where it was prior to 9/11."

See Also

Bucca, Ronald; Downey, Ray Matthew; Feehan, William M. "Bill"; Fire House 40/35; Ganci, Peter J. "Pete"; Von Essen, Thomas

See Documents

Document #14; Document #25

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Firefighters dig through the rubble covering the remains of the South Tower of the World Trade Center in October 2001. (AP IMAGES/Michael Conroy.)

Flynn, *102 Minutes: The Untold Story of the Fight to Survive inside the Twin Towers* (New York: Times Books, 2005); David Halberstam, *Firehouse* (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Peter Lange, *1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI—the Untold Story* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003); Dennis Smith, *Report from Ground Zero* (New York: Viking, 2002); Thomas Von Essen with Matt Murray, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York City* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002).

Firefighter Riot on November 2, 2001

The firefighters of the New York Fire Department (NYFD) were possessive of their dead after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center complex. After all, the firefighters had just lost 343 members of a close-knit fraternity of brothers. They had made a special ceremony of the recovery of their fallen comrades. In some cases, these efforts caused resentment among members of the New York Police Department (NYPD), Port Authority police, and the 3,000 or so construction workers. Tempers flared on several occasions between firefighters and others.

Work at the World Trade Center site was always chaotic, so Mayor Rudolph Giuliani proposed that the number of firefighters, police, and Port Authority police be reduced to twenty-five representatives each on the grounds of safety. At that time, around 100 firefighters were active in helping locate bodies and body parts. The firefighters, unlike the NYPD police and the Port Authority police, were furious at this announcement. They charged that the Giuliani administration wanted to

Negative Reaction to Plan to Reduce Number of Workers at Ground Zero

Instantly, as the mayor had feared, the rescue workers were up in arms. Stories went around that we had simply given up on finding bodies; that the mayor wanted to speed the cleanup so that it would be finished before he left office; that we had recovered gold from the trade center vaults and didn't care about anything else. (As it happened, on the day of the manning reduction, rescuers had recovered more than $200 million in gold and silver from a vault deep in the basement, belonging to the Bank of Nova Scotia; but neither the mayor nor I knew that.) Many asserted that although safety was the stated reason for the move, we were really just interested in speeding up the return of commerce to southern Manhattan. Union officials started telling the workers we were haphazardly trucking everything to Fresh Kills—a "scoop and dump" operation, as they called it.

Thomas Von Essen with Matt Murray, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York* (New York: Regan-Books, 2002), p. 265.

accelerate the disposal of debris at the expense of finding the remains of the victims. Complaints made their way up the ladder to the management of both firefighter unions. Union leaders decided to organize a demonstration at Ground Zero on November 2, 2001. This demonstration was scheduled seven weeks and three days after September 11.

The heads of the Department of Design and Construction (DDC) found themselves in the middle of the controversy. Kenneth Holden and Michael Burton, the two top officials at DDC, agreed that there were safety issues involved with having so many people at the site, but they also knew that Giuliani's decision would cause political trouble. Holden was a veteran civil service administrator and to buck Giuliani would have been a career breaker. Both leaders wanted to clear the debris out of the World Trade Center site as soon possible, but not at the expense of finding the remains of the victims.

Union leaders assured the Giuliani administration that the demonstration would be orderly, but tensions were so high that the situation soon developed into a confrontation between the firefighters and the police. Around 500 firefighters joined the demonstration at the beginning, but during the course of the demonstration another 500 showed up. Since there was no love lost between the NYPD police and the FDNY firefighters, pushing and shoving soon turned into an attempt by the firefighters to break police lines. The police responded by meeting force with force. Soon police began arresting the most violent of the demonstrators. Twelve firefighters were arrested, including the two heads of the firefighter unions. These arrests further infuriated the firefighters.

The Giuliani administration, including Mayor Giuliani and the Fire Commissioner, Thomas Von Essen, knew that they had a serious public relations problem. Giuliani was furious at the riot. At first, the mayor wanted to arrest some of the construction workers for supporting the demonstration, but cooler heads soon prevailed. Then, on the evening of November 12, 2001, the families of the dead firefighters vented their frustrations at the inability of the search and rescue teams to find bodies, and they expressed their concern about the rapid pace of the cleanup at Ground Zero. It was an emotional meeting in which the widows attacked the leaders of the Department of Design and Construction in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. They accused the Medical Examiner and Burton

New York City firefighter Declan Grant (right) participates in a demonstration conducted by firefighters outside City Hall in New York, November 2, 2001. Firefighters marched from Ground Zero to City Hall to demand that they be allowed to continue searching for victims' remains at the site of the World Trade Center Attack. (AP IMAGES/Tina Fineberg)

of lying. The mayor came away from this meeting relatively unscathed, but he was aware that things had to be calmed down.

Mayor Giuliani decided to compromise. He authorized first fifty and then seventy-five firefighters to remain at the site to help recover human remains. These concessions, including the release of the twelve arrested demonstrators without charges, did little to reconcile the firefighters with the Giuliani administration. Strong feelings remained after the Giuliani administration stepped down on January 1, 2002. Some of the distrust on the part of the firefighters carried over to the new mayor and his administration.

See Also

Department of Design and Construction; Firefighters at Ground Zero; Giuliani, Rudolph William Louis "Rudy" III

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Floyd, Nancy (1960–)

Nancy Floyd was the FBI agent whose association with the undercover informant Emad Salem helped reveal and break up the conspiracy by the followers of Abdel Rahman to bomb New York City landmarks. She was a specialist on tracking Russian agents, but her contact and subsequent involvement with Salem transformed her career. Ultimately, this association hurt her FBI career because of her outspokenness about how her superiors had mishandled the Salem affair.

Floyd, who was born in 1960, had wanted to be in government service from an early age. Her father was an officer in the U.S. Air Force who reached the rank of major before suffering a fatal heart attack at age 53. She moved around with her family, living both in Europe and at various air force bases in the United States. Floyd ended up living in Dallas, Texas. She attended the University of Texas at Arlington, where she received a BS in criminal justice. After graduating in 1982, she worked at various other jobs before applying to join the FBI in 1985. Floyd was one of eight women out of sixty trainees in her class at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

Most of Floyd's FBI career has been spent at the New York City Field Office. However, her first assignment was as a special agent in the Savannah, Georgia Field Office. After a couple of years, she was transferred the New York City Field Office. Once there, she was assigned to Branch A in the Bureau's Foreign Counterintelligence Division (FCI). The mission of the FCI was the gathering of intelligence on the intelligence unit of the Russian army (*Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie*, or GRU). Her mentor was the legendary agent Len Predtechenskis.

Floyd first made contact with Emad Salem while trying to locate Russian agents. Salem was working at a down-and-out hotel when Floyd approached him for information about a Russian agent who had possibly been using the hotel. Salem rounded up the information she had asked for, and then began volunteering other information. It was Salem who alerted her to how dangerous Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman was to the United States. Salem also showed an eagerness to do undercover work, but he was more comfortable dealing with Floyd than with his two FBI handlers. His only stipulation regarding his services was that he would not wear a wire.

Salem soon began to produce first-class intelligence on the extremists who were centered around the al-Kifah Refugee Center. He learned about possible bomb-making activities when the extremists approached him about working on a bomb, but he was not told where they planned to plant the bomb.

At this critical stage, a change of supervisors led to the termination of Salem's undercover work for the FBI, much to Floyd's disgust. The new supervisor, Carson Dunbar, insisted that Salem wear a wire so that a court case could be pursued against the terrorist targets. Dunbar was also suspicious of Salem, and he questioned Salem's reliability. Dunbar was also critical of Floyd's close personal relationship with Salem. Salem refused to wear a wire and his employment with the FBI was terminated at a key juncture in 1992.

After the World Trade Center bombing in February 1993, the FBI changed its mind and rehired Salem. Salem still only had confidence in Floyd, but he was persuaded to wear a wire. His secret recordings led to the break-up of a plot to bomb key New York City landmarks. His lack of trust in the FBI culminated in his record-

ing his contacts with various FBI agents. On some of these secret recordings, Floyd had made some disparaging remarks about her FBI superiors, which caused these supervisors to report her for disciplinary action.

For the next five and a half years, Floyd's conduct during the Salem affair was investigated. The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) began an investigation of Floyd that ruined her career. Any chance of promotion to higher positions in the FBI for Floyd ended during the investigation. Ultimately, the OPR investigation concluded that Floyd was guilty of insubordination against Carson Dunbar. The original penalty was suspension for thirty days, but her appeal reduced the suspension to fourteen days. Floyd remained in the New York office until she decided to request a transfer to a remote field office. During this time, she received a direct order not to have any contact with Salem. She was still in New York City on September 11, 2001.

Suggested Reading

Peter Lange, *1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI—the Untold Story* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003).

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) was passed as a result of the abuses of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in conducting warrantless surveillance of American citizens in the 1960s and early 1970s. Recommendations came out of the 1975 Church Committee on ways to prevent the warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens by the FBI. Committee members also wanted to end decades of presidentially approved electronic surveillance for national security purposes without a judicial warrant, and thus prevent irregularities in surveillance activities. This committee also believed that the U.S. judiciary lacked the expertise to rule on matters concerning foreign intelligence surveillance. Provisions of the FISA allowed for a special court to be established that would issue warrants after receiving requests from law-enforcement agencies. This court was given the name of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). A search warrant or a wire tap could be issued by the FISC if the subject was an agent of a foreign power, which was defined as either a foreign country or an international terrorist group, or if the subject was engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation for terrorism on behalf of a foreign power. FISC's orders are classified and kept secret. In the history of the FISC, only a few warrants have ever been turned down, because FISA permits search warrants to be issued based on a lower standard than the standard of probable cause used for criminal search warrants.

Despite the reputation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for almost never turning down a request from a law-enforcement agency, the FBI had been reluctant to apply for warrants from the court before September 11, 2001. An elaborate and time-consuming procedure had to be followed to apply for a warrant from the FISC. Once the agents at a field office had determined that there was probable cause for a FISA warrant, an electronic communication (EC) with supporting documents would be sent to the FBI headquarters unit overseeing the investigation. That unit would add any supporting documents and send the package to the National Security Law Unit (NSLU). This unit comprises lawyers with

expertise in national security law. Lawyers in the NSLU would review the case on its merits. If these lawyers agreed that the case met the threshold of probable cause, then the dossier would be forwarded to the Department of Justice. If not, the case would end at the NSLU. At the Department of Justice, the case would be examined anew by its Office of Intelligence Policy Review (OIPR), where lawyers would once again examine the case for a FISA warrant. Only if the case could pass all of these roadblocks could it be forwarded to the FISA court in the form of a declaration and be signed off by a FISA court judge.

Part of the problem was that the FBI's lawyers interpreted the FISA law in a more restrictive manner than the legislation had intended. This strict interpretation of the law was the case with the FISA request from the Minneapolis Field Office for a warrant concerning Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called twentieth hijacker on September 11, 2001. FBI agents had requested authority for a warrant several times for Moussaoui, including one from the FISC, but each time their request was turned down by FBI headquarters. Moussaoui had been in Chechnya assisting the Chechen rebels fighting against Russia. The head of the Radical Fundamental Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters refused to classify the Chechen rebels as part of a so-called recognized foreign power.

The final interpretation of FBI headquarters in the Moussaoui case was that Moussaoui was not associated with a foreign power, nor was the Chechen rebel group a recognized terrorist group. This decision was made despite the warning from French security agents that Moussaoui had been associating with Muslim extremists and even though it was well-known in intelligence circles that the Chechen rebels had extensive contacts with al-Qaeda.

Everything changed after the events of September 11, and the FBI had no trouble obtaining a criminal warrant against Moussaoui in the aftermath of the attacks. An examination of his computer after September 11 revealed his contacts with the Hamburg Cell, which had carried out the 9/11 attacks, and al-Qaeda. The FBI's strict adherence to its interpretation of the FISA has been blamed as part of the "Wall" that hindered the flow of information and thwarted the effectiveness of the FBI's efforts against terrorism.

Since September 11, 2001, the controversy over the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has intensified. The Bush administration made its view known that the onerous requirements of FISA stood in the way of intelligence gathering. In a secret court proceeding before the FISA Appeals Court on September 9, 2002, with only government lawyers present, the Bush administration presented its case that the FISC had hindered the flow of information and had obstructed the president's authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information. The court accepted the government's position and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear any appeals. This judgment was the legal grounds for subsequent warrantless searches, which were conducted by the National Security Agency in secret and under presidential authority.

Despite the efforts of the Bush administration to bypass the FISC system, FISA courts still exist and the number of warrant requests coming before them has increased significantly in recent years. The use of FISA and its courts does protect the government from accusations that it violates the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. persons. Since the disclosure of the warrantless searches, President Bush has

instructed the various intelligence organizations that the FISC system be used for all intelligence-gathering activities. The debate over FISA and its courts is ongoing, with many critics believing that both the law and its implementation are hindering the War on Terrorism.

See Also
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Moussaoui, Zacarias; Wall, The

See Documents
Document #28; Document #30

Suggested Reading
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Freedom Tower

The replacement for the twin towers destroyed on September 11, 2001, is known as the Freedom Tower. Almost from the beginning, the project to replace the World Trade Center complex and the twin towers has been mired in controversy and politics. Part of the reason for the conflict has been the involvement of so many players in the rebuilding project. The Lower Manhattan Development Corporation has the overall responsibility for guiding the entire project, but the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the New York Police Department (NYPD), the developer Larry Silverstein, and politicians such as Governor George Pataki and New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, have all played active roles in the process. Add to this the lobbying from the Families of 9/11 Movement, and it can easily be seen that any type of decision making would be difficult and time-consuming. Moreover, there have been irreconcilable differences between the stakeholders at times, which has further complicated the process.

It took nearly two years after September 11, 2001, for the concept of the Freedom Tower to win approval. A German architect, Daniel Libeskind, was selected in 2003 by the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation to design the building. Libeskind's original plan was to build the memorial to the victims of September 11 first, complete Church Street buildings next, and finally construct the Freedom Tower last. This plan was revised by Governor Pataki, who insisted that the Freedom Tower should be built first. In the meantime, a feud developed between the lead architect, Libeskind, and the developer's choice of architect, David Childs.

The original design was for a futuristic building that would reflect the city's self-confidence and that could withstand any type of terrorist attack. It was designed as a twisting obelisk of steel and glass rising to 1,776 feet. There would be about 2.6 million square feet of office space in the lower 69 stories, but the building would be 102-stories tall overall. The bottom half of the building would contain offices while the top half would be a broadcast tower with restaurants at the top. Part of the top half would have an open space for wind turbines that could fulfill

Architects David Childs (right) and Daniel Libeskind (left) in 2005, posing next to the model of the redesigned Freedom Tower during a news conference in New York. (AP IMAGES/Mary Altaffer.)

20 percent of the building's energy needs. Original site for the building was to be within twenty-five feet from the West Street-Route 9A. The cost of the building had been estimated in the $2 billion range.

The Freedom Tower was in the initial construction phase in the spring of 2005 when the New York Police Department criticized the building's location and insisted that it would present serious security concerns. The NYPD feared that a large truck bomb attack would seriously damage the Freedom Tower. After all, it had happened in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. After some negotiations, Governor Pataki announced in May 2005 that the building would be moved further from West Street, and that the tower's exterior would be strengthened to withstand a truck bombing. These requirements meant that the Freedom Tower would have to be redesigned almost from scratch. In this new design, there would be a twenty-story fortified wall around the base of the tower. These modifications brought the estimated cost of the Freedom Tower to the $3 billion range.

The twin towers had structural problems that contributed to their collapse, so the Freedom Tower would also have to meet higher structural standards. Elevators and stairwells are to be protected by walls of concrete and steel two feet thick. There will be wider exit stairs, improved emergency systems, and better fireproofing. The ultimate assessment of the building, however, will be conducted by structural engineers, who must give their approval that the proposed design of the building is structurally sound. This creates a further problem in that, as Guy Nordenson, a structural engineer and a professor of architecture at Princeton University, points out, "the computer software that is being used to simulate the

blast effects is proprietary and classified by the federal government." This means that the structural engineers only have access to the data produced by the government's software without being able to judge the reliability of the tests.

Once the security and structural problems posed by the design of the Freedom Tower had been resolved, the next obstacle was finding potential tenants for the building. A residue of fear had built up over working at a place where so many had died so recently. Moreover, the building would serve as a prime target for future terrorist activity. To encourage the private sector to move into the building, the governors of New York and New Jersey, and the mayor of New York City committed state and federal agencies to occupy 1 million of the 2.6 million square feet in the Freedom Tower. Despite this decision, there has been widespread resistance to the idea of working in the Freedom Tower by the employees of these governmental agencies. A secondary issue is the escalating cost of construction, which means that leasing space in the Freedom Tower might eventually be too expensive for most businesses and corporations.

Wrangling over terms between the state and local governments and the developer, and the constant changing of agendas by the various players, has slowed down the pace of construction of the Freedom Tower. It was originally envisaged that the tower would be operational sometime in 2009, but it now seems likely that the building will be completely finished sometime in 2011.

See Also

World Trade Center Bombing (1993)

Suggested Reading

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Freeh, Louis (1950–)

Louis Freeh was the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during most of the early days of the September 11 plot. He was the fifteenth head of the FBI, and his tenure in office lasted from September 1, 1993, until June 2001. In those eight years, Freeh transformed the FBI and its culture according to his own views and ideas. He had been a field operative earlier in his career and he distrusted FBI headquarters. This distrust led him to institute certain policies and to engage in downsizing that weakened FBI headquarters. This weakening was so severe that headquarters was unable to process information from the field offices that might have had an impact on counteracting and preventing al-Qaeda operations in the United States.

Freeh spent his entire professional life in government service. He was born on January 6, 1950, in Jersey City, New Jersey. His father ran a real estate firm after spending most of World War II as a combat engineer, and his mother worked as a secretary in the same firm. Freeh attended Immaculate Heart of Mary Grammar School, St. Joseph of the Palisades Junior High, and then St. Joseph's High

School. After graduation from high school, Freeh entered Rutgers University where he was a Phi Beta Kappa graduate. He then entered Rutgers Law School, and he graduated with a JD in 1974. During part of this time, Freeh worked in the office of Republican Senator Clifford P. Chase. Later, Freeh obtained an LLM degree from New York University Law School in 1984. In the meantime, Freeh joined the FBI in the summer of 1975 and graduated from the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, in August of the same year. His first assignment was with the New York City Field Office and he was later transferred to the FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. He became bored with the office work at FBI headquarters.

In 1981 Freeh made a career change by leaving the FBI for a legal position in government service. He became an assistant U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, working as a federal prosecutor in Manhattan. His duties there were handling investigations and conducting trials of Mafia figures. He moved steadily up the legal ladder in this office, becoming Chief of the Organized Crime Unit, Deputy United States Attorney, and Associate United States Attorney. Then, in 1991, President George H. W. Bush appointed Freeh as United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York. He remained in this position until President Bill Clinton appointed him FBI director in 1993.

Freeh's tenure as FBI director was characterized by numerous problems, both inherited and new. Two investigations were ongoing—the Ruby Ridge incident in Idaho and the Branch Davidian standoff in Waco, Texas—when Freeh assumed office in 1993. He took a neutral position on both of these investigations by maintaining his distance from blame that accumulated in both incidents. Critics in Congress and in right-wing circles accused the federal government of misconduct in using force to capture the Weaver family, and in the siege of the Branch Davidians, when David Koresh refused to surrender to federal agents, leading to heavy casualties. Several high-profile cases did take place during Freeh's stay as director: the Centennial Olympic Park bombing, the negotiations with the Montana Freemen, the capture of the Unabomber, the Robert Hanssen spy case, and the Wen Ho Lee investigation. Freeh also had to deal with the fallout from the Clinton sex and perjury scandals.

Freeh valued his independence, and, early in his tenure as FBI director, he alienated President Bill Clinton by rejecting Clinton's attempts to forge a closer working relationship with him. His official reason for rejecting any alignment with the president was the possibility of legal action against him, but Freeh also wanted complete independence in carrying out his duties. This attitude soon resulted in a souring of relations with President Clinton. Freeh did retain good working relations with the Democrats who controlled Congress. This friendliness with Democrats ended in 1994, however, when the Republicans assumed control of Congress. Freeh soon began to cultivate the Republican leaders. Whether this was a calculated policy or not, Freeh's former good relationships with Democrats ended abruptly. From the time the Republicans gained control of Congress until he resigned, his position was impregnable because of his support from Republicans in Congress.

Toward the end of the Clinton administration, Clinton and Freeh had developed, according to Clinton, "an openly adversarial relationship." Freeh believed

that the Clinton administration had prevented the FBI from receiving cooperation from Saudi officials over the Khobar bombing that had taken place on June 25, 1996. Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, told Freeh this. He added that the Clinton administration had impeded the FBI's efforts to receive Saudi cooperation because it did not want to risk worsening relations with Iran. In fact, it was Saudi Arabia that wanted to avoid trouble with Iran, and thus limited its cooperation on the Khobar investigation. In actuality, the Clinton administration considered military options against Iran, but Freeh was never informed of them.

Clinton came to distrust Freeh so much that he no longer invited Freeh to top-level national security briefings. This isolation led to some embarrassing incidents such as when President Clinton authorized cruise missiles to be shot at al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan without notifying Freeh in advance. Freeh's relationship with Janet Reno, the U.S. Attorney General, was also strained. Freeh had enough support among Republicans in Congress and in the media that it was politically impossible for President Clinton to fire him.

Freeh's biggest impact on the FBI was the type of culture he left behind. He had been a field agent earlier in his career and his experiences had led to a deep distrust of FBI headquarters. His tour of duty at FBI headquarters only reinforced this distrust. As soon as Freeh became director, he reduced staff at headquarters. Nearly fifty top-level posts were eliminated and some 600 supervisory agents were reassigned to the field in this purge. This purge led to a large number of senior agents leaving the FBI. Freeh admitted in 2001 that 41 percent of FBI special agents had less than six years of experience. He was also more comfortable with agents in the field than at FBI headquarters.

Freeh was also distrustful of technology. He refused to use a computer in his office. Consequently, the FBI was a paper-based organization to such an extent that it was constantly flooded with paperwork and its analysts at headquarters were unable to keep up with the flow of documents. The FBI's computer system, known as the Automated Case Support system, has been described by Ronald Kessler as "so flawed that memos sent to agents never arrived, and there was no way for the sender to know if a memo had been received." It took twelve commands to store a document on the FBI's computer system. Moreover, the case organization system meant that the computer was unable to send relevant information from one case file to another. Freeh maintained in his memoirs that it was Congress's fault for not appropriating sufficient funds for installing a new computer system.

When Freeh left his position as director of the FBI, it was an organization that operated well in the field offices but exhibited a lack of coordination at headquarters. What has been termed a risk avoidance culture has also caused some controversy, as every decision during Freeh's tenure went through the legal staff first, and the most conservative interpretation of the law was usually upheld by the lawyers. This was partially the reason why Zacarias Moussaoui's laptop was not examined until after September 11. Freeh's relationship with the FBI's top counterterrorism expert, John O'Neill, was strained because of this policy. Freeh's replacement as the director of the FBI was Robert Mueller.

Freeh has returned to the legal profession. In September 2001, he became the senior vice chairman for MBNA America, a large credit card company. Several

companies have also appointed him to their board of directors. Freeh wrote an editorial in the November 17, 2005, edition of the *Wall Street Journal* that was critical of the 9/11 Commission. He also authored, with Howard Means, a 1995 book about his career in the FBI: *My FBI: Bringing Down the Mafia, Investigating Bill Clinton, and Fighting the War on Terror*. Most of his criticisms in the book are directed against former President Bill Clinton and his former counterterrorism advisor, Richard A. Clarke.

See Also
Clarke, Richard A.; Clinton Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation; O'Neill, John

See Document
Document #33

Suggested Reading
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002); Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004); Louis J. Freeh and Howard Means, *My FBI: Bringing Down the Mafia, Investigating Bill Clinton, and Fighting the War on Terrorism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005); Ronald Kessler, *The CIA at War: Inside the Secret Campaign Against Terror* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2003); Peter Lange, *1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI—the Untold Story* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003); Murray Weiss, *The Man Who Warned America: The Life and Death of John O'Neill, the FBI's Embattled Counterterror Warrior* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003); Richard Gid Powers, *Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI* (New York: Free Press, 2004).

Fresh Kills Landfill

The debris from the World Trade Center complex site was transported to the Fresh Kills Landfill on Staten Island, New York. This island had been used as a landfill for New York City for half a century before it was closed down in March 2001. It was a landfill covering 2,200 acres, and in places it reached 200 feet above the surrounding water. Plans had been made to turn the landfill into a park. Because it had been one of the largest open spaces in the New York City area, the landfill was a natural depository for the debris from the World Trade Center complex site.

Nature of the Procedures at the Fresh Kills Landfill

Those procedures remained remarkably stable over the course of the operation, because though the conditions at the Trade Center site frequently changed (resulting in production spikes), once the heavy steel had been redirected to New Jersey, the nature of the output destined for Fresh Kills remained largely the same: bargeloads of rubble consisting of broken and crushed concrete, asbestos, asphalt millings, rebar, and other forms of light steel—all stirred through with a homogenized mixture of details from 50,000 working lives, nearly 3,000 of which had just ended violently. Fresh Kills's job was to separate the human mixture from the rest—to dehomogenize the debris.

William Langewiesche, *American Ground: Unbuilding the World Trade Center* (New York: North Point Press, 2002), p. 194.

Almost from day one, debris came from the World Trade Center site to the Fresh Kills Landfill. At first the debris came by truck, but within days it began to come by barge. Once a debris load arrived at the Fresh Kills Landfill, it underwent a

detailed inspection for body parts and any type of evidence that could be used to understand the nature of the attack. The method used for sorting the materials was complex. First, large items—those larger than six inches—were isolated from the rest of the materials. The remaining materials were then placed in one of four large sorters. These sorters separated the materials into three sizes: less than a quarter of an inch, more than a quarter inch to three inches, and from three to six inches. Because almost all of the material below the size of a quarter of an inch consisted of asphalt milling and dirt, the inspectors only gave them a brief inspection. The two other piles were closely inspected along an assembly line of inspectors. Inspectors were on ninety-minute rotations to keep them alert. Soon after this final inspection, the debris was buried in the landfill.

The only item from the debris not buried was the structural steel. Retaining structural steel would have caused burial problems at the Fresh Kills Landfill. The solution was to sell and send the structural steel to scrap yards in New Jersey. This sale of the structural steel helped defray some of the expense of the World Trade Center complex cleanup.

The process of handling debris at the Fresh Kills Landfill continued beyond the end of the work at the World Trade Center complex in May 2002. Materials ceased arriving, but there was a backlog of work still to be done. The closing ceremony at the World Trade Center complex was held on May 30, 2002. Once the

New York police officers in biohazard suits painstakingly sift through the wreckage of the World Trade Center as it is dumped at the Fresh Kills Landfill on Staten Island in New York, in October 2001. (AP IMAGES/Beth A. Keiser.)

work was completed at the landfill several months later, it was closed again. Plans are still active to make it into a park, but for now it serves as a memorial for the victims of September 11.

See Also

Cleanup Operations at Ground Zero

Suggested Reading

William Langewiesche, *American Ground: Unbuilding the World Trade Center* (New York: North Point Press, 2002).

G

Ganci, Peter J. "Pete" (1946–2001)
Peter Ganci was one of the highest-ranking Fire Department of New York (FDNY) officers to die at the World Trade Center on September 11. He started out in the ranks and worked himself up through the ranks to Chief of the Fire Department of New York. Eleven thousand uniformed officers and firefighters reported to him. Ganci was also one of the most highly decorated firefighters in the history of the FDNY. Members of the fire department loved him because he always considered himself one of them.

Ganci spent his entire life as a firefighter. He was born on October 27, 1946, and raised in North Massapequa, New York. His mother died young, and he was raised by his father. He attended St. Killian's School and Farmingdale High School. He joined the Farmingdale Volunteer Fire Department when he was eighteen, and he never left it, even after employment as a firefighter with the New York City Fire Department. At twenty, he entered the U.S. Army, serving with the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. After serving in the military for two years, Ganci returned to civilian life in 1968 and became a firefighter with Engine Company 92 in the Bronx. After marriage and three children, he opened a bar and restaurant in North Massaquequa, Potter's Pub, to supplement his income. Ganci rose rapidly in the FDNY. He made lieutenant in 1977, captain in 1983, and Chief of the FDNY in 1987. He had a reputation as "a tough, hard-ass firefighter who was fearless." Ganci received numerous citations for bravery in his thirty-three years in the FDNY. As a lieutenant he was cited for saving the lives of three children. His office was at headquarters in Brooklyn.

Ganci responded to the crisis at the World Trade Center like the rest of the New York City Fire Department. He was in his office in Brooklyn when the first plane hit the north tower of the World Trade Center complex. He and his commanders immediately traveled to the World Trade Center complex and established a command center. While there, the fire commissioner, Thomas Von Essen, and the deputy fire commissioner, Bill Feehan, joined him for consultation. Von Essen left to report on the state of affairs to Mayor Giuliani, but Feehan stayed with his old friend Ganci. After the second plane crashed into the south tower, Ganci ordered

three command centers to be set up—one in the each tower's lobby and one on the adjacent West Street. Shortly after he received a warning about the danger of collapse of the towers, the south tower collapsed. Then the north tower collapsed twenty-nine minutes after the south tower, burying Ganci and Feehan under four feet of rubble. The search-and-rescue dog, Bear, discovered both Ganci and Feehan's bodies only hours after the collapse of the towers. Ganci was buried with full honors befitting one of the most loved figures in the FDNY.

Reputation of Ganci among Firefighters

To them [fraternity of firefighters] Ganci was the complete fireman; his bravery was laced with an almost reckless competitiveness, the desire that all fireman have to be able to say later, "I opened the door first" or "I got to the fire first." Or, to put this another way, he was known for his instinct to be in front in a fire, to embody the New York Fire Department's sobriquet—the bravest.

Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, From Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002), p. 150.

See Also

Firefighters at Ground Zero; Feehan, William M. "Bill"; Von Essen, Thomas

Suggested Reading

Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, from Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002); Thomas Von Essen with Matt Murray, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York City* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002).

Giuliani, Rudolph William Louis "Rudy" III (1944–)

Mayor Rudolph Giuliani achieved worldwide fame for his role in the aftermath of the September 11 attack. He was born on May 28, 1944, in Brooklyn, New York. His family was working class. Giuliani attended and, in 1961, graduated from Bishop Loughlin Memorial High School in Brooklyn. His collegiate years were spent at Manhattan College in the Bronx where he graduated in 1965. Next, Giuliani obtained a law degree from New York University Law School in 1968. His first job was clerking for Judge Lloyd MacMahon, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New York.

The bulk of Giuliani's career has been spent in government service. His first position was with the Office of the U.S. Attorney in 1970. After a stint as the chief of the narcotics unit and Executive U.S. Attorney, he left for Washington, D.C., in 1975 to become the associate deputy attorney general and chief of staff to the deputy attorney general. Giuliani briefly left government service in 1977 to practice law at the Patterson, Belknap, Webb and Tyler law firm. Then, in 1981 the Reagan administration recruited Giuliani to the office of associate attorney general. Giuliani then was appointed the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York where he earned a reputation for tackling high-profile cases—including those of Wall Street icons Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken.

Giuliani's law-and-order reputation led to his running for the post of New York City mayor. His first attempt as the Republican candidate was unsuccessful; he lost to David Dinkins in 1989 in a close race. His second attempt in 1993 led to his election as mayor after a campaign featuring attacks on crime and rising taxes. Giuliani won reelection in 1997 by a large margin. His law-and-order campaign led to a reduction in crime in New York City. New York City's limit on mayoral terms meant that Giuliani could not run for a third term as mayor, but he was still mayor in September 2001.

Giuliani's career received a boost because of his role in the management of New York City in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center. His response immediately after the assault on the twin towers was to coordinate the response of various city departments, and he made quick contact with state and federal authorities. Giuliani made contact with President George W. Bush and received assurances of federal aid. In the next new few weeks Giuliani held meetings several times a day to coordinate aid and relief. He also worked closely with the fire commissioner, Thomas Von Essen, and the police commissioner, Bernard Kerik, on the activities at the World Trade Center site. Von Essen described the mayor's style as barking, pleading, commiserating, and questioning. At every meeting Giuliani demanded measurable progress on the situation from his subordinates. He was also present and often talked at ceremonies honoring the dead. Giuliani did run into some difficulty trying to reduce the number of firefighters at the World Trade Center site, and he had to back down in a confrontation that took place in early November 2001. This conflict with the firefighters made him furious, but he realized that he had a growing public relations problem unless he compromised.

Because the scheduled date of the mayoral primary was September 11, this primary had to be rescheduled. Few people could make it to the polls on September 11 because the city had been closed down. Giuliani first sought an emergency override of the term-limit law, but this attempt ran into political oppositions, as did his effort to have his term of office extended four months. He left the mayoral office on December 31, 2001.

Mayor Giuliani's Role after September 11

Through it all, the mayor [Giuliani] barked, pleaded, commiserated, prodded, and questioned, just as he always had. At every meeting he wanted to see measurable progress on what you had been working on earlier; he demanded the latest facts and figures from the site; and he piled on the tasks. If you couldn't deliver, he made it clear, you had to get out of the way.

Thomas Von Essen with Matt Murray, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York* (New York: Regan-Books, 2002), p. 201.

Giuliani left public life with a national reputation. *Time* magazine named Giuliani its Person of the Year for 2001. Shortly after leaving office, Giuliani founded a security consulting business, and he purchased the accounting firm Ernst & Young's investment banking unit, which he named Giuliani Capital Advisors LLC. He also traveled around the country making speeches. He campaigned vigorously for the reelection of President George W. Bush. Bush responded by inviting Giuliani to replace Tom Ridge as Secretary of Homeland Security, but Giuliani turned down the offer. Then in March 2005, Giuliani joined the firm of Bracewell & Patterson LLP, which was promptly renamed Bracewell & Giuliani LLP. Giuliani has maintained his political contacts in the Republican Party, and he has constantly been advanced as a candidate for national office. In the meantime, he was appointed to Congress's Iraq Study Group (ISG). This group had the mission to assess the military situation in Iraq under the sponsorship of the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Giuliani's role has a hero of September 11 has been challenged in recent years. Much of the criticism has come from family members of the victims of September 11. The most vocal have been the families of firefighters. They have criticized Giuliani for

New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani (center), Fire Commissioner Thomas Von Essen (left), and Chief of the New York Fire Department Peter Ganci (right), cut the ribbon on a new firehouse for Engine Company 75, Ladder 33 and Battalion 19, in the Bronx, on August 16, 2000. Looking on from the background are Captain Thomas Kelly (left) and Captain John Stark (right). (AP IMAGES/Ed Bailey.)

separating the police and firefighter command posts on the morning of September 11 and for not holding emergency drills to check on communication equipment prior to the attacks. Another criticism has been the ineffectiveness of the Office of Emergency Management because of its locations in the World Trade Center complex.

Rudy Giuliani has continued to pursue a political career. In 2007 he announced his intention to seek the 2008 Republican presidential nomination. He ran a lackluster campaign trying to capitalize on his 9/11 reputation. Because of his previous positions on gun control and abortion, he had trouble convincing social conservatives in the Republican Party to support him. After low vote totals in the primaries, Giuliani dropped out of the presidential race on January 31, 2008.

See Also

Kerik, Bernard Bailey; Office of Emergency Management (OEM); World Trade Center, September 11; Von Essen, Thomas

Suggested Reading

Wayne Barrett and Dan Collins, "The Real Rudy: The Image of Rudy Giuliani as the Hero of September 11 Has Never Been Seriously Challenged. That Changes Now," *American Prospect* 17 (September 1, 2006); Jack Newfield, *The Full Rudy: The Man, the Myth, the*

Mania (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2003); Robert Polner, *America's Mayor: The Hidden History of Rudy Giuliani's New York* (New York: Soft Skull Press, 2005); Fred Siegel, *The Prince of the City, Giuliani, New York, and the Genius of American Life* (New York: Encounter Books, 2005); Thomas Von Essen with Matt Murray, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002).

Giuliani Time (Documentary)

Giuliani Time is a documentary that debates the career of former New York City mayor Rudolph "Rudy" Giuliani. Kevin Keating is an award-winning director of documentaries *When We Were Kings* and *Harlan County, U.S.A.* He began work on the documentary *Giuliani Time* in 1998 during Mayor Giuliani's second term. Keating is no admirer of Giuliani although he allows some of Giuliani's allies to speak of his accomplishments. The main voices in the documentary are critical of Giuliani, particularly Wayne Barrett, a *Village Voice* journalist and the author of an unauthorized critical biography of Giuliani. Little is said of Giuliani's role in the September 11, 2001, attack. The film shows that "his decisiveness, forensic intelligence and wit could be impressive," but it also reveals his "high-handedness, arrogance and meanness." This documentary had little impact on Giuliani's presidential campaign; it was considered too partisan. Even Democratic activists showed little interest in using this documentary against Giuliani.

See Also

Giuliani, Rudolph William Louis "Rudy" III

Suggested Reading

Robin Finn, "Giuliani, through a Lens, Darkly," *New York Times* (May 12, 2006), p. B2; Michael Powell, "'Giuliani Time' Recalls Ex-Mayor's Less Heroic Deeds," *Washington Post* (May 26, 2006), p. C5; A. O. Scott, "Confronting the Legacy of Giuliani: Crime, Race and Urban Politics," *New York Times* (May 12, 2006), p. PT1.

Glick, Jeremy (1970–2001)

Jeremy Glick was one of the passengers on United Airlines Flight 93 who attempted to regain control of the aircraft from al-Qaeda hijackers on September 11, 2001. Glick was a former national collegiate judo champion, and he used his physical abilities to attack the hijackers. The fact that the aircraft crashed does not lessen the courage of Glick's and his fellow passengers' attempt to gain control.

Glick was always athletic and public service–minded. He was born on September 3, 1970, into a Jewish family of six. Glick and his brothers and sisters grew up in Saddle River, New Jersey. He attended Saddle River Day School, graduating in 1988. Always interested in athletics, Glick started training in judo at age seven. In high school, he was also a member of the wrestling team. After high school, Glick studied English at Rochester University. He took time off in 1991 to spend ten months in Israel performing community service and studying Hebrew. During his senior year, Glick participated in the national collegiate judo championship in San Francisco as an independent. He arrived there without a coach or any backing, but his grade school coach was there with another team. This coach helped him, and Glick won the national title in his weight class. He was also elected president of the Alpha Delta Phi fraternity. Glick graduated from Rochester University in 1993. Next, he traveled to Japan where he taught English.

Glick had another reason to compete in the national collegiate judo championship. He was interested in courting a girl from his high school, Lyzbeth Makely, who lived in San Francisco. Their courtship culminated in marriage in 1996. By this time Glick had found a position as a sales rep with Giga Information Group. Then in 2000, he changed jobs and found a position with Vividence, an Internet service provider of products about the behavior, thoughts, and attitudes of Web customers. Although his job meant some traveling, the birth of a daughter, Emerson Glick, made him reluctant to travel from his lakeside home in Hewitt, New Jersey. His daughter was only twelve weeks old when Glick left for a business trip in September 2001.

Like several others on United Airlines Flight 93, Glick was not supposed to have been on that plane. He had planned to leave on September 10, 2001, but because of a fire at the Newark International airport, his flight was rerouted to Kennedy International Airport. Glick decided to take a flight the next morning. On September 11, Glick boarded the plane at Newark International Airport for a business trip to San Francisco. After a forty-five-minute delay, the aircraft lifted off. At approximately 9:28 a.m., the hijackers seized control of the aircraft. Soon afterward, Glick was one of those who used the GTE Airfone to call loved ones. His conversation with his wife confirmed what others were saying: that the hijackers were on a suicide mission. In a twenty-minute conversation, he told his wife of the plans to regain control of the aircraft. The passengers had voted to attack the hijacker. He joked that he still had the butter knife from breakfast. Glick also told his wife to take care of their newborn daughter, and to have a good life. He left the phone on and joined the attackers. Todd Beamer, Mark Bingham, Thomas Burnett, and the others came close to regaining control of the airliner, but the pilot of the hijack team, Ziad Jarrah**,** put the airliner into a dive and crashed the aircraft near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

Glick's Comments to His Wife on September 11

"I need you to be happy in the rest of your life," Jeremy told Lyz. "I'll support any decisions that you make." He told her to love their baby and to tell Emerson how much he loved her.

Jere Longman, *Among the Heroes: United Flight 93 & the Passengers & Crew Who Fought Back* (New York: Perennial, 2003), p. 146.

Since September 11, 2001, Glick and his companions have become heroes. They prevented the terrorists from carrying out their mission to crash the airliner into the U.S. Capitol or possibly even the White House. A memorial service was held at the upstate ski resort of Wyndam, New York, where Glick often ski boarded in his youth. This status of hero was small consolation to the widows and children left behind. Glick's wife kept a journal by writing letters to her husband and her daughter. This exercise led to a book *Your Father's Voice* published in 2004. Glick has been honored by the Rochester University, which has endowed a scholarship in his name to support his commitment to the value of a fraternity experience and its rewards.

See Also

Beamer, Todd Morgan; Bingham, Mark Kendall; Burnett, Thomas Edward; Jarrah, Ziad Samir; United Airlines Flight 93

See Document

Document #16

Suggested Reading
Lisa Beamer and Ken Abraham, *Ordinary People, Extraordinary Courage* (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2002); Cindi Lash, "An Eloquent Journal of 'Your Father's Voice'," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* (November 29, 2004), p. A1; Cindi Lash, "Liz Glick: Widow of Flight 93 Passenger Jeremy Glick," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* (September 11, 2002), p. B4; Jere Longman, *Among the Heroes: United Flight 93 and the Passengers and Crew Who Fought Back* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002); Tom Zucco, "Heroes Come from All Walks of Life," *St. Petersburg Times* [Florida] (September 18, 2001), p. 1D.

Goss, Porter J. (1938–)

As a Republican congressman active in intelligence affairs and later head of the CIA, Porter Goss has been concerned about the effectiveness of American intelligence gathering before and after September 11, 2001. Early in his career, until ill health led to his retirement, he was a CIA operative. Goss then turned to politics, becoming a congressman from the 14th congressional district of Florida. Again in the House of Representatives Goss specialized in intelligence, serving as the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.

Goss had a privileged upbringing. He was born on November 26, 1938, in Waterbury, Connecticut. His early education was at the exclusive Fessenden School in West Newton, Massachusetts, and the equally elite Hotchkiss High School in Lakeville, Connecticut. Goss graduated from that high school in 1956. Next, he attended Yale University where his Bachelor of Arts degree was in ancient Greek. Goss belonged to several prominent societies at Yale. Some of his classmates were William H. T. Bush, the uncle of President George W. Bush, and John Negroponte, career diplomat and Director of National Intelligence from 2005 to 2006.

Most of Goss's early career was with the CIA. It was while he was still at Yale University that the CIA recruited him. His career in the CIA was with the Directorate of Operations (DO). This directorate carries out the clandestine operations of the CIA. Goss worked as a CIA agent in the DO from 1960 until 1971. Most of his activities in the CIA are still classified, but it is known that his area of operation included Latin America and the Caribbean and later Europe. He participated in the events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. In 1970, while he was in London, health problems led him to resign from the CIA.

Goss began his political career in 1975. He served as mayor of Sanibel City, Florida, in 1975–1977 and again in 1981–1982. In 1988 he ran for the House seat in Florida's 13th congressional district. Goss defeated a former holder of that congressional seat and retained it until 1993. In 1993 he became the congressional representative from Florida's 14th congressional district, and he held this seat until May 5, 2006, when he resigned it to head the CIA. In his sixteen years in Congress, Goss served on specialized committees that had oversight on intelligence. Although Goss had always been supportive of the CIA, he endorsed legislation in 1995 that would have cut intelligence personnel by 20 percent over a five-year period as a budget-cutting measure. Goss served as chair of the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence from 1997 to 2005, and he helped establish and served on the Homeland Security Committee. Throughout his political career, Goss defended the CIA and supported budget increases for it. He also was a strong supporter of George Tenet, the director of the CIA.

The September 11 attacks brought Goss to the political forefront. Goss was having a breakfast meeting with Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) and the chief of Pakistani intelligence, Lieutenant General Mehmoud Ahmed, when news surfaced of the attacks on September 11. They had been discussing what was going on in Afghanistan and the capabilities of al-Qaeda. Goss's immediate response was to find out how this could have happened. In particular, why had the intelligence community not been able to detect the plotters? Goss found that his good friend Senator Graham had the same questions. Together, in their respective houses of Congress, they began to call for a bipartisan investigation into the events surrounding September 11. Both in the Senate and in the House of Representatives there was reluctance to proceed. Opposition was even stronger in the Bush administration against such an investigation. Everyone was afraid of a "gotcha" investigation that would lay blame on them. This fear on both the Republican and the Democratic sides slowed down the setting up of a Senate-House Joint Inquiry on Intelligence, and the length of time provided to produce a report was unrealistically short. Despite the short time span—and reluctance and sometimes nonexistent cooperation from the CIA, the FBI, and the White House—a valuable report was finally issued with sections of it censored.

Goss opposed the creation and many of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Like many of his fellow Republicans, he was fearful that the commission would be a witch hunt against the Bush administration. Even after it was apparent that the 9/11 Commission was bipartisan, Goss opposed its recommendations on intelligence matters. His biggest concern was the recommendation for a national intelligence director whose job would be to oversee all intelligence agencies.

Goss's Opposition to the 9/11 Commission

Breitweiser said that when the victims' families met with Goss to advocate an independent commission to investigate the attacks, he was not supportive. Four steering committee members said that when they made the rounds on Capitol Hill, Goss's staff turned them away, saying that he wasn't there. Mindy Kleinberg, whose husband, Alan, worked on the 104th floor of the World Trade Center, recalled pushing into Goss's office, only to find the congressman hiding: "They said he wasn't there—he was right behind the door."

Laura Blumenfeld, "Goss Hailed as Old Pro, Assailed as Partisan," *Washington Post* (September 13, 2004), p. A1.

As a conservative Republican, Goss has defended the Bush administration in its war on terrorism. He also has been a severe critic of what he calls the failures of the Clinton administration. His loyalty to the Bush administration was noted. When George Tenet resigned as director of the CIA on June 3, 2004, Goss was a natural candidate. President George W. Bush rewarded Goss for his loyalty by nominating him to become director of the CIA. Despite opposition from some Democratic senators, Goss won conformation from the Senate by a vote of 77–17 on September 22, 2004. During his conformation hearings, Goss promised that he would bring change and reform to the CIA.

Goss's tenure as head of the CIA was a mixed record. He arrived at CIA headquarters on September 24, 2004, with a mandate for change, but the top leadership of the CIA showed reluctance to accept him. These leaders were already distressed by how the CIA had been made a scapegoat for past mistakes by both

the Clinton and Bush administrations. Several of Goss's top subordinates, particularly his chief advisor Patrick Murray, clashed with senior CIA management, leading three of the top officials—John McLaughlin, Steve Kappes, and Michael Sulick—to resign from the CIA. An attempt by Goss to make the CIA more loyal to the Bush administration also produced criticism. His memo to CIA staff that it was their job "to support the administration and its policies" was the cause of the resentment. Finally, it was Goss's promotion of his friend Kyle Dustin "Dusty" Foggo to a high CIA position from the ranks and his links to former congressman Randy "Duke" Cunningham, who was convicted of accepting bribes, that lowered morale in the CIA.

Eventually, Goss lost out in a power struggle with his nominal boss, John Negroponte. One of the reforms called for in the final report of the 9/11 Commission was coordination of intelligence efforts. This need led to the creation of the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the appointment of Negroponte, a career diplomat, to that post. Goss and Negroponte had disagreements about how to reform intelligence gathering. Goss was reluctant to transfer personnel and resources from the CIA to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC). These disagreements led to Goss's surprising resignation as Director of the CIA on May 5, 2006, after only nineteen months tenure. His replacement was Negroponte's principal deputy director for national intelligence, four-star Air Force General Michael Hayden.

Representative Porter Goss (left, R-FL) and Senator Bob Graham (right, D–FL), chairmen for the House and Senate Intelligence Committee's Joint Inquiry into intelligence failures leading up to the September 11 attacks, at their hearing on Capitol Hill, September 24, 2002, in Washington. (AP IMAGES/Ken Lambert.)

See Also
Bush Administration; Clinton Administration; Central Intelligence Agency

Suggested Reading
Bob Graham, *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); James Risen, "Rifts Plentiful as 9/11 Inquiry Begins Today," *New York Times* (June 4, 2002), p. A1.

Graham, Daniel Robert "Bob" (1936–)

Bob Graham, a former governor of the state of Florida and longtime U.S. Senator from Florida, was active in the investigation of intelligence failures of American agencies before the September 11 attacks. He is a lifelong Democrat who has never lost an election in his home state. In the U.S. Senate, Graham specialized in the committee dealing with the intelligence community.

Graham was a successful politician from the beginning. He was born on November 9, 1936, in Coral Gables, Florida. His father was a Florida state senator, mining engineer, and dairy cattleman, and his mother was a schoolteacher. He was the youngest of four children. Graham had family contacts with the *Washington Post* because his brother, Philip Graham, was the husband of Katharine Graham. His political career began in high school at Miami Senior High School when he was elected the student body president. After graduating from high school in 1955, Graham attended the University of Florida. There he was a member of a fraternity and received several student awards. Graduating in 1955, Graham next sought a law degree at Harvard Law School, receiving an LLB in 1962. His family owned Graham Dairy in Miami Lakes, Florida, but the family decided to redevelop the land into a residential and commercial community. Graham participated in this redevelopment and holds a substantial share in the Graham Companies.

Graham decided in the early 1960s to pursue a political career. He ran for the Florida House of Representatives in 1966 and won. Reelected to the Florida House of Representatives in 1968, he opted to run for the Florida State Senate in 1970. Graham was voted into the Florida State Senate in 1970 and again in 1974. Successful in all of his elections, Graham ran for governor of Florida in 1978, winning again. He remained governor of Florida from 1979 to 1987. After two tours as governor, Graham turned to the U.S. Senate. Graham was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1986 and remained there until 2005. Graham toyed with running for President of the United States in the 2004 election, but after announcing his candidacy, he found it difficult to raise funds and withdrew on October 7, 2003. It did not help that he had to undergo heart surgery and received an artificial replacement heart valve in early 2003. Also, his habit of keeping a notebook of his activities made politicians nervous.

Graham was a successful senator, but it was as co-chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (Joint Committee on Intelligence) that he made a contribution to the understanding of the intelligence failures leading to the September 11 attacks. On September 11, 2001, Graham was having a breakfast meeting with Congressman Porter Goss (R-FL) and the chief of Pakistani intelligence, Lieutenant General Mehmood Ahmed, when news surfaced of the attacks. They had been talking about what was happening in Afghanistan and the capabilities of al-Qaeda.

From this time onward, Graham wanted to know why September 11 happened. Republicans in both Congress and the White House, however, were reluctant to have an investigation for political reasons. They were afraid of an out-of-control investigation that might tarnish the reputation of the Bush administration. Even the Democrats in Congress were somewhat leery because there might be attacks on the Clinton administration. Both Graham and Goss pursued their goal of a bipartisan investigation that would bring about reform in the intelligence community.

Graham worked closely with his co-chair and longtime friend Porter Goss to ferret out weaknesses in intelligence gathering and errors in judgment by intelligence administrators. It was in this committee that the Phoenix Memo, the Moussaoui debacle, the Rowley letter, and the failure of the intelligence agencies to cooperate were pointed out. Despite difficulties in obtaining materials from the CIA, the FBI, and the White House, the final report from the committee was devastating. It pointed out gross failures within the intelligence community that needed to be corrected and fast. Graham chronicled his tenure on the committee in his book *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror* (2004). On his retirement from the U.S. Senate Graham listed his greatest accomplishment in office as "intelligence reform and the new programs to create another generation of intelligence officer." Graham was particularly pleased with the creation of the post of National Intelligence Chief.

Since his retirement, Graham has been active. He taught a one-year term as an Institute of Politics Fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Another of his goals has been the establishment of the Bob Graham Center for Public Service at the University of Florida. He has also been traveling extensively with his wife, Adele.

Criticism That the Final Report Was Not Critical Enough

Senator Bob Graham of Florida, the Democrat who is co-chairman of the joint inquiry, did not publicly respond today, but his aides said that he disagreed with Mr. Shelby's assertions that the final report was not critical enough of officials in the intelligence. The Graham aides pointed out that the report has what they described as strong accountability provisions. They said the report calls for the joint panel to submit its findings to the inspectors general of the relevant agencies to point out either unsatisfactory or exemplary performances by individuals. The inspectors general will then be asked to recommend to their agencies and to Congress specific actions to be taken.

James Risen, "Dissent on Assigning Blame as 9/11 Panel Adopts Report," *New York Times* (December 11, 2002), p. A1.

See Also

Federal Bureau of Investigation; Phoenix Memo; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11

Suggested Reading

Bill Adair, "Dress in Gray Suit, Discuss CIA, Mingle," *St. Petersburg Times* [Florida] (February 23, 2003), p. 1F; Bill Adair, "Work That Gave Graham Expertise Muzzles Him," *St. Petersburg Times* (April 28, 2003), p.1A; Bob Graham, *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); Kathy Kiely, "Intelligence Chairmen Draw Praise for Integrity," *USA Today* (June 5, 2002), p. 8A; New York Times Staff, "Senator Bob Graham, 'Victory in the War on Terrorism Will Not Be Won on the Defensive'," *New York Times* (September 10, 2002), p. A19; Brad Smith, "Citizen Graham," *Tampa Tribune* (December 19, 2004), p. 1.

Griffin, David Ray (1939–)

Dr. David Ray Griffin is a retired professor of philosophy of religion and theology at Claremont University and a leading proponent of the September 11 conspiracy theory that the U.S. government was responsible for the attacks. He has had a long and distinguished academic career and is a leading proponent of postmodern theology. Griffin also views the U.S. government as a direct conspirator in the attacks on the World Trade Center complex and the Pentagon.

Griffin had a distinguished academic career. He was born in 1939 and grew up in a small town in Oregon. Active in the Disciples of Christ Church, he decided to become a minister. He attended Northwest Christian College beginning in 1958 but soon became disenchanted with the conservative-fundamentalist theology taught there. Despite this alienation, Griffin remained at the college and obtained a BA in 1962. Abandoning his plans for the ministry, he entered the University of Oregon to obtain a master's degree in counseling. While at the university, he heard the distinguished theologian and philosopher Paul Tillich in a lecture series. These lectures convinced Griffin to change his academic focus to philosophical theology. He began this course of study at the School of Theology at Claremont University in 1963. Griffin took the 1965–1966 academic year off to study theology at the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, Germany. Returning to Clermont University, Griffin received his PhD in 1970. His first academic job was as assistant professor of theology at the University of Dayton, beginning in 1968. He remained at the University of Dayton teaching theology and Eastern religions until 1973. Accepting a teaching position at Claremont University in 1973, Griffin spent the remainder of his academic career there until his retirement in 2004. In the intervening years, he taught at Cambridge University and the University of California–Berkeley. Then, in 1983, he started the Center for a Postmodern World in Santa Barbara, California. He also became the editor of the SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Philosophy in the years between 1987 and 2004. During the course of his academic career, he wrote 24 books and 180 articles.

Since retirement, Griffin has turned his attention from theology to conspiracy politics. According to his own version, Griffin was initially skeptical about the various conspiracy theories surrounding the events of September 11, 2001. Gradually, however, he became convinced that the U.S. government had played a hand in the September 11 attacks. His first book on the topic, *The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 9-11,* appeared in 2004. In it Griffin charged that there was evidence that members of the U.S. government had participated in a conspiracy that led to attacks on September 11. Griffin followed this book with another critical of the *9/11 Commission Report.* This book, titled *The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions,* continued the advancement of his thesis that the U.S. government had been involved in the attacks on September 11. His latest book, *Christian Faith and the Truth behind 9/11: A Call to Reflection and Action*, tied his views on the 9/11 plot with how it impacts Christians. Griffin was a charter member of the Scholars for 9/11 Truth, and he has been active in its affairs.

Griffin's views have not gone unchallenged. Critics have pointed out that most of the claims in his books can be explained by chaos surrounding that fateful day when everyone was caught unprepared. Others have stated that Griffin is merely

another in a long line of conspiracy theorists who appear after a national emergency. At least one of Griffin's critics, former CIA agent Robert Baer, has maintained that the Bush administration's climate of secrecy and defensiveness has created the atmosphere for conspiracy theories to promulgate.

See Also

Conspiracy Theories; Scholars for 9/11 Truth

Suggested Reading

Reyhan Harmanci, "David Ray Griffin: Theologian Scoffed at 9/11 Conspiracy Theories, Then Looked Closer," *San Francisco Chronicle* (March 30, 2006), p. H24; Michael Powell, "The Disbelievers: 9/11 Conspiracy Theorists Are Building Their Case against the Government from Ground Zero," *Washington Post* (September 8, 2006), p. C1; Douglas Todd, "Another Conspiracy Theory: A Respected Theologian Has Waded into the Debate, and Readers Are Lapping It Up on Two Continents," *Ottawa Citizen* [Canada] (December 4, 2004), p. A17.

Guantánamo Bay Detainment Camp

The Guantánamo Bay Detainment Camp is situated on the Cuban mainland. Guantánamo Bay is an area of forty-five square miles that has been occupied by the United States since 1903. U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt signed an agreement with the Cuban government leasing the bay for 2,000 gold coins per year on February 16, 1903. The original intent of the base was to serve as a coaling station for the U.S. Navy. A subsequent lease was signed on July 2, 1906, on the same terms. A new lease was negotiated between the Cuban government and Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1934. Shortly after the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Castro government demanded that the Guantánamo Bay area be returned to Cuban sovereignty, but the American government refused, citing that both parties had to agree to the modification or abrogation of the agreement. The United States sends a check to the Cuban government for the lease amount every year, but the Cuban government has refused to cash the checks.

In its invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. military captured a large number of al-Qaeda fighters. What to do with these and other prisoners captured in Afghanistan became a national problem. The Bush administration determined that those captured were enemy combatants, not prisoners of war. This decision came after lawyers from the White House, the Pentagon, and the Justice Department had issued a series of secret memorandums that maintained the prisoners had no rights under federal law or the Geneva Conventions. In this ruling enemy combatants were not covered by the Geneva Conventions for treatment as prisoners of war, and they could be held indefinitely without charges. A number of conservative lawyers in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provided the legal opinions for this decision. The Bush administration issued this decision on January 22, 2002. Finally, after considering several sites to hold these prisoners, the U.S. military decided to build a prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba: the Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp. Camp X-Ray was the first facility, and the first 110 prisoners arrived there on January 11, 2002. These prisoners were held in wire cages. Later, Camp Delta was constructed, but neither camp was up to standards for prison inmates in the United States. At their peak, the camps held 680 prisoners.

The Bush administration picked Guantánamo Bay area for a specific reason. If the prisoners were held on U.S. soil, then the prisoners might claim access to legal

representation and American courts. Guantánamo Bay had a unique legal situation because the land is leased from Cuba and not technically on American soil. Because the United States has no diplomatic relationship with Cuba, the prisoners can have no access to the Cuban legal system. The prisoners reside in legal limbo with few if any legal rights.

The camp is run by the military. At the beginning, command responsibility for the base was divided between Major General Michael Dunlavey, an army reservist, and Brigadier General Rick Baccus, of the Rhode Island National Guard. Dunlavey maintained a hard-line attitude toward the detainees, but Baccus was more concerned about their possible mistreatment. They quarreled over interrogation techniques and other issues. This situation changed when Army Major General Geoffrey Miller replaced them and assumed command at Guantánamo in November 2003. Miller had no experience running a prison camp, and he was soon criticized for allowing harsh interrogation techniques. Later, Miller was transferred to Iraq where he took over responsibility for military prisons there.

After Camp Delta was built, the detainees lived in better but restrictive conditions. At Camp X-Ray, the original camp, the detainees lived behind razor wire in cells open to the elements and with buckets in place of toilets. At Camp Delta the detainees were held in trailer-like structures made from old shipping containers that had been cut in half lengthwise with the two pieces stuck together end to end. Cells were small, six feet eight inches by eight feet, with metal beds fixed to the steel mesh walls. Toilets were squatting-style flush on the floor, and sinks were low to the ground so that detainees could wash their feet before Muslim prayer. There was no air-conditioning for the detainees, only a ventilation system that was supposed to be turned on at 85 degrees but rarely was. Later, a medium-security facility opened up, and it gave much greater freedom and better living conditions to the detainees.

The Bush administration gave the CIA responsibility for interrogations. Because these enemy combatants had no legal standing in American courts, they were treated as merely sources of intelligence. President Bush had determined this stance after deciding that al-Qaeda was a national security issue, not a law enforcement issue. Consequently, the FBI was completely left out of the loop. But this did not mean that the FBI gave up. For various reasons, FBI personnel did interrogate the detainees on occasion.

To encourage cooperation, levels of treatment for detainees are determined by the degree of the detainee's cooperation. Level one was for cooperating prisoners, and they received special privileges. Level two included more moderately cooperative detainees, and they received a few privileges like a drinking cup and access to the library. Level three was for the detainees who absolutely refused to cooperate. They were given only the basics—a blanket, a prayer mat and cap, a Koran, and a toothbrush.

The CIA determined that the most important al-Qaeda prisoners should not be held at the Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp. There were simply too many American officials from too many agencies trying to interrogate the prisoners. Moreover, it was too public. CIA leaders wanted a secret location where there would be no interference in the interrogations. Several secret interrogation sites were set up in friendly countries where the CIA could do what they wanted without interference.

Soon after the prisoners had been transferred to the Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp, reports began to surface about mistreatment of the detainees. A CIA analyst visited the camp in the late spring of 2002, and he was aghast at the treatment of the prisoners. Because he spoke Arabic, he was able to talk to the detainees. In his report this analyst claimed that half of the detainees did not belong there. This report traveled around the Bush administration, but nothing was done about it. The American public was still upset over September 11, and public reports about mistreatment of those held at Guantánamo Bay garnered little sympathy.

The Bush administration decided in the summer of 2006 to transfer the top captured al-Qaeda leaders to the Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp. In September 2006, the transfer of these fourteen detainees was complete. Then, beginning in March 2007, court proceedings were started to determine their status. In the most important case, that of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the accused made a total confession of all his activities both in and outside al-Qaeda. Among these were the planning for the September 11 attacks and the execution of Daniel Pearl. His justification was that he was at war against the United States. Proceedings against the other detainees continued in the spring of 2007.

See Also
Bush Administration

See Documents
Document #24; Document #42

Suggested Reading
Edward Epstein, "Guantanamo Is a Miniature America," *San Francisco Chronicle* (January 20, 2002), p. A6; Jonathan M. Hansen, "Making the Law in Cuba," *New York Times* (April 20, 2004), p. A19; Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004); Erik Saar and Viveca Novak, *Inside the Wire: A Military Intelligence Soldier's Eyewitness Account of Life at Guantanamo* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005); John Yoo, *War by Other Means: An Insider's Account of the War on Terror* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).

H

Hage, Wadih el- (1960–)

Wadih el-Hage is a mysterious al-Qaeda operative, who besides serving as Osama bin Laden's secretary in Sudan, was a key participant in the African Embassy bombings in 1998. At the time of these activities, el-Hage was an American citizen married to an American convert to Islam. Although el-Hage was never one of the leaders of al-Qaeda, he was a valuable asset used on various occasions for odd jobs.

El-Hage has an unconventional background. He was born in 1960 in Lebanon into a Lebanese Catholic family. His birth was difficult, and he was born with a withered right arm. He had a solid education in Lebanese schools. His conversion to Islam took place in Lebanon sometime in the late 1970s. El-Hage was already a Muslim by the time he immigrated to the United States in 1978. That same year he enrolled at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette to study urban planning. It took him eight years to complete his degree. During his schooling, el-Hage became attracted to military Islamist theology. After his conversion to militancy, he traveled to Pakistan to help in the Afghan-Soviet War, but his disability prevented him from participating in the fighting. Instead, he worked for the Saudi charity Muslim World League.

El-Hage returned to the United States in 1985 in time to be married. He married April Ray, a recent convert to Islam. They were eventually to have seven children. Despite his degree in urban planning, el-Hage had to take a series of menial jobs to support his family. He decided to move his family to Quetta, Pakistan. El-Hage stayed there for only about a year and a half. Between 1987 and 1990, he made frequent trips to Brooklyn's al-Kifah Refugee Center. El-Hage ran the al-Kifah Refugee after the death of Mustafa Shalabi. There he met several of the Muslim extremists who later participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. His name came up in the trial of the 1993 bombers, but at the time of the bombing, el-Hage had been in Sudan working as bin Laden's secretary. This position lasted until bin Laden returned to Afghanistan.

Between 1996 and 1997, el-Hage held two jobs. He worked at Lone Star Tires as a manager in Arlington, Texas. His other job was allegedly doing charity work

in Nairobi, Kenya. In reality, el-Hage was building an al-Qaeda cell network in Nairobi to plan and implement the bombing of the American embassy in downtown Nairobi. While in Nairobi, he roomed with the operational commander of the mission Haroun Fazil.

After the bombing, el-Hage was arrested by Kenyan authorities. American authorities used rendition to take him back to the United States. He was placed on trial in a Manhattan federal court where he was charged with perjury for his untrue statements about his relationship with bin Laden and for his participation in an al-Qaeda conspiracy to kill Americans. Because he was never charged with complicity in the American embassy bombing in Nairobi, the maximum penalty prosecutors could request was life imprisonment without parole. A federal jury convicted el-Hage of perjury, and he received the penalty of life imprisonment without parole. El-Hage is now serving this sentence in a maximum-security federal prison.

El-Hage was not a participant in the September 11 plot, but his career shows how militant Islamists placed their cause above all else. El-Hage had a large family and with some effort could have found a decent job to support his family. Instead, he joined al-Qaeda and worked against his adopted country. His lawyer appealed his case, but in November 2005 a federal judge in Manhattan refused to overturn the 2001 conviction of el-Hage.

See Also

African Embassy Bombings; Bin Laden, Osama; Kifah Refugee Center, al-; Rendition; World Trade Center Bombing (1993)

Suggested Reading

Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Free Press, 2001); Simon Houpt, "Embassy Bombers Sentenced to Life," *Globe and Mail* [Canada] (October 19, 2001), p. A5; Elizabeth Neuffer, "Four Guilty in Embassy Bombings," *Boston Globe* (May 30, 2001), p. A1; Robert Tait, "Bin Laden Men Jailed for Embassy Bombs," *Scotsman* [Glasgow] (October 19, 2001), p. 9; Benjamin Weiser, "Going on Trial," *New York Times* (February 4, 2001), p. 27; Benjamin Weiser, "Jury Rejects Death Penalty for Terrorist," *New York Times* (July 11, 2001), p. B1; Benjamin Weiser, "Judge Upholds Conviction in Terror Case," *New York Times* (November 3, 2005), p. B1.

Hamburg Cell

A group of radical Islamists formed a terrorist cell affiliated with al-Qaeda in Hamburg, Germany. This cell began when Mohamed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Marwan al-Shehhi began rooming together on November 1, 1998, in an apartment on 54 Marienstrasse in Hamburg. They were members of a study group at the al-Quds Mosque run by Mohammad Belfas, a middle-aged postal employee in Hamburg originally from Indonesia. Both in the study group and at the apartment they began talking about ways to advance the Islamist cause. Soon the original three attracted others of a like mind. The nine members of this cell were Mohamed Atta, Said Bahaji, Mohammad Belfas, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Zakariya Essabor, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, Mounir el Motassadez, and Abdelghani Mzoudi. At first Belfas was the leader of the group, but he was soon replaced by Atta and left the cell. Atta then became the formal leader of the Hamburg Cell, but bin al-Shibh was its most influential member because he was better liked in the Muslim community than the dour Atta.

At first the members of the Hamburg Cell wanted to join the Chechen rebels in Chechnya in fighting against the Russians. Before this move could take place, the leaders of the cell met with Mohamedou Ould Slahi, an al-Qaeda operative in Duisburg, Germany, who advised that they undertake military and terrorist training in Afghanistan first. Atta, bin al-Shibh, Jarrah, and al-Shehhi traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan, where they underwent extensive training in terrorist methods. They also met with Osama bin Laden, at which time Atta, Jarrah, and Shehhi were recruited for a special martyrdom mission to the United States.

Bin al-Shibh was to have been a part of this mission, but he was never able to obtain a visa to travel to the United States. Instead, bin al-Shibh stayed in Hamburg, serving as the contact person between the Hamburg Cell and al-Qaeda. He also served as the banker for the September 11 plot.

The most dedicated members of the Hamburg Cell participated in the September 11, 2001, plot. Other members of the group, however, provided moral and technical support. Mamoun Darkanza was the money man for the Hamburg Cell. What made those in the Hamburg Cell so important was that they were fluent in English, well-educated, and accustomed to the Western lifestyle, so they could fit in any of the Western countries. They also had the capability to learn how to pilot a large aircraft with some training.

Bin al-Shibh shut down the Hamburg Cell as soon as he learned the date of the attacks. He made certain that anyone connected with the Hamburg Cell was forewarned so that they could protect themselves. Bin al-Shibh destroyed as much material as possible before leaving for Pakistan. Only later did German and American authorities learn of the full extent of the operations of the Hamburg Cell.

German authorities had been aware of the existence of the Hamburg Cell, but German law prevented action against the cell's members unless a German law was violated. This restriction did not prevent a veteran CIA officer attached to the American consulate in Hamburg, Thomas Volz, from attempting to persuade the German authorities to take action against the Islamist extremists in the Hamburg Cell. Volz had become suspicious of several members of the Hamburg Cell and their connections with other Muslim terrorists. He hounded the German authorities to do something until his actions alienated them to the point that they almost had him deported from Germany.

After the September 11 attacks, German authorities began a serious investigation of the Hamburg Cell and its surviving members. By this time there was little to examine or do except to arrest whoever had been affiliated with it. German authorities learned the extent to which al-Qaeda had been able to establish contacts in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Bin al-Shibh, Ramzi; Quds Mosque, al-; World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading

Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, from Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002); Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005); Gerald Posner, *Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003); Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

Hamburg Cell (TV Movie)

On August 23, 2004, a fictionalized study of the September 11 skyjackers premiered at the Edinburgh International Film Festival. It was a project co-produced by Channel 4 in the United Kingdom and CBS in Canada. Antonia Bird, a British movie director with a reputation for controversially themed movies, made this semi-documentary based on a film script by Ronan Bennett. Bennett is famous as a prominent Irish Republican sympathizer.

The director tried to make the story line as realistic as possible. Two actors with Arab backgrounds played Mohammed Atta (Maral Kamel) and Ziad Jarrah (Karim Saleh). The central figure in the movie is the character Jarrah. It shows him in the process of changing from a moderate Muslim into a terrorist. Most of the action in the movie dealt with the background and planning of the September 11 operation. Using computer-generated imagery, the enactment of the events of September 11 was enhanced. This movie appeared in Great Britain and Germany, but not in the United States. Some of the British families of September 11 victims were disturbed by the showing of the movie, and they expressed their unhappiness openly.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Hamburg Cell; Jarrah, Ziad Samir; World Trade Center, September 11.

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Malcolm Fitzwilliams and Anthony Barnes, "Parents of British Victim Attack Cruel and Insensitive TV Drama about 9/11 Hijackers," *Independent on Sunday* [London] (August 29, 2004), p. 6; S. F. Said, "The Ordinary Terrorists: Controversial Director Antonia Bird's Latest Film Is Her Most Ambitious Yet," *Daily Telegraph* [London] (August 31, 2004), p. 19.

Hamdani, Mohammad Salman (1977–2001)

Mohammad Hamdani was an American Muslim in medical technician training with the New York City Police Department who died helping people evacuate the buildings at the World Trade Center complex on September 11, 2001. His unexplained disappearance led the Joint Terrorist Task Force to suspect him of terrorism. Only after his body was found at the World Trade Center site was he exonerated.

Hamdani came to the United States at an early age. He was born on December 28, 1977, in Pakistan. His family moved to the United States when he was only one year old. He was the eldest son. His father runs a candy store in Brooklyn, and his mother is a literacy teacher in a middle school. Hamdani grew up and was educated in New York City. His childhood was typically American; he loved baseball and the Star Wars movies. He graduated from Queens College with a degree in biochemistry. His goal was to become a medical doctor, but in the meantime he worked as a laboratory research assistant at the Howard Hughes Medical Institute at Rockefeller University. Hamdani had applied and been accepted to the medical technician program of the NYPD and had begun its training program.

On September 11 Hamdani responded to the emergency at the World Trade Center complex. Hamdani was evidently heading to his job on the elevated train from his home in Queens when he witnessed the first aircraft crash into the North Tower. He headed to the World Trade Center complex with his medical bag to

help the injured. Unfortunately, he was killed in the collapse of the buildings, but his body was not recovered until months later.

Hamdani's unexplained disappearance led to suspicion that he was somehow involved in the World Trade Center attacks. The Joint Terrorist Task Force began to look for him for questioning. An unofficial poster appeared all over the World Trade Center site with his picture and personal background, noting that the Joint Terrorist Task Force was seeking him. Rumors began to spread, and a newspaper article charged that he was part of the al-Qaeda plot against the World Trade Center. These rumors gained some credibility when an article in the *New York Post* repeated them. This theorizing continued even though unofficial sources in the NYPD believed that Hamdani had died at the World Trade Center complex. His mother refused to believe that he was dead, and she believed that he had been arrested by the government after the September 11 attacks. All of this speculation ended when his remains were found along with his medical bag and an identification card on March 29, 2002.

Unselfish Acts of Hamdani

Yet another confirmed death, the awful doing of terrorists. But the story of 23-year-old Salman, as his family called him, was unlike those of most of the people missing in the attack on the World Trade Center. A mystery surrounded his disappearance. He did not work at the trade center. He had no appointment there. He did not show up at work on Manhattan's Upper East Side. And he never came home. When there are questions there are often rumors, which there were about Mr. Hamdani, scurrilous whisperings that he was either connected to the terrorists or hiding out, scheming to profit from the tragedy. . . . Mr. Hamdani, who wanted to be a doctor, must have seen the destruction from the elevated No. 7 subway line, and instead of going to his job as a research assistant at Rockefeller University, headed south. "He gave his life for humanity," said his mother, Talat Hamdani, a teacher at a middle school in Queens. "He did not know a single soul down there, he did not have to go there. He was a son of New York City." And, as overused as the word is, a hero.

Joyce Purnick, "A Son Lost, A Reputation Redeemed," *New York Times* (March 25, 2002), p. B1.

Both his family and his fellow Muslims at the Islamic Cultural Center of New York were bitter about Hamdani's treatment. Hamdani had become an American citizen, and he had never expressed any sympathy toward Muslim extremism. His family and friends thought he had been unfairly treated. Police Commissioner Edmond Kelly attended Hamdani's funeral and spoke of his courage in trying to help those victims of the World Trade Center attacks.

See Also
Casualties of September 11

Suggested Reading
David W. Ausmus, *In the Midst of Chaos: My 30 Days at Ground Zero* (Victoria, BC [Canada]: Trafford, 2004); Glenda Cooper, "A Muslim Family in N.Y. Fears for a Son Who Loved America," *Washington Post* (September 18, 2001), p. A22; William J. Gorta and Simon Crittle, "Missing—or Hiding?—Mystery of NYPD Cadet from Pakistan," *New York Post* (October 12, 2001), p. 11; Joyce Purnick, "Praying for a Son to Be in Jail," *New York Times* (October 29, 2001), p. F1; Joyce Purnick, "A Son Lost, a Reputation Redeemed," *New York Times* (March 25, 2002), p. B1.

Hamilton, Lee H. (1931–)

Lee H. Hamilton was the co-chair of the 9/11 Commission. He is a former Democratic congressman from Indiana, having served from 1965 to 1999. After leaving Congress, he became the president and director of the Woodrow Wilson

International Center for Scholars. His reputation for bipartisanship and ability to work on commissions made him a natural choice for the 9/11 Commission.

Hamilton started out his career as a lawyer. He was born on April 20, 1931, in Daytona Beach, Florida. His family moved first to Tennessee before settling in Evansville, Indiana. He graduated from Central High School, Evansville, in 1948. His basketball ability in high school continued in college at DePauw University. He graduated from DePauw University in 1952. Hamilton was inducted into the Indiana Basketball Hall of Fame in 1982. His next venture was studying aboard at Goethe University, Frankfurt on the Main, West Germany, in the academic year 1952–1953. Upon returning the United States, Hamilton entered law school at Indiana University. After graduating with a JD in 1956, he practiced law in Chicago and Columbus, Indiana. He decided in 1964 to run for public office in the 9th Congressional District of Indiana. Winning election in 1965, he represented that district until 1999.

In his thirty-four years in the House of Representatives, Hamilton garnered expertise on foreign policy and intelligence issues. He served as member and chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and as the chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence among other positions. He was also chair of the House Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. Over the years Hamilton established his credentials as the leading congressional expert on foreign affairs. It was this expertise and his ability to work both with Republicans and Democrats that made his appointment to the 9/11 Commission possible.

Hamilton played a positive role as co-chair of the 9/11 Commission. Thomas Kean appointed him co-chair of the commission in the spirit of bipartisanship. They worked closely together and displayed a common front before the media. His foreign-policy and intelligence-gathering expertise proved useful in the compiling of the final version of the *9/11 Commission Report.* Both Hamilton and Kean, however, chaffed at the roadblocks put up to hinder the commission's access to information. They were particularly unhappy with the FAA and NORAD's failures to produce documents. Their unhappiness has been articulated in their 2006 book *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission.*

Hamilton has been active since the release of the *9/11 Commission Report,* responding to critics. A whole industry of critics of the 9/11 Commission has surfaced, attacking its findings, omissions, and alleged distortions. Hamilton has responded to these critics by pointing out the immensity of the project and the limited amount of time to undertake it. Perhaps the most serious charge was the failure of the 9/11 Commission to handle the Able Danger story. News of Able Danger came late in the 9/11 Commission deliberations, and it was simply not considered reliable.

Comment on What the 9/11 Commission Accomplished by Lee Hamilton

An awful lot that we recommended has been adopted. If you looked at all of our recommendations with regard to intelligence, they basically have been enacted into law and enacted into law in a remarkably quick period of time. And if you look at the other recommendations, you can see progress on almost all of them . . . It is not a record we should be totally discouraged about.

Quoted in David T. Cook, "Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton," *Christian Science Monitor* (December 6, 2005), p. 25.

9/11 Commission chairman Thomas Kean (left) and vice chairman Lee Hamilton (right) discuss the commission's final report after its release in Washington, July 22, 2004. The report concluded that a "failure of imagination"—not government neglect—allowed nineteen hijackers to carry out the 9/11 attacks. (AP IMAGES/Dennis Cook.)

See Also
Able Danger; Kean, Thomas Howard; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States

See Document
Document #34

Suggested Reading
Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, and Benjamin Rhodes, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Knopf, 2006); Kathy Kiely, "Intelligence Chairmen Draw Praise for Integrity," *USA Today* (June 5, 2002), p. 8A.

Hanjour, Hani Saleh Husan (1972–2001)

Hani Saleh Hanjour was the leader and probable pilot of the terrorist group that seized the American Airlines Flight 77 and crashed it into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. He was a last-minute recruit because the September 11 conspirators needed one more pilot. Although Hanjour was a terrible pilot, he had enough skill to guide an airliner into a stationary target.

Hanjour had advantages in life, but he lacked the abilities to capitalize on them. He was born on August 30, 1972, in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia. His father was a successful food-supply businessman in Ta'if. Hanjour was a devout Muslim, and it colored all of his conduct. Because he was an indifferent student, Hanjour was only persuaded to stay in school by his older brother. This older brother, who was living in Tucson, Arizona, encouraged him to come to the United States. Hanjour arrived in the United States on October 3, 1991. He stayed in Tucson, Arizona, where he studied English at the University of Arizona. After completing the English program in three months, Hanjour returned to Ta'if. He spent the next five years working

at his family's food-supply business. In 1996 he briefly visited Afghanistan. Following this visit, Hanjour decided to move back to the United States. He stayed for a time with an Arab American family in Hollywood, Florida. Then in April 1996, Hanjour moved in with a family in Oakland, California. This time he attended Holy Names College and attended a course in intensive English. Hanjour decided to become a pilot and fly for Saudi Airlines. Hanjour also enrolled in a class at Sierra Academy of Aeronautics, but he withdrew because of the cost. After leaving Oakland in April 1996, he moved to Phoenix, Arizona. This time he paid for lessons at CRM Flight Cockpit Resource Management in Scottsdale, Arizona, but his academic performance there was disappointing. His instructors found him to be a terrible pilot, and it took him a long time to master the essentials of flying. While in Phoenix, he roomed with Bandar al-Hazmi. In January 1998, Hanjour took flying lessons at Arizona Aviation, and after a three-year struggle, he earned his commercial pilot rating in April 1999. Hanjour was unable to find a job as a pilot. His FAA license expired in 1999 when he failed to take a mandatory medical test.

Frustrated in his job hunting, Hanjour traveled to Afghanistan. He arrived there just as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's men were looking for another pilot for the September 11 plot. Hanjour was made to order. After his recruitment by al-Qaeda, he returned to the United States. In September 2000, when he moved to San Diego, California, Hanjour met up with Nawaf al-Hazmi. Hanjour returned to Phoenix to continue his pilot training at the Jet Tech Flight School. He was so inept as a flyer and his English was so bad that the instructors contacted the FAA to check on whether his commercial license was valid. The FAA confirmed that his commercial license was indeed valid. Hanjour spent most of his time there on the Boeing 737 simulator. Next, he moved to Paterson, New Jersey, in the early spring of 2001. There he met several times with other members of the September 11 conspiracy. On September 11, 2001, Hanjour was the hijackers' pilot of American Airlines Flight 77. Despite his lack of ability, he managed to fly that aircraft into the Pentagon.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 77; Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh; Pentagon Attack; Pilot Training for September 11

Suggested Reading

Bob Graham, *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005).

Hazmi, Nawaf bin Muhammad Salim al- (1976–2001)

Nawaf al-Hazmi was one of the hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. He was intended to be one of the team pilots, but he lacked the skills to fulfill that role. Instead, al-Hazmi worked behind the scenes to provide logistical support to all the teams.

Al-Hazmi became an Islamist militant at an early age. He was born on August 9, 1976, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. His father was a grocer. An older brother was a police chief in Jizan, Saudi Arabia. As a teenager, al-Hazmi had traveled to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, he met Khalid al-Mihdhar. They joined the Muslims in Bosnia to fight against the Serbian Bosnians in 1995. Then with his brother Salem al-Hazmi, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar returned to Afghanistan in time to

fight with the Taliban against the Afghan Northern Alliance. Next, al-Hazmi traveled to Chechnya in 1998 to fight with the Chechen rebels. Returning to Saudi Arabia in early 1999, al-Hazmi decided to go to the United States with al-Mihdhar and his brother Salem al-Hazmi. They easily obtained visas.

By 1999 al-Hazmi had been recruited by al-Qaeda for a special mission. Original plans had called for him to become a pilot, but he lacked the necessary competency in English and the ability to pass pilot's training. He teamed with al-Mihdhar to provide logistical support for the September 11 plot. On September 11, 2001, al-Hazmi was part of the American Airlines Flight 77 hijacker team. He provided security while the airliner was crashed into the Pentagon.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 77; Mihdhar, Khalid al-; Pentagon Attack.

Suggested Reading

Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005).

Homer, LeRoy Wilton Jr. (1965–2001)

LeRoy Homer was the first officer of United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, on September 11, 2001. Captain Jason M. Dahl was the pilot on that fateful flight. Homer and Dahl tried to fight off the hijackers but were overpowered.

Homer had always wanted to be a pilot. He was born on August 27, 1965, and grew up in West Islip, on Long Island, New York. His parents had nine children but only two boys. At an early age, Homer dreamed of flying, and he started flight instruction at age fifteen. His first solo was at age sixteen. In 1983 Homer qualified for his private pilot's certificate. He attended high school in West Islip. Always a good student, Homer fulfilled a lifelong dream by entering the U. S. Air Force Academy on July 6, 1983. He rose to the cadet rank of captain in Cadet Squadron 31. He graduated from the U. S. Air Force Academy on May 27, 1987, and received a commission as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force. His first assignment was flying Lockheed C-141B Starlifter out of McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey. His duties required him to fly supplies into the war zones of Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. Later, he also flew missions in Somalia. Homer rose to the rank of captain before leaving the Air Force in 1995. He remained a member of the U.S. Air Force Reserve, serving as a flight instructor and recruiting officer. His duty in the reserves led to his promotion to the rank of major.

Shortly after leaving active duty in the Air Force, Homer found a position as a pilot with United Airlines. He joined United Airlines in May 1995. His first assignment was as second officer on the Boeing 727. In 1996, he was promoted to first officer on the Boeing 757/767. Homer married Melodie Thorpe, a Canadian native, on May 24, 1998, and they had one daughter. They lived in Marlton, New Jersey.

On September 11, 2001, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark International Airport, headed for San Francisco International Airport with no hint of trouble. On board was a team of hijackers led by Ziad Jarrah. Not long after the aircraft reached its designated flight height, the hijackers invaded the cockpit and gained control of the aircraft. Both Homer and Dahl were overpowered, and they

may have been incapacitated or killed. When the passengers learned that the hijackers were on a suicide mission, they tried to regain control of the cockpit and almost succeeded. Realizing that danger, Jarrah crashed the aircraft in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing all aboard.

Homer has received many honors since his death. He had always been well-liked both in the military and in civilian life, so tributes to him have flooded in. A memorial service was held in Hamilton, Ontario, and in Trenton, New Jersey. The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) honored him, and he received the Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Award. In his honor, the LeRoy W. Homer Jr. Foundation has been established to provide financial support and encouragement to young people with an interest in aviation, to pursue professional training leading to certification as a private pilot.

See Also

Dahl, Jason Matthew; Jarrah, Ziad Samir; United Airlines Flight 93

Suggested Reading

Johanna Huden, "Kin Recall Tragic United Pilot," *New York Post* (September 21, 2001), p. 16; Marshall Wilson, "Widow of United Co-Pilot Retraces Fatal Sept. 11 Flight," *San Francisco Chronicle* (January 19, 2002), p. A8.

I

Ielpi, Lee (1944–)

Lee Ielpi is a retired firefighter who has become a leader in the September 11 families movement since losing his son at the World Trade Center complex on September 11. As of 2001, he had retired after twenty-six years in the New York City Fire Department (FDNY). Nineteen of those years had been with the Rescue 2 company. At the time of his retirement, Ielpi was one of the most highly decorated firemen in the history of the FDNY.

Ielpi had always wanted to be a firefighter. He was born in 1944 in Great Neck, New York. After high school, Ielpi joined the Great Neck Vigilant Fire Department in 1963. Within a few years he was promoted to chief of that fire department. In 1968 Ielpi was drafted into the U.S. Army, and he served a tour of duty in Vietnam with the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division. While in Vietnam, he was a member of a reconnaissance unit and earned several medals for bravery under fire. Leaving the army in 1970, Ielpi immediately joined the FDNY. For the first seven years, he worked in the Brownsville station of Brooklyn, New York. Then, in 1977, he became a member of the elite Rescue 2 company. By his retirement Ielpi had earned twenty-four citations for exemplary service, including a Class B Ribbon of Honor for service beyond the call of duty.

Ielpi lost his eldest son on September 11, 2001, at the World Trade Center complex. Ielpi had married before beginning his military duty, and he and his wife had two sons and two daughters. In 2001 both sons were firefighters with the FDNY. His eldest son, Jonathan Ielpi, was a firefighter in Squad 288 in Queens. Jonathan's squad responded to the World Trade Center attack by racing to the scene. The squad was busy evacuating people from the south tower when the building collapsed. Jonathan and six members of his squad died.

Ielpi arrived at the World Trade Center complex shortly after the collapse of the twin towers. He spent the next three months working in the debris trying to recover bodies and hoping to find his son's body. Jonathan's body was found on December 11, 2001, and his funeral was held on December 27, 2001. During those months Ielpi became an expert on the recovery process. When the mayor's office decided to reduce the number of firefighters and police working at the site,

Ielpi was one of the spokespersons who negotiated a compromise keeping more firefighters and police at the site looking for bodies or remains.

Ielpi has slowly become one of the leaders of the September 11 families movement. He has not been one of the more vocal leaders, but he has maintained contact with the other leaders of the movement. When the 9/11 Commission wanted a tour of Ground Zero at the World Trade Center, Ielpi gave the tour. Ielpi then helped start the September 11th Families Association. This group has served as an umbrella organization for the families, and its headquarters is at a building across the street from the World Trade Center complex site. He has also been active in the controversy over what type of buildings will be built on the site and what kind of memorial for the victims will be on the site. Much of his energy has been devoted to serving as the "ambassador for the dead," taking trips around the country to talk to school and community groups about September 11.

Lee Ielpi, a retired New York City firefighter, pauses near the site of the New York World Trade Center disaster, where he volunteered in the recovery effort, December 1, 2001. (AP IMAGES/Mark Lennihan.)

See Also
Firefighters at Ground Zero; World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading
Mike Dillon, "The Persistence of Memory," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* (March 16, 2003), p. B2; Muriel Dobbin, "Sept. 11 Families Still Linked by Loss," *Sacramento Bee* (August 9, 2004), p. A1; Mike Littwin, "Father of Fallen Firefighter Wages War Against Complacency," *Rocky Mountain News* [Denver] (September 11, 2006), p. 2S; Patrice O'Shaughnessy, "Witness to Devastation: Retired Firefighter, Vietnam Vet Went to Find Son—and Stayed," *Daily News* [New York] (May 27, 2002), p. 5; Dennis Smith, *Report from Ground Zero* (New York: Viking, 2002).

Lee Ielpi's Comments at the End of the Search

People have been building up the last day to be a horrible day. I have other things . . . . I don't know what others will do. I set a goal on the second day, when I realized this wasn't going to turn out very good. The main goal was to find my son, and others. I walked in the shoes of these people, of the civilians at home, then I was blessed we could bring Jon [his son] home and bring him to bed. How could I not come back to try to find others?

Quoted in Patrice O'Shaughnessy, "Retired Firefighter, Vietnam Vet Went to Find Son—And Stayed," *Daily News* [New York] (May 27, 2002), p. 5.

Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS)

The Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) had the legal responsibility to monitor entrance of foreigners into the United States, and in the case of the September 11 conspirators, it failed miserably. All of the September 11 conspirators

had little trouble entering the United States, despite doctored passports and false statements on visa applications. Most of the hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, where there was an express approval program for visas to the United States.

The exception to this ease in entering the United States was the case of Jose Melendez-Perez. He was an immigration inspector at Orlando International Airport when, on August 4, 2001, he interviewed a Saudi national by the name of Mohamed al-Katani. Melendez-Perez questioned al-Katani through an Arabic translator, and he became suspicious of al-Katani's conduct and answers. When Melendez-Perez tried to put al-Katani's answers under oath, al-Katani refused. After consulting with his supervisor, Melendez-Perez denied al-Katani entry and had him placed on an airliner back to Saudi Arabia. Melendez-Perez had risked his job by rejecting al-Katani because instructions had come down that Saudis were to receive special treatment. Evidence surfaced later indicating that Mohamed Atta was waiting for him at the Orlando International Airport. Staff at the 9/11 Commission have surmised that al-Katani was to be the twentieth hijacker. Al-Katani was later captured in Afghanistan, and he has been held at the Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp as an enemy combatant.

Part of the reason the INS was so ineffectual was that it was not actively looking for possible terrorists. To the INS leadership immigration was an economic issue—how many immigrants could be admitted and what impact they would have on the American economy. Also, it has long been noted, according to Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, that "the INS was considered the most poorly administered, underfunded, understaffed, and woefully disorganized part of the U.S. government." It had an antiquated paper system in which it could take an analyst almost two years to detect fraud, by which time the miscreant had disappeared into American cities. An effort had been made in the 1980s with the issuance of a *Red Book* to guide and train immigration and custom officials in the detection of fraudulent passports and visas, but the INS ceased printing it in 1992. The official explanation was that terrorists had obtained access to the book and could take countermeasures.

There was an attempt in the mid-1990s to build a system that could track foreign students. At the time there were approximately half a million international students in the United States, but no one knew who they were, where they were, and what their status was. The Department of Justice wanted a system that could track these students. Maurice Berez, a mid-level INS civil servant, formed a task force that devised a program called the Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS). This electronic system would require that student visa applications provide date of birth, nationality, parents' names, all overseas addresses, and detailed financial data. This information would then be shared with other governmental agencies and cross-checked. Schools would be required to report change of status of the international students. A pilot program of this system was started in Atlanta, Georgia, in April 1997 with twenty-one institutions, including Duke and Auburn universities. The pilot program was a resounding success.

But CIPRIS was never put into operation because it ran up against obstacles. What killed it was a combination of its cost and lobbying by colleges and universities. The INS executives balked at the $11 million price tag and wanted the institutions to collect from the international students a $100 fee. College and

university administrators did not want to police international students and collect the fee. An education lobby called NAFSA: Association of International Educators hired a lobbyist to block the implementation of CIPRIS. He persuaded twenty-one senators to sign a letter against CIPRIS. The INS dropped the budget for CIPRIS from $11 million to $4 million, making it impossible to implement. Berez was removed from his position, and CIPRIS was reconfigured into a skeleton program and renamed SEVIS (Student and Exchange Information System). It was a passive database rather than one that did screening up front.

The loss of a tracking system meant that the INS continued in its inefficient ways with inadequate funding. The hijackers had no difficulties passing through the INS even though some came in on faulty visas and forged passports. Infringements of visa requirements were almost never noted. After September 11, officials of the INS admitted that the agency could not account for 314,000 foreigners ordered deported, and it had a backlog of over five million pending cases for legal residency. An example of the inefficiency in the tracking of international students was when the INS sent out notices six months after September 11 informing a flight school that Atta and al-Shehhi had been approved for student visas to study there. This incident was so embarrassing that several INS officials lost their jobs.

The INS's record was so poor that it was disbanded and its functions handed over to the Homeland Security Department. The INS and its 36,000 employees were broken into three pieces: Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Bureau for Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. A director has been appointed for each bureau, but there is no longer a single head of immigration functions, and this bothers some critics.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Shehhi, Marwan Yousef Muhammed Rashid Lekrab al-

Suggested Reading

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002); Bob Graham, *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, and Benjamin Rhodes, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Knopf, 2006); Gerald Posner, *Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003); Michael Riley and Mike Soraghan, "INS Set to Join Homeland Security," *Denver Post* (March 2, 2003), p. B4; Steven Strasser, ed., *The 9/11 Investigations: Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission; Excepts from the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Report on 9/11; Testimony from 14 Key Witnesses, Including Richard Clarke, George Tenet, and Condoleezza Rice* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004); Susan B. Trento and Joseph J. Trento, *Unsafe at Any Altitude: Failed Terrorism Investigations, Scapegoating 9/11, and the Shocking Truth about Aviation Security Today* (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2006).

J

Jarrah, Ziad Samir (1975–2001)
Ziad Jarrah was another of the nineteen suicide skyjackers on September 11, 2001. He had been recruited by Ramzi bin al-Shibh at al-Quds Mosque. Less religious than the other members of the Hamburg Cell, Jarrah still joined the September 11 conspiracy. He was the hijackers' pilot on United Airlines Flight 93.

Jarrah came from a prosperous Lebanese family. He was born on May 11, 1975, in Beirut, Lebanon, into a wealthy and influential family. His father held a high-ranking post in the Lebanese social security system, and his mother taught school. Although the family lived in a prosperous area of Beirut, the Lebanese civil war that began in 1975 made this Sunni neighborhood less than secure. Jarrah attended the best private Christian schools in Beirut, but he was never more than an indifferent student. His family claimed that he was more interested in girls than his studies. He flunked his high school finals and only graduated two years later. Members of his family were secular Muslims who paid little attention to religion. After finishing his schooling, the family sent him to study biochemistry in Greifswald, Germany, in the spring of 1996. His parents subsidized his education by sending him at least $2,000 dollars a month. In Germany, Jarrah met Aysel Sengün, a young Turkish student studying dental medicine, and they became a couple.

Jarrah was a happy-go-lucky person until he returned to Lebanon for a winter break in 1997. He returned with a much more serious outlook on life, and he began to have trouble with his girlfriend. Jarrah wanted her to conform to a more traditional Muslim form of behavior. Searching for a career, Jarrah decided to study aeronautical engineering at Hamburg University of Applied Science. Jarrah joined the al-Quds Mosque in Hamburg, and he became a militant Islamist. Bin al-Shibh was his chief contact at the al-Quds Mosque, and Jarrah had little contact with Mohamed Atta. Jarrah was never an active member of the Hamburg Cell, but he shared most of its orientation. As religion became a more important part of his life, his relationship with his girlfriend deteriorated to the point that she was unable to understand him. They still intended to be married at a future time.

Jarrah was a follower, not a leader, in the September 11 plot. In some respects, he was the weak link among the leaders of the plot. He was intelligent enough to

pass the qualifying tests as a pilot, but he lacked some of the other characteristics of a dedicated terrorist, such as ruthlessness. An American psychological profile pointed out character flaws: "indecisive and impulsive as well as immature, unstable, and unprofessional." Nevertheless, he trained at an al-Qaeda camp beginning in November 1999 along with Mohamed Atta. He was with Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi when they met and talked with Osama bin Laden in Kandahar. It was at this time that bin Laden asked them to swear allegiance to him and to be part of a suicide mission. Jarrah agreed with the others to do both. He then received a briefing from Mohammad Atef, the military chief of al-Qaeda, on the general outlines of the September 11 operation. Jarrah returned to Germany with the others to prepare for their mission.

Jarrah entered the United States on June 27, 2000, on a Delta flight from Munich. He trained at the Florida Flight Training Center in Venice, Florida. His flight instructor considered him an average pilot who needed more training to become a proficient pilot. Jarrah left the school without a commercial pilot's license. In an October 2000 note Jarrah wrote about his longing for paradise.

Note of Ziad Jarrah

I come to you with men who love the death just as you love life. . . . The Mujahideen give their money for the weapons, food, and journeys to win and to die for Allah's cause, but the unhappy ones will be killed. Oh, the smell of paradise is rising.

Quoted in Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), p. 88.

In January 2001 Jarrah returned to Germany. Then, in April 2001, Jarrah was back in the United States, living in Hollywood, Florida. While there, Jarrah took martial arts lessons at the U.S. 1 Fitness Club, working with Bert Rodriguez. Rodriguez held eight black belts in the martial arts, and he considered Jarrah a good student. Jarrah made one last trip to Germany to see his girlfriend, leaving on July 25 and returning on August 4. Later in August 2001, Jarrah moved to an apartment in Lauderdale-by-the-Sea. While still in Germany, Jarrah had received notification that he had qualified for a commercial license to fly single-engine aircraft. After his return from Germany, Jarrah began to study the manuals on flying Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft. In the weeks before September 11, Jarrah lived with Ahmed al-Haznawi. Throughout late August and September, Jarrah traveled frequently from south Florida to the Washington, D.C., area. On September 7, 2001, Jarrah made a flight from Ft. Lauderdale to Newark, New Jersey, on Continental Airlines with al-Haznawi. Jarrah reappeared in the Washington, D.C., area when he received a speeding ticket on Interstate 95 in Maryland. Jarrah and two of his fellow conspirators checked in at the Newark Airport Marriott soon after midnight on September 11. Before boarding United Airlines, Jarrah made a last phone call to Aysel Sengün in Germany.

Jarrah was the leader and pilot of the hijack team of United Airlines Flight 93. Team members had some trouble passing through security at Dulles International Airport, but they all made it. Once in the air, the hijackers seized control of the aircraft. Jarrah assumed the role of pilot. He began turning the aircraft around to head to the Washington, D.C., area. There were only three hijackers to control the crew and passengers. Soon passengers learned through cell phone calls that the

aircraft was to be used as a flying bomb. They revolted and attempted to regain control of the plane. When it became apparent that the hijackers were about to be overpowered by the passengers, Jarrah crashed the aircraft into the ground near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Jarrah followed instructions to destroy the aircraft if the mission did not have a chance of success.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Hamburg Cell; Quds Mosque, al-; United Airlines Flight 93

Suggested Reading

Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, from Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002); Jere Longman, *Among the Heroes: United Flight 93 and the Passengers and Crew Who Fought Back* (New York: Perennial, 2003); Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005).

Jersey Girls

The Jersey Girls were four widows of the World Trade Center complex disaster on September 11 who formed an alliance to find out the truth of why it happened. They were dissatisfied with the official version that it could not have been prevented and the failure of the Senate-House Joint Committee on Intelligence to ferret out the truth because of roadblocks put out by the Bush administration. Kristen Breitweiser served as the unofficial spokesperson of the Jersey Girls, but the other three, Patty Casazza, Lorie Van Auken, and Mindy Keinberg, were just as vocal and determined to find out the truth. Each had lost her husband at the World Trade Center complex. Three of the husbands had worked at Cantor Fitzgerald in the north tower in an area above the airliner crash where there was not a chance for escape. Before September 11, none of them were acquainted with each other. The group was also bipartisan, with Breitweiser and Casazza having voted for George W. Bush in 2000 and Van Auken and Kleinberg having voted for Al Gore.

The Jersey Girls' determination to find the truth about September 11 led to the creation of the 9/11 Commission. Their attitude was that because the U.S. government had taken away the right to sue and hold people accountable in a court of law with the Victim's Compensation Fund, they would fight for accountability in a nonpolitical, independent blue-ribbon panel. Almost daily the four women haunted the halls of Congress, approaching politicians and demanding an accounting. One witness has described them as crying, pleading, and cajoling to persuade representatives and senators to act. They were also active in placing pressure on the White House through appearances on television and radio talk shows. Exactly what happened and accountability were their key points. When it looked like the 9/11 Commission was finally going to happen, the Jersey Girls then concentrated on the composition of the commission. The White House selected Henry Kissinger to be chair of the commission. This selection made the Jersey Girls uneasy. They confronted Kissinger and demanded that he disclose the names of his consulting firm's clients. When the Senate concurred, Kissinger resigned from the commission. In the meantime, the Jersey Girls began to lobby the White House to name former New Jersey governor Thomas Kean as Kissinger's replacement. The Jersey Girls were familiar with Kean and valued his impartiality and limited ties to the Bush administration.

As soon as the 9/11 Commission began to function, the Jersey Girls joined the Family Steering Committee. This group of twelve individuals, eleven women and one man, was a loose confederation of representatives from the major families of 9/11 organizations. Its goal was to keep the 9/11 Commission on the straight and narrow path of finding out the truth and making sure that the White House and government agencies cooperated. This determination led to monitoring of the progress of the commission and to constant calls to its co-chair Thomas Kean.

The merger with the Family Steering Committee ended the independence of the Jersey Girls until the Family Steering Group disbanded soon after the issuance of the commission's report. Throughout the fourteen-month ordeal of the 9/11 Commission, however, the Jersey Girls continued to play an active role within the Family Steering Committee. They were particularly effective in pressuring the Bush administration to allow Condoleezza Rice to testify in public before the 9/11 Commission. When the White House initially refused, the Jersey Girls and the rest of the Family Steering Group walked out in silent protest. They were back when Rice finally testified.

Thomas Kean's Comments on the Influence of the Jersey Girls

They call me all of the time. They monitor us, they follow our progress, they've supplied us with some of the best questions we've asked. I doubt very much if we would be in existence without them.

Quoted in Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "9/11 Widows Skillfully Applied the Power of a Question: Why?" *New York Times* (April 1, 2004), p. A1.

The Jersey Girls criticized parts of the *9/11 Commission Report* for its vagueness, but in the end they supported it. Along with the others, the Jersey Girls protested against blacking out of sections of the report. Notwithstanding this reservation, their next task was to put pressure on the Bush administration to implement the provisions of the *9/11 Commission Report*. This pressure caused conservative backers of the Bush administration to coordinate an attack on the motives of the Jersey Girls. They interpreted the actions of the Jersey Girls as evidence that they were backing the candidacy of John Kerry. The attacks from conservative Republicans were vicious enough that the Jersey Girls did begin to campaign for John Kerry's presidential run. Breitweiser was particularly active although she had been a Republican before September 11. It was their disillusionment with the Bush administration and their belief that it tried to sabotage the 9/11 Commission that turned them to the Democratic Party.

The Jersey Girls have maintained a high profile in the intervening years since September 11. Most of their political activities have centered around lobbying for homeland-security improvement. They also participated in a documentary film titled *911: Press for Truth,* which appeared in early September 2006. But their actions and their criticisms of the Bush administration have continued to bother extreme right-wing conservatives. In President Bush's second term, the most vicious attack on them was by the right-wing writer Ann Coulter. In her 2007 book *Godless: The Church of Liberalism,* Coulter characterized the Jersey Girls in the following terms: "These broads are millionaires, lionized on TV and in articles about them, reveling in their status as celebrities." She then added, "I've never

seen people enjoying their husbands' deaths so much." These tasteless remarks led the Jersey Girls to respond with a statement (see sidebar).

Reply of the Jersey Girls to Attack by Ann Coulter

Contrary to Ms. Coulter's statements, there was no joy in watching men that we loved burn alive. There was no happiness in telling our children that their fathers were never coming home again. We adored these men and miss them every day.

Quoted in Gene Lyons, "Coulter's Latest Smear Tactic Backfires," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette* (June 14, 2006), p. 1.

See Also

Family Steering Committee; Kean, Thomas Howard; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States; Victims' Compensation Fund

Suggested Reading

Kristen Breitweiser, *Wake-Up Call: The Political Education of a 9/11 Widow* (New York: Warner Books, 2006); Gene Lyons, "Coulter's Latest Smear Tactic Backfires," *Arkansas Democratic-Gazette* (June 14, 2006), p. 1; Ernest R. May, ed., *The 9/11 Report with Related Documents* (Boston: Bedford, 2007); Dorothy Rabinowitz, "The 9/11/Widows," *Wall Street Journal* (April 14, 2004), p. A14; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "9/11 Widows Skillfully Applied the Power of a Question: Why?" *New York Times* (April 1, 2004), p. 1.

Joint Inquiry Committee. *See* Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11

Joint Terrorism Task Force

New York City's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) was a joint New York City Police Department (NYPD) and FBI effort to combat the domestic terrorism threat to New York City. It was formed in 1980 in the midst of a terrorist campaign by Puerto Rican nationalists, after it became apparent that better cooperation between the NYPD and the FBI was necessary. The original plan was for a unit of ten FBI agents and ten New York City police detectives, but over the years the size of the unit expanded. In 1990, Neil Herman, an FBI agent, assumed control of the JTTF.

The early focus of the JTTF was domestic terrorism. Besides Puerto Rican nationalists, the agents of the JTTF were involved in the investigation of the black nationalist group called the New Afrikan Freedom Fighters (NAFF). The acquittal of the eight defendants in a conspiracy trial angered members of the task force.

Another important case was the assassination of Israeli extremist Meir Kahane by Islamist El Sayyid Nosair. Members of the JTTF had monitored paramilitary training by militants before the assassination. Shortly after the assassination, the JTTF was shut out of the case and lost access to sixteen boxes of intelligence information.

In the early 1990s the JTTF recruited a Muslim agent. Emad Salem, a former Egyptian army officer, penetrated the al-Kifah Refugee Center militant circle. There he heard about a possible bomb plot against a dozen Jewish targets. The problem was that elements in the JTTF had reservations about Salem. He was simply too good to be true. Salem kept reporting about a bomb plot, but the details were vague. His handlers wanted Salem to wear a wire, but he refused to compromise himself. After his refusal, the JTTF let him go in July 1991. His parting remark was "Don't call me when the bombs go off." He had been their best access

to Islamist militants in the New York City area, but the agents were more interested in winning a court case than in gathering intelligence.

The JTTF had more to worry about than terrorist plots. In the summer of 1992, the head of the New York City's Criminal Division tried to transfer the functions of the JTTF to urban gang cases, saying, "Terrorism is dead." It took the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing to change this attitude.

In the meantime, the JTTF had recruited another informant. Garret Wilson, a black former U.S. Army veteran, was the new source of information. He had been contacted by the Islamists for paramilitary training. Although Wilson was not in the inner circle of the 1993 World Trade Center plot, he heard strange things that he reported to the JTTF. But about when the agents were getting close to the plot, a bureaucrat became nervous and closed the investigation.

The 1993 World Trade Center bombing made the unit begin to study international terrorism as well as domestic terrorism. Members of the JTTF were part of the 700 investigating agents assigned to the World Trade Center bombing. Within weeks the JTTF team had arrested or identified all of the World Trade Center bombers. Now with more resources, the JTTF began to investigate other militants. Emad Salem was rehired, and the team sent him in to investigate the doings in the al-Kifah Mosque. There he learned that Abdel-Rahman was instigating a plot to assassinate Egypt President Hosni Mubarak during a New York visit in April 1993. Because of questions of his safety, Mubarak canceled his New York City visit. The JTTF became heavily involved in the investigation of the United Airlines Flight 800 Crash off the coast of the United States. Agents of the JFFT spent seventeen months investigating the explosion and crash. It finally took a series of computer simulations to prove that the explosion had been an accident, not a terrorist attack. This investigation consumed most of the JTTF's attention at a time when it needed to be investigating potential terrorism conspiracies.

The members of the JTTF had no knowledge of the September 11 plot before it was carried out. They had been suspicious of increased al-Qaeda activity in the United States and were busy investigating leads. New York City was a prime target of any terrorist conspiracy. Then a CIA agent presented the JTTF staff with photos of possible terrorists on June 11, 2001, and he asked for information about them. After identifying the individuals in the photos, the CIA agent refused to give out any further information, infuriating the JTTF agents. The JTTF agents became even more suspicious when they received the news that two prominent al-Qaeda operatives had been operating for more than a year in San Diego, California—Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. They had participated in a meeting of al-Qaeda leaders in 2001. A formal request for more information was made to the FBI, but the staff of the JTTF did not receive the information until after September 11. Like the rest of the nation, the members of the JTTF watched with horror the events of September 11.

See Also

Bush Administration; Clinton Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Hazmi, Nawaf bin Muhammad Salim al-; Mihdhar, Khalid al-; World Trade Center Bombing (1993)

Suggested Reading

John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Timothy Naftali, *Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

Jones, Steven E. (1949–)

Steven Jones is a former physics professor at Brigham Young University who has become one of the leaders of the conspiracy theorists about the events on September 11, 2001. His earlier work as a physicist had been with cold fusion, and he was able to escape the debacle of that research without much damage to his scientific reputation. Jones was active in other physic projects when he turned his attention to the physics of falling buildings. His nineteen-page paper titled "Why Indeed Did the WTC Buildings Collapse?" at a departmental seminar at Brigham Young University became his introduction to the controversy of a U.S. government conspiracy on September 11.

Jones had a traditional academic career. He was born on March 25, 1949. His family was Mormon, and he was raised in that faith. His family lived in Bellevue, Washington, and he graduated from Bellevue High School in 1967. Jones then attended Brigham Young University where he earned a BA in physics, magna cum laude, in 1973. His PhD in physics, in 1978, came from Vanderbilt University. After postdoctoral research at Cornell University and the Los Alamos Meson Physics Facility, he became a senior engineering specialist at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in Idaho Falls, Idaho, in 1979, remaining there until 1985. In 1989 Jones became the associate director at the Brigham Young University Center for Fusion Studies, and he remained in this position until 1994. In the meantime, he became a tenured professor in the Department of Physics and Astronomy at Brigham Young University.

Jones's early-career research on cold nuclear fusion landed him in a rivalry with Stanley Pons and Martin Fleischmann over cold fusion possibilities. Jones's more modest findings avoided much of the controversy when it became apparent that cold fusion did not work because of alpha-muon sticking losses. His research, however, was rejected for experimental error. After leaving cold fusion, Jones turned to other research areas, including metal-catalyzed fusion. Besides physics research, Jones as a life-long Mormon was interested in archaeology and the Book of Mormon. Although mostly apolitical, he was a Republican voter and a supporter of President George W. Bush. His political attitude changed after September 11, 2001.

Jones's life as a tenured professor at Brigham Young became more difficult after he joined the 9/11 conspiracy movement. Although he had no expertise in the building sciences, Jones decided that the collapse of the twin towers and Seven World Trade Center building defied the laws of physics. In a departmental seminar at Brigham Young University on September 22, 2005, Jones presented the outlines of a paper that would become "Why Indeed Did the WTC Buildings Collapse?" His thesis was the buildings could not have pancaked like they did from explosions and fires of airliner crashes. Instead, Jones suggested that it would have taken controlled demolitions in the buildings to produce such a collapse. In his eyes the culprits were rogue agents working in the U.S. government. A revised edition of this paper appeared in a book edited by David Ray Griffin and Peter Dale Scott titled *9/11 and American Empire: Intellectuals Speak Out.*

This paper and his subsequent charges of a U.S. government conspiracy made Jones a controversial figure at Brigham Young University. Soon after his presentation, members of the university's engineering department began questioning his conclusions. This questioning was soon followed by similar criticism from the faculty of the College of Physical and Mathematical Sciences and the faculty of

structural engineering. Nearly a year after his Jones's presentation of his thesis, Brigham Young University's administration placed Jones on paid leave on September 7, 2006. Jones then announced his retirement from the university on October 20, 2006.

Since his retirement from Brigham Young University, Jones has devoted his energies to the 9/11 conspiracy movement. He was a co-founder with James H. Fetzer, a former philosophy professor at the University of Minnesota at Duluth, of Scholars for 9/11 Truth. This alliance disintegrated almost a year later as Fetzer became enamored by some of the more outlandish conspiracy theories, such as those that featured mini-nukes or high-energy weapons. Jones wanted to keep the conspiracy theories more scientific. This disagreement and others led Jones to separate from the Scholars for 9/11 Truth on December 5, 2006, and start his own organization—Scholars for 9/11 Truth and Justice. He also became the co-editor of the *Journal of 9/11 Studies,* which publishes articles about 9/11 conspiracy theories.

Criticism of Jones's analysis has come mostly from structural engineers. A report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) contradicted Jones's thesis by stating that high-temperature fires started by jet fuel caused the buildings' out columns to collapse. Moreover, after the collapse of the twin towers, the New York Fire Department allowed the Seven World Trade Center building to burn and subsequently collapse because there was nothing the firefighters could have done to prevent it. Despite contradictory testimony, Jones continues to hold to his thesis.

See Also

Conspiracy Theories; Fetzer, James H.; Griffin, David Ray; Scholars for 9/11 Truth

Suggested Reading

John Gravois, "Professors of Paranoia? Academics Give a Scholarly Stamp to 9/11 Conspiracy Theories," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 52.42 (June 23, 2006), p. A10; Peter McKnight, "Attempts to Make Sense of Senseless Acts," *Vancouver Sun* (September 16, 2006), p. C5.

Judge, Mychal (1933–2001)

Father Mychal Judge was a Franciscan priest serving as the chaplain for the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) who died serving others on September 11, 2001. He was born on May 11, 1933, in Brooklyn, New York, into an Irish immigrant family from County Leitrim. His birth name was Robert Emmett Judge. When he was only six years old, his father died from a lingering illness. Judge took jobs as a boy to help support his mother and two sisters. Judge entered the Franciscan order in 1954, and he attended St. Bonaventure College, graduating in 1957. He was ordained a priest in 1961. His assignment was to serve as the pastor of St. Joseph's parish in East Rutherford, New Jersey, and then at St. Joseph's parish in West Milford, New Jersey. Judge showed an early interest in firefighting. After other assignments at Siena College in Loudonville, New York, and St. Francis of Assisi, he became a fire chaplain in 1992.

Father Judge took his responsibilities as fire chaplain seriously. He always carried a pager and responded to calls throughout the city regardless of the time and circumstances. At the scene of fires, he was seen counseling people in need. He was also active in consoling family members at the hospital. Judge also performed masses at FDNY ceremonies. While performing these duties, Judge became a beloved figure in the fire department. Part of his popularity was that although he talked about his

love for Jesus, he was never judgmental or unfairly critical of anyone. Judge was open about his gay sexuality, but few if any of the firefighters he served cared.

Father Judge's Philosophy of Firefighting

Good days, bad days, up days, down days, sad days, happy days, but never a boring day on this job. You do what God has called you to do. You show up, you put one foot in front of another, you get on the rig, you go, and you do the job, which is a mystery, and a surprise. You have no idea when you get on that rig—no matter how big the call, no matter how small—you have no idea what God is calling you to.

Quoted in Thomas Von Essen with Matt Murray, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002), p. 5.

On two occasions before his death, Father Judge received national attention. The first was his support for the victims of AIDS. Long before it was acceptable to give help to AIDS victims, Father Judge was active, even though he had opposition from within the Catholic Church. Many members of the church hierarchy were uncomfortable with Father Judge because he was gay.

Father Judge's second venture onto the national headlines was his role in comforting the families of the victims of TWA Flight 800 off Long Island, New York, in 1996. This aircraft had exploded in midair, killing all of the 230 crew and passengers. Despite lengthy investigations, the exact nature of the explosion is still a subject of dispute. After conducting masses for the victims, he spent time counseling the families regardless of their denominations.

Father Judge was serving as the chaplain to the New York Fire Department on September 11, 2001. He was a gregarious man who enjoyed being a chaplain and loved publicity. Father Judge had been an alcoholic, but he had avoided drink for over twenty years as an active member of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). As soon as he heard about the World Trade Center incident, Father Judge dashed to the World Trade Center to render aid to the victims. He began giving last rites to those dying. While giving the last rites to a firefighter named Daniel Suhr, Father Judge was struck by falling debris. Shortly afterward, Father Judge entered the lobby of the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Debris from the collapse of the South Tower of the World Trade Center hit him, killing him instantly. His body was removed later by the firefighters with great dignity. There is a picture of firefighters and a policeman carrying his body out, and this picture has received the title "American Pieta." They respected his courage in administering the last rites for the victims of September 11 in the face of danger. Father Judge was buried on September 15, 2001, at Holy Sepulchre Cemetery in Totowa, New Jersey.

Twin Sister's Commentary on the Death of Mychal Judge

I truly believe this was a moment my brother had been working towards all of his life. This is how he wanted to die, with his fire fighters around him trying to help in a disaster. His was a glorious death. I don't know how people manage to do these things. I do know my brother loved to pray. We used to joke about it all the time. This was his life. Images like that picture make a hero and that is what my brother was—a hero.

Chris Hughes, "The Brave Chaplain: My Hero Twin," *Mirror* [New York] (September 18, 2001), p. 7.

Since his death, Father Judge has become a controversial figure because there is a growing campaign to make him a saint. His conduct at the World Trade Center has led to a growing mythology. For a candidate to qualify for sainthood, five years must have passed since his or her death, and at least two miracles must be attributed to the candidate. Several people have claimed that their prayers to Father Judge produced miracles. The archdiocese of New York has left it up to the Franciscan order to advance his sainthood, but the leaders of the Franciscan order say they will not press it because he was a good friar but should not be set apart. The fact that Father Judge was gay is a complicating factor.

See Also

Firefighters at Ground Zero; World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading

Dale Brazao and Kevin Coombs, "Father Mike Died Doing His Duty; Father Mike Loved Life, Loved Souls," *Toronto* Star (September 16, 2001), p. A1; Charisse Jones, "The Making of St. Mychal," *USA Today* (February 20, 2003), p. 1A; Dennis Smith, *Report from Ground Zero* (New York: Viking, 2002); Daniel J. Wakin, "Killed on 9/11, Fire

Candidacy of Mychal Judge for Sainthood

Yet it is Judge's contradictions, as well as his compassion, that make him appealing to so many. He was a recovering alcoholic who sported a shamrock tattoo on his behind. He loved to spin yarns and was ever ready with a joke. The Brooklyn native wore his brown Franciscan robe on the hottest days of summer, always remembered a widow's birthday and wasn't above tweaking church officials he found to be pretentious or hypocritical.

Charisse Jone, "The Making of St. Mychal," *USA Today* (February 20, 2003), p. 1A.

Mychal Judge, a chaplain with the New York City Fire Department, stands at the shore before a service where 230 candles were lit for the victims of TWA Flight 800 on July 17, 2000, at Smith Point Park in Shirley, New York. (AP IMAGES/Ed Betz.)

Chaplain Becomes Larger Than Life," *New York Times* (September 27, 2002), p. A1; Thomas Von Essen with Matt Murray, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002).

Justification for the September 11 Suicide Mission

The most difficult aspect of the September 11 attacks for Americans to understand was the use of suicide as a weapon. Nineteen young men bonded together to hijack four American commercial aircraft and crash them into preselected targets. They had no regard for their safety or for anybody else. Each had received at least basic training at al-Qaeda camps to prepare for such a mission. An important part of this training was religious instruction that prepared them for what they called a martyrdom mission.

The religious justification for suicide missions is controversial among Muslim religious authorities. Both opponents and proponents refer to the religious teachings of the Prophet Mohammad as stated in the Koran or to the sayings of the Prophet in the hadiths. Personal suicide is not a part of Muslim religious practice, and this is reflected in the low personal suicide rate in the Muslim world. On the other hand, suicide undertaken as part of jihad, or holy war, is where it becomes controversial.

Jihad has two meanings in Muslim theology. Foremost, jihad means a personal struggle to adhere to the precepts of being a Muslim. The other meaning of jihad is war against the enemies of Islam. Again there are two meanings to this concept. There is jihad that aggressively wages war for the faith. This was the type of jihad that the Muslim successors to the Prophet Mohammad waged in the expansionary period of its history. Then there is defensive jihad, which exists when the Islamic world is attacked by outsiders. According to this concept, it is the obligation of every able-bodied Muslim to participate in war against an invader. Islamist groups consider the presence of Israel in the Middle East as part of an invasion of the Muslim world. Because the United States is an ally of Israel and has a presence in the Middle East, it is also considered a partner in this invasion. Al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups maintain that the war against Israel and the United States is a continuation of the war between the West and the Muslim world that dates back to the Crusades in the Middle Ages.

What Is Jihad?

Jihad literally means "to struggle." In the military sense it is meant in the context, "to struggle against oppression." Jihad is therefore an act to liberate people from the oppression of tyrants. Jihad is not illegal acts against innocent people. When tabloid journalism mistakenly informs the masses that Jihad is "to commit illegal acts of terror," they are revealing the lack of their unprofessional approach to the subject.

Interpretation of Jihad from the Azzam Web site, which advocates Jihad against the West, from Adam Parfrey, ed., *Extreme Islam: Anti-American Propaganda of Muslim Fundamentalism* (Los Angeles: Feral House, 2001), p. 266.

Suicide as a political weapon has a history in the Muslim world. The most famous historical cases of suicide used as a political weapon were those carried out by the assassins of the Ismaeli Shiite sect of Hassan ibn Sabbah, who established the Ismaeli Assassins in the Middle Ages (1034–1255), and they carried out suicide missions against Muslim Sunnis and Christian Crusaders. After the collapse of this sect, there were sporadic suicide missions mostly against European colonial targets. Only

in the early 1980s did the use of suicide as a weapon reappear in the Middle East. It has appeared elsewhere mostly in association with the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. The first incident of a suicide mission in the Middle East in modern times was by the Shiite Amal organization when a suicide bomber drove a car with explosives into the Iraq Embassy in Beirut on December 15, 1981, killing sixty-one people. Hezbollah (the Party of God) in Lebanon borrowed this tactic and has used it with lethal effect against American and Israeli targets. Later, both the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas began depending on suicide bombers for use against the Israelis. The military wing of al-Fatah, the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, has also resorted to the use of suicide bombers.

Noting the effectiveness of suicide bombers, al-Qaeda's leadership adopted the practice. Suicide bombing is considered an effective weapon in a war in which one side is so much stronger militarily than the other. Besides its lethal impact, a suicide bombing has the element of surprise. The suicide bomber is able to get close to the target before he or she detonates the bomb. Al-Qaeda leaders claim that it is the most successful tactic in inflicting damage and at the same time the least costly in terms of loss of its operatives. This belief is reinforced by the fact that suicide attacks claim ten to fifteen times the casualties of any other terrorist operation.

At training camps in Afghanistan, candidates were appraised for the characteristics necessary to recruit for a martyrdom mission. Candidates had to be religious and of strong character. The members of the Hamburg Cell were ideal candidates because of their strong religious views, language expertise, and ability to adapt to Western society without arousing suspicion. Once a candidate had been selected, he underwent specialized training for the mission. For those on the September 11 mission, this meant concentrating on hijacking a commercial aircraft in flight. Those selected to be pilots were given leadership training and sent to the United States for pilot training. Other candidates received different training for different missions.

Interpretation of Suicide Terrorism

"Suicide terrorism" is the most aggressive form of terrorism, pursuing coercion even at the expense of angering not only the target community but neutral audiences as well. What distinguishes a suicide terrorist is the attacker does not expect to survive the mission and often employs a method of attack (such as a car bomb, suicide vest, or ramming an airplane into a building) that requires his or her death in order to succeed. In essence, suicide terrorists kill others at the same time that they kill themselves.

Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), p. 10.

See Also

Hamburg Cell; Qaeda, al-

See Document

Document #7

Suggested Reading

Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History of al Qaeda* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005); Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, eds., *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

K

Kean, Thomas Howard (1935–)

Thomas H. Kean was the chair of the 9/11 Commission that convened to study the events of September 11, 2001. He was a well-respected Republican politician from New Jersey whose moderate views and popularity in the Republican Party led to his appointment as 9/11 Commission chair.

Kean spent his entire political career in New Jersey. He was born on April 21, 1935, in New York City. With his father having served as a Member of Congress, and his grandfather as a U.S. senator, Kean's family had a long history in New Jersey politics. Kean's early education began at St. Mark's School in Southborough, Massachusetts. He then attended Princeton University and later earned a master's degree from the Teachers College, Columbia University. His early career was as a teacher of history and government. When Kean decided to run for public office, he first won election to the New Jersey General Assembly in 1967, and became New Jersey House Speaker for a year in 1972. He aspired to higher office but was unsuccessful in winning the Republic nomination for New Jersey Governor in 1977. Kean was more successful in 1981, and was elected the forty-eighth governor of New Jersey. His term as governor lasted until 1990. Kean proved hugely popular in office, and he made New Jersey a two-party state. Kean left politics to become president of Drew University in Madison, New Jersey. He continued to head the small liberal arts university until 2005.

President Bush appointed Kean chair of the 9/11 Commission because of Kean's reputation as a consensus builder. He earned this reputation through service on various national foreign policy boards under the administrations of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. President George W. Bush turned to him after Henry Kissinger resigned as chair of the 9/11 Commission. Perhaps Kean's most important decision on the 9/11 Commission was to make former U.S. Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN) co-chair. Making the commission bipartisan increased its credibility. Commissioners made all decisions as a group, and met with the media as a team. This bipartisan approach helped make the 9/11 Commission work.

The 9/11 Commission was a massive undertaking. It had to organize itself in record time because its mandate was only for eighteen months, and its initial budget of $3 million was inadequate. There were also conflicting political agendas from various parties outside the commission. Besides pressure from the political side, Kean and the 9/11 Commission had to withstand pressure from the Family Steering Committee. As the process moved forward Kean and Hamilton because frustrated with repeated misstatements by Pentagon and FAA officials. Some of these frustrations have appeared in their book *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission*. The 9/11 Commission issued its final report, the *9/11 Commission Report*, on July 22, 2004.

Reasons Thomas Kean Accepted the Post of Chair of the 9/11 Commission

It's hard to say no when the president of the U.S. asks you to do something—although I've said no before. I knew a lot of people who died on September 11, and lost some good friends. This is an area where many people commute to work in New York—the train only takes 40 minutes to reach the station directly under the Twin Towers. Almost a third of those killed, some 700, were from New Jersey. In the communities around here there were funerals for months.

Interview of Thomas Kean in Steven Knipp, "Without Fear or Favour," *South China Morning Post* (January 17, 2005), p. 16.

Comment by 9/11 Commission Member Richard Ben-Veniste

Tom Kean is a man of enormous good humor and noblesse oblige. His personal charm has played no small role in the cohesiveness and camaraderie that has developed among the members of the commission.

Richard Ben-Veniste quoted by Linton Weeks, "An Indelible Day; On 9/11, University President Thomas Kean Had No Idea How Much His Life Would Change," *Washington Post* (June 16, 2004), p. C1.

The 9/11 Commission has had to withstand considerable criticism then and now. Members and staff did not have the luxury of unlimited time, and members also had to withstand criticism for the political orientation of some of their staff. Philip D. Zelikow, the Commission's Staff Director, had extensive contacts with the Bush administration. Kean has tried to answer most of the criticisms. In turn, Kean's participation in the ABC TV miniseries *The Path to 9/11* has been criticized for the show's anti-Clinton bias.

Kean is now in semiretirement. His main occupation is as chairman of the board of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, a foundation that specializes in health and health care. He and his wife live in Bedminster Township, New Jersey. Kean keeps his hand in politics by writing a weekly column for the Newark, New Jersey, *Star-Ledger* newspaper. His income is supplemented by service on several corporate boards of directors. Kean was active in supporting his son, Tom Kean Jr., in his unsuccessful 2006 campaign for governor of New Jersey.

See Also

Family Steering Committee; Hamilton, Lee H.; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States

Suggested Reading

David T. Cook, "Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton," *Christian Science Monitor* (December 6, 2005), p. 25; Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, and Benjamin Rhodes, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Knopf, 2006); Dana Milbank,

"With 9/11 Film, Kean Finds Tough Critic in Hamilton," *Washington Post* (September 12, 2006), p. A2; Philip Shenon, "9/11 Commission Says U.S. Agencies Slow Its Inquiry," *New York Times* (July 9, 2003), p. A1.

Kerik, Bernard Bailey (1955–)

Bernard Kerik was the Police Commissioner of the City of New York on September 11, 2001. He was a long-time political ally of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. His actions at the World Trade Center on September 11 elevated him, along with Giuliani, to the national limelight.

Kerik had an unusual background. He was born on September 4, 1955, in Paterson, New Jersey. His mother was a prostitute, and his father deserted him when he was only two years old. He was raised by a violent stepfather with a criminal record. He had trouble in school, often getting into fights. Kerik finally dropped out of high school. He later earned a GED and a mail-order bachelor's degree from Empire State College. In his autobiography Kerik states that his violent tendencies were leading to a life of crime until he joined the U.S. Army. Kerik became a military policeman, serving in Korea and then with the 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. His passion was martial arts, and he earned a black belt at age eighteen. After leaving the Army, he worked at security assignments for the Saudi royal family between 1982 and 1984. Returning to the United States, Kerik joined the Passaic County Sheriff's Office, where he held a number of jobs. Kerik's career took off when he took a job with the New York City Police Department. His first assignment was working undercover for the anticrime and narcotics units in Harlem, Spanish Harlem, and Washington Heights. His successes led to his selection for the U.S. Justice Department's New York Drug Enforcement Task Force. During his duty as a uniformed and plainclothes officer, Kerik earned thirty medals for meritorious and heroic service, including the department's Medal for Valor. On January 1, 1998, he was appointed Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correction. Kerik earned praise for improving the safety of the city's jail system, and improving the morale of the guards. Kerik became the fortieth Police Commissioner of the City of New York on August 21, 2000, appointed by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Kerik had responsibility for a uniformed force of more than 41,000 officers, and a civilian force of more than 14,500. He had a reputation as "a tough-talking, sometimes coarse, law enforcer who rarely stood on ceremony," and as one interested in shaking up the status quo. He was considered a tough boss who was willing to fire subordinates whom he considered to be slackers. Kerik was also known to be reluctant to cooperate with the FBI.

Kerik was in charge of the New York City Police Department on September 11. He was taking a shower in his office at 1 Police Plaza when he was informed about the aircraft that hit the North Tower. He immediately headed for the World Trade Center, where he took charge of police operations. Kerik was there when the second aircraft crashed into the South Tower. By this time Mayor Giuliani had made an appearance at the World Trade Center. Communications equipment failed, and coordination between police and firefighters was lacking. Both Giuliani and Kerik survived the collapse of the towers, but they were at risk from falling debris. They made it out of the area and established a new communication center.

Over the next few months Kerik worked to rebuild the New York Police Department (NYPD). The loss of twenty-seven police officers on September 11 was debilitating to the department. Kerik spent the next four months working to build the department back to pre–September 11 standards and to improve morale. Mayor Giuliani and Kerik worked hand in hand to restore New York City to normalcy. They both received considerable media attention for their efforts.

Kerik retired from the Police Commissioner's job at the end of Mayor Giuliani's tenure in office. He worked for awhile as a partner in Giuliani's consulting firm, Giuliani Partners, until President George W. Bush sent him to Iraq to create an Iraqi police force after the invasion. His role there turned out to be controversial: his stay was short, and he was not effective. Returning to the United States, he served on the board of directors of Taser International, manufacturer of stun guns used by police departments. He used his stock options as a director to sell $5.8 million of Taser stock.

Kerik's performance on September 11, 2001, came under scrutiny by the 9/11 Commission. Commissioners criticized Kerik and the NYPD for their performance on September 11. They cited the long-running rivalry between the police and firefighters for having led to failures in command and control and for communication problems. Kerik countered by calling the criticism Monday morning quarterbacking.

Kerik tried to stay out of the limelight until President George W. Bush nominated him for the position of Secretary of Homeland Security on December 3, 2004. Rudolph Giuliani had pressed the White House to select Kerik for this post. A problem arose in the failure of the Bush administration to have Kerik vetted properly; when they did review his background, they found financial and moral problems. His financial picture was clouded by suspicions of illegality. On the moral side, there was evidence of adultery involving more than one woman. When it became apparent that Kerik could not survive the confirmation process, Kerik withdrew from consideration as Secretary of Homeland Security, citing an illegal immigrant nanny he had hired for whom he failed to pay taxes. Soon afterward Kerik also quit the Giuliani Partnership.

Criticism of Kerik for Failure of Leadership

A prominent Republican member of the September 11 Commission, former Navy Secretary John F. Lehman, sharply criticized Kerik and former Fire Commissioner Thomas Van Essen for failures of leadership during the terrorist attacks, saying that rivalry between the departments hampered rescue efforts. The command and control of their departments, Lehman said, were "not worthy of the Boy Scouts." Kerik heatedly disputed the charge.

Michael Powell and Dan Eggen, "A Tough Cop Tempered by 9/11 and Iraq," *Washington Post* (December 4, 2004), p. A1.

Since 2004 Kerik has been in and out of legal trouble. Federal and state authorities began to investigate his various financial transactions. After leaving Giuliani Partners, he formed his own security firm, the Kerik Group. In July 2006 he pleaded guilty to conflict-of-interest charges for accepting $165,000 in gifts from a mob-linked construction firm that was seeking business with the city. Kerik was ordered to pay $221,000 in fines and fees and faced a misdemeanor charge for failing to inform city ethics regulators about a $28,000 loan from a real estate developer in 2002. In September 2006 Kerik became embroiled in an illegal wiretapping case involving a woman who wanted evidence of her husband's



Former New York City Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik exits the Bronx supreme court June 30, 2006, in New York a year and a half after his Homeland Security nomination sank over ethics questions. Kerik pleaded guilty to charges of accepting tens of thousands of dollars in gifts while a top city official. (AP IMAGES/Louis Lanzano.)

adultery. Since then federal authorities have investigated him for violating federal tax laws. They tried to persuade Kerik in March 2007 to plead to the charges and serve two years in prison, but he turned the offer down.

See Also
Giuliani, Rudolph William Lewis "Rudy" III; World Trade Center, September 11

See Document
Document #14

Suggested Reading
Mike Allen and Peter Baker, "On Kerik Nomination, White House Missed Red Flags," *Washington Post* (December 15, 2004), p. A4; Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Bernard Kerik, a Life," *Pittsburgh Tribune Review* (December 8, 2004), p. 1; Russ Buettner and William K. Rashbaum, "Kerik Is Again a Figure in an Official Investigation," *New York Times* (September 28, 2006), p. B6; Dennis Buffa, Murray Weiss, and Todd Venezia, "Bernie—From a Hero to a Zero," *New York Post* (July 1, 2006), p. 8; Elisabeth Bumiller and Erick Lipton, "Kerik's Position Was Untenable, Bush Aide Says," *New York Times* (December 12, 2004), p. 1; Kevin Flynn et al., "A Street Cop's Rise from High School Dropout to Cabinet Nominee," *New York Times* (December 3, 2004), p. A26; Stephanie Gaskell, Jennifer Fermino, and Andy Soltis, "Heroes Rage at WTC Probe," *New York Post* (May 19, 2004), p. 6; John Solomon and Matthew Mosk, "Ex-Partner of Giuliani May Face Charges," *Washington Post* (March 31, 2007), p. A1.

Kifah Refugee Center, al-

The al-Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, New York, was the center of militant Islamist plots against the United States in the 1990s. It had been founded in 1987 by Abdullah Azzam during one of his periodic visits to the United States in the 1980s. As the flagship of approximately forty al-Kifah Refugee Centers in the United States, it was housed in a three-story building on Atlanta Avenue above the Fu King Chinese Restaurant and near the al-Faroog Mosque. Mustafa Shalabi,

Egyptian and an electrical engineer by training, had been selected by Azzam to head the Brooklyn refugee center. Shalabi had been arrested in Egypt in the aftermath of the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981, and immigrated to the United States soon after his release from prison. He was an admirer of Azzam and followed his instructions loyally.

The mission of the refugee center was to raise funds for the establishment of a purified Islamic state in Afghanistan. Shalabi was a strong fundraiser, so soon money was flowing from the refugee center to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although Shalabi was a militant Islamist, he was not a terrorist. The benefit of Shalabi's close ties to Azzam ended with the latter's assassination in 1989. In the meantime, there had developed a more militant wing at the refugee center that wanted to bring jihad (holy war) to the United States.

The political situation at the al-Kifah Refugee Center changed dramatically after the arrival of Abdul Rahman. The blind Egyptian imam had great prestige in the Islamist world. His arrival in the United States in 1990 was greeted with open arms by both Shalabi and the militants. Shalabi leased a house for him in the Bay Ridge area of Brooklyn. At first Abdul Rahman sided with Shalabi, but in a matter of months he changed sides. The source of contention was money and how to spend it. Shalabi wanted to continue giving funds to build an Islamist state in Afghanistan, but the militants were eager to use the money for terrorist operations in the United States. Suddenly Abdul Rahman began calling Shalabi a bad Muslim. Shalabi realized that he had lost out in the power struggle with Abdul Rahman, and he prepared to return to Egypt. Soon after Abdul Rahman changed sides Shalabi was mysteriously murdered. The events surrounding his murder on February 26, 1991, are so murky that no one has been charged in his death.

With Shalabi out of the way, the militants had control of al-Kifah Refugee Center. Abdul Rahman began to quietly issue a series of fatwas (religious rulings) declaring war on the United States. The militants began to consider a series of plots. Some of the plots were unreasonable, but after recruiting Ramzi Yousef the militants settled on bombing the World Trade Center. The arrest and conviction of key members of the al-Kifah Refugee Center did not end the plotting. Soon another plot was instigated, which involved the bombing of key tunnels, the United Nations building, and the FBI headquarters in New York City. This plot was infiltrated by a Muslim agent, Emad Salem, of the New York City Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the participants were arrested before the bomb could be built.

After the arrest of Abdul Rahman and the militants of the al-Kifah Refugee Center, the plots stopped coming out of the center. Al-Qaeda leaders observed how dangerous it was to conduct a terrorist campaign out of a refugee center. The nineteen suicide bombers made certain to avoid mosques, service centers, and any outward signs that they were devoted Muslims. In this way the plotters attempted to blend into the American scene.

See Also

Nosair, El Sayyid; World Trade Center Bombing (1993)

Suggested Reading

John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Gerald Posner, *Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003).

Kuala Lumpur Meeting

The Kuala Lumpur Meeting was a planning meeting of eighteen terrorists that took place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on January 5, 2000. This meeting was one of convenience because it allowed mid-level al-Qaeda operatives a chance to review their upcoming operations. They also wanted to explore possible operations in South Asia.

Even before the meeting, the National Security Agency (NSA) had intercepted communications indicating that such a gathering would take place. Late in 1999 the agency began intercepting communications between Nawaf and Salem al-Hazmi in Karachi, Pakistan, and Khalid al-Mihdhar in Yemen. These intercepts came from the telephone of a prominent Yemeni family—the Hada family—who had marriage ties to al-Qaeda member Khalid al-Mihdhar. From these intercepts the NSA learned there would be a major meeting of al-Qaeda operatives in Kuala Lumpur. Yazid Sufaat, a former Malaysian army captain and successful Malaysian businessman academically trained in biochemistry in Great Britain and the United States, provided his weekend retreat at the Bandar Sungai Long condominium complex outside Kuala Lumpur for the meeting. Exactly what was discussed at this gathering is unknown, but from informants it is known that planning occurred for the attack on the USS *Cole*, and there was discussion of using aircraft as weaponry, possibly in South Asia. Khallad bin Atash and Muhammad Omar al-Harazi, operational chiefs of the attack on the USS *Cole* on October 12, 2000, were in attendance. Representing the September 11 plot were Ramzi bin al-Shibh, al-Mihdhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi.

Once American authorities learned of the meeting, they requested that Malaysian security officials photograph the attendees and bug the condo. Bugging was impossible because of the constant coming and going of the participants, but Malaysia's security service—the Special Branch—took photographs. Two photos came to have special importance—those of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. Both were Saudi citizens with combat experience in Bosnia and training at al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Although al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were known al-Qaeda operatives, they left Kuala Lumpur and entered the United States without incident. They were eligible to be put on a watch list to prevent their entry, but the CIA neglected to do so. This inaction proved to be a monumental mistake, for al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were two of the nineteen suicide hijackers on September 11, 2001.

See Also

Bin al-Shibh, Ramzi; Hazmi, Nawaf bin Muhammad Salim al-; Mihdhar, Khalid al-; Qaeda, al-

See Document

Document #27

Suggested Reading

Bob Graham, *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); Peter Lance, *Triple Cross: How Bin Laden's Master Spy Penetrated the CIA, the Green Berets, and the FBI—And Why Patrick Fitzgerald Failed to Stop Him* (New York: ReganBooks, 2006); Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005); Steven Strasser (ed.), *The 9/11 Investigations; Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission; Excerpts from the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Report on 9/11 Testimony from 14 Key Witnesses, Including Richard Clarke, George Tenet, and Condoleezza Rice* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).

L

Laden, Osama bin. *See* Bin Laden, Osama

Levin, Neil David (1955–2001)

Neil D. Levin, Executive Director of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, died at the World Trade Center complex on September 11, 2001. His position made him landlord of the World Trade Center complex, as well as operator of the New York City area's three major airports and its port facilities, bridges, tunnels, and the Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) rapid transit system. Levin was a political appointee, and administering all these facilities was a difficult and demanding job.

Levin's training was as an economist. He was born in 1955 and raised in Atlantic Beach, New York. After graduation from high school, Levin attended Lafayette College, where he earned a bachelor's degree in economics. His next academic degree was an MBA from the C.W. Post Center of Long Island University's Graduate School of Business. Levin finished his academic training by earning a law degree from Hofstra University. In his first job he worked as counsel to the securities subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, where he worked closely with Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato. Part of his job involved helping to draft the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. He spent seven years as chair of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board of New York, and then joined Goldman Sachs & Company, where he became a vice president after two years with the company.

Levin's close ties with Republican politicians in New York advanced his career. Governor George Pataki appointed Levin New York State Superintendent of Banks. This position gave him oversight responsibility for 4,500 banks, thrifts, and other financial institutions in the state of New York. Governor Pataki later appointed Levin superintendent of the State Insurance Department and head of the Commission on the Recovery of Holocaust Victims' Assets.

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey was Levin's next assignment. Some controversy had surrounded his predecessor, but when New York Governor Pataki and New Jersey Governor Donald DiFrancesco jointly appointed Levin

Executive Director in spring 2001, there was no controversy. Levin had earned a reputation as consensus maker, which enabled him to function smoothly with other politicians. His relationship with Mayor Giuliani was particularly important. It did not hurt that Levin had married Christine Ann Ferer in May 1996. She was an NBC broadcast journalist, and a public personality in her own right.

On September 11, 2001, Levin was caught in the wrong place at the wrong time, like so many other victims of the day. His office was on the sixty-fourth floor of the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex. Although American Airlines Flight 11 hit the tower higher than this floor, Levin was in a breakfast meeting with Fred V. Morrone, the Port Authority's police superintendent, in the Windows on the World Restaurant on the 107th floor of the North Tower. Levin was trapped, like all of those on floors above where the plane crashed. His wife frantically tried to reach him, but without success. There was no chance of escape, and Levin and Morrone evidently died when the North Tower collapsed. Levin's body has never been found.

Levin's wife has become active in the families of September 11 movement. New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg appointed her to a position of liaison with the families who are victims of September 11, placing her in the middle of the family groups' criticism of the mayor's office. Governor Pataki honored Levin by naming a program of the State University of New York the Neil D. Levin Graduate Institute of International Relations and Commerce.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 11; Giuliani, Rudolf William Louis "Rudy" III; Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Suggested Reading

Ronald Smothers, "Pataki Names State Official as Port Authority's Chief," *New York Times* (March 31, 2001), p. B6; Edward Wyatt, "Neil Levin, Executive Director of Bistate Port Authority, 46," *New York Times* (September 22, 2001), p. A5.

Lewin, Daniel M. (1970–2001)

Daniel M. Lewin was the first victim of the terrorist plot on September 11, 2001. He was born in 1970 in Denver, Colorado, but lived as a teenager in Jerusalem, Israel, after the family moved there in 1984. Because he held both American and Israeli citizenship, he frequently moved between the two countries. Lewin served his four-year Israeli military obligation as an officer in the Israeli Defense Forces elite counterterrorist unit, Sayeret Matkal. He also graduated with BA and BS degrees in computer science and mathematics from Technion University in Haifa, Israel. His first job was with IBM's research laboratory in Haifa, where he worked on development of the Genesys system, a processor verification tool. In 1996, he entered Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) as a graduate student. After receiving a master's degree in 1997, he began collaborating on special projects with Professor F. Thomson Leighton. Together they devised innovative algorithms for optimizing the Internet. In 1998 they founded the Internet company Akamai Technologies. Lewin was chief technical officer and a member of the board of Akamai Technologies, and his financial interests in the company made him a multimillionaire. He lived in Brookline, Massachusetts, with his wife and two children. At the time of his death he was a PhD candidate in the Algorithms groups at MIT's Laboratory for Computer Science.

Lewin was a passenger on American Airlines Flight 11 that boarded at Logan International Airport bound for Los Angeles International Airport. His seat was 9B, in the first-class section of the aircraft. Shortly before 8:17 a.m. the skyjacking team led by Mohamed Atta attacked the flight attendants in First Class. Lewin evidently reacted to the situation but before he could intervene, Satam al-Suqami, a member of the skyjacking team seated in 10B, fatally stabbed him. (The hijack team may have identified him as a possible air marshal.) Betty Ann Ong, a flight attendant, reported in a phone call to Amy Sweeny at Logan International Airport that a passenger in seat 9B had had his throat cut by a passenger in seat 10B at approximately 8:20 a.m. An FAA memo later suggested that Lewin had been shot, but this information is probably in error because there were no reports of gunshot by Ong. In any event, Lewin was probably the first victim of the September 11 attack, unless one of the flight attendants died before him. Since his death his company, Akamai Technologies, has prospered from its position as an Internet music enabler.

Growing Prominence of Daniel Lewin

Lewin was recently named one of the 25 most influential Chief Technology Officers by InfoWorld, and ranked seventh in the Power 100 list of the *Enterprise Systems Journal*. Having risen to such prominence in the IT industry in just three years, Lewin's was in every way a career cut short in its prime. He was studying for a PhD at MIT at the time of his death. In private life Lewin lived in Brookline, Massachusetts, and his pastimes were devoted to the pursuit of speed—motorcycling, fast cars, and skiing.

Martin Campbell-Kelly, "Lewin: 'A Better Internet'," *Independent* [London] (September 14, 2001), p. 6.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 11; Ong, Betty Ann

Suggested Reading

Martin Campbell-Kelly, "Terror in America—Obituary: Daniel Lewin," *Independent* [London] (September 14, 2001), p. 6; Richard Sisk and Monique el-Faizy, "First Victim Died a Hero on Flt. 11," *Daily News* (July 24, 2004), p. 7.

M

Marrs, Jim (1943–)

Jim Marrs is a freelance journalist and a veteran conspiracy theorist who has joined the ranks of those claiming that a U.S. government conspiracy led to the September 11 attacks. Marrs first became famous because of his involvement in the investigations surrounding the John F. Kennedy assassination. His book, *Crossfire: The Plot That Killed Kennedy*, appeared in 1989 and served as the basis for Oliver Stone's movie *JFK,* for which Marrs served as an advisor. Marrs has spent most of his journalistic career as an investigative journalist. He was born on December 5, 1943, in Fort Worth, Texas. His father sold structural steel for a St. Louis company. Marrs attended public schools in Fort Worth and showed an early interest in journalism. He entered North Texas State University and graduated with a BA in journalism in 1966, after which he joined the U.S. Army. After leaving the military in 1968, he worked as a police reporter and general assignments reporter for the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*. Marrs took a leave of absence to travel to Vietnam with a Fourth Army intelligence unit. After returning to the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, he worked as a military and aerospace writer. He was also a graduate student for two years at Texas Tech in Lubbock, Texas.

Marrs gained a national reputation as a leading critic of the official version of the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963. After interviews with witnesses, Marrs was convinced that the Warren Commission was a government cover-up. He left the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* in 1970 to work full-time on his investigation and concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald, commonly thought to be the assassin of Kennedy, had been set up by the U.S. government and killed before he could expose the plot. *Crossfire* became a nonfiction bestseller. Since 1976, Marrs has taught a course at the University of Texas at Arlington about the events surrounding the Kennedy assassination. Beginning in 1980, he has devoted his energies to freelance writing and public relations consulting, as well as dabbling in the publishing of a weekly newspaper.

Marrs' next big project was a study of a secret government project involving a psychic phenomenon known as "remote viewing." He spent nearly three years researching, only to have his publishing company cancel the book in 1995. Two

months afterward, the CIA announced the program, and information about it appeared in the *Washington Post*. This development was a keen disappointment to Marrs, but he posted his manuscript, *PSI Spies*, to the Internet via his Web site.

Marrs next turned his attention to unidentified flying objects (UFOs). After several years of research, his book, entitled *Alien Agenda,* was published by HarperCollins in May 1997. In this book, he recounted the history of UFO sightings and the response to them from the U.S. government. This book also received national exposure, becoming the bestselling UFO book to date. Marrs appeared as a speaker at several UFO-related national conventions and at other public affairs. He also began teaching a course about UFOs at the University of Texas at Arlington.

Marrs's interest in conspiracies produced another book, published in 2000 by HarperCollins: *Rule by Secrecy: The Hidden History That Connects the Trilateral Commission, the Freemasons, and the Great Pyramids*. He attempted to tie modern secret societies to those of ancient times—the so-called "ancient mysteries." This book also sold well, reaching the *New York Times* Best Seller List.

It did not take Marrs long to suspect a U.S. government conspiracy surrounding the events of September 11, 2001. The ineptitude of the agencies of the U.S. government was so dramatic that it has made for a field day for conspiracy theorists worldwide. In 2003, Marrs produced a book entitled *The War on Freedom* (which has since appeared under the title *The Terror Conspiracy: Deception, 9/11 and the Loss of Liberty*), in which he examined the various actions of the U.S. government with a view to proving a conspiracy that allowed the events of September 11 to happen. Marrs, who has been busily promulgating his thesis throughout the nation, has also been active in the Scholars for 9/11 Truth.

See Also

Conspiracy Theories; Fetzer, James H.; Scholars for 9/11 Truth

Suggested Reading

Jonathan Curiel, "The Conspiracy to Rewrite 9/11," *San Francisco Chronicle* (September 3, 2006), p. E1; Adam Harvey, "The Big Lie," *Sunday Mail* [South Australia] (September 10, 2006), p. 46; Ted Mahar, "Who Shot JFK?" *Oregonian* [Portland] (December 20, 1991), p. 6; Jim Marrs, *The Terror Conspiracy: Deception, 9/11, and the Loss of Liberty* (New York: Disinformation, 2006).

Mazza, Kathy (1955–2001)

Kathy Mazza, a captain in the Port Authority Police Department and the first female commanding officer of the Port Authority Police Academy, was one of two woman police officers to die while evacuating people from the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Mazza, a late recruit to the Port Authority police, was nevertheless rapidly promoted, becoming one of two female captains in the Port Authority Police Department.

Mazza's first career was in nursing. Born in 1955, in Massapequa, New York, she was the only girl among three brothers. After high school, Mazza attended Nassau Community College, earning a nursing degree. For the next ten years, she worked as a cardiothoracic nurse at the Long Island Jewish Hospital in Queens and at St. Francis Hospital in Roslyn, New York. In 1985, she married Christopher Dolosh, an officer in the New York City Police Department's 25th precinct. They

lived in South Farmingdale, New York. In 1987 she decided to change professions by enrolling in the Port Authority Police Academy.

Mazza's career in the Port Authority Police Department prospered. After a tour of duty at JFK Airport in New York City, she was promoted to sergeant. After a year in the central police pool, she returned to JFK Airport for six more years. Her career was briefly interrupted when she underwent open-heart surgery to correct a quarter-sized hole in her heart in 1992, but this was only a temporary lull in her upward climb in the hierarchy of the Port Authority Police Department. In December 1998, Mazza became a lieutenant and assumed command of the Staten Island Bridges and New Jersey Marine Terminals. In April 2000, she was promoted to captain, making her one of two female captains out of fourteen. She took advantage of her installation as commander of the Port Authority Police Academy to institute a program teaching life-saving techniques that has saved at least sixteen lives to date.

Kathy Mazza's Drive for Excellence

Kathy was such a shining star. They couldn't deny her, and she wasn't going to back down. She wasn't going to go away quietly and be satisfied with being passed over. She knew that as a female in law enforcement, you have to give at least 150 percent to gain the respect and acknowledgment of your colleagues. Kathy was always willing to do that. She worked incredibly hard, and she earned every promotion.

Comment from Jessica Gotthold, Port Authority Police Officer, quoted in Susan Hagen and Mary Carouba, *Women at Ground Zero: Stories of Courage and Compassion* (New York: Alpha Books, 2002), p. 305.

Mazza volunteered to help at the World Trade Center complex during the September 11 emergency. She had been at the Jersey City headquarters of the Port Authority police when the attack occurred and left with five others to respond to the emergency. Mazza and her crew helped evacuate people from the North Tower. From the position of the bodies, it is evident that the five of them—Mazza, Lt. Robert D. Cirri, Chief James A. Romito, Officer James W. Parham, and Officer Stephen Huczko—were trying to evacuate a woman in a rescue chair even after the South Tower had collapsed. They were found sixty feet below ground on February 9, 2002.

Mazza's family established the Kathy Mazza Memorial Fund for Pediatric Cardiology at Saint Francis Hospital in her honor, and in 2003 the Town of Oyster Bay, Long Island, dedicated the Captain Kathy Mazza Park to her memory and heroism.

See Also

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Suggested Reading

Larry Celona, Mark Stamey, Farrah Weinstein, and Adam Miller, "3 Who Died as They Had Lived: Helping," *New York Post* (November 18, 2001), p. 18; Susan Hagen and Mary Carouba, *Women at Ground Zero: Stories of Courage and Compassion* (New York: Alpha Books, 2002); Eric Lipton, "For 5 Officers, Apparent Last Heroic Act," *New York Times* (February 11, 2002), p. B3; Michael Thier, "A Female Captain in Policing's Male World," *Newsday* [New York] (September 21, 2001), p. 1.

Merino, Yamel (1976–2001)

Yamel Merino was a young emergency medical technician (EMT) killed by the collapse of the South Tower of the World Trade Center complex on September 11,

2001. The twenty-four-year-old was one of the three women who died attempting to aid the victims of the terrorist attack.

Recollection of the Yamel Merino's Personality

Yamel Merino had a soft, sweet voice and a gentle smile, yet she could be as strong as a bull. She had to lift heavy patients onto gurneys in her job as an emergency medical technician. She knew her job was dangerous. Every night, she prayed for God to protect her 8-year-old son, whom she was raising on her own.

Diane Cardwell et al., "Parties, Love Notes and Other Small Memories That Now Loom Large," *New York Times* (September 18, 2001), p. B10.

Merino was a single parent who was resolved to be a success. She was born on October 21, 1976, and raised in Yonkers, New York. Her schooling was interrupted by the birth of a son when she was sixteen years of age, but she studied and received her general equivalency diploma. In June 1997, at age twenty, she started working at Metrocare, an ambulance company. Although she loved her job, her ultimate goal was to become a nurse. Much of the time her job in the ambulance company required her to transport the elderly and the handicapped—but she had time to be a fervent New York Mets fan.

Merino was one of the first emergency medical technicians to arrive at the World Trade Center complex. Her assignment was working in a triage area at the Marriott Hotel, across the street from the twin towers. Witnesses report that she was last seen calming hysterical survivors before the South Tower collapsed on her. Her body was found on September 12. Merino was the youngest female rescue worker to be killed and was among the first buried. Her funeral was heavily attended. Because Merino was employed by a private company instead of a municipal employee, her family was ineligible for the financial support received by FDNY and NYPD employees after September 11.

See Also

Casualties of September 11

Suggested Reading

Diane Cardwell et al., "Parties, Love Notes and Other Small Memories That Now Loom Large," *New York Times* (September 18, 2001), p. B10; Susan Hagen and Mary Carouba, *Women at Ground Zero: Stories of Courage and Compassion* (New York: Alpha Books, 2002), pp. 293–298; Ian O'Connor, "EMT Answered Call to Be a Hero Daily," *USA Today* (September 10, 2002), p. 3C.

Meyssan, Thierry (1957–)

Thierry Meyssan is a French left-wing journalist and intellectual who has become a leading proponent of the view that the U.S. government was part of a conspiracy surrounding the events of September 11. He believes that right-wing elements within the U.S. government threatened President George W. Bush with a coup d'état unless he increased military spending and went to war against Afghanistan and Iraq. Meyssan added that these right-wingers also initiated a media campaign against Osama bin Laden to mask their conspiracy.

Meyssan, who was born on May 18, 1957, rebelled against his traditionalist Catholic family by becoming a left-wing freethinker. He attended Catholic schools and for a time was a theology student, but his rebellion against his family's political views led him into left-wing politics. In 1989 he founded Project Ornicar to



French author Thierry Meyssan holds his book, *9–11: The Big Lie,* in this March 19, 2002, photo, taken in Paris. (AP IMAGES/Michel Euler, File.)

oppose discrimination against homosexuals. In March 1994 Meyssan formed the Voltaire Network (*Réseau Voltaire*) as a platform from which to attack the French right wing and the Catholic Church. Casting himself as a freethinker along the lines of Voltaire, Meyssan made the secret Catholic organization Opus Dei a special target. Also in 1994, Meyssan became National Secretary of the Radical Party of the Left (*Parti radical de gauche*). He was active in working in political campaigns—during Bernard Tapie's try for election to the European Parliament in 1994 and during deputy Christiane Taubira's candidacy in the 2002 French presidential election. Meyssan was also active in the National Committee of Vigilance Against the Extreme Right (*Comité national de vigilance contre l'estrême droite*) from 1996 until 1999, when he became head of the Radical Anti-Prohibitionist Coordination (*Coordination radical anti-prohibitionniste*), a group resolved to fight organized crime and the drug trade.

Meyssan had already built a reputation in French left-wing circles when he published his book, *The Big Lie* (*l'Effroyable imposture*), asserting that parts of the U.S. government had orchestrated the events of September 11. The book appeared in 2002 and became an immediate bestseller in France, within months selling over 200,000 copies. Its popularity corresponded to the growing anti-Americanism among French citizens who increasingly feared the political intentions of the United States.

In his book, Meyssan makes a number of charges about September 11 that seem difficult to correlate with the facts. He asserts that a right-wing cabal organized the attacks on September 11 to force President George W. Bush to build military strength for an invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. He believes that members of this plot, rather than al-Qaeda operatives, crashed the airliners into the World Trade Center complex, but he has alternated between blaming a truck bomb and a guided missile for the damage to the Pentagon. He has also claimed that Osama bin Laden was a stooge of the CIA who could be easily

blamed for the attacks. He wrote that Muslims could not have crashed the aircraft, because the Koran forbids suicide.

However, Meyssan has never traveled to the United States and did not interview any witnesses. He has dismissed witnesses out of hand because of his belief that they are part of the conspiracy. His evidence came from photographs and data gathered by other conspiracy theorists on the Internet. An eyewitness to the crash, James S. Robbins—a contributing editor to the *National Review*—replied to Meyssan by calling his ideas an affront to any reasoning person (see sidebar).

Reaction of September 11 Eyewitness James S. Robbins to Meyssan's Theories

So, of course, I take it personally when a half-wit like Meyssan comes along saying [the airliner crash into the Pentagon] did not happen. And he is so evidently at war with reality that one is tempted not to waste time with him. His ideas are obviously foolish, easily disproved, an affront to any reasoning person. It would be easy to ignore him. But that would be a mistake. . . . Allowing the extremists to go unchallenged only encourages them. . . . When such ideas are allowed to stand, they take root among the impressionable and those predisposed to think the worst. And especially now that communications technology has made it possible to give global reach to the bizarre and archive it forever, it is essential for men and women of reason resolutely to counter the delusions of the fringe element. I was there. I saw it. That is my entire rebuttal.

James S. Robbins, "9/11 Denial," *National Review* (April 9, 2002), p. 1.

Despite its popularity in France, Meyssan's book has been panned by French critics. Two French investigative journalists, Guillaume Dasquie and Jean Guisnel, have written *L'Effroyable mensonge* (*The Terrible Lie*) that counters all of Meyssan's points about September 11. In researching their book, they traveled to the United States and interviewed witnesses to disprove Meyssan's assertions.

Meyssan has paid little attention to the negative publicity for his book, which has now been translated into English for American and British audiences. He is continuing to advance his conspiracy theories in another book, *The Pentagate* (*Le Pentagate*).

See Also

Conspiracy Theories; Pentagon Attack

Suggested Reading

Max Berley, "The French Disconnection," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* [Pennsylvania] (April 14, 2002), p. E1; Stephen Goode, "What's behind the Hatred of America?" *Insight on the News* (January 19, 2004), p. 39; John Lichfield, "Delusions of Ground Zero: Thierry Meyssan with a Copy of His Discredited Book," *Independent* [London] (July 22, 2002), p. 7; Alan Riding, "Sept. 11 as Right-Wing U.S. Plot: Conspiracy Theory Sells in France," *New York Times* (June 22, 2002), p. A1; James S. Robbins, "9/11 Denial," *National Review* (April 9, 2002), p. 1.

Mihdhar, Khalid al- (1975–2001)

Khalid al-Mihdhar was one the hijackers of Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. He was an early recruit to the September 11 plot and was intended to be one of the pilots. His ineptness and poor English skills kept him from any role as a pilot, but he continued to serve in a support

role. Al-Mihdhar was an early convert to militant Islamism. Born on May 16, 1975, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, he completed a rudimentary education and became an active Islamist. As a teenager, he traveled to Afghanistan in 1993 and then with his friend Nawaf al-Hazmi joined Muslim fighters in Bosnia in their war against Bosnian Serbs. In 1996 al-Mihdhar moved back to Afghanistan with the al-Hazmi brothers in time to fight with the Taliban against the Afghan Northern Alliance. In 1997 he joined the Chechen rebels in Chechyna in their fight against the Russian army. By 1998 he had become a part of al-Qaeda and returned to Afghanistan for training at a special al-Qaeda training camp at Mes Aynak. In early 1999 he returned to Saudi Arabia, and on April 7, 1999, he obtained a U.S. visa through the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In late 1999 the Saudi government placed al-Mihdhar on a Saudi terror watch list, and then–Saudi Intelligence Minister Prince Turki al Faisal warned the CIA about both al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. By that time, both lived in San Diego, California, a region where they had arrived in November 1999.

Sometime in early 1999, al-Mihdhar was recruited to the September 11 plot by Mohamed Atta. On January 5, 2000, he attended the three-day conference of al-Qaeda supporters in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where the outline of the September 11 plot was discussed. He and al-Hazmi returned to the United States on January 15, 2000, arriving in Los Angeles, where they met the Saudi Omar al-Bayoumi, who directed them to the large Muslim community in San Diego, California. Al-Bayoumi found them an apartment and helped them settle in. Because neither al-Mihdhar nor al-Hazmi spoke English, they made no attempt to make contact with anyone outside their own Muslim community. Later, they moved to another apartment in the home of a retired literature professor Abdussattar Shaikh—who, unbeknownst to them, was an informer for the FBI.

Al-Mihdhar's Aptitude for Piloting

[Fred] Sorbi gave [Kalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi] introductory lessons in one of his small Piper Cherokees, each taking a turn at the controls for about an hour. "We took them up to show them how the airplane flies," said Sorbi. On approach to the runway at the end of the flight, Sorbi said, one of the men—he couldn't remember which—grew extremely frightened and started praying aloud, calling out to Allah as the other man piloted the small plane toward the landing strip. Sorbi advised them to delay further lessons: "We told them to go to college and learn to speak English if they wanted to become pilots. They said they were."

Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), p. 192.

Al-Mihdhar's role was to learn to become a pilot. He tried to learn to fly small aircraft at San Diego's Montgomery Field. But both al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi proved such poor students that their instructor told them to go to college and learn English, which meant that other pilots had to be trained. Al-Mihdhar instead became the recruiter for the muscle part of the operation. In June 2000, he headed back to the Middle East for an extended stay. On June 10, 2001, he traveled to Saudi Arabia, where he finalized plans for the emigration of the final twelve members of the plot. To do this, he traveled extensively throughout the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and

Afghanistan. Despite his suspicious activity, al-Mihdhar was able to return to the U.S. on July 4, 2001, on the Visa Express Program. In August 2001 he moved to Laurel, Maryland.

On September 10, 2001, al-Mihdhar and two associates traveled to Herndon, Virginia, where they stayed at a Marriott Residence Inn, preparing for the mission the next day. Early on the morning of September 11, al-Mihdhar and four others boarded American Airlines flight 77, where he provided much of the protection for the hijacking team's pilot until the airliner crashed into the west wing of the Pentagon.

See Also
Hazmi, Nawaf bin Muhammad Salim al-; Pentagon Attack

See Document
Document #1

Suggested Reading
Bob Graham, *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005).

Millennium Plots

Leaders of al-Qaeda planned for a series of terrorist operations to take place on or around January 1, 2000. At least three plots surfaced during investigations in the months and weeks before the millennium. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad has claimed credit for planning and financing these plots, whose targets were in three different places—Amman, Jordan; Los Angeles, California; and, Aden, Yemen. Fortunately, none of the plots were carried out—but the news clearly indicated that al-Qaeda's leadership was busy concocting plots to the detriment of the United States. Al-Qaeda operatives had planned to bomb the Radisson Hotel in Amman, along with Christian tourist sites in and around the city on January 1, 2000, hoping to kill as many Americans as possible. Jordanian authorities, however, learned of the plot and raided the terrorists' bomb factory, which was hidden in an upper-middle-class residence. The terrorists had planned to use poisons and other improvised devices to increase the casualties of their attacks, planning to disperse hydrogen cyanide in a downtown Amman movie theater. News of this plot reached American officials in the middle of 1999.

The terrorists also plotted to plant a large bomb at the Los Angeles International Airport, a plan that originated in Canada among Muslim militants there. Ahmed Ressam tried to smuggle the explosives from Canada to the United States through the British Columbia–Washington Ferry Entry Point. An alert U.S. Customs Officer, Diana Dean, suspicious of Ressam's nervousness, pulled him over and had begun to check the vehicle when Ressam made a break. Dean and fellow customs officers soon captured him, and an examination of his vehicle revealed a large quantity of explosives and a map of the Los Angeles International Airport. American authorities believed that Ressam would have received assistance from al-Qaeda members in the Los Angeles area, but no proof of this has surfaced.

Finally, the terrorists planned a marine bombing intended to sink the destroyer USS *The Sullivans* at its berth in the port of Aden, Yemen. Al-Qaeda operatives overloaded a small boat with explosives, to the point of sinking, and nothing

remained but to cancel the operation. Because of the covert nature of this operation—and because of its failure—American authorities did not learn about this plot until much later, after the attack on the USS *Cole*.

See Also
Qaeda, al-; Ressam, Ahmed

Suggested Reading
Vernon Loeb, "Planned Jan. 2000 Attacks Failed or Were Thwarted; Plot Targeted U.S., Jordan, American Warship, Official Says," *Washington Post* (December 24, 2000), p. A2.

Mohamed, Ali Abdel Saoud (1952–)

American authorities first began to understand Osama bin Laden's role in the Islamist movement after questioning Ali Mohamed. Until the mid-1990s, authorities believed bin Laden to be a secondary character acting mostly as a "money man." Mohamed was a professional soldier and Islamist who then served as a sergeant in the U.S. Army.

Mohamed's entire career has been associated in one way or another with the military. He was born in 1952 in Kafr el-Sheikh, near Alexandria, Egypt. His father was a professional soldier, and Mohamed followed in his footsteps. He attended the Military Academy in Cairo and then enrolled in the University of Alexandria, where he earned a master's degree in psychology in 1980. He joined the Egyptian Army as an officer in 1971, and his abilities as a linguist allowed him rapid promotion as an intelligence specialist in the Egyptian Special Forces. In that capacity Mohamed participated in the 1973 Yom Kippur War against Israel. In 1981 he underwent Green Beret training at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.

At the same time that his military career prospered, Mohamed became a militant Islamist. Religious since childhood, he was attracted to the extremist Islamist side of Islam. His spiritual mentor was Abdel Rahman, and he made contact with elements in the Islamist extremist terrorist group Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Members of this group and of Mohamed's military unit assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Although Mohamed approved of the assassination, he was not implicated in the plot because he was then stationed at Ft. Bragg. Later, Mohamed's association with religious and political extremists led to his dismissal from the Egyptian army in 1984. Bitter about his forced dismissal at the rank of major, he reached out to Ayman al-Zawahiri and his Egyptian Islamic Jihad for support, swearing an Islamic oath of allegiance (*bayat*) to al-Zawahiri and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

After working as a security advisor to Egypt Airlines and, briefly, as an operative of the CIA, Mohamed immigrated to the United States in 1986. During his service as a CIA operative in Lebanon, he confessed to being a CIA agent in his contacts with Hezbollah, an incident that caused his name to be placed on a State Department Watch List. Nevertheless, Mohamed had little trouble obtaining a visa to the United States and arrived in New York City on a TWA aircraft on September 6, 1985.

Once in the United States, Mohamed lived in Santa Clara, California, and soon married an older American woman. He was unemployed for several months before landing a security officer job with American Protective Services of Sunnyvale,

California. One of his first actions was to set up an Islamist cell with the help of recruit Khalid Dahab, but his goal was to join the U.S. Army. In August 1986, Mohamed volunteered for military duty. Basic training was at Ft. Jackson, South Carolina. The army then assigned him to Ft. Bragg, where he served as a supply sergeant until he was appointed assistant lecturer on Islamic culture and politics at the JFK Special Operations Warfare School. During his off-duty hours in the military, he studied for a PhD in Islamic Studies. His views were controversial, and in 1987 he decided that he wanted to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Mohamed took a thirty-day leave to travel to Afghanistan to train mujahideen fighters. While in Afghanistan, he led several patrols against Soviet forces. Mohamed's commanding officer at Ft. Bragg, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Anderson, became so concerned with Mohamed's political views and his unauthorized trip to Afghanistan that he filed two intelligence reports on him—reports that were somehow lost in the military's bureaucracy.

After returning to the United States, Mohamed moved closer to the militants at the al-Kifah Mosque. On weekends, he trained volunteers in military tactics at sites in Brooklyn and New Jersey. Mohammed copied maps and training manuals and used these resources to write the multivolume terrorist manual used by al-Qaeda. He also wrote and translated the contents of a 180-page manual entitled *Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants.* Mohamed had become increasingly close to Abdel Rahman and el Sayyid Nosair. He taught Nosair field-survival tactics and weapons handling. Nosair used these lessons to assassinate the Israeli extremist Rabbi Meir Kahane. Mohamed decided to leave the army and received an honorable discharge in November 1989. That same year, Mohamed became an American citizen. He also started a leather import–export business that served as cover for his frequent trips to the Middle East. By the early 1990s, he had become familiar with—and contacted—both Ayman al-Zawahiri (former head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and second-in-command in al-Qaeda) and Osama bin Laden. He handled security arrangements for bin Laden's transfer from Sudan to Afghanistan. After Mohamed's return to the United States, he was al-Qaeda's only open operative in the country. In 1992 he returned to Afghanistan, where he gave weapons instruction and intelligence training to al-Qaeda trainees.

Confession of Ali Mohamed in October 2000

I was involved in the [Egyptian] Islamic Jihad organization and the Islamic Jihad organization had a very close link to al Qaeda. And the objective of all this, just to attack any Western target in the Middle East, to force Western countries to pull out from the Middle East, based on the Marine [barracks] explosion in Beirut [in 1983].

Quoted in Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 143.

In the spring of 1993, an FBI field agent interviewed Mohamed, who told him all about Osama bin Laden's plans to overthrow the Saudi regime and rid the Middle East of foreigners. The agent informed his FBI superiors about Mohamed and bin Laden, but nothing happened. Mohamed continued to perform small missions for al-Qaeda around the world. On one mission in 1995, he scouted targets

in Nairobi, Kenya, and advised that the American embassy was the best target. Returning to the United States, Mohamed moved with his wife to Sacramento, California, in 1997 and found a job with Valley Media, a wholesaler of recorded music and videos, as a computer network support specialist. Throughout the 1990s, Mohamed remained a triple agent working for both al-Qaeda and the FBI but kept his allegiance with al-Qaeda. In 1998 the FBI decided to arrest Mohamed for lying to the FBI. After his arrest on November 4, 1998, he was reluctant to cooperate with the FBI. Even threats to send him back to Egypt, where he had been sentenced to death in absentia in the spring of 1999, did not persuade him to cooperate. Finally, in October 2000, Mohamed began to cooperate with the FBI, confessing his role in the African embassy bombings. In return, the FBI promised Mohamed to refrain from pursuing the death penalty or life in prison in future court trials. He has never been sentenced despite pleading guilty to five counts of conspiracy to kill, kidnap, and maim Americans both in the United States and abroad, as well as to the destruction of American property both in the United States and abroad. Since his cooperation, Mohamed has been held in protective custody in a Florida prison.

See Also

Abdel Rahman, Sheikh Omar; Bin Laden, Osama; Kifah Refugee Center, al-; Qaeda, al-; Zawahiri, Ayman al-

Suggested Reading

Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, from Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002); Peter Lance, *Triple Cross: How Bin Laden's Master Spy Penetrated the CIA, the Green Berets, and the FBI—And Why Patrick Fitzgerald Failed to Stop Him* (New York: ReganBooks, 2006); John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Knopf, 2006).

Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh (1965–)

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was the operational chief for the planning for the September 11 operation. He had been active in extremist Islamist activities with his nephew Ramzi Yousef before and after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, but it was his role as instigator of the September 11 plot that made him notorious. Until his capture in Pakistan, he rivaled Osama bin Laden as the United States' "public enemy number one."

Mohammed came from a family with strong religious and political views. He was born on April 24, 1965, in the Fahaheel neighborhood of Budu Camp, Kuwait. His father was a Muslim cleric from the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. Because of the citizenship rules of Kuwait, the family remained as guest workers instead of Kuwaiti citizens. The young Mohammed grew up in Kuwait resenting his inferior status. Mohammed was a good student and excelled in science. His father died before he graduated high school, and his elder brothers assumed responsibility for his care. Because both brothers had strong political views, they guided his political orientation, which eventually led him to join the Muslim Brotherhood at age 16. He graduated from Fahaheel Secondary School in 1983, and his brothers decided to send Mohammed to the United States to further his

education. Mohammed traveled to the United States in 1983 to study mechanical engineering at Chowan College, a Baptist school in Murfreesboro, North Carolina. After a short stay there, Mohammed transferred to North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in Greensboro, North Carolina (now University of North Carolina—Greensboro). At both schools, Mohammed remained aloof from American students and American society. Most of his contacts were with other students from Arab countries. After graduating in 1986 with a degree in mechanical engineering, Mohammed traveled to Pakistan to join the mujahideen in fighting Soviets in Afghanistan. His older brother Zahed Sheikh Mohammed was head of a Kuwaiti charity, the Committee for Islamic Appeal (*Lajnat al Dawa al Islamia,* or LDI), in Peshawar, Pakistan. His other brother worked for Abdul Rasool Sayyaf's newspaper in Peshawar. For a time, Mohammed taught engineering at a local university. The three brothers worked together with Abdullah Azzam, Sayyaf, and Gulbaddin Hekmatyar to determine the strategy of the Afghan resistance. Mohammed's war experiences in Afghanistan changed his life, especially after he lost a brother, Abed Sheikh Mohammed, in the fighting late during the war, at the Battle of Jalalabad. Mohammed became secretary to the Afghan warlord Sayyaf and, through him, made the acquaintance of Osama bin Laden and other Islamist leaders.

After the end of the Afghan-Soviet war in 1989, Mohammed stayed in Pakistan, where he devoted his activities to operations run against the West. When the political situation in Afghanistan deteriorated for Islamist militants, Mohammed looked elsewhere for employment. The conflict in Bosnia attracted him, and he fought with the mujahideen there in 1992. During these years, Mohammed held a number of jobs before ultimately working for the Qatari government as an engineer in its electricity headquarters. His first involvement in a major terrorist operation was with his nephew, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef. His role in the planning of the February 26, 1993, bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City is still mostly conjecture, but it is known that he sent Yousef $660 to help build the bomb. This bombing, however, proved a disappointment. Although it caused many casualties, it failed to cause the collapse of the twin towers or kill the hoped-for thousands. After Yousef returned to Karachi, Pakistan, he met with Mohammed. It was at one of these meetings in 1993 that Yousef and his friend, Abdul Hakim Murad, suggested a way to attack the United States. Murad, who had earned a commercial pilot license at an American commercial pilot school, proposed packing a small airplane full of explosives and dive-bombing into the Pentagon or the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mohammed quizzed Murad about details of pilot training and the ways that such an operation might be carried out. Nothing was done at that time, but Mohammed later used this information in the September 11 plot.

Later in 1993 Mohammed contacted Hambali, the operation chief of the Indonesian Islamist terrorist group Gama'a Islamiyya. Mohammed and Yousef traveled to the Philippines to work on a plan, Project Bojinka, that envisaged the bombing of a dozen U.S. commercial aircraft over the Pacific during a two-day period. He also worked with Yousef to plan the assassination of Pope John Paul II during his visit to the Philippines, but a chemical mishap caused by Yousef ended this attempt. Mohammed returned to Pakistan, where he kept in touch with

Yousef. Only after Yousef was captured in 1995 did Mohammed begin to make separate plans for terrorist operations, one of which was the use of commercial aircraft as terrorist weapons. However, he needed allies before undertaking such a massive operation.

American intelligence was slow to realize the importance of Mohammed in the terrorist world even as he traveled throughout the Muslim world making contacts. Evidence obtained in Yousef's apartment in Manila indicated Mohammed's association with Yousef, but nothing else was known. Beginning in 1993, Mohammed lived in Doha, Qatar, working at the Ministry of Electricity and Water. In his spare time, Mohammed raised money for terrorist groups. Enough evidence about his participation in Yousef's activities existed that a New York grand jury issued a secret indictment against him in January 1996. Although American authorities tried to persuade Qatari officials to extradite Mohammed, the Qatar government was reluctant to do so. Efforts to mount a seizure operation were hindered by a lack of commitment on the part of the American military, the CIA, and the FBI. Eventually a half-hearted effort was made by the FBI, but Mohammed was long gone, warned by his friend Abdullah ibn Khalid, the minister of religious affairs in Qatar, that the Americans were looking for him.

Mohammed began cooperating with al-Qaeda in 1996. Bin Laden invited him to join al-Qaeda's military committee under Mohammad Atef. Mohammed was to swear loyalty (*bayat*) to bin Laden and to al-Qaeda, bringing with him connections to the Middle East and South Asia, as well as plans to attack the United States. He met with bin Laden and Atef, al-Qaeda's military commander, at bin Laden's Tora Bora mountain refuge in 1996, where Mohammed presented to them a variety of terrorist schemes, the most promising of which was the use of commercial airliners as flying bombs to use against targets in the United States. Yet, though bin Laden asked Mohammed to join al-Qaeda, Mohammed turned him down, wishing to retain his autonomy. Despite this, Mohammed developed a close working relationship with al-Qaeda. Mohammed needed al-Qaeda to supply money and martyrs for his operations even as he supplied the planning, but bin Laden was noncommittal about the plan until 1998, when he proposed that the four leaders of the plane hijackings should be two Saudis—Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi—and two Yemenis—Walid Mohammed bin Attash and Abu Bara al-Yemenis. This plan, however, fell apart when the two Yemenis were unable to obtain American visas. At this time, no need existed for pilots—something that soon changed. This

Relationship of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Osama bin Laden

It doesn't surprise me [that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed organized 9/11]. It's not exactly bin Laden's territory. He's not very fond of details, looking at details. He's the enigma; he's the chairman of the company, so to speak. He is the symbol of the organization. He would still need people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to be advising him on certain operations, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed would, in turn, need people to execute things.

Comment by Yosri Fouda after talking with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, quoted in Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 303.

change of plans led to the later recruitment of Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, and Marwan al-Shehhi from the Hamburg Cell. At this time American intelligence had no idea of the extent of Mohammed's growing contacts with al-Qaeda, but the FBI was offering a $2 million reward for his capture because of his role in the Manila plot.

Shortly after his 1996 meeting with bin Laden, Mohammed began recruiting operatives for a future suicide mission. His liaison with al-Qaeda's leadership was Ramzi bin al-Shibh. He briefed bin Laden and the leadership of al-Qaeda orally on his final plan for a suicide mission using commercial aircraft sometime in 1998 or 1999. By this time, Mohammed, who had sworn a loyalty oath to bin Laden, had been integrated into al-Qaeda's leadership hierarchy. Recruits for the mission were trained at the Afghan al-Matar Training Complex, where Abu Turab al-Urduni, a Jordanian trainer, taught them how to hijack planes, disarm air marshals, and use explosives. Mohammed confessed in a June 2002 interview with the Muslim journalist Yosri Fouda that the operation in the United States had been planned two-and-a-half years before it took place.

Khalid Sheik Mohammed Confesses to His Role in the 9/11 Attacks

About two and a half years prior to the holy raids on Washington and New York the military committee held [a] meeting during which we decided to start planning for a martyrdom operation inside America. As we were discussing targets, we first thought of striking a couple of nuclear facilities but decided against it for fear it would go out of control. The attacks were designed to cause as many deaths as possible and havoc and to be a big slap for America on American soil.

Quoted in Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, *Masterminds of Terror: The Truth Behind the Most Devastating Terrorist Attack the World Has Ever Seen* (New York: Arcade, 2003), p. 114.

Mohammed's original plan included the hijacking of ten aircraft and the destruction of ten targets but was ultimately reduced to four. Once the operatives were selected and Mohamed Atta had been picked and briefed as mission leader, Mohammed watched from behind the scenes.

After September 11, Mohammed knew that he was a marked man. He eluded capture for nearly two-and-a-half years. Considerable investigation was required by American authorities before they realized just how important Mohammed was to the planning of September 11; but once his importance was realized, his capture was only a matter of time. On March 1, 2003, a joint team of Pakistani and American agents arrested Mohammed in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, seizing his computer, cell phones, and documents. For more than two-and-a-half years, American authorities held him at a remote prison site in Pakistan, where he was interrogated about his role in al-Qaeda and in the September 11 attacks. In September 2006 Mohammed was transferred to the Guantánamo Bay Detainment Camp. In early March 2007 the Bush administration announced that he and thirteen others would appear before military courts to determine whether or not they were enemy combatants, after which enemy combatants would appear before a military tribunal. Before the proceedings, it was reported that Mohammed had been increasingly forthcoming about his role in the September 11 plot. His confessions included myriad plots—most of which were never carried out or were failures. At his hearing at the Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Hearing on March 10, 2007, Mohammed stated that he had been the organizer of the September 11 plot, justifying it as part of a war between the Islamist world and the United States. Mohammed also confessed to complicity in many other plots, among which were the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the killing of the Jewish journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan, in which he claimed personal involvement only, stating that it was not related to his al-Qaeda activities. Although his open confession of participation in these terrorist acts equated to a guilty plea, Mohammed simultaneously claimed that he had been tortured. His fate is still to be determined.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Bin al-Shibh, Ramzi; Bin Laden, Osama; Guantánamo Bay Detainment Camp; World Trade Center Bombing (1993); World Trade Center, September 11; Yousef, Ramzi Ahmed

See Document

Document #42

Suggested Reading

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Motassadeq, Mounir el- (1974–)

Mounir el-Motassadeq was a member of the Hamburg Cell, the leaders of which participated in the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. He was not one of the leaders of the cell, but he provided material support for its planning and for its operations in Germany. Despite evidence to the contrary, el-Motassadeq has maintained his innocence, claiming that no terrorist organization existed in Hamburg.

Little is known about el-Motassadeq's personal background. He was born on April 3, 1974, in Marrakesh, Morocco. His father was an affluent doctor. After graduating from a Moroccan secondary school with distinction, el-Motassadeq decided to study electrical engineering at German schools and moved to Münster, Germany, in 1993, where he studied German. During this time, he married a Belarus woman, with whom he later had a son. He was fluent enough in German to be accepted into the electrical engineering program at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg. In addition to his studies, el-Motassadeq became active at the al-Quds Mosque. Soon after he arrived in Hamburg, he became acquainted with Mohamed Atta, with whom he prayed at both the university and the mosque. Often el-Motassadeq and Atta ate together; according to witnesses, they discussed religion and politics.

Much of the evidence linking el-Motassadeq with the Hamburg Cell and the September 11 plot is circumstantial. His close association with Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh is suspicious in itself, but in May 2000 he flew to Afghanistan. El-

Motassadeq spent three weeks at the al-Qaeda training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan. A witness at the camp has stated that he attended a session at which Osama bin Laden spoke. Earlier he had covered for Atta, bin al-Shibh, Ziad Jarrah, and Marwan al-Shehhi when they made their trip to Afghanistan for al-Qaeda training. El-Motassadeq was a signatory for Atta's will and held power of attorney over al-Shibh's bank account, making his denial of any knowledge of the September 11 plot dubious. Although he covered for his friends in Germany while they trained as pilots and sent them funds in the weeks before September 11, he did not flee Germany before September 11 as bin al-Shibh did. Reports have surfaced that bin al-Shibh stated under interrogation that el-Motassadeq was not part of the September 11 plot; but, after weeks of surveillance by German authorities, el-Motassadeq was arrested on November 28, 2001.

The ambiguity of el-Motassadeq's relationship with the Hamburg Cell has complicated the conviction of el-Motassadeq of a crime difficult to prove in German courts. The German legal system protects individual rights even more strictly than the American system. In February 2003, during his first trial, el-Motassadeq was convicted of over 3,000 counts of accessory to the murders on September 11, 2001. A German panel of judges sentenced him to a fifteen-year prison term, but an appeals court overturned the verdict as unproven because the United States had refused to allow a key witness to testify—the only surviving leader of the Hamburg Cell, Ramzi bin al-Shibh. El-Motassadeq was retried for his membership in a terrorist organization and convicted again in August 2005 and sentenced to seven years, but an appeals court also overturned this conviction. On February 7, 2006, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court ordered an early release of el-Motassadeq, claiming an absence of proof that he had been informed about the September 11 plot. El-Motassadeq was released shortly thereafter, but the Federal Supreme Court rejected his appeals and ruled that sufficient evidence existed to prove that he was aware of the hijacking scheme. The court held him guilty of accessory in 246 counts of murder for those killed on the hijacked aircrafts. On January 8, 2007, el-Motassadeq received a sentence of fifteen years from the State Supreme Court in Hamburg, and his lawyers continue to draft appeals on his behalf. In the meantime, however, he remains in prison.

See Also

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Richard Bernstein, "German Court Convicts Man of Qaeda Ties," *New York Times* (August 20, 2005), p. A6; Desmond Butler, "Trial in Germany; Friend of Hijacker Admits to Training in Afghanistan," *New York Times* (October 23, 2002), p. A11; Peter Finn, "Germany Makes Its First Sept. 11 Arrest," *Washington Post* (November 29, 2001); Mark Landler, "9/11 Associate Is Sentenced in Germany to 15 Years," *New York Times* (January 9, 2007), p. A10; Anton Notz, Deborah Steinborn, and Hugh Williamson, "Guilty of Terrorism," *Financial Times* [London] (February 20, 2003), p. 15.

Moussaoui, Zacarias (1968–)

Zacarias Moussaoui has become infamous as the so-called "twentieth member" of the suicide hijacking mission of September 11, 2001. He was born on May 30,

1968, in St.-Jean-de-Luz, near Narbonne, France, to Moroccan parents. His father was a successful tiler, and his mother worked in a variety of menial jobs until finding a position in the French postal system. Moussaoui's parents divorced when he was only three years old, and his mother raised him along with his older brother and two older sisters. She continued to bring up her children in France, but their upbringing was secular. During Moussaoui's youth, his family moved around France—first to a resort in the Dordogne and then to Mulhouse in Alsace before finally settling down in Narbonne. While in Mulhouse, the children spent a year in an orphanage run by the local Social Services Department. Moussaoui and his mother did not get along and had frequent and furious arguments. Things became so serious that Moussaoui left home in 1986. A good student, he easily passed his vocational baccalaureate. After passing entrance exams, he opted to study mechanical and electrical engineering at a school in Perpignon. His French girlfriend, Fanny, followed him, and they lived together. Moussaoui transferred to the University of Montpellier's Economic and Social Administration program, but he had begun to tire of school when the Persian Gulf War broke out in 1991.

The plight of Iraqi civilians and Palestinians concerned Moussaoui, and he became increasingly interested in politics. He had experienced racism in France, and his sympathy for Muslim causes was increasing. While at the University of Montpellier, he came into contact with Muslim students advocating extremist Islamist views. He made a six-month visit to London in 1992, but his stay in England proved disillusioning when he found British society intolerant and class-ridden. This experience, however, did not prevent him from returning to England, where he stayed for the next three years. He attended the South Bank University in London, studying international business. Moussaoui earned his degree in 1995 and he moved back to Montpellier. Some time during his stay in England, Moussaoui became converted to the Wahhabi strain of Islam by the militant Islamic teacher Abu Qatada, who ran a religious community, the Four Feathers, near Baker Street in London. His behavior during visits to France and Morocco alarmed his family. Soon after his conversion, al-Qaeda recruiters convinced him to join al-Qaeda.

Moussaoui's Brother Describes the Process of Recruitment by Al-Qaeda

First, they pick out young people who, one way or another, have been estranged from their families. These young people, with no adult to guide them, are cut off from strong moral anchors. The chaotic personal and family history of Zacarias fits the pattern perfectly.

Abd Samad Moussaoui with Florence Bouquillat, *Zacarias, My Brother: The Making of a Terrorist* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003), pp. 114–115.

Between 1995 and 2001, Moussaoui's association with al-Qaeda became even closer. He received training in Afghanistan at al-Qaeda's Khaldan camp in 1998, at the same time as Mohamed Atta. Moussaoui's trainers found him enthusiastic but questioned his stability. Moussaoui was finally recruited for a future suicide mission, but little evidence exists to show that it was the September 11 plot. The al-Qaeda leadership had other plans for him, and he wanted to work on a Boeing 747 simulator, unlike the hijackers of the September 11 bombings, who trained exclusively on 757 and 767 simulators. Moussaoui's friend, Hussein al-Attas, described him "as the kind of man who believed it was acceptable to kill civilians who harmed Muslims and that he approved of the 'martyrs' who did just that."

Moussaoui entered the United States in hopes of becoming a pilot. He arrived at Chicago's O'Hare Airport on February 23, 2001, with a ninety-day visa. Within days of his arrival, he began learning to fly small aircraft at the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma. He became frustrated by his lack of progress after failing the written examination, for which he blamed inexperienced instructors at the school. After looking at other pilot schools, Moussaoui contacted the Pan Am International Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota, near Minneapolis, hoping to learn how to fly the huge Boeing 747-400. After only a few days of training in mid-August, the school's instructors became suspicious of Moussaoui, who showed more interest in flying than in taking off or landing. He also inquired about the protocols used for communicating with flight towers, asked about cockpit doors, and wondered how much damage a fully loaded 747 could do. After a meeting of the instructors, one volunteered to contact a friend in the Minneapolis FBI field office. Instead, the call went to FBI Special Agent Harry Samit, a U.S. Navy aviation veteran and small-engine pilot who was immediately suspicious of Moussaoui.

The Minneapolis FBI field office was part of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) system, and a brief investigation showed that his visa was "out of status," having expired on May 22, 2001. This led the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) agent in the JTTF to authorize the arrest of Moussaoui on August 16, 2001. Moussaoui refused to allow the FBI agents to search his belongings but agreed to allow them to be taken to the local INS building. Because of Moussaoui's French citizenship, the FBI requested information concerning him from French authorities, who deemed Moussaoui dangerous and conveyed this to the FBI office in Minneapolis.

The Minneapolis FBI agents wanted a search warrant to examine Moussaoui's belongings—in particular, his laptop—but ran into difficulties at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. Two types of search warrants are possible—standard criminal search warrants and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) search warrants, which are issued by a secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). FBI headquarters found insufficient cause for a criminal warrant. The agents' request for a FISA court warrant was denied because he was not affiliated with a recognized terrorist group, even though Moussaoui had contacts with Chechen rebels and close ties to al-Qaeda.

The political climate changed after September 11, and Moussaoui became a key target for retribution. American federal prosecutors charged Moussaoui with capital crimes, accusing him of six acts: preparing acts of terrorism, conspiracy to hijack an aircraft, destruction of an aircraft, use of weapons of mass destruction, murder of American officials, and destruction of property—even though Moussaoui had been in jail for twenty-five days when the events of September 11 occurred. Moreover, doubt still lingered about Moussaoui's role in the September 11 plot. The FBI had difficulty in proving that had Moussaoui cooperated, the September 11 attacks could have been prevented.

Nevertheless, Attorney General John Ashcroft insisted that the Justice Department seek the death penalty. Opposition to this position arose within the Justice Department, because a death sentence would make plea bargaining impossible. Although Moussaoui had information about al-Qaeda, no attempt was made to extract it from him.



Zacarias Moussaoui in an August 17, 2001, file photo provided by the Carver County, MN, sheriff's department. (AP IMAGES/Carver County Sheriff's Department, File.)

The trial was a national event. Moussaoui's irrational behavior and sudden guilty plea created even more controversy. It became apparent that Moussaoui *wanted* to be martyred. During the sentencing, prosecutors argued for the death sentence, but a dubious jury handed him a life sentence without chance of parole instead, reflecting Moussaoui's role as an al-Qaeda operative who intended to commit acts of terror rather than any action he might have taken. Moussaoui is now serving his sentence at a federal maximum-security prison.

See Also
Federal Bureau of Investigation; Qaeda, al-

See Documents
Document #30; Document #40

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Murad, Abdul Hakim Ali Hashim (1968–)

Abdul Hakim Murad was a coconspirator of Ramzi Yousef in Operation Bojinka. He suggested to Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed that a commercial aircraft would be a good terrorist weapon. This advice was based on his experience obtaining a pilot's license in the United States.

Murad wanted to become a commercial pilot. He was born on January 4, 1968, in Kuwait, but his father was from Pakistan and worked as a crane operator for a petroleum company in Kuwait. After graduating from high school in al-Jery, Kuwait, Murad pursued his dream of becoming a commercial pilot by attending the Emirates Flying School in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. He then traveled to the United States to train at various commercial pilot schools—Alpha Tango in Gern Stages, Texas; Richmore Flying School in Schenectady, New York; Coastal Aviation in New Bern, North Carolina; and California Aeronautical Institute in Red Bluff, California. Murad obtained his FAA multiengine license from Coastal Aviation on June 6, 1992.

Murad returned to the Middle East in July 1992. Soon after his arrival in Pakistan, Yousef contacted him. Murad helped Yousef plan the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, but the bomb exploded prematurely, wounding Yousef. When Yousef transferred his operations to the Philippines, Murad followed him. Yousef's uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, also joined them. Sometime during this period, Murad began to discuss with Yousef and Mohammed a scheme to hijack commercial aircraft and use them as flying missiles. Murad, who had the piloting skills the others lacked, talked about the need to train pilots for such a mission. In the meantime, Yousef was engaged in a plot to assassinate the Pope and to launch Operation Bojinka. These plans were in the process of implementation when the chemical accident at the Josepha apartment ended them. Yousef sent Murad back to pick up his laptop computer, but in doing so Murad was arrested by the police.

After capturing him, the Philippine police interrogated Murad. Murad was reluctant to cooperate until Colonel Rodolfo Mendoza, the commander of the Philippine National Police's Special Investigations Group, began his interrogation. Under pressure, Murad identified Yousef as his coconspirator, later mentioning a plan to hijack commercial airliners and crash them into targets like the Pentagon, or nuclear facilities. Other possible targets identified by Murad were the Transamerica Tower in San Francisco, the Sears Tower in Chicago, the World Trade Center in New York City, and the White House. Philippine police told American authorities about the plans to turn commercial aircraft into flying bombs in 1995. Murad's mission was to fly his aircraft into CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

Murad's Scheme for a Suicide Hijacking

The Philippine report on [Murad's] hijacking proposal conveyed the simplicity of his idea: "What subject have in his mind is that he will board any commercial aircraft pretending to be an ordinary passenger. Then he will hijack said aircraft, control its cockpit and dive it into CIA Headquarters. There will be no bomb or any other explosive that he will use in its execution. It is, simply a suicidal mission that he is very much willing to execute. That all he need is to be able to board the aircraft with a pistol so that he could execute the hijacking."

Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), p. 167.

For whatever reason, American authorities ignored Murad's tale. In fact, the FBI later claimed that it

had never heard of the plot. This denial came as the interrogation material from Murad became available. After being extradited from the Philippines, Murad is now serving a life sentence in an American federal prison.

See Also
Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh; Yousef, Ramzi Ahmed

See Document
Document #26

Suggested Reading
Peter Lance, *Triple Cross: How Bin Laden's Master Spy Penetrated the CIA, the Green Berets, and the FBI—And Why Patrick Fitzgerald Failed to Stop Him* (New York: Regan, 2006); Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005).

N

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States

The creation of an independent commission to inquire into all aspects of the 9/11 attacks was prompted because of the stark limitations of earlier congressional inquiries. Congress's Joint Inquiry on Intelligence had outlined serious deficiencies in governmental intelligence-gathering and interagency cooperation, but the White House had refused to turn over documents to the investigators, citing constitutional separation of powers. Senator John McCain described the process as "slow-walked and stonewalled." A more in-depth inquiry into the policy miscalculations of the Bush and Clinton administrations engendered partisanship and found Republicans and Democrats attacking the other party's administration. The best way to mitigate such issues was to create an independent, bipartisan commission having unlimited access to all documents and officials.

However, conflicting interests caused delays in forming such a commission. The Bush administration was reluctant to support such a commission, fearing that it would concentrate chiefly on mistakes made during the Bush administration. Democrats feared a witch hunt for errors made during the Clinton administration. Intense pressure from the families of those killed during the attacks finally forced the creation of the commission. The survivors of the dead made it plain to all involved that they wanted an immediate investigation of the events surrounding September 11, but it was not until fourteen months after the attacks that the 9/11 Commission was announced. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, or the 9/11 Commission, received a mandate from the President of the United States and the U.S. Congress to investigate the facts and circumstances of the attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001. Legislative authority for this commission was given by Public Law 107-306, signed by President Bush on November 27, 2002. The five Republicans and five Democrats selected for this commission were a matter of some controversy. President Bush selected Henry Kissinger, once Nixon's Secretary of State, to chair the committee, and Senator Tom Daschle appointed George Mitchell, former Senate majority leader and chief negotiator of the Northern Ireland Peace Accords, as vice-chair.

These appointees soon encountered political difficulties. The families of the victims confronted Kissinger about his consulting firm's clients, some of whom were suspected to be Saudis and even, possibly, the Bin Laden family. Responding to pressure, the Senate Ethics Committee ruled that the members of the commission had to abide by congressional rules on the disclosure of possible conflicts of interest, which meant that Kissinger had to disclose his entire client list. He was unwilling to do so and resigned from the commission. Mitchell encountered the same problem with the client list of his law firm, so he, too, resigned from the commission. President Bush then turned to the well-respected former Governor of New Jersey, Thomas H. Kean, and Senator Tom Daschle to former Indiana congressman Lee H. Hamilton. Neither Kean nor Hamilton had prior dealings with each other, but they soon began to work together.

The final members of the commission were Thomas H. Kean (chair), Lee H. Hamilton (vice-chair), Richard Ben-Veniste, Fred F. Fielding, Slade Gorton, Max Cleland, John F. Lehman, Timothy J. Roemer, and James R. Thompson. Midway in the commission's deliberations, Cleland left the commission for a government job and was replaced by Bob Kerrey. In the interests of bipartisanship, Kean made Hamilton co-chair.

The families of the victims maintained the momentum behind the creation of the 9/11 Commission, championing its subpoena powers by lobbying members of Congress and even the White House. These representatives formed the twelve-member Family Steering Committee (FSC). Members of the FSC came mainly from four organizations: Families of September 11, Voices of September 11th, the Skyscraper Safety Campaign, and September 11th Advocates. Soon after the creation of the 9/11 Commission, representatives from the Family Steering Committee met with Kean and Hamilton to express their desire for the commission to move swiftly and aggressively. They presented to Kean and Hamilton a document entitled *September 11 Inquiry: Questions to Be Answered,* which consisted of fifty-seven questions about 9/11 that reflected their greatest desire: accountability.

Almost immediately the 9/11 Commission began to work with Philip Zelikow, who had a reputation as a presidential historian and who was the director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. Zelikow's Republican connections included work on the National Security Council of President George H. W. Bush and on the transition team of the National Security Council of President George W. Bush. His coauthorship of a book with Condoleezza Rice on German unification, as well as his relationship with Stephen Hadley, the National Security Advisor, made Democratic commissioners leery of him. Members of the Family Steering Group were also unhappy with his selection and petitioned to have him removed. Both Kean and Hamilton, however, had confidence in his integrity, and he stayed. Zelikow became the mainstay of the 9/11 investigation, supervising the 80-person staff and playing a major decision-making role.

Much criticism was also directed at the composition of the 9/11 staff, at least half of which was drawn from the agencies the commission was tasked to investigate. This raised worries that evidence would be looked at in lights that would exonerate agencies and people implicated. Some critics have maintained that the evidence was "cherry-picked" to produce a portrayal that sat well with investigators. Again members of the Family Steering group complained, but to no avail. Even Kean and Hamilton expected the 9/11 Commission to fail in its mission,

realizing that the odds of its success were low because the political stakes were so high. Both Republicans and Democrats lined up together to find fault as part of a commission expected to operate on a rigid, unrealistic timeline with inadequate funds.

Reasons Why the 9/11 Commission Would Fail

Both of us [Kean and Hamilton] were aware of grumbling around Washington that the 9/11 Commission was doomed—if not designed to fail: the commission would splinter down partisan lines; lose its credibility by leaking classified information; be denied the necessary access to do its job; or alienate the 9/11 families who had fought on behalf of its creation.

Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, and Benjamin Rhodes, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Knopf, 2006), p. 15.

Although the 9/11 Commission had broad subpoena powers, it used these judiciously and only against those unwilling or unable to produce necessary documents. The most notorious offenders were the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), both of which were so reluctant to produce documents regarding the events of September 11 that the commission was forced to subpoena documents from them. Both agencies compiled with the subpoenas, which also acted as a warning to the White House to produce its own documents when required.

In its analysis of the failures to detect the September 11 conspiracy, the 9/11 Commission listed four contributing factors: (1) a "failure of imagination" to even conceive of the possibility of such an operation, (2) a "failure of capabilities" that allowed al-Qaeda to operate in the United States despite agencies designed to prevent just such activity, (3) a "failure of management" by national security leaders whose agencies neither shared information nor collaborated in their activities, and (4) a "failure of policy" by both the Clinton and Bush administrations to prioritize counterterrorism.

The 9/11 Commission not only criticized the failures leading to September 11 but also made a series of recommendations. Among these recommendations were a National Counterterrorism Center, a national intelligence director, the reform of congressional oversight of national security, reform within the FBI, more transparent levels of information sharing between government agencies, and smoother transitions between presidential administrations. It did recognize, however, that not all of its recommendations would find approval both in the White House and in Congress.

In the course of the commission's investigations, members of the commission and its staff reviewed 2.5 million documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries. Nineteen days of public hearings and the testimony of 160 witnesses informed its investigation, but from the beginning, the commission was under pressure to achieve its objectives in a short time. Its request for an extension was greeted with little enthusiasm because the report would be produced too near to the 2004 presidential election. An extension of two months was granted, but still too little time remained to answer all the questions posed.

Despite its attempts at thoroughness, the 9/11 Commission has been subjected to severe criticism both from the inside and the outside. One of the criticisms has to do with the Able Danger controversy. Then-Congressman Curt Weldon charged that the commission ignored Able Danger and its alleged identification of

Mohamed Atta before September 11, but Kean and Hamilton have replied that Able Danger was brought to the commission's attention late in its deliberations. Both the commissioners and the staff concluded that none of the Able Danger materials indicated any knowledge of Atta—despite the meeting of the commission's executive director, Zelikow, with Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan in late 2003, at which time Shaffer informed Zelikow of the findings of Able Danger.

See Also

Able Danger; American Airlines Flight 11; American Airlines Flight 77; Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Pentagon Attack; United Airlines Flight 93; United Airlines Flight 175; World Trade Center, September 11

See Documents

Document #31; Document #34; Document #36

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National Security Agency (NSA)

The National Security Agency is the U.S. government's electronic spy service. When President Harry Truman created this agency to consolidate the government's code-breaking activities, the NSA's mandate included the surveillance of both domestic and international communications, something that changed when Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978, requiring search warrants from the FISA court before NSA domestic wiretaps in cases of national security. Until September 11, 2001, the primary mission of the NSA was the surveillance of international communications.

The head of the National Security Agency was Air Force General Michael Hayden, who was director of the NSA from March 1999 to April 2005—the longest in the history of the agency. Officially, his boss was George Tenet, head of the CIA, but in reality the NSA was an independent agency answering to the President more than to the CIA.

Exploiting the capabilities of today's supercomputers, the National Security Agency has learned to deal with a massive amount of intelligence-related information. International intelligence-gathering has been hidden under the codename Echelon. As reported by James Risen, the NSA has recruited personnel who were "technicians, math and linguistic geeks, and military and civilians who were bureaucratic conformists." In 1990, in its greatest success, it stole every Soviet code machine and manual.

The National Security Agency began to target the communications of al-Qaeda leaders in the late 1990s. At that time, al-Qaeda leaders used communication systems that the NSA could monitor by using satellites and other signals technologies, as it did to transmissions from an al-Qaeda logistics center in Yemen in 1998. After word leaked out in an article in the *Washington Times* that the NSA had this capability, al-Qaeda leaders stopped using satellite cell phones and e-mail.

Since then, all of al-Qaeda's communication has been in code. A problem developed in the late 1990s that affected the NSA's ability to handle its normal volume of data. The NSA's computer system, which was becoming outdated, crashed for four days in January 2000. The required upgrades cost $1 billion and were not totally in place by September 11, 2001. Even today, the NSA's attempts to overhaul its badly dated computer system have not been successful.

As the volume of al-Qaeda traffic went up, ominous conversations about "Zero Hour" made NSA and CIA analysts nervous. George Tenet, director of the CIA, warned the Bush administration that something big was going to happen—perhaps even in the United States. He communicated this to Condoleezza Rice in a meeting on July 10, 2001, but nothing came of it. Later, General Hayden was forced to explain before Congressional committees why a key intercept on September 10, 2001, regarding something big scheduled for September 11, was not translated until September 12.

Within weeks of September 11, the NSA received permission from the Bush administration to start the controversial "terrorist surveillance program." This program required that at least on one side of the phone call be from outside the United States and that there be probable cause to believe the person on the other side to be associated with al-Qaeda or another terrorist group. The president had to reauthorize this program every forty-five days, something he has faithfully done. Budgetary increases have enlarged the project's funds from about $4 billion pre-September 11 to $8 billion in 2007. What has made this surveillance program especially controversial is the loose interpretation that has included far more phone calls than the authorization explicitly allows. Soon after September 11, all telephone companies were submitting to pressure from the NSA. This circumvention of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts (FISC) came to an end in 2007 when the Bush administration promised to use a more systemic approach to intelligence-gathering from telephone communications.

See Also

Central Intelligence Agency; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; Qaeda, al-; Tenet, George

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Bob Barr, "Privacy . . . Now the Guard? Approve a Rollback of Bush's Power," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* (May 2, 2007), p. 15A; Siobhan Gorman, "Management Shortcomings Seen at NSA," *Baltimore Sun* (May 6, 2007), p. 1A; Bob Graham, *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); James Risen, *State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration* (New York: Free Press, 2006); Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

Naudet Documentary on 9/11

The Naudet brothers' documentary film on the events of September 11, 2001, was an accidental product, but it is the most accurate portrayal of the events of that day. Jules and Gédéon Naudet, who were filming a documentary about a rookie fireman's experiences in New York City's fire department, were on location filming with Engine 7 Company, Ladder 1 Company of the Fire Department of New York City (FDNY) on the morning of September 11. Jules Naudet was riding with

Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer to check out a gas leak when the American Airlines Flight 11 flew overhead. Naudet turned his camera in time to record the aircraft crashing into the North Tower. Pfeifer allowed Naudet to record the rescue operations until it became too dangerous. Meanwhile Gédéon was back at the fire house filming the reactions of the firefighters as they prepared to head to the World Trade Center complex. He then followed the firefighters to the World Trade Center complex to film their ordeal. They were filming when the South and North Towers collapsed. Together they filmed 180 minutes, much of it considered too graphic for public consumption. The footage includes jumpers landing and a screaming woman burning from aviation fuel that poured down an elevator shaft. It also captures the removal of chaplain Mychal Judge's body. Naudet and Gédéon received permission to film both the rescue attempts and the subsequent hunt for bodies.

The Naudet brothers turned their footage into a documentary with the assistance of retired New York City firefighter James Hanlon as codirector. CBS aired the film, titled simply *9/11*, commercial-free on March 10, 2002, narrated by actor Robert De Niro. It has since been shown by CBS several times. Normally the film would have had to be edited because of the use of profanity by the participants, but a federal appeals court granted a temporary halt to the Federal Communications Commission's enforcement of its indecency rules. This film has been studied by law enforcement authorities trying to understand the sequence of events of September 11.

Reason Why Naudet Brothers Censored Their Documentary

It is a story about a firehouse and the men in the firehouse, going through their daily lives, and, after Sept. 11, surviving this. It's not a story about death or what happened. It's a tribute.

Quoted in Lisa de Moraes, "CBS's Controversial Date with Destiny; Network Defends Airing '9/11' Special with Scenes inside the Trade Center," *Washington Post* (March 9, 2002), p. C1.

See Also
Firefighters at Ground Zero; Judge, Mychal

Suggested Reading
Paul J. Gough, "9/11 Documentary Update exposes CBS to Indecency Laws," *Ottawa Citizen* [Canada] (August 11, 2006), p. D7; Renee Peck, "On Sept. 11, Two French Filmmakers Were Shooting a Documentary about New York City Firefighters When the Unthinkable Happened," *Times-Picayune* [New Orleans] (March 9, 2002), p. 1; David Usborne Top, "The Brothers Who Made Ground Zero, the Movie," *Independent* [London] (February 8, 2002), p. 7.

New York City Landmarks Bombing Conspiracy

The New York City Landmarks Bombing Conspiracy was another attempt to attack the United States that followed the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman was the spiritual leader of this plot, but the actual work was done by his followers at the al-Kifah Refugee Center. The leaders were Ibrahim Siddig Ali, Mohammed Salah, Fares Kallafal, and Emad Salem. Almost immediately after the bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, the conspirators began planning a series of bombings of New York City landmarks. By May 1993 they had selected four targets—the FBI Building, the United

Nations, and the Lincoln and Holland tunnels. The plotters considered the George Washington Bridge, but they lacked the know-how to bring it down.

The conspirators then began building bombs, renting a workspace at 139-01 90th Avenue, Jamaica, Queens. Although they had selected four targets, they intended to build three large bombs. Because they lacked the bomb-making expertise of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef, they tested their bomb components constantly. However, an undercover agent had disclosed the nature of their plot to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) from its beginning. Emad Salem, a former Egyptian military officer, carried a wire for the JTTF that recorded the conversations of the plotters. Salem acted as the chief bomb maker for the conspiracy. Some of the taped recordings implicated Abdel Rahman. These taps allowed the JTTF to keep abreast of the progress of the terrorists in building the bombs. The terrorists were busy doing just that when JTTF agents raided the bomb-making facility and arrested eight men. Most of the conspirators were caught red-handed. Clement R. Hampton-El and Victor Alvarez were arrested later. A few days later the JTTF agents arrested Abdel Rahman.

The trial of the twelve members of the conspiracy began in June 1995. In addition to those arrested earlier, El Sayyid Nosair, the assassin of Rabbi Meir Kahane, was the twelfth defendant. Siddig Ali turned state's evidence and implicated the other conspirators. The defendants were convicted of forty-eight of the fifty counts on October 1, 1995. Abdel Rahman and Nosair received life sentences in solitary confinement without chance of parole, and the other defendants garnered sentences ranging from twenty-five to fifty-seven years. This trial ended the second attempt to launch a bombing campaign in the United States by Islamist terrorists.

See Also

Abdel Rahman, Sheikh Omar; Joint Terrorism Task Force; Nosair, El Sayyid; World Trade Center Bombing (1993); Yousef, Ramzi Ahmed

Suggested Reading

J. Bowyer Bell, *Murders on the Nile: The World Trade Center and Global Terror* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003); Gerald Posner, *Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003); Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004).

New York City Police Department (NYPD)

The New York City Police Department responded en masse to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Police worked to rescue and evacuate those trapped in the World Trade Center complex and in doing so suffered their greatest casualties. They also tried to control traffic around the complex, with mixed levels of success. One major problem was the lack of coordination between the police and the firefighters, two departments that have traditionally had poor relations. Both police and firefighters tended to act independently, without coordinating with the other agency. Much of the bad feelings arose from the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) belief that the NYPD was a political favorite, receiving more funds and personnel. Whatever the reason, the hostility between the two departments hindered operations at the World Trade Center complex on September 11.

Failures in the communication system also hindered the activities of the police. The radios refused to work around the World Trade Center, and what

communication systems did work were soon overwhelmed by traffic. Police and others had to use cell phones to call family members and establish communications.

Casualties, lower among police than among the firefighters, were nevertheless high. Police lost 23 officers, including one woman. This loss paled beside that of the firefighters of the FDNY, but police losses were severe enough to cause a crisis of confidence. A demoralized police force had to be returned to normal police duties, a task that was the responsibility of Police Commissioner Kerik—who was generally successful. Kerik left office in January 2002, leaving much still to be done to reestablish the morale of the police of the NYPD. Later, when the 9/11 Commission questioned New York firefighters and police about their conduct on September 11, Kerik and the police became defensive, charging that the commission was unfairly second-guessing their actions.

See Also
Firefighters at Ground Zero; Kerik, Bernard Bailey

Suggested Reading
Peter Lange, *1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI: The Untold Story* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003); Patrice O'Shaughnessy, "Painful Days for Cops Who Won't Give Up," *Daily New* [New York] (December 16, 2001), p. 28; Dennis Smith, *Report from Ground Zero* (New York: Viking, 2002).

9/11 Commission. *See* National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States

Nineteen Martyrs
In the Muslim world, the participants in the attacks on September 11, 2001, have been characterized as the Nineteen Martyrs. These nineteen young men are revered throughout much of the Middle East, where it is believed that by giving up their lives they weakened the hated power of the United States. Yet, several of the participants' families have denied that their sons were capable of such an act, and some of the families accuse the CIA of having them killed. Moreover, the identities of all but the leaders of the operation are in doubt. Reports have surfaced that some of them had entered the United States on false passports, and their names may never be known. Regardless of these problems, the nineteen hijackers sought and found martyrdom, their apparent motivation the threat they believed the United States posed to Islam. They differed in the intensity of their religious beliefs, but they were united in their worldview, believing that the West had been corrupted by greed, sin, and selfishness. In contrast, they believed the Islamic world to be an oasis of faith threatened by the West—in particular, the United States. Fifteen of the nineteen hailed from Saudi Arabia. They were sons of well-to-do families, and most were well-educated. Their fathers' occupations ranged from supermarket owners to tribal princes.

The members of the September 11 plot arrived in the United States at different times. Mohamed Atta and the other designated pilots arrived earliest for their pilot training and served as mentors of the later arrivals. Those later arrivals entered the United States from Dubai between March and June 2001, traveling in small groups and landing at four different airports to allay suspicion. Although they arrived in the United States knowing they were part of a martyrdom mission, for reasons of operational security they were not given the details of their mission.

The plan called for more than twenty hijackers, but at least six of the men selected for the mission were unable to obtain visas to enter the United States. In all, the nineteen terrorists entered and reentered the United States thirty-three times—most of that activity on the part of the four pilots. They flew back to Europe to consult with al-Qaeda leaders on the progress of the mission, as well as on personal business.

The leader of the nineteen was Atta, who was assisted by Marwan al-Shehhi, Hani Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrah. These individuals were also the pilots of the four hijacked aircraft: Atta of American Airlines Flight 11, al-Shehhi of United Airlines Flight 175, Hanjour of American Airlines Flight 77, and Jarrah of United Airlines Flight 93. The pilots bought tickets for flights on Boeing 757s and 767s, because learning to fly these more modern models was much easier than learning to fly older aircraft. The pilots trained on simulators. Takeoffs and landings were difficult, but actually flying was relatively easy. The flight control systems made the aircraft responsive and made normal flight easy. The leadership of the plot took at least twelve intercontinental flights to check on security and plan for takeovers.

The secondary leaders of the plot were Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. They had originally been selected to be pilots, but their lack of English and limited education made them poor choices. Their responsibilities then became providing logistical support. The remainders of the hijackers were muscle men sent over to the United States later, most of them from Saudi Arabia.

The thirteen muscle men had been trained to hijack aircraft and provide physical support for the pilots. At al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, they were trained in hand-to-hand combat and taught how to assault a commercial airliner's cockpit area, giving no quarter to crew or passengers.

Osama bin Laden's Comments about the Hijackers, from a Videotape Made in November 2001

The brothers, who conducted the operation, all they knew was that they have a martyrdom operation and we asked each of them to go to America but they didn't know anything about the operation, not even one letter. But they were trained and we did not reveal the operation to them until they are there and just before they boarded the planes. Those who were trained to fly didn't know the others.

Stefan Aust et al., *Inside 9–11: What Really Happened* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), p. 320.

Each of the muscle men was assigned to a team. American Airlines Flight 11 carried Abdul Aziz al-Omari, Wail al-Shehri, Waleed al-Shehri, and Satam al-Suqami. The team on United Airlines Flight 175 was assigned Fayez Rashid Banihammad, Ahmed al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-Ghamdi, and Mohammad al-Shehri. American Airlines Flight 77 carried Salem al-Hazmi and Majed Moqued. The United Airlines Flight 93 team received Saeed al-Ghamdi, Ahmed al-Haznawi and Ahmed al-Na'ami.

In the week before September 11, the hijackers moved around the Eastern coast trying to avoid suspicion. They enrolled at local gyms to maintain their physical shape. In the meantime, Atta and the other leaders were traveling the country on commercial airliners noting weaknesses in security. Atta's choice of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, was based on their research, which led them to consider that date the best for a successful hijacking.

Because the nineteen knew their mission to be one of martyrdom, each selected a name that honored an important person or event from the Golden Age of Islam,



Twelve of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers are shown in this photo combo. In the top row, from left to right, are Marwan al-Shehhi, Waleed al-Shehri, Satam al-Suqami, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Mohammad al-Shehri, and Ahmed al-Na'ami. In the bottom row, left to right, are Ahmed al-Haznawi, Wail al-Shehri, Fayez Banihammad, Saeed al-Ghamdi, Abdul Aziz al-Omari, and Salem al-Hazmi. (AP IMAGES/Files.)

the decades that followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Each name was recognizable in the Muslim world and chosen for maximum mass appeal. Several made videotapes of their confessions of faith before leaving the Middle East. After their deaths, these videotapes were broadcast over the Internet. The mission and the publicity surrounding the nineteen martyrs themselves made them popular figures throughout much of the Muslim world.

On the morning of September 11, each team proceeded to its assigned airport, passing through security with only minimal interference. Each team member carried box cutters, utility knives, and chemical sprays. Both box cutters and chemical sprays were prohibited items. Teams had been divided into two groups: cockpit assault and passenger security. Two members of each team, including the designated pilot, were assigned to the cockpit assault unit and had seats near the cockpit door in the first-class section. The others were seated at the rear of the first-class section to provide security from the crew and the passengers, keeping them from interfering in the hijacking. Anyone who stood in their way was either to be killed or incapacitated.

The goal of the hijackers was to seize control of the aircraft within fifteen minutes after takeoff. This goal was accomplished on American Airlines Flight 11, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 175, but not on United Airlines Flight 93. Delay in seizing the aircraft, exacerbated by the time it took to reverse the aircraft's course, allowed the passengers and crew to organize resistance against the terrorists. This aircraft crashed rather than completing its mission. In the eyes of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda's leadership, the mission remained a complete success. Each year since September 11, 2001, celebrations have been held across the world honoring the nineteen martyrs. Many in the Muslim world have perceived the events of September 11 as a just

response to what they consider the many transgressions of the United States against the Muslim world. Others, less certain, have feared an American backlash. The celebrations have been widely reported in the press and, despite official and public disapproval of these celebrations, continue to take place. But not all Muslims approve of the September 11 attacks and the actions of the nineteen hijackers.

Majority of Muslims Disapproved of the September 11 Attacks

In the Gallup poll of nine Muslim countries, perhaps more important for judging hatred of the U.S. is the question about the 9/11 attacks. A surprisingly large 67 percent of Muslims said the 9/11 attacks were morally unjustified.

Clark McCauley, "Understanding the 9/11 Perpetrators: Crazy, Lost in Hate, or Martyred," in N. Matuszak, ed., *History Behind the Headlines: The Origin of Ethnic Conflicts Worldwide,* vol. 5 (New York: Gale Publishing Group, 2002), p. 277.

See Also
American Airlines Flight 11; American Airlines Flight 77; Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; United Airlines Flight 93; United Airlines Flight 175; World Trade Center

See Documents
Document #6; Document #7; Document #13

Suggested Reading
Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers; Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005); Steven Strasser, *The 9/11 Investigations: Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission; Excerpts from the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Report on 9/11; Testimony from 14 Key Witnesses, Including Richard Clarke, George Tenet, and Condoleezza Rice* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has the military responsibility to defend the continental United States from enemy attacks, but on September 11, 2001, it failed to do so. NORAD's mission includes defending the United States from foreign bombers or ballistic missiles, but civilian aircraft were not a part of this mission. On September 11, NORAD's radars were mostly directed outward to detect attacks from abroad. Because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was responsible for domestic aviation, NORAD depended on information from the FAA, but the FAA was not a part of the infrastructure of defense against foreign attack. This black hole of responsibility meant that both NORAD and the FAA lacked protocols for dealing with a scenario such as that surrounding the events of September 11.

The lack of protocols did not mean that no Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) existed between the FAA and NORAD. In the event of a hijacking the FAA was responsible to inform the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC), which would then seek approval from the Secretary of Defense for military assistance in the hijacking. Upon the Secretary's approval, NORAD would receive orders to scramble a flight of jets with orders to find the aircraft and monitor it from a distance of five miles, at no time interfering with the hijacking. No guidelines were in place for dealing with a hijacking meant to end in a suicidal crash. Only a presidential order could be given to shoot down an American commercial aircraft—an order that had to be relayed through the chain of command.

Because of a lack of coordination and information between NORAD and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the actions of NORAD turned into a morass of errors on September 11. On that date NORAD had fourteen National Guard jets on standby throughout the country. Complicating the situation, NORAD was conducting three war games on September 11. One of the war games was with NEADS (Northeast Air Defense Sector), which diminished the number of fighter jet flights available. FAA officials disregarded SOP and contacted NORAD directly. NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) scrambled two F-15s from Otis Air Force Base in Massachusetts at 8:46 a.m., but the pilots had only a vague notion of their mission. They were vectored toward military-controlled airspace off Long Island. Within seconds of their takeoff, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex. Eight minutes before the F-15s arrived in New York City at 9:10 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade complex. The jets' slowness in arriving indicates that they had not traveled at their maximum speed, but even if they had arrived sooner, they had no orders to intercept the hijacked aircraft. It is uncertain just what they could have done to prevent the second crash. Much the same can be said about the two jets of the 177th Flight Wing of the New Jersey Air National Guard in Atlantic City, New Jersey, which, though available, were never called to assist.

By 9:00 a.m. it had become apparent that the hijacking plot involved more commercial airliners. At 9:24 a flight of F-16s of the National Guard's 119th Fighter Wing was scrambled from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, tasked with protecting the Washington, D.C., area after a report that American Airlines Flight 11 was heading in that direction. Flight 11, however, had crashed into the North Tower forty minutes before. Lacking accurate information, the pilots of the F-15s and F-16s tried to keep visual contact with possible hijacked aircraft. Exactly what these pilots would have done if ordered to intercept a hijacked aircraft is unknown. Their orders were to "identify type and tail numbers of the hijacked aircraft"—nothing more.

Orders to intercept and possibly shoot down a hijacked aircraft had to be authorized by President George W. Bush. Both the F-15s and F-16s had full combat loads, but the pilots had no direct orders to do anything but intercept. President Bush was in Sarasota, Florida, and Vice President Dick Cheney was in Washington, D.C. Cheney contacted President Bush and received authorization from him to shoot down hijacked aircraft shortly after 10:00 a.m. This order did not reach NORAD until 10:31—much too late to do anything. American Airlines Flight 77 had already crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37. It was known by the FAA at this time, however, that hijackers had seized United Airlines Flight 93, and that this airliner might be headed toward the Washington, D.C., area. For some reason, this information was not transmitted by the FAA to the Pentagon's National Military Command Center. The NMCC did not learn that United Airlines Flight 93 had been hijacked until after it had crashed, informed at last by the Secret Service.

The shoot-down order authorization was sent to NORAD at 10:31 a.m., but the 9/11 Commission reported that this order never reached the F-15 or F-16 pilots. It came to be a moot point, because by the time this order would have reached the pilots, it was already too late. United Airlines Flight 93 had crashed

near Shanksville, Pennsylvania at 10:03 a.m. Shooting down an American commercial airliner would have been a traumatic experience for the pilots, even with a presidential order authorizing it. It is doubtful whether the pilots would have done so, especially if over heavily populated areas.

The confusion on September 11 extended into NORAD's record-keeping about the events of September 11. So many contradictory accounts came out of NORAD that the 9/11 Commission staff had difficulty finding out just what had happened. NORAD's leadership has been particularly defensive about its conduct on September 11, and so many discrepancies have appeared in its records that conspiracy theorists have used NORAD as an example of government complicity in the attacks. In fact, NORAD depended on the FAA for information, some of which proved to be inaccurate and belated. As the 9/11 Commission pointed out, the military had "nine minutes' notice that American Airlines Flight 11 had been hijacked; two minutes' notice that an unidentified aircraft, American 77, was headed toward Washington, and no notice at all about United Airlines 175 or 93." The military, which depends heavily on contingency plans, had no contingency plan available to help NORAD handle hijackers determined to use commercial aircraft on suicide missions. Because NORAD was operating in the dark, it failed much as any other agency in the government on that fateful day.

Problems with the FAA and NORAD Timelines

Indeed, many of the families' most detailed and frequently asked questions dealt with the FAA and NORAD. As it became apparent that FAA and NORAD officials had been inaccurate—if not untruthful—in making public statements, including in testimony before Congress and the 9/11 Commission, the families became more upset. The notion that they were not being told the truth fed their mistrust of the government, and nearly aligned some of them with the conspiracy theorists.

Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, and Benjamin Rhodes, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Knopf, 2006), p. 260.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 11; American Airlines Flight 77; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States; United Airlines Flight 93; United Airlines Flight 93

See Document

Document #35

Suggested Reading

Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, and Benjamin Rhodes, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Knopf, 2006); Glenn J. Kashurba, *Quiet Courage: The Definitive Account of Flight 93 and Its Aftermath* (Somerset, PA: SAJ Publishing, 2006); Peter Lance, *Triple Cross: How Bin Laden's Master Spy Penetrated the CIA, the Green Berets, and the FBI—And Why Patrick Fitzgerald Failed to Stop Him* (New York: ReganBooks, 2006).

Nosair, El Sayyid (1955–)

The first case of Islamist extremism in the United States was the assassination of the Israeli extremist politician Meir Kahane on November 5, 1990, by El Sayyid Nosair. Nosair stalked Kahane for several days before shooting him twice on a New York City street. He then escaped in a taxi. After a policeman accosted him, the two exchanged shots, and Nosair received a severe wound to the neck.

Nosair had a relatively normal upbringing. Born in 1955 at Port Said, Egypt, he was displaced along with his family during the Six Days War with Israel in 1967. Nosair spent his adolescent years in Cairo, Egypt, where his academic achievements led to his graduation with a degree in industrial design and engineering from the Helwan University Faculty of Applied Arts. In July 1981, Nosair decided to immigrate to the United States. His first residence was in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where he found work as a diamond cutter. Despite his distaste for the United States, he married an American woman who had recently converted to Islam. After Nosair lost his job as a diamond cutter because of a dispute with his employer, he held a variety of jobs, but none so prestigious or lucrative. Nosair decided to move his family to New York City.

Nosair had previously held moderate Islamic views, but after his move to New York City he became more militant. His religious home was al-Farooq Mosque in Brooklyn, which was affiliated with al-Kifah Refugee Center. At al-Kifah, Nosair became enamored with the jihadist philosophy of Abdullah Azzam. Nosair wanted to go to Afghanistan in 1987 to fight against the Soviets, but he lacked the funds to do so. Instead, he joined others in paramilitary training. Many of his compatriots were later to participate in the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing. Nosair also became an admirer of Abdul Rahman, the blind Egyptian religious leader and militant terrorist. With Abdul Rahman's blessings from Egypt, Nosair formed a terrorist cell. Now working as a janitor, Nosair began to consider schemes that ranged from assassinations to bombings. He threw a grenade at Mikhail Gorbachev when the Soviet Premier visited New York City on December 8, 1989—but it failed to explode. In April 1990 he exploded a crude bomb in a gay bar, causing minor injuries. After Abdul Rahman arrived in the United States in May 1990, Nosair received more direction, as well as instructions on weapon use given by Ali Abdel Saoud Mohamed, who drew from his service in the Egyptian and American armed forces.

Explanation for the Assassination of Meir Kahane

El-Sayyid Nosair was sure he had changed the course of history. He believed this because of his bizarre reading of Israeli politics. Kahane was a Brooklyn rabbi who founded the Jewish Defense League and then immigrated to Israel and established the Kach party, which was banned from his country's parliament in 1988 because of its blatant racism—the group advocated, for example, the expulsion of Arabs from Israel and the Occupied Territories. Yet Nosair was convinced that Kahane was destined to be the leader of the Jewish state and a force in global affairs; "They were preparing him to dominate, to be the prime minister someday," he would later say. "They were preparing him despite their assertion that they reject his agenda and that he is a racist."

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 4.

Nosair decided to assassinate Meir Kahane. Kahane was an Israeli extremist, but Nosair believed that one day Kahane would be the leader of the Jewish state—and thus that his death would advance the Palestinian cause. He began stalking Kahane, looking for an opportunity to shoot him. When the opportunity arose, Nosair shot Kahane three times. After the assassination, the New York District Attorney's office assumed jurisdiction of the case. The FBI turned over sixteen boxes of information gathered in a search of Nosair's apartment to the Manhattan District Attorney's office, but the boxes promptly disappeared. The New York City Joint Terrorism Task Force

became interested in the case because of its domestic terrorism aspects, but the FBI agents and New York City police detectives of the JTTF were removed from the case. The Nosair case was botched from its beginning. Nosair was charged with simple murder rather than participation in a conspiracy. The New York Police Department's Chief of Detectives, Joseph Borelli, refused to classify Kahane's assassination as a political assassination, instead calling Nosair a "lone deranged gunman" despite evidence to the contrary. Kahane, though a victim, did not inspire sympathy. The case then took a strange turn; William Kunstler, the well-known defense lawyer, handled Nosair's defense, and Nosair was convicted of shooting two people after the assassination—but not of causing Kahane's death. He was sentenced to seven and a half to twenty-two and a half years in prison. The lightness of his sentence caused great celebration in the Muslim community and convinced Islamist militants that the United States was merely a paper tiger.

From his prison cell, Nosair has continued to advocate violence against the United States. Several of the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing conspirators visited Nosair in prison to confirm their plans. He constantly advocated terrorist projects, many of which were designed for his compatriots to break him out of prison. After government officials became aware of his activities and his participation in the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, a subsequent trial sentenced him to life in prison.

See Also

Abdel Rahman, Sheikh Omar; Mohamed, Ali Abdel Saoud; World Trade Center Bombing (1993)

Suggested Reading

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002); Peter Lange, *1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI—the Untold Story* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003); John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2002).

O

Office of Emergency Management (OEM)

The Office of Emergency Management is New York City's disaster management team, but during and after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center it ceased to function effectively—not because of lack of planning or preparedness, but because its headquarters was located in the World Trade Center complex and neutralized in the attacks.

A similar type of organization had been set up by the then-Mayor of New York City, David N. Dinkins, in 1990, under the name Aviation Emergency Preparedness Working Group (AEPWG), intended to handle emergencies after aircraft crashes. Representatives from the Fire Department, Police Department, Emergency Medical Services, and other agencies served in this group. A report from the AEPWG recommended that the various agencies practice working together and stated that they needed a single radio frequency that commanders of the agencies could share during emergencies. After several drills, the group was disbanded in 1994 when Rudolph W. Giuliani became the new mayor and established the Office of Emergency Management.

The Office of Emergency Management was to serve as the command-and-control center during large-scale emergencies. Its offices were on the twenty-third floor in Seven WTC, a forty-seven-story building on the north side of the complex. This post had been made bomb-resistant and bulletproof and had been reinforced to be able to withstand hurricanes. It also had a reserve of thirty days of food and water. The OEM operated on a twenty-four-hour schedule and was responsible for coordinating the sixty-eight city, state, and federal agencies, as well as the city's fire and police departments. Personnel monitored all emergency radio frequencies, and the center had a state-of-the-art communication system.

Despite its support from the mayor's office, the Office of Emergency Management never had enough political clout to force cooperation between the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) and the New York City Police Department (NYPD), even though this lack of cooperation had been one of the reasons for founding the OEM. Despite the reminder of the 1993 World Trade Bombing, the rivalry and distrust between the two departments remained high. Instead of

bickering, they refused to communicate, exacerbating the situation by using different radio frequencies. This utter inability to communicate interdepartmentally greatly hindered evacuation operations on September 11.

The airliner crashes into the North and South Towers destroyed the ability of the Office of Emergency Management to operate. When the first aircraft hit the North Tower, it made the elaborate communications system at the Office of Emergency Management's headquarters in Seven World Trade Center (7 WTC) useless. Throughout the course of the evacuations and the final collapse of the twin towers, the Office of Emergency Management was effectively out of the loop. Cut off from the OEM, firefighters and police operated without coordination. Moreover, the damage to the twin towers extended to 7 WTC, requiring the offices of the OEM to be evacuated. Later that evening, 7 WTC collapsed as well.

As soon as possible, the Office of Emergency Management reestablished its command-and-control headquarters in a warehouse at one of the harbor piers in Manhattan. By setting up its bank of computers and establishing communications with other government agencies, the OEM was able to participate in the decision-making during the World Trade Center cleanup, readying itself for any future emergencies.

After September 11, controversy arose over who had located the Office of Emergency Management in the World Trade Center complex. The then-Director of the Office of Emergency Management, Jerome M. Hauer, had recommended a site in Brooklyn, but Rudy Giuliani wanted it in Manhattan. Hauer, with the advice the mayor's aides, selected the World Trade Center complex. Fingerpointing about the decision has led to bitter exchanges among those who were in power at the time.

See Also

Giuliani, Rudolph William Louis "Rudy" III; World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading

David W. Ausmus, *In the Midst of Chaos: My 30 Days at Ground Zero* (Victoria, Canada: Trafford, 2004); J. Bowyer Bell, *Murders on the Nile: The World Trade Center and Global Terror* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003); Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, *102 Minutes: The Untold Story of the Fight to Survive inside the Twin Towers* (New York: Times Books, 2005).

Ogonowski, John (1951–2001)

John Ogonowski was the pilot of American Airlines Flight 11, which al-Qaeda hijackers crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex on September 11, 2001. A veteran pilot with twenty-three years of experience flying for American Airlines, he was a member in good standing with the Allied Pilot Association (APA), and his reputation as a good pilot had led to his promotion to the rank of captain in 1989, as well as his assignment to fly the prestigious Boston–Los Angeles route.

Ogonowski had spent his entire life flying. He was born in 1951 in Lowell, Massachusetts. His father was a truck driver and farmer. Ogonowski's entire education took place in Lowell, where he attended St. Stanislaus Elementary School and Keith Academy. After high school, he entered Lowell Technical Institute, graduating in 1972 with a BSc in nuclear engineering. While in college, he joined the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC). After graduating, he entered the U.S. Air Force and graduated from flight school in Texas.

Assigned to an Air Force Base in Charleston, South Carolina, he flew C-141s to and from Vietnam. After leaving the U.S. Air Force at the rank of captain in 1978, Ogonowski found a job flying commercial aircraft for American Airlines—and a wife who was a flight attendant.

Ogonowski's passion for flight was matched by his love of farming. He lived on the 150-acre White Gate Farm in Dracut, Massachusetts, with his wife and three daughters. Ogonowski was a passionate farmer and raised hay, corn, pumpkins, blueberries, and peaches on his farm. In 1998, Ogonowski became active on behalf of immigrant Cambodian farmers as part of the New Entry Sustainable Farming Project. He gave the immigrants access to some of his land and even prepared it for them, rarely collecting the rent they owed him. Ogonowski was also active in the Dracut Land Trust, working to preserve farming land in the Dracut area.

Ogonowski's role in the events of September 11, 2001, is unclear, because too few survivors remained to tell the tale. He left his farm before 6:00 a.m. in his GMC pickup to travel the thirty-five miles to Logan International Airport. It was a routine takeoff and everything went fine until about fifteen minutes into the flight. His last contact with air traffic controllers was an order to climb to 35,000 feet. Shortly after this change in altitude, the hijackers, under the command of Mohamed Atta, seized control of the aircraft, killing one of the passengers, Daniel M. Lewin, to forestall any resistance. The airline industries' standard operating procedure (SOP) was for crews not to resist hijackers and to discourage passengers from doing so. Consequently, the hijackers met with no opposition. It is thought that Ogonowski hit a button allowing him to communicate via radio without afterward taking his hands from the controls, making air traffic controllers privy to conversations in the cockpit. At this time, a statement was made by one of the hijackers that other planes were involved, but nothing could be done by Ogonowski, who had been neutralized by the hijackers before they crashed the airliner into the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex.

Ogonowski had been a well-liked figure in Dracut. A living memorial to his life was established when the Dracut Land Trust, with aid from the federal government, purchased a thirty-three-acre plot of land that Ogonowski had once farmed, restricting it for solely agricultural purposes. Some of the land will be made available to immigrant farmers who participate in the New Entry Sustainable Farm Project.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 11; Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed

Suggested Reading

Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, from Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002); John Ingold, "American Airlines Flight 11: Ordinary Lives Intersect on Celebrity-Studded Flight," *Denver Post* (September 16, 2001), p. A10; Christine McConville, "Pilot's Dream, His Memory Preserved," *Boston Globe* (November 30, 2003), p. 1.

Olson, Barbara (1955–2001)

Barbara Olson was a conservative American television commentator who was a passenger on American Airlines Flight 77 when it crashed into the Pentagon. She had worked for FOX News and other media outlets. Her presence on American

Airlines Flight 77 was the result of her presence at the taping of Bill Maher's program *Politically Incorrect*.

Before becoming a political commentator, Olson was a lawyer. She was born on December 27, 1955, in Houston, Texas, as Barbara Kay Bracher. After graduating from Waltrip High School in Houston, she attended the University of Saint Thomas, where she earned a Bachelor of Arts degree. Her first career, as a professional ballet dancer, took her to Houston, New York, and San Francisco. She then worked in Hollywood as an assistant to the actor Stacy Keach before deciding to go to law school. She obtained a law degree from Yeshiva University's Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and worked for three years for the Washington, D.C., law firm Wilmer Cutler and Pickering. Next, she served as an assistant U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia from 1992 to 1995, specializing in the prosecution of drug cases.

By the mid-1990s, Olson became more involved in politics. She was the Chief Investigative Counsel for the House of Representatives Government Reform Committee. Later, Olson served as a staff lawyer for Senate Minority Whip Don Nickles. In both of these positions, she investigated cases of misconduct by President Clinton and Hillary Rodham Clinton. Her national profile rose when she became a TV commentator. In 1997 she married Theodore Olson, who later became the United States Solicitor General for the Bush administration.

Barbara Olson and Her Attacks on the Clintons

In fact, if there was, as Hillary Clinton famously claimed, a "massive right-wing conspiracy" against her husband, Olson was at the heart of it. She was in charge of another Scaife investment, the "Arkansas Project" at the right-wing magazine *The American Spectator*, an investigation of the various (mostly unproven) allegations against the Clintons that are collectively known as "Whitewater," named after a contested Clinton real-estate deal. However, Olson vigorously denies any suggestions of conspiracy.

Godfrey Hodgson, "Olson: Partying and Politicking," *Independent* [London] (September 14, 2001), p. 6.

Based on her earlier investigations Olson made the Clintons a special target. A self-styled Reagan conservative, she began attacking them in her commentaries, outlining her views in frequent appearances on FOX News. She also published two books criticizing the Clinton administration: *Hell to Pay: The Unfolding Story of Hillary Rodham Clinton* and *The Final Days: The Last, Desperate Abuses of Power by the Clinton White House*.

Soon after the hijacking, Olson contacted her husband by cell phone and described what was going on. Her description of how passengers and crew were herded to the rear of the aircraft by the hijackers, who were armed with knives and box cutters, was the first indication of how the other hijacking had

Olson's Actions on September 11

When, on Tuesday, hijackers took over American Airlines flight 77 from Washington to Los Angeles, on which she was a passenger, Olson coolly locked herself in the lavatory and speed-dialed her husband at his office a mile or so away and told him what had happened, speaking to him only seconds before the plane plunged into the Pentagon. She was only on the fatal flight because she had delayed her trip to be with her husband on his birthday.

Godfrey Hodgson, "Olson: Partying and Politicking," *Independent* [London] (September 14, 2001), p. 6.

occurred. Her husband contacted others and informed them of the hijacking. Contact was reestablished with Barbara Olson, who wanted to know what she should do, but there was nothing that she could do and she died when the plane crashed into the Pentagon.

See Also
American Airlines Flight 77; Pentagon Attack

Suggested Reading
Neil A. Lewis, "Solicitor General Got 2 Calls from Wife on Doomed Plane," *New York Times* (September 12, 2001), p. A19; Peter Worthington, "She's Still the Clintons' Nemesis," *Toronto Sun* (December 21, 2001), p. 16.

O'Neill, John (1952–2001)

John O'Neill was the former FBI counterterrorist expert who warned the FBI about a possible terrorist attack on the United States. His counterterrorism experience led him to suspect that al-Qaeda was conspiring to commit a terrorist act—probably in New York City. Because of this belief, he began a job at the World Trade Center on September 10, 2001.

O'Neill spent most of his career as a FBI agent. He was born on February 6, 1952, at Atlantic City, New Jersey, where his parents ran a small taxi business. After graduating from high school, he joined the FBI as a fingerprint technician and attended American University, from which he graduated in 1974. He studied government and law enforcement at the university's School of Justice and then enrolled in the MSc program at George Washington University, studying forensic science. In 1976, upon his graduation, he entered the FBI training program in pursuit of his childhood ambition to become a FBI agent. His training took place at the FBI's Quantico training facility in Virginia. His first assignment was with the Baltimore Office, where his work led to rapid promotion, culminating in his July 1991 assignment to the Chicago field office. O'Neill had built a solid reputation as an aggressive, effective FBI agent. In Chicago, he and his field agents attacked and ultimately ended the reign of notorious street gangs.

Outbursts of violence in anti-abortion protests led the FBI to pick O'Neill in 1994 to head a task force investigating such violence, called the Task Force on Violence Against Abortion Providers Conspiracy (VAAPCON). This task force was directed to find a nationwide conspiracy, but when no such conspiracy was found, it was disbanded.

In November 1994 O'Neill was promoted to chief of counterterrorism in FBI headquarters. His first action was the coordination of the arrest of Ramzi Yousef, the 1993 bomber of the World Trade Center, in Islamabad, Pakistan. He acted on a tip from Richard Clarke, President Clinton's national coordinator for counterterrorism, claiming that Yousef had been sighted. Over the course of three days, O'Neill coordinated the capture of Yousef and his transportation to the United States. Among other investigations that O'Neill participated in was that of the bombing at the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. On March 9, 1995, O'Neill warned his FBI supervisors that Osama bin Laden was becoming the greatest threat to the United States, but his warning was for the most part ignored.

In December 1996 O'Neill received another promotion—this time to special agent in charge of the National Security Division in the FBI's New York City office, where he was in charge of about 400 agents. O'Neill joined New York

City's Joint Terrorism Task Force in the middle of its investigation of the explosion and crash of United Airlines Flight 800. He was able to persuade the investigators to conduct computer simulations that ultimately showed the explosion to be an accident rather than a terrorist act.

O'Neill became convinced as early as 1997 that militant terrorist groups were preparing a major terrorist attack in the United States. He said as much in a 1997 conference held in Chicago and attended by agents from the FBI and CIA, arguing that members of Islamic fundamentalist groups in the United States were fully capable of carrying out a major terrorist attack, having the necessary support infrastructure to do so. O'Neill believed it was his job to ferret out these groups and expose them before they carried out their plots.

In 2000 he had attended a conference in Miami, Florida. O'Neill left a briefcase with sensitive material about suspected terrorist operations in the United States in a conference room when he made a brief phone call. During his absence, the briefcase disappeared. It was recovered several hours later, but O'Neill had to withstand a series of investigations from the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility. On October 12, 2000, al-Qaeda operatives using a boat filled with explosives attacked the American destroyer USS *Cole* in Aden harbor, Yemen. O'Neill received the assignment to assemble a team and investigate the attack. He immediately ran into opposition from Barbara Bodine, the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen. She wanted to be in charge of the investigation, and she desired limited FBI—or any other outside—intervention. Even worse, Yemeni authorities put obstacles in the way of O'Neill's team. After a month, he and his team left Aden, frustrated by the lack of support they had received from Bodine and the Yemeni government. He believed the suspects to be al-Qaeda operatives, but the Yemeni government would not allow access to them. Bodine had him declared persona non grata, refusing to allow him to return to Yemen.

Personality of John O'Neill and How It Affected His Job

After all, [O'Neill] had devoted his life to integrating his professional and personal lives—his "day job" and his "night job"—into a cohesive force that would help him accomplish his missions. He had performed his job as an FBI agent with flair and panache, but he wanted to be remembered as a serious and successful law enforcement agent, not someone known merely for stylish eccentricity, or more seriously, for a careless breach of protocol. Yet O'Neill was both: he was a serious and successful—even prescient—law enforcement, and he was also a flawed man who led a tangled personal life, a complex figure whose unorthodox approach to his job and miscues led to his exit from the FBI, his one great love.

Murray Weiss, *The Man Who Warned America: The Life and Death of John O'Neill, the FBI's Embattled Counterterror Warrior* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003), pp. 389–390.

O'Neill returned to the United States empty-handed and decided that his career in the FBI was over. In spring 2000 he had already been passed over for the position of assistant director in charge of the New York field office. His habit of stating his strongly held opinions had won him enemies in the FBI hierarchy. After looking around, he took a job in the private sector, working as the Director of Security at the World Trade Center.

O'Neill started his new job on September 10. Based on his experience as a terrorism expert, he believed that something bad was going to happen soon in

New York City. At a dinner party on the evening of September 10, O'Neill made a prediction that a terrorist attack would hit the New York City area in the near future. He was on duty at the World Trade Center Complex on the morning of September 11. His immediate reaction was to help rescue people first at the North Tower and later at the South Tower. O'Neill disappeared when the South Tower collapsed. His body was found on September 21 under twelve feet of debris. It was discovered that he had died from blows to the skull and chest. O'Neill was buried on September 28, 2001, in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

See Also

Bin Laden, Osama; Clarke, Richard A.; Joint Terrorism Task Force; Qaeda, al-; World Trade Center; Yousef, Ramzi Ahmed

Suggested Reading

John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Murray Weiss, *The Man Who Warned America: The Life and Death of John O'Neill, the FBI's Embattled Counterterror Warrior* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003).

Ong, Betty Ann (1956–2001)

Betty Ong was a Chinese American flight attendant on American Airlines Flight 11 who first reported the tactics of the hijackers to authorities on the outside. She was a veteran flight attendant, and the flight to San Francisco always took her home. Her reporting of the tactics of the hijackers has proven helpful in understanding how they took over the aircraft.

Thomas Kean Describes Betty Ong's Heroism

With the assistance of her fellow crew members, Betty was able to provide us with vital information that would later prove crucial to the investigation. Betty's selfless acts of courage and determination may have saved the lives of many others. She provided important information which ultimately led to the closing of our nation's airspace for the first time in its history.

Steven Knipp, "An Angel's Last Call," *South China Morning Post* (August 14, 2004), p. 14.

Ong's family and home were in San Francisco's Chinatown. She was born on February 5, 1956, in San Francisco, into a well-respected Chinese American family. Her family owned and operated a specialty grocery store in San Francisco. Soon after her graduation from George Washington High School, Ong took a job as a flight attendant with American Airlines, a position in which she spent fourteen years. Most of her assignments were as a purser on the Boston-to-Los Angeles flights, and she moved to Massachusetts.

Shortly after the hijackers seized the aircraft, Ong obtained a phone and contacted an American Airlines agent. She contacted Vanessa Minter, an American Airlines agent in North Carolina, who opened up a conference call with Nydia Gonzales in Dallas, Texas. In the next twenty-three minutes Ong gave a detailed description of the hijackers. She estimated there to be three or four hijackers, all of Middle Eastern origin. Her identification of the seat numbers allowed the FBI to learn the names, addresses, and passport details of the hijackers. Ong also reported that passenger Daniel M. Lewin had been killed and that at least one flight attendant was dead as well. She was also certain that

the hijackers had neutralized or killed the pilot—John Ogonowski. Ong continued to describe the situation until the aircraft crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex. Since then there have been several celebrations of her life and her courage.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 11; Lewin, Daniel M.; Ogonowski, John

Suggested Reading

Cicero A. Estrella, "Heroine of 9/11 Gets Her Due; Chinatown Honors Flight Attendant," *San Francisco Chronicle* (September 22, 2004), p. B1; Stephen Kiehl, "'I Think We're Getting Hijacked,'" *Baltimore Sun* (September 10, 2006), p. 1A; Steven Knipp, "An Angel's Last Call," *South China Morning Post* (August 14, 2004), p. 14.

Operation Bojinka

Operation Bojinka was the first plan by terrorists to attack commercial aircraft. The name Bojinka is Serbo-Croatian for "big bang," or "explosion." Ramzi Yousef conceived of the plan to blow up eleven U.S. commercial aircraft with the help of his friend Abdul Hakim Murad. Yousef had discussed such a plan earlier with his friend, who knew something about commercial aircraft after receiving a commercial pilot's license from a pilot training school in the United States. There were four members of the Bojinka cell: Yousef, Murad, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Wali Khan Amin Shah. Funds for the operation came from al-Qaeda sources. Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, brother-in-law to Osama bin Laden, was the contact man for funding.

Yousef, a skilled bomb maker, built a liquid bomb timed to detonate using a Casio watch timer. He decided to experiment with such a bomb, exploding it at the Greenbelt Theater in Manila. It worked, but only a few moviegoers were even slightly injured. His next experiment took place on a commercial aircraft, Philippines Airline Flight 434 from Manila to Cebu City in the southern Philippines. Yousef planted his liquid bomb underneath a passenger seat and left the plane when it landed. The bomb exploded on the next stage of the flight, killing a 24-year-old Japanese engineer, Haruki Ikegami. The force of the explosion blasted a small hole in the 747's floor, but it also severed the aileron cables that controlled the plane's flaps. Despite the damage, the pilot managed to control the plane to a safe landing at Naha Airport in Okinawa. Yousef called the Associated Press and claimed responsibility in the name of the Islamist terrorist group Abu Sayyaf.

Yousef's original scheme was to target eleven American commercial aircraft, and he had the necessary type of bomb. He knew that he had to build a more powerful bomb. After studying Boeing 747 blueprints, Yousef decided that the bombs needed to be placed in a seat above the central fuel tank, adjacent to the wing. The resulting explosion would ignite the fuel,

Bomb Found by Philippine Police

"The guys in the bomb squad had never seen an explosive like this before," says [former Philippine police officer] Fariscal. Neither had many U.S. investigators. "The particularly evil genius of this device was that it was virtually undetectable by airport security measures," says Vincent Cannistraro, the former head of the CIA's counter-terrorism centre.

Matthew Brzezinski, "Operation Bojinka's Bombshell," *Toronto Star* (January 2, 2002), p. 6.

destroying the aircraft in the ensuing explosion. Yousef began to gather the chemicals he needed to make his new, stronger bomb.

A chemical accident in a Manila apartment ended the plot. While mixing chemicals in the sixth floor in the Josefa Building on President Quirino Avenue, Yousef produced a mixture that suddenly produced flame and black smoke. Both Yousef and Murad fled the apartment when the Manila Fire Department arrived. In their haste to leave, they left Yousef's laptop computer, manuals, and computer files behind. Yousef persuaded Murad to attempt to recover the laptop and other materials from the apartment, but Philippine police suddenly arrived and arrested him. Yousef watched Murad's arrest and immediately flew to Pakistan. Later, Pakistani authorities arrested him for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing.

Besides leading to the idea of attacking American commercial aircraft carriers, Operation Bojinka expanded Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's idea of using commercial aircraft as weapons. Murad mentioned this concept to Mohammed, because it was so easy for anyone to obtain commercial pilot training in the United States. Mohammed, who had contacts with al-Qaeda's leadership, was able to persuade Osama Bin Laden to finance the plot, but the idea of commercial aircraft as a terrorist weapon goes back to Yousef's Operation Bojinka.

See Also
Bin Laden, Osama; Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh; Murad, Abdul Hakim Ali Hashim; Yousef, Ramzi Ahmed

See Document
Document #26

Suggested Reading
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); Peter Lange, *1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI: The Untold Story* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003); Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999)

Occupational Safety and Heath Agency (OSHA)

The federal Occupational Safety and Heath Agency arrived at the site of the World Trade Center complex on September 12, 2001. The OSHA office in World Trade Center Building 6 had been destroyed along with the rest of the buildings in the complex. OSHA employees faced many of the dangers of the others at the World Trade Center complex, but all were successfully evacuated. Much like others at the site, OSHA employees had helped the injured to treatment centers and searched for survivors. When the South and North Towers collapsed, they, too, had to run for their lives. Official OSHA activity began on September 12, 2001.

Difficulty of Using Respirators

It was impossible to dig with a respirator on. It was extremely hot, and none of us had our masks on. I was inhaling all that stuff because they were passing buckets over my head and all this stuff was falling on me and the dust was being kicked up. One guy looked down at me and said, "You should put your mask on." But the mask just didn't matter to me at that point. That may sound very foolish, but it wasn't my health that mattered. It was getting the people out that mattered the most.

Comment by Police Officer Patty Lucci, quoted in Susan Hagen and Mary Carouba, *Women at Ground Zero: Stories of Courage and Compassion* (New York: Alpha Books, 2002), p. 157.

A worker uses a cutting torch while an excavator claws at debris at the site of the terrorist attacks on New York's World Trade Center, Monday, December 3, 2001. (AP IMAGES/Richard Drew.)

OSHA monitors workplace safety. Individuals working on the debris pile at the World Trade Center site performed dangerous jobs. Sharp metal objects, unstable footing, dust, smoke, and fires all posed danger to rescuers. OSHA officials had consulting powers but not enforcement powers; they could point out dangerous situations but had no authority to do anything but verbalize their concerns. Nevertheless, 1,000 OSHA agents appeared at the World Trade Center site during the cleanup.

OSHA provided equipment support, distributing more than 113,000 respirators from September 13, 2001, to February 6, 2002, 4,000 of which were made available during the first few weeks after the attacks. But OSHA workers had difficulty convincing those working at the site to use respirators. OSHA agents found that the firefighters were the most reluctant of all to use the respirators (although they were not alone), objecting that their sense of smell was vital to locating some the remains. OSHA reported that fewer than 45 percent of Ground Zero workers wore respirators.

OSHA's main responsibility was monitoring air samples. Its agents took 3,600 bulk and air samples looking for metals, asbestos, silica, and other air-borne compounds. Despite these efforts, the air around the World Trade Center site remained toxic. Most OSHA tests check for the existence of individual compounds, but the air at the World Trade Center was a chemical soup.

See Also

Cleanup Operations at Ground Zero; Firefighters at Ground Zero

Suggested Reading

Graham Rayman, "9/11 Five Years Later; Still More Blame amid Lasting Pain," *Newsday* [New York] (September 9, 2006), p. A6; Susan Q. Stranahan, "The Health of Ground Zero," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* (January 24, 2002), p. 11A.

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***The Path to 9/11* (TV Miniseries)**

The Path to 9/11 was a two-part TV miniseries that appeared on ABC on September 10 and 11, 2006. This Walt Disney production dramatized the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing in New York City and the conspiracy that led to the events of September 11, 2001. Prerelease publicity focused on the failure of the Clinton administration to deal with the threat of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and claimed that the screenplay had been based on the conclusions of the 9/11 Commission Report. It touted former Governor Thomas H. Kean, the chairman of the 9/11 Commission, as a senior consultant to the miniseries. Other sources for the screenplay were John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, authors of *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (2002). Despite these claims of authenticity, members of the 9/11 Commission and members of the Clinton administration were critical of what they called distortions in the miniseries. They also asserted that the writer and producer, Cyrus Nowrasteh, a politically conservative Iranian American Muslim, held anti-Clinton views.

The production did attract talented people. This five-hour docudrama had a budget of $40 million. Its producers were Hans Propper and Cyrus Nowrasteh and its director David L. Cunningham. Nowrasteh also wrote the screenplay. Harvey Keitel played the leading character, John O'Neill (the former FBI counterterrorist expert who was employed as Security Director of the World Trade Center complex when he perished in the attack). Other key players were Katy Selverstone as Nancy Floyd; Shaun Taub as Emad Salem; Michael Benyaer as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed; and a host of other actors and actresses who assumed the roles of Madeleine Albright, Barbara Boudine, Condoleezza Rice, George Tenet, and Richard Clarke, among others.

See Also

Bin Laden, Osama; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States; O'Neill, John; World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading

Scott Collins and Tina Daunt, "ABC Stands by Its 9/11 Story—Almost," *Los Angeles Times* (September 9, 2006), p. A1; Melanie McFarland, "Shaky Ground, Fudged Facts Put 'Path

to 9/11' on a Slippery Slope," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* (September 9, 2006), p. C1; Frazier Moore, "What Can We Learn from ABC's Folly?" *Associated Press Financial Wire* (September 12, 2006), p. 1; Edward Wyatt and Laura M. Holson, "A Show That Trumpeted History but Led to Confusion," *New York Times* (September 18, 2006), p. C1.

Patriot Act. *See* USA PATRIOT Act

Pavel Hlava Video

Pavel Hlava, a Czech immigrant construction worker, made a videotape of American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 77 approaching and crashing into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. On the morning of that day, Hlava was trying out his new video camera in the passenger seat of a Ford Explorer SUV in Brooklyn near the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel. He wanted to capture the New York City environment for his friends and relatives back in the Czech Republic. By accident, he recorded Flight 11 as it struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center, unaware at the time that he was recording the event. Later, he accidentally recorded the crash of United Airlines Flight 77 into the South Tower.

What the Camera Saw on September 11

They did not even see the pale fleck of the airplane streak across the corner of the video camera's field of view at 8:46 a.m. But the camera, pointed at the twin towers of the World Trade Center from the passenger seat of a sport utility vehicle in Brooklyn near the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel to Manhattan, kept rolling when the plane disappeared for an instant and then a silent, billowing cloud of smoke and dust slowly emerged from the north tower, as if it had sprung a mysterious kind of leak. . . . The camera pointed upward, zoomed in and out, and then, with a roar in the background that built to a piercing screech, it locked on the tarrying image of the second plane as it soared, like some awful bird of prey, almost straight overhead, banking steeply, and blasted into the south tower.

James Glanz, "Rare Tape Shows Each Jet Hitting Tower," *New York Times* (September 9, 2003), p. A1.

Hlava was unaware of the importance of his videos until almost two weeks later. He had made the tapes in order to make postcards to send back to the Czech Republic. His inability to speak English also confused the situation. Several times Hlava and his brother attempted to sell the tape privately both in New York City and in the Czech Republic, but their lack of English and no understanding of the new media prevented a sell. The existence of the tape was first made public when a friend of Mr. Hlava's wife traded a copy of the tape to another Czech immigrant for a bar tab at a pub in Ridgewood, Queens. It was only after a woman told a freelance news photographer, Walter Karling, that the tape was brought to the attention of the *New York Times*. By this time almost two years had gone by. In December 2003, Hlava returned to the Czech Republic.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 11; World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading

James Glanz, "Two Years Later: Images; A Rare View of Sept. 11, Overlooked," *New York Times* (September 7, 2003), p. 1; Karen Matthews, "Newly Surfaced Tape Might Help 9/11 Investigators," *Gazette* [Montreal] (September 8, 2003), p. A21.

Pentagon Attack

The attack on September 11, 2001, damaged the west side of the Pentagon and caused heavy loss of life. As the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense, the Pentagon was an obvious target in any type of hostilities including terrorist acts. It is considered the world's largest office building. The building is huge, covering twenty-nine acres. Ten numbered corridors provide 17.5 miles of hallways. Although the building was built to house as many as 50,000 military and civilian personnel, on September 11, 2001, it had approximately 18,000 employees, as well as about 2,000 non-defense support personnel, working there. The building was built between 1941 and 1943, during World War II. Its unique construction incorporates five concentric rings named A, B, C, D, and E, from the inner ring facing the courtyard (A) to the outermost ring (E).

Five terrorists seized American Airlines Flight 77 as it traveled from Dulles International Airport (outside Washington, D.C.) to Los Angeles, California. Instead, they crashed it into the Pentagon. The five hijackers—Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Salem al-Hazmi, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Majed Moqued—had little trouble passing through the Dulles checkpoint with weapons, which they subsequently used to take over the aircraft. Once seated in the first-class section, they seized control of the aircraft shortly after takeoff. As air traffic controllers at Dulles tried to regain contact with the airliner, the hijackers redirected the aircraft toward the Washington, D.C., area. A request was made to a U.S. Air Force transport for a visual sighting, and the pilot replied that he had the airliner in sight. An air traffic controller asked the C-130 pilot, Lt. Col. Steve O'Brien, to monitor the airliner. He reported that the airliner was moving low and fast, and then he watched it crash into the west side of the Pentagon. The flight hit at first-floor level and penetrated three of the five rings of that section of the Pentagon.

The personnel at the Pentagon had no warning of the approaching aircraft. Many of the Pentagon workers were watching news footage on TV of the attacks on the World Trade Center complex. Several of the survivors remarked later how they talked about how vulnerable the Pentagon was to a similar type of attack. Suddenly there was a tremendous explosion. Those not killed or injured in the original explosion had to face fire and reduced visibility from the smoke. Most of those working in the Pentagon were evacuated, but those trapped in the West side of the building were unable to escape.

First Minutes at the Pentagon

It felt like a train was going underneath us. There was a series of explosions, or at least noises that sounded like explosions. While the plane was skidding across the first floor, it was knocking out the support columns, which made explosion-like sounds. Any time a column went down, that opened a hole in the floor, which offered a gateway for the ball of fire to go through. We lost 22 coworkers in our area because of that. It was basically one fireball, but it was like an octopus with tentacles, reaching for any avenue of approach, as we call it in the military. The aircraft had 20,000 gallons of fuel, so the fireball was powerful. We all recognize in our area, those of us who worked on the second floor, that we are fortunate to be alive. It was by the grace of God that we survived. If it hadn't been for the extra precautions they took, like the blast-proof window and coating the floors with Teflon-like material, more would have died, including me.

Testimony of Army Lt. Col. Victor Correa, quoted in Dean E. Murphy, *September 11: An Oral History* (New York: Doubleday, 2002), p. 231

The key to survival was finding a safe route out of the building. Most of the rescues of the trapped or incapacitated took place in the first half-hour after the attack. Both military personnel and civilians aided hundred of individuals badly shaken or injured. This help enabled many people to escape the building, keeping the casualty rate relatively low. Once firefighters and other professional rescue people arrived, they began to discourage active participation by nonprofessionals because it was simply too dangerous entering a building where there were still fires and structural collapses.

Firefighting teams from the Arlington County Fire Department and other area fire departments responded to the emergency as soon as they heard the news. News of the attack came to the Arlington County Emergency Communications Center (ECC), which began broadcasting the news of the attack to various agencies and fire departments. On arriving at the Pentagon, the firefighters began fighting the fire and rescuing some of those who were trapped. Many of those rescued were severely burned. Although firefighting at the Pentagon was much easier than at the World Trade Center complex because of the Pentagon's fewer number of floors, difficulties were caused by the high-temperature fire caused by burning aviation fuel. It took firefighters nearly five hours to put out the fire feeding on the aviation fuel and the burning building. As soon as the fire and smoke subsided, a general search for survivors took place. There were no survivors. Because many of the offices on the west side were undergoing renovation, the number of casualties was lower than would have been if the offices had been occupied. The blast and fire killed 128 Pentagon personnel, as well as the crew and passengers of Flight 77.



A video image made available by the Pentagon on May 16, 2006, shows an explosion after American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon on September 11. (AP IMAGES/Pentagon.)

The evacuation process and fire fighting had several interruptions because of warnings about possible other airliner attacks. Most serious of these warnings concerned United Airlines Flight 93 approaching the Washington, D.C., area. At each warning the Pentagon had to be evacuated. Despite these interruptions, by the end of the day on September 12 the fires had been contained.

It took ten days after the attack for all human remains to be removed from the Pentagon. A body-recovery team of one or more FBI agents, one or two FEMA representatives, a photographer, and a four-body carrier unit from the 3rd Infantry Regiment (Old Guard) looked for remains. Each body or body part was photographed at the site. Later, cadaver-sniffing dogs were brought in to help the body-recovery teams.

See Also
American Airlines Flight 77; Hazmi, Nawaf bin Muhammad Salim al-; Mihdhar, Khalid al-; Pentagon Attack

See Document
Document #15

Suggested Reading
Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, from Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002); Alfred Goldberg et al., *Pentagon 9/11* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007); Michael Hedges, "Workers at Pentagon Recount Horrific Scene," *Houston Chronicle* (September 12, 2001), p. A22.

Phoenix Memo

The Phoenix Memo was an attempt by FBI field agent Kenneth Williams of the Phoenix FBI Field Office to warn FBI headquarters of a suspiciously large number of Middle Eastern males studying to become commercial pilots. His memo noted an "inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest" attending aviation training in Arizona. He believed that this might be part of "an effort to establish a cadre of individuals in civil aviation, who would be in position to conduct terrorist activity in the future." Williams also suspected that some of these pilot trainees had connections with al-Qaeda. Williams was right. One of the ten trainees of whom he was most suspicious had contacts with Hani Hanjour. Williams sent the memo to individuals in the Usama Bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) and the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) within the Counterterrorism Division at FBI headquarters and to several FBI special agents in the New York City field office.

Williams was a rookie FBI agent most of whose previous experience was with the San Diego Police Department and its SWAT team. He had become the counterterrorism expert in the Phoenix Field Office, but most of the attention was directed toward fighting the drug trade. In the middle of his investigation of Middle Eastern flight students, he received a six-month assignment to a high-profile arson case. This delayed his sending of the memo until after the end of the arson case.

Williams recommended in his memo that the FBI investigate the 3,000 or so commercial pilot schools for possible al-Qaeda operations. This undertaking would have been on a massive scale and would have overloaded the FBI field offices with little chance of FBI offices receiving any credit for their labor. Despite this failing, such an investigation might have identified some of the September 11 plotters and

prevented the events of September 11. The problem was that this memo fell into a bureaucratic black hole, and no agent assumed responsibility for it.

The memo appeared at FBI headquarters on July 10, 2001, and elicited little interest. Nor was there any interest in it at the New York City Field Office's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). Agents in the New York City Field Office knew that Middle Eastern flight students were common, and they also knew many of the students were affiliated with al-Qaeda. These agents reasoned that Bin Laden needed pilots to transport goods and personnel in Afghanistan. Personnel at FBI Headquarters let the memo sit a week before deciding what to do with it. The FBI had a system where communications and memoranda were classified as a lead, meaning that the office sending a communication can request that the receiving office or officers take some follow-up action or conduct additional investigation. The lead was filed by the receiving office without notifying the officers' superiors of its existence. Finally, on July 30, 2001, the memo was assigned to an Intelligence Assistant (IA) in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit. This agent decided that the memo belonged to the Usama Bin Ladin Unit. She was able to persuade a UBLU agent to take charge of the memo. This agent discussed the issue with colleagues over the legality of the proposal and whether it raised profiling issues. On August 7, 2001, the agents in the RFU and UBLU closed the file. They briefly considered assigning the Phoenix Memo to a headquarters analysis unit but decided against it.

What Happened to the Phoenix Memo

It was reviewed by midlevel supervisors, who headed the agency's bin Laden and Islamic extremist counterterrorism units. But the officials said the memorandum was never sent to top F.B.I. managers, including Thomas J. Pickard, who was acting director in the summer of 2001 before Mr. Mueller took over early in September. Other senior officials were unaware of the memorandum before Sept. 11, including Michael Rolince, who managed the bureau's international terrorism unit, and Dale Watson, his superior, the officials said.

David Johnston and Don Van Natta Jr., "The F.B.I. Memo: Ashcroft Learned of Agent's Alert Just after 9/11," *New York Times* (May 21, 2002), p. A1.

This inaction remained hidden within FBI Headquarters until the Joint Committee on Intelligence's investigators learned of its existence. Several of the participants then disclosed what had happened. This failure to respond to a warning was a black mark on FBI Headquarters for its lack of action to this warning. Some of the FBI's field investigators became unhappy because no one in FBI Headquarters was held responsible for this lapse of judgment.

See Also

Federal Bureau of Investigation; Joint Terrorism Task Force; Pilot Training for September 11

See Document

Document #29

Suggested Reading

Bob Graham, *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, *Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives,* vol. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 2004); Don Van Natta Jr. and David Johnston, "Anti-U.S. Views at Pilot Schools Prompted Agent's Alert," *New York Times* (May 22, 2002), p. 22; Jim Yardley and Jo Thomas, "For Agent in Phoenix, the Cause of Many Frustrations Extended to His Own Office," *New York Times* (June 19, 2002), p. 18.

Pilot Training for September 11

The key to the terrorist conspiracy of September 11 was pilot training. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's original plan, as presented to Osama bin Laden and the other leaders of al-Qaeda in mid-1996, envisaged the use of aircraft as flying bombs. Mohammed's nephew, Ramzi Yousef, had proved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York City that no bomb delivered by conventional means could cause enough damage to destroy a complex as large as the World Trade Center. The use of an aircraft as a flying bomb meant that the aircraft had to be large enough to carry a huge load of aviation fuel. The only candidates for such a mission were the aircraft flown by commercial airlines. Mohammed and his planners knew that seizing a commercial aircraft was possible, but the big problem was flying the aircraft to the target. Al-Qaeda knew that it could recruit intelligent, educated, and highly motivated suicide bombers, but training a handful of them to fly commercial aircraft was beyond them. Al-Qaeda was forced to send a select group of al-Qaeda operatives to the United States and enroll them into commercial pilot training schools. Such training was expensive—about $30,000 per person—but al-Qaeda had the necessary funds available. An additional risk that nevertheless had to be taken was the exposure of operatives to the attention of American authorities both on entry into the United States and during their stay in the country.

The United States has a thriving commercial pilot training industry. In 2000 around 3,000 commercial flight schools operated under the auspices of the National Air Transportation Association (NATS). These schools were located around the country, often in remote areas, operating from local airstrips and often training their students in airplane hangers—about 70,000 students annually, before September 11, 2001. Local interest in pilot training is steady, but some of the more ambitious schools actively recruited students from foreign countries. These schools had an agreement with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that allowed foreign students to enter the United States on the highly coveted I-20M immigration forms designed to help foreign students acquire visas to enter the United States as vocational students. Foreign students have flocked to the United States because a commercial pilot license in Europe or the Middle East would cost as much as $100,000 to earn in contrast to $30,000 in the United States. In Florida's 220 commercial pilot training schools in 2000, 27 percent of the students were international students.

It was easy for al-Qaeda to send a handful of its operatives to receive commercial pilot training. These operatives trained in at least ten schools—from the Sorbi Flying Club in San Diego, California, to the Freeway Airport in Bowie, Maryland. After investigating the Airmen Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma in July 2000 and finding it unsatisfactory, Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi trained together at two Florida schools—Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida, and Jones Aviation Flying Service at the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport. After rejection by a flight instructor at the Jones Aviation Flying Service, they received

most of their pilot training from Huffman Aviation. After Atta and al-Shehhi received their commercial pilot licenses in December 2000, they began renting small aircraft to fly up and down the East Coast. It was on one such trip, on December 26, 2000, that Atta abandoned his rented aircraft on the taxiway at a Miami Airport after its engine sputtered before takeoff. The Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) complained about this but did nothing about it. In January 2001, Atta and al-Shehhi took even more flying lessons at the flight school at Gwinnet County Airport, near Atlanta, Georgia.

The other pilots trained at different schools. Several of them raised the suspicions of their flight instructors because of their apparent indifference to takeoffs and landings. All they seemed to be interested in was flying aircraft. This apparent disinterest made these pilots-in-training poor candidates for commercial pilots. Only one of the hijackers, Hani Hanjour, had ambitions to be a commercial pilot, but he was so poor a pilot that no commercial aviation company would hire him. Frustrated in his ambition to be a pilot, he joined the ranks of the hijackers.

The pilot flight schools have fallen on hard times after September 11, hurt by a combination of security-related red tape, diminished enrollment, and the stigma of association with the 9/11 hijackers. Florida and its pilot schools have suffered the most, but the hard times have affected the entire country.

Blame for the 9/11 Hijackers and Pilot Training

"We never recovered," said Mr. [Terry] Fensome, whose school has 30 students now, down from the 60 before the attacks, though none of the hijackers trained at Pelican [Flight Training Center]. "The idea that the flight schools were to blame for this was totally off the wall, and it hurt us a lot." At least 50 of the state's flight schools have closed since 9/11, most of them mom-and-pop operations that could not survive the drop in business and rising costs. The number of foreign students has plummeted, flight school owners say, because of tough new immigration rules, the battered aviation industry and a general fear of bias since 9/11.

Abby Goodnough, "Hard Times Are Plaguing Flight Schools in Florida," *New York Times* (September 14, 2002), p. 20.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Hanjour, Hani Saleh Husan; Shehhi, Marwan Yousef Muhammed Rashid Lekrab al-

Suggested Reading

Steve Fainaru and Peter Whoriskey, "Hijack Suspects Tried Many Flight Schools," *Washington Post* (September 19, 2001), p. A15; David Hirschman, "I Didn't See Evil," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* (January 27, 2002), p. 1A; Barry Klein, Thomas C. Tobin, and Kathryn Wexler, "Florida Flight Schools Decry Rush to Regulate after Attacks," *St. Petersburg Times* [Florida] (September 24, 2001), p. 1A; Aaron Sharockman, "9/11 Hijackers Practiced Here," *St. Petersburg Times* [Florida] (March 31, 2006), p. 1A.

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and its police force, the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), suffered heavily on September 11. In 1921 the states of New York and New Jersey created an independent agency, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, to oversee the harbors. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s the Port Authority's authority increased to include the administration of the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, as well as of various bridges. It also

built the World Trade Center complex in the 1960s and 1970s. The Port Authority owned the World Trade Center complex until June 2001, when Larry Silverstein leased it. But by September 11 the Port Authority still had its agencies in fifteen floors in the North Tower.

The Port Authority Police Department provided security for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's various responsibilities. It had been formed in 1928 by recruiting forty men to police the bridges to Staten Island. Headquartered in Jersey City, New Jersey, it supervises individual operating units, each of which has its own commander. Over the years, the PAPD grew until, in 2001, it had 1,100 police officers. This police force was responsible for three airports, two tunnels, four bridges, the PATH Subway System, two interstate bus terminals, and marine cargo terminals in both New York and New Jersey, as well as the World Trade Center complex.

Port Authority police were on duty on September 11. They responded to the emergency and worked beside the firefighters of the Fire Department of New York City and the officers of the New York City Police Department to evacuate the North Tower and South Tower. Thirty-seven members of the PAPD were killed on September 11, including Superintendent of Police Fred Marrone, Chief of Police James Romito, Inspector Anthony Infante, Captain Kathy Mazza, and a number of Emergency Service Unit officers. Thirty-eight Port Authority civilian employees also died, including Neil Levin, executive director of the Port Authority.

The first problem of the rescue and recovery phase of September 11 surfaced when the Port Authority police were ignored by the FDNY and the NYPD. Both the firefighters and police were busy establishing their areas of responsibility, and during the early hours the PAPD police were unable to communicate with either. It took a while before the PAPD was accepted by the other departments. Later, however, because the PAPD police knew the ins and outs of the World Trade Center complex, the Port Authority police became equal partners with the firefighters and city police.

See Also

Firefighters at Ground Zero; Mazza, Kathy; New York City Police Department; World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading

Susan Hagen and Mary Carouba, *Women at Ground Zero: Stories of Courage and Compassion* (New York: Alpha, 2002); William Keegan Jr. and Bart Davis, *Closure: The Untold Story of the Ground Zero Recovery Mission* (New York: Touchstone Book, 2006).

Predator

The Predator is a medium-altitude, long-range, unmanned aerial vehicle used by the CIA and the U.S. Air Force as an antiterrorist weapon. Developed by the U.S. Air Force in the 1990s for long-range reconnaissance missions, it is about the size of a small SUV and is powered by a 101-horsepower propeller-driven engine that gives it a top speed of 135 miles per hour. It holds enough fuel to travel 400 nautical miles (460 miles). Its ability to orbit an area gives it an advantage over other, faster reconnaissance aircraft. When equipped with a pair of Hellfire antitank missiles, it also becomes an effective, lethal weapon. The Hellfire missile is an air-to-ground missile about five-and-a-half feet long that weighs just over 100 pounds and can be fired from attack helicopters and the Predator.

The Predator is remotely controlled. A team of three—a pilot and two sensor operators—operate the Predator from a ground-control station that can be thousands of miles away. Controls for the system resemble those used in ultrasophisticated model aircraft and advanced video games. It has a TV camera, an infrared camera, and a system that enables it to penetrate smoke and clouds.

The Predator has great potential for use against terrorists—particularly in remote areas—but its development was slowed by interagency gridlock. Both the CIA and the U.S. Air Force wanted to gain control of the Predator program. Leaders of the CIA envisaged it as a counterterrorism weapon, but the U.S. Air Force saw it as a reconnaissance asset. This infighting hindered the development of the program. Early versions of the Predator were used in Bosnia, and it was finally sent to Afghanistan in September 2000. President Clinton authorized its use in Afghanistan to hunt down Osama bin Laden. Unfortunately, soon after it arrived in Afghanistan, one of the Predators crashed. It was suspected that news of its capabilities, or the possible capture of one of the aircraft, caused the Predator program to be shelved for improvements. Despite its obvious capabilities for neutralizing leaders of al-Qaeda, the Predator program remained shut down until after September 11.

Revival of political fighting between the CIA and the U.S. Air Force caused most of the delay. The CIA still wanted to use the Predator as a weapon, and the Air Force insisted that it be chiefly restricted to reconnaissance missions. The addition of the Hellfire antitank missile system sacrificed the Predator's ability to see through smoke and cloud. There was also argument about who would pay the $1 million price for each Predator. The Bush administration finally ruled that the Department of Defense would pay for them, ending this part of the controversy.

The effectiveness of the Predator was proved when it killed key al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and Yemen. A Predator-fired missile also killed senior al-Qaeda officials, including Mohammad Atef, in the early stages of the overthrow of the Taliban regime. Slow communications when seeking approval for a strike saved Omar and most of the Taliban from a Predator attack on October 7, 2001. Then, in October 2002, a Predator launched its Hellfire missiles at a car carrying Abu Ali al-Harithi and Ahmed Hijazi, as well as four other al-Qaeda operatives, on a road in Marib province, Yemen. Al-Harithi had been part of the plot to attack the USS *Cole* in October 2000. A National Security Agency communications satellite intercepted a phone call from al-Harithi, and the Predator tracked the car before launching its missile. The car was destroyed with all its passengers, except one who escaped. This was exactly the type of mission the CIA had envisaged for the Predator system.

Despite this success, the Predator program has come under the operational control of the U.S. Air Force after a decision made by the Bush administration. The CIA selects the target, but after the Predator is in flight, operational control is turned over to Air Force personnel in the United States. The job of completing a Predator's mission requires a task force of about 55 people to pilot the aircraft, check sensors, monitor communications, and manage the mission. Besides these personnel requirements, the Predator needs enough equipment for its ground control station that the equipment has to be hauled around by a C-130 transport aircraft. Despite this heavy logistical load, the use of the Predator has been common in fighting the Iraq insurgency. The Predator was at first used in Iraq chiefly

The unmanned Predator B taxis back to its hangar in El Mirage, California, on September 6, 2001, after a test flight over the Mojave Desert. (AP IMAGES/Doug Benc.)

in its reconnaissance mode, but this has changed as fighting against insurgents has intensified.

In 2002 a new version of the Predator, Predator B, appeared in the inventory of the U.S. military. Predator B is a larger model than its predecessor and has a more powerful jet engine. It lacks some of the loitering capability of the Predator, but it can fly twice as high and is much faster. Because it can carry a heavier armament package, the Predator B is more a hunter-killer than its earlier model. The U.S. Air Force has used both the Predator and the Predator B in Iraq.

See Also

Bin Laden, Osama; Bush Administration; Central Intelligence Agency

Suggested Reading

Bruce V. Bigelow, "Predator, Part II: Spy Plane's New Version is Bigger, Better, More Capable," *San Diego Union-Tribune* (August 27, 2002), p. C1; Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004); Mick Farren, *CIA: Secrets of "The Company,"* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2003); Mark Huband and Mark Odell, "Unmanned Weapon Makes Its Mark in Yemeni Sea of Sand," *Financial Times* [London] (November 6, 2002), p. 24; Judith Miller and Eric Schmitt, "Ugly Duckling Turns Out to Be Formidable in the Air," *New York Times* (November 23, 2001), p. B1; Walter Pincus, "Predator to See More Combat," *Washington Post* (March 22, 2005), p. A3; Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. Arms Unmanned Aircraft," *Washington Post* (October 18, 2001), p. A1; Winn L. Rosch, "Unmanned Vehicles, Crews Await War," *Plain Dealer* [Cleveland, OH] (February 13, 2003), p. C2; Richard Sisk, "Hellfire Homed in on Terrorist's Cell Phone," *Daily News* [New York] (November 20, 2002), p. 28.

Q

Qaeda, al-

Al-Qaeda is the umbrella terrorist organization that planned and carried out the attacks of September 11, 2001. Osama bin Laden formed al-Qaeda in May 1988, near the end of the Afghan–Soviet War, from the Mujahideen Services Bureau. The idea for an organization to coordinate Islamist activities came from bin Laden's mentor, Abdullah Azzam. An organizational meeting on August 11, 1988, and another on August 20, finalized plans. In November 1988, the existence of al-Qaeda was formally announced. From its beginning, al-Qaeda had an organizational structure consisting of four committees: military, religious, financial, and media. A consulting council headed by bin Laden oversaw the organization.

Al-Qaeda's Operational Principle

Al Qaeda pursues a method or principle that calls for "centralization of decision and decentralization of execution." The decision was made centrally, but the method of attack and execution was the duty of field commanders. . . . The planning for the *Cole* operation was carried out by the people [on the ground]. The idea was formed and the target was set and then it was referred to a higher military control committee in al Qaeda called the Military Affairs Committee, which does not plan, but gives the green light, the support, and the funds for these operations. But, the planning, execution, and method of attack were all undertaken by field commanders in the operations field.

Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 253.

Leadership with al-Qaeda is highly selective. Only about two hundred individuals have sworn loyalty (*bayat*) to bin Laden and provide the leadership cadre. Empty leadership positions caused by deaths and captures are filled by highly motivated subordinates. These leaders have extensive contacts in the Islamist world and communicate via the Internet.

Bin Laden recruited a large number of Afghan fighters into al-Qaeda at the end of the Afghan–Soviet War. Many of these recruits headed back to their native countries, where they formed indigenous terrorist groups. Among the more prominent groups affiliated with al-Qaeda are Abu Sayyaf (the Sword of God, the

Philippines), the Armed Islamic Group (the GIA, Algeria), Hezbollah (the Party of God, Lebanon), the Islamic Group (Egypt), Hamas (Palestine), the Islamic Jihad (Egypt), Gama'a Islamiyya (Indonesia), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, Philippines), along with at least twenty-two additional groups.

Al-Qaeda believes in training its operatives in basic combat skills. An estimated 10,000 to 110,000 trainees have trained in al-Qaeda camps from 1989 to 2001. Probably about 30,000 have graduated during that period. About 3,000 trainees were assessed as capable of advanced training for terrorist operations. Graduates of these camps retain their affiliation with al-Qaeda when they go elsewhere.

Al-Qaeda established various training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1990s. Most of the instructors were Egyptians and had previous experience in the military or in security forces. After the loss of Afghanistan as a base, several of these camps were transferred to remote areas in Pakistan to join the Pakistani camps already there.

Instructors at the camps issue a training manual to the trainees that emphasizes teamwork, willing submission to leaders, and, above all, secrecy. Among its recommendations are that apartment living arrangements during a mission should be in groups of three. The manual also recommends that martyrdom missions have at least four targets for greatest effect.

Only a select few of the trainees were deemed worthy of a martyrdom mission. Psychological profiling was conducted by the instructors to select those most worthy. The best candidates were those who were highly religious and well-educated. A graduate of the al-Masada Training Camp, Hasan Abd-Rabbuh al-Suraghi, put it another way, stating that instructors looked for candidates who were "young, zealous, obedient, and [had] a weak character that obeys instructions without question." The instructors had no difficulty finding volunteers.

How Al-Qaeda Instructors Select Those for Special Missions, According to an Early Member of Al-Qaeda

The majority of the instructors were Egyptians who were paid their salaries by bin Ladin. It seems that these instructors, who used to work in Azzam's camps before he was assassinated, had past experience in the Egyptian army or security organs. During the training period, there were some Egyptians whose task was to screen the young men well. They looked for certain specific qualifications among these young men. The most important criteria were that the ones who are chosen should be young, zealous, obedient, and with a weak character that obeys instructions without question. This period of scrutiny went on for one to two weeks in closed and guarded locations which were accessible only to al Qaeda. Sometimes, only very few were selected and were asked whether they wanted to join. If these accepted to join, they were asked to leave and bid farewell to their families and then to return for higher training in the camps on specialized military curricula (preparatory level, middle level, and final level).

Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006) p. 84.

Western terrorist analysts have been confused over the extent of al-Qaeda's control over these groups. The only consensus is that al-Qaeda has been able to establish a degree of coordination among its member groups. Rohan Gunaratna, a Sri Lankan and a former research fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at University of St. Andrews in Scotland, has described al-Qaeda as "a secret, almost virtual

organization, one that denies its own existence in order to remain in the shadows."

Al-Qaeda is a selective organization that rigidly oversees the selection of its members to carry out operations. It recruits only the most talented and motivated candidates, who then earn a modest salary of about $200 a month; those with great responsibilities may receive up to $300. Before the loss of Afghanistan in late 2001, al-Qaeda had trained more than 5,000 operatives in a dozen training camps to carry out terrorist operations. Recruits were processed through main training camps before being sent to various locations for specialized training. About fifty-five possible training locations existed.

Besides specialized training, political and religious instruction also took place. Osama bin Laden made regular visits to the camps, where he gave lectures and pep talks. He also held personal talks with those selected for special operations. Bin Laden met with Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah when they arrived for training in Afghanistan. Because of al-Qaeda's high prestige in the Muslim world, there are many Arabs—probably as many as 100,000—who are willing to join al-Qaeda if invited. This highly selective system is used to make operations resistant to foreign intelligence services penetration. Those agents who

Qualification for Membership in Al-Qaeda

1. Islam: The member of the Organization must be Moslem. . . .
2. Commitment to the Organization's Ideology: This commitment frees the Organization's members from conceptional [*sic*] problems. . . .
3. Maturity: The requirements of military work are numerous, and a minor cannot perform them. . . .
4. Sacrifice: He [the member] has to be willing to do the work and undergo martyrdom for the purpose of achieving the goal and establishing the religion of the majestic Allah on earth.
5. Listening and Obedience: In the military, this is known today as discipline. . . .
6. Keeping Secrets and Concealing Information: [This secrecy should be used] even with the closest people, for deceiving the enemies is not easy. . . .
7. Free of Illness: The Military Organization's member must fulfill this important requirement. . . .
8. Patience: [The member] should have plenty of patience for [enduring] afflictions if he is overcome by the enemies. . . .
9. Tranquility and "Unflappability": [The member] should have a calm personality that allows him to endure psychological traumas such as those involving bloodshed, murder, arrest, imprisonment, and reverse psychological traumas such as killing one or all of his Organization's comrades. . . .
10. Intelligence and Insight. . . .
11. Caution and Prudence. . . .
12. Truthfulness and Counsel. . . .
13. Ability to Observe and Analyze. . . .
14. Ability to Act, Change Positions and Conceal Oneself. . . .

Stefan Aust et al., *Inside 9-11: What Really Happened* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), pp. 267–272.

have attempted to penetrate al-Qaeda are killed when discovered or even suspected. In 2002 al-Qaeda had operatives active in fifty-five countries.

Financial support for al-Qaeda comes from a variety of sources. In the early years bin Laden used his personal fortune of between $30 and $35 million to support many of al-Qaeda's operations, but after leaving Sudan his personal fortune diminished, and other sources of income had to be developed. Other significant sources of funding have come from Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Islamic charities and foundations. After the attacks on September 11, 2001, western authorities attacked these NGOs, and a considerable amount of funding for al-Qaeda suddenly dried up. For a time financial support came from state sponsors—Afghanistan, Iran, and Sudan—but these sources of funding have also mostly ceased.

Ineptness of Some of Al-Qaeda's Operations

One underappreciated aspect of Al Qaeda operations was how crude many of them were. Intelligence analysts sometimes cited the plans' complexity and sophistication, as if blowing up buildings or boats or vehicles was high-end science. In fact, many Al Qaeda plots have been marked by the haphazardness of their design and execution. Over the years, many of the plots seemed harebrained at worst, ill-conceived at best, pursued by ill-equipped and unprepared, inept men. Some were almost comical in their haplessness: boats sank, cars crashed, bombs blew up too soon. Some of the men virtually delivered themselves to police. The gross ineptitude of the execution often disguised the gravity of the intent, and hid, also, the steadfastness of the plotters. Whatever else they did, they did not go away.

Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), pp. 174–175.

Al-Qaeda has conducted operations in a systematic way. It developed operations by using three types of operatives. Local militants were recruited for groundwork but had no knowledge of the details of a plan. Sleepers were sent to live and work in the area long before the operation. Finally, al-Qaeda specialists and martyrs were brought in at the final stages of the mission. Once the mission was accomplished, the survivors were to go underground again. This was the type of operation that al-Qaeda carried out in the African embassy bombings. Al-Qaeda planners, however, were flexible and willing to improvise in case conditions changed.

Al-Qaeda's first terrorist operation took place in 1992. This was the bombing of a hotel in Aden, Yemen, on December 29, 1992, that barely missed its targeted U.S. troops. On June 26, 1995, an al-Qaeda–led group attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak as he visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Al-Qaeda cooperated with an Iranian group in a June 25, 1996, truck bombing outside the Khobar Towers in Dharhran, Saudi Arabia, that killed nineteen U.S. servicemen and wounded five hundred others. Its next operation was the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998, killing 234 people. A suicide bombing of the American warship USS *Cole* on October 5, 2000, killed seventeen sailors and wounded thirty-nine others. All of these attacks paled beside the havoc of the al-Qaeda–led suicide attacks on the World Trade Center's twin towers and on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.

The collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the autumn of 2001 was a serious blow to al-Qaeda's future operations. It lost its main base for the training of its

operatives, as well as a secure staging area. Another important loss was al-Qaeda's military operations chief, Mohammad Atef. He was the victim of a Predator strike in the early days of the attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan. The survival of bin Laden and his second-in-command, al-Zawahiri, has allowed al-Qaeda to reestablish operations outside of Afghanistan, although on a much more limited basis. Because of its decentralized command structure, al-Qaeda has been able to recover some of its strike capability by entrusting operations to subordinate groups. Despite this, al-Qaeda has been put on the defensive, forced to pursue operations prematurely or send operatives underground as sleepers for future operations. Western intelligence and security forces continue to consider al-Qaeda a major threat, poised to strike at any time and anywhere with any type of weapon, from biological to nuclear.

Since 2003 al-Qaeda military forces have been fighting alongside Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Because bin Laden was aware in advance of the September 11 attacks, he began distributing al-Qaeda's fighting assets throughout Afghanistan so that al-Qaeda forces could survive the onslaught of American retaliation. It took the American military the three weeks until October 7, 2001, to begin offensive operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. During this interval, al-Qaeda dismantled its forces in Afghanistan and sent most of them into Pakistan and other central Asian countries. Most of the battles during the Northern Alliance takeover of Afghanistan—such as those at Tora Bora and Shahi Kowt—were delaying actions designed to allow al-Qaeda forces time to escape into Pakistan.

Besides fighting and planning future operations, al-Qaeda has become increasingly active on the Internet, where it contacts its operatives and recruits sympathizers. *Al-Neda* and *al-Ansar* have been the two most prominent Web sites for al-Qaeda. Information provided on these Web sites by al-Qaeda members gives justification for al-Qaeda operations. Western intelligence services have tried, with only limited success, to close down these Web sites.

Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces have made a military comeback since 2003. From secure bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan, military operations have been launched without fear of detection. The Afghan government has had to depend on NATO forces for security, but parts of Afghanistan have fallen into the hands of the al-Qaeda–Taliban alliance.

The loss of Afghanistan as a training and staging area has hindered al-Qaeda's terrorist operations. Immediately after the loss of its training camps, al-Qaeda's leadership began to look for alternate sites. An unlikely replacement has been Europe. An underground railroad of recruits for al-Qaeda has been set up from the Middle East to Germany and Great Britain. Both Germany and Great Britain have been more tolerant in their laws against suspected terrorists, although both have tightened their laws since September 11. After receiving training, many al-Qaeda recruits have returned to the Middle East and been smuggled into Iraq to join the Sunni resistance to the American occupation of Iraq, and to fight Iraq's Shiites.

See Also

Azzam, Sheikh Abdullah Yussuf; bin Laden, Osama; Taliban; World Trade Center, September 11; Zawahiri, Ayman al-

See Documents:

Document #5; Document #6

Suggested Reading

Jane Corbin, *Al Qaeda: In Search of the Terror Network* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002); Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Hamdi A. Hassan, *Al-Qaeda: The Background of the Pursuit for Global Jihad* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 2004); Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Knopf, 2006).

Quds Mosque, al-

Al-Quds Mosque was the mosque in Hamburg, Germany, where leaders of the September 11 attack worshiped and planned the attack. It was located in a poorer section of Hamburg on Steindamm Street. The mosque was situated above a body building gym near Hamburg's central railway station. This location, close to cheap transportation, made it attractive to expatriate Muslims. Al-Quds was one of the few Arab Sunni mosques; most of others in Hamburg were Shiite or Turkish Sunni. It was small, holding at most 150 people at prayer time. These small mosques were good places for Islamist extremists to cultivate and recruit members.

Attraction of Radical Mosques for Young Muslims

The reasons that young immigrants turn to fundamentalist Islam while in Europe are many. In most cases, radical mosques played a key role in their conversion. Some, like Shadi Abdallah, turned to the mosque simply because it offered the cheapest meals. Once there, they become fascinated with radical sermons and caught up in terrorist activities. Others begin going to the mosque out of homesickness. Many consider it more a social center than a place of worship. Nevertheless, after hearing the fiery words of local radicals, some change.

Lorenzo Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006), p. 44.

Al-Quds was an extremist mosque because of the preaching of its leading cleric, Mohammed al-Fazazi. The founders of the mosque had been Moroccans, and most of its clerics were Moroccans—including al-Fazazi. He preached there constantly. Al-Fazazi believed Western civilization was the enemy of the Muslim world, and he believed in martyrdom. He was quoted in 2000 as saying that "who[ever] participates in the war against Islam with ideas or thoughts or a song or a television show to befoul Islam is an infidel on war footing that shall be killed, no matter if it's a man, a woman, or a child." It was these ideas that attracted Mohamed Atta to Islamist extremism and later to al-Qaeda. Al-Fazazi spent considerable time with the young men in his congregation talking with them about jihad, holy war, and martyrdom. Later, al-Fazazi's involvement in bombings in Morocco and Spain landed him a 30-year prison sentence in Morocco.

The al-Quds Mosque remained a place where it was possible to recruit others susceptible to the appeal of al-Fazazi and, later, al-Qaeda. Atta taught religious classes at al-Quds Mosque, but his hard-line position alienated all but those who thought as he. All of the members of the Hamburg Cell were recruited at the al-Quds Mosque, including Marwan al-Shehhi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and still others.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Bin al-Shibh, Ramzi; Hamburg Cell

Suggested Reading

Jane Corbin, *Al-Qaeda: The Terror Network That Threatens the World* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002); Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005); Lorenzo Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006).

R

Rendition

Rendition has been a successful but controversial way to fight terrorism. This program is run by the CIA but has been approved by both President Clinton and President George W. Bush. There are two forms of rendition: ordinary rendition and extraordinary rendition. Ordinary rendition occurs when a terrorist suspect is captured in a foreign country and then turned over to the United States. The individual is then transported to the United States or held at a foreign site for interrogation. Extraordinary rendition is the turning over of a suspected terrorist to a third-party country for detainment and questioning. Often the suspect is wanted by that country for past offenses or crimes. The first use of ordinary rendition was in 1986 by the Reagan administration after the suicide bombings in Beirut, Lebanon. Fawaz Yunis had participated in a hijacking of a Jordanian aircraft in 1985, during which three Americans had been killed. FBI agents and U.S. Navy SEALs seized him in a boat off the Lebanese coast.

Rendition as a policy lay dormant until the rise of terrorism in the early 1990s. One such rendition involved the capture of Ramzi Yousef and his transportation to the United States. There was a need for rules to standardize rendition. Michael Scheuer, then the head of the Alex Station in the CIA, drew up the guidelines for a new rendition program in 1996, and he ran the rendition program for forty months. President Clinton signed off on this program. Intent of the rendition program was to dismantle and disrupt the al-Qaeda network and detain Islamic terrorists. Because the Clinton administration and the FBI did not want the captives brought to the United States where the legal process protected them too much, the CIA focused on al-Qaeda suspects who were wanted in a third country. In the early years, most of the extraordinary renditions were to Egypt, where tougher methods were used on interrogations.

The CIA has always been nervous about rendition. It has justified it with the contention that when Allied governments had intelligence on terrorists that could not be used in a court of law, sometimes rendition was the only way to neutralize the terrorists. For renditions the CIA used paramilitary officers organized into teams and under the supervision of a CIA handler.

The rendition program has been effective, but it includes the danger that the information gathered is tainted by torture. Moreover, international law prohibits the forced return of any person, regardless of the crime, to a foreign location where that person would be subject to torture or mistreatment. Michael Scheuer has maintained that he warned the lawyers and policymakers about the dangers of turning over al-Qaeda suspects to foreign countries.

Michael Scheuer on Rendition

Well, several senior C.I.A. officers, myself included, were confident that common sense would elude that bunch (non-C.I.A. officials), so we told them—again and again and again. Each time a decision to do a rendition was made, we reminded the lawyers and policy makers that Egypt was Egypt, and that Jimmy Stewart never starred in a movie called "Mr. Smith Goes to Cairo." They usually listened, nodded, and then inserted a legal nicety by insisting that each country to which the agency delivered a detainee would have to pledge it would treat him according to the rules of its own legal system.

Michael Scheuer, "A Fine Rendition," *New York Times* (March 11, 2005), p. A23.

In the Bush administration, the CIA continues to handle rendition cases. Whereas rendition cases were infrequent in the Clinton administration, they became numerous in the Bush administration. Approximately 100 suspected al-Qaeda operatives have been captured and turned over to foreign governments for interrogation since 1996. Most of the rendition cases, however, have taken place since September 11, 2001. In recent years a white Gulfstream V jet has been used to move prisoners around to various countries. Egypt, Afghanistan, and Syria have been popular destinations, but at least fourteen European states have known what was going on and have cooperated with the United States. Several Eastern European states even housed CIA detention centers.

Former CIA Agent Bob Baer on Rendition Destinations and Possible Fates

If you want them to be tortured, you send them [suspected terrorists] to Syria. If you want someone to disappear—never to see them again—you send them to Egypt.

Quoted in Lila Rajiva, "The Torture-Go-Round: The CIA's Rendition Flights to Secret Prisons," *Counterpunch* (December 5, 2005), p. 4.

In one blatant case, two Egyptians were seized in Sweden and sent to Egypt. Ahmed Agiza and Muhammed al-Zery were radical Islamists, and they had sought political asylum in Sweden. On December 18, 2001, American agents seized both of them and placed them on a Gulfstream jet bound for Cairo, Egypt. The Swedish government cooperated after its representatives had been assured that Agiza and al-Zery would not be tortured. Once it was learned that both Agiza and al-Zery had been tortured, there was a major political outcry in Sweden against the Swedish government and the United States. Egyptian authorities determined that al-Zery had no contacts with terrorists, and he was released from prison in October 2003. Agiza was less lucky because he had been a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and close to its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. An Egyptian court sentenced Agiza to twenty-five years in prison.

Rendition has become more controversial since the backfire of several rendition cases. The first such case was that of the radical Islamist cleric Abu Omar. His full

name is Hassan Osama Nasr, and he lived in Milan, Italy, in political refugee status. Omar had been under investigation for terrorism-related activities and support of al-Qaeda when the CIA, with the assistance of the Italian security personnel, seized him off the streets of Milan on February 17, 2002. He was taken to a NATO base near Aviano, Italy, and then flown to Egypt on February 18. There Omar was offered a deal to be an informant. After he refused, Omar was sent to a prison where he claims that he was tortured. Italian authorities became incensed over this rendition, and a judge charged twenty-five American CIA operatives and two Italian security officers with abduction. The Italian government has decided not to request extradition of the CIA operatives, but the affair has damaged American and Italian relations.

Two other cases of rendition have caused unrest among allies. One was that of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen from Ottawa and a software engineer. Arar was changing planes in JFK Airport in New York from an American Airlines flight from Zurich, Switzerland, on September 26, 2002, when U.S. authorities detained him. They were acting on inaccurate information given to them by the Royal Mounted Canadian Police (RMCP) that Arar was a member of al-Qaeda. After interrogation and a stay at the Metropolitan Detention Center, he was flown to Jordan on October 8, 2002. CIA operatives then transferred him to Syria. In Syria, he was imprisoned, and he was intensively interrogated for nearly a year. It took an intervention by the Canadian government to win Arar's release after ten and a half months in October 2003. Since then, Arar has been seeking to sue both the American and the Canadian government.

Another case was the December 2003 rendition of Khalid el-Masri, a German citizen. El-Masri was born in Kuwait but raised in Lebanon. In 1985 he immigrated to Germany, where he became a German citizen in 1994. He took a vacation in Skopje, Macedonia, but he was arrested at the Macedonian border on December 31, 2003, because his name resembled that of Khalid al-Masri, the mentor of the al-Qaeda Hamburg Cell. CIA agents took him into custody on January 23, 2004, shortly after Macedonian officials had released him. He was sent to Afghanistan where he was tortured during lengthy interrogations. El-Masri went on a hunger strike for twenty-seven days in the confinement camp. American officials determined that he had been wrongfully detained, and he was released on May 28, 2004. He was dumped on a desolate road in Albania without an apology or funds to return home. German authorities have initiated legal proceedings against CIA officials for their handling of el-Masri.

These cases of torture have been verified, and they have made rendition a difficult policy to justify. Most of the rendition cases came the first two years after September 11, and there have been fewer of them recently. Political fallout, however, continues both at home and among our allies.

See Also

Bush Administration; Clinton Administration

See Document

Document #24

Suggested Reading

Tyler Drumheller and Elaine Monaghan, *On the Brink: An Insider's Account of How the White House Compromised American Intelligence* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2006); Roy Eccleston, "CIA 'Renditions' in Tune with Habib Claim of Abuse in Egypt," *Australian*

(February 14, 2005), p. 17; Stephen Grey and Ian Cobain, "From Secret Prisons to Turning a Blind Eye: Europe's Role in Rendition," *Guardian* [London] (June 7, 2006), p. 1; Michael Scheuer, "A Fine Rendition," *New York Times* (March 11, 2005), p. A23; Craig Whitlock, "In Letter, Radical Cleric Details CIA Abduction, Egyptian Torture," *Washington Post* (November 10, 2006), p. A23; Tracy Wilkinson, "Details Emerge in Cleric's Abduction," *Los Angeles Times* (January 10, 2007), p. A4.

Rescorla, Cyril Richard (Rick) (1939–2001)

One of the unsung participants on September 11, 2001, was Rick Rescorla. He was the vice president of security for Morgan Stanley in the South Tower of the World Trade Center. Part of his job was to conduct security drills for Morgan Stanley. After arriving at his office at 7:00 a.m. on the forty-fourth floor of the South Tower, he was present when American Airlines 11 crashed into the North Tower. Rescorla spent the remainder of his life helping evacuate Morgan Stanley's 2,600 employees from the South Tower.

Most of Rescorla's life was in the military. He was born in 1939 in Hayle, Cornwall, England, and raised by his grandparents. His grandfather worked at the local power plant, and his grandmother was a housewife. He had a normal childhood and soon became a competitive rugby player. He did well in school, but the family lacked the funds to send him to a university. As soon as he finished schooling at Penzance County Grammar School at age eighteen, he joined the British Army in 1957, serving in an intelligence unit. His tour of duty took him to Cyprus where he fought against the Greek terrorist group EOKA. Upon leaving the British Army, he found a job as a colonial policeman in Northern Rhodesia. It was here that Rescorla met Dan Hill, an American veteran of the U.S. Army. They became lifelong friends.

Rescorla decided to immigrate to the United States in 1963. He contacted his friend Dan Hill. Once in the states, he joined the U.S. Army. After attending Officer Candidate School (OCS) and obtaining a commission as a second lieutenant, he was sent to South Vietnam as a rifle platoon leader. He was assigned to Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), where he saw combat in the Ia Drang Valley under then Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore. Rescorla became a battlefield legend in his unit for his bravery, and he earned the nickname "Hard Core." When the going got toughest, Rescorla would start singing Cornish songs in a baritone voice, settling everybody down. He earned a Silver Star, Bronze Stars for Valor and Meritorious Service, and a Purple Heart for a wound.

After the Vietnam War, Rescorla returned to the states. He attended the University of Oklahoma on the GI Bill. In 1967 he became an American citizen. After graduating with bachelor's and master's degrees in literature, he went on to earn a law degree, also at the University of Oklahoma. Shortly after law school, in 1972, he married. Rescorla briefly taught criminal justice at the University of South Carolina Law School. He also remained first in the Oklahoma National Guard and then in the Army Reserve, from which he retired as a colonel in 1989. Next, he turned to corporate security. His first corporate security job was with Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company in Chicago. He then moved to New York City to take a job with Dean Witter at the World Trade Center. After Dean Witter merged with Morgan Stanley, Rescorla was promoted to executive vice president in charge of security.

Rescorla was always concerned about the lack of security at the World Trade Center complex. After studying the security situation at the World Trade Center, Rescorla made a series of recommendations to tighten security, but these recommendations were ignored. He and fellow consultant Dan Hill were concerned about the underground garage entrances, but their warning was ignored. They proved to be right when the 1993 World Trade Center bombing took place. Rescorla believed that other terrorists would target the World Trade Center complex as well. He even envisaged that terrorists might hijack a cargo plane and load it with explosives, chemicals, or biological weapons before flying the aircraft into the World Trade Center complex or some other monumental building. It was even possible that the aircraft might have a small nuclear weapon. Based on these suspicions, Rescorla recommended that Morgan Stanley move someplace more secure and in a building only several stories high.

Complex Personality of Rick Rescorla

Rescorla was also a passionate and complex man, a writer and a lawyer, as well as a blood-streaked warrior and six-figure security expert. At his home in suburban Morristown, N.J., he carved wooden ducks, frequented craft fairs, took playwriting classes. He wrote romantic poetry to his second wife, Susan, and renewed their vows after just one year of marriage. "He was a song-and-dance man," she says. He was a weeper, too. He liked to quote Shakespeare and Tennyson and Byron—and Elvis and Burt Lancaster. He was a film buff, history buff, pottery buff—"pretty much any kind of buff you can be," says his daughter, Kim. He liked to point his Lincoln Mark VIII in random directions and see where it would take him.

Michael Grunwald, "On September 11, Rick Rescorla Died as He Lived: Like a Hero," *Washington Post* (October 28, 2001), p. F1.

When nothing came of his recommendations, Rescorla began tightening security. He conducted fire and evacuation drills every other month. These drills were not popular. Rescorla also implemented a policy of the employees obeying his and his staff's announcements rather than those of the Port Authority.

Rescorla died on September 11, 2001, while evacuating Morgan Stanley people from the South Tower. Immediately after the first plane plowed into the North Tower, he began evacuating people from the South Tower. Rescorla ignored instructions for everybody to stay where they were. Rescorla believed that the North Tower might collapse. Soon afterward, another aircraft crashed into the South Tower. Rescorla made it plain to everyone that he would evacuate only when everybody else had been evacuated. He went back into the South Tower to search for stragglers. His actions meant that Morgan Stanley lost only six of its employees on September 11. While he was hunting for stragglers, the tower collapsed, killing him. His body has never been recovered. Rescorla had earlier told his wife that if she ever wanted a memorial to him, he would be okay with a plaque at a nearby bird sanctuary called the Raptors, to be

Response of Rick Rescorla When Told Not to Evacuate South Tower

The dumb sons of bitches told me not to evacuate. They said it's just Building One. I told them I'm getting my people the [expletive] out of here.

Words of Dan Hill, quoted in Michael Grunwald, "On September 11, Rick Rescorla Died as He Lived: Like a Hero," *Washington Post* (October 28, 2001), p. F1.

placed on two American eagle cages. This plaque is his memorial. His wife had the following words engraved on them after his name and dates: "Just like the eagle, you have spread your wings, and soared into eternity."

See Also

World Trade Center, September 11; World Trade Center Bombing (1993)

Suggested Reading

Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, from Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002); Michael Grunwald, "Tower of Courage; On September 11, Rick Rescorla Died as He Lived: Like a Hero," *Washington Post* (October 28, 2001), p. F1; James B. Stewart, *Heart of a Soldier: A Story of Love, Heroism, and September 11th* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002); Jonathan Yardley, "A Hero's Tale," *Washington Post* (September 8, 2002), p. T2.

Ressam, Ahmed (1967–)

Ahmed Ressam became infamous as the al-Qaeda operative who was part of a plot to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport on January 1, 2000. For this reason Ressam earned the name as the "Millennium Bomber." Although this attempt failed, it was an indicator that al-Qaeda was actively plotting against the United States.

Ressam had a difficult childhood. He was born on May 19, 1967, in the town of Bou Ismail, Algeria. His father was a veteran of the Algerian War of Independence from France, and he worked as a government chauffeur. Ressam was the eldest of seven children. He was an active child and a good student. At age sixteen, however, a long-festering ulcer led him to have medical treatment and an operation in Paris. During this time, Ressam fell behind on his schoolwork, and even after repeating a year of school, he failed his final exam. This failure meant that he was ineligible to attend a university. Ressam applied for jobs with the Algerian police and security forces, but he was turned down. Unable to find meaningful employment, Ressam began working in a small café that his father had opened. In the meantime, he lived a secular life, drinking wine, smoking hashish, and dating girls. Political conditions in Algeria deteriorated in the early 1990s with open warfare between the military-controlled government and the radical Islamist Islamic Front for Salvation. Ressam decided that there was no future in Algeria, so he left for France.

Ressam arrived in Marseilles, France, on September 5, 1992, and his thirty-day visa soon expired. After obtaining a false French passport under the name Nasser Ressam, he traveled to Corsica where he worked at odd jobs, mostly picking grapes and oranges. On November 8, 1993, French authorities arrested him in Ajaccio, Corsica, and charged him with immigration violations. Facing a March 1994 hearing and probable deportation to Algeria, Ressam fled to Canada.

Ressam arrived in Montreal, Canada, on February 20, 1994. An immigration agent spotted the false passport and detained him. Ressam claimed political asylum to avoid deportation to Algeria. His insisted that the Algerian police had arrested him for selling firearms to a terrorist and had tortured him. Ressam was released on bond and told to have a lawyer represent him at a March 28, 1994, hearing. In the meantime, Ressam lived off welfare from the Canadian government. Even after missing the March court date, Ressam was able to remain in Canada. Ressam began attending the Assuna Annabawiyah Mosque, where he ran into young men

engaged in small-time criminal activity. To supplement his income, Ressam turned to small-scale crime. He was arrested once for shoplifting and then for pickpocketing, but in both instances he received only fines and probation. His stealing of identifications and passports led him to an al-Qaeda operative, Fateh Kemal, who bought them from Ressam. Kemal used the proceeds from these crimes to support al-Qaeda's operations both in Canada and in the Middle East.

In 1996 an al-Qaeda leader in Canada recruited Ressam for training as an al-Qaeda operative. Ressam had made many contacts among Algerians in Canada. It was noted by Hal Bernton that these were disaffected young men who spent their time "playing soccer, smoking cigarettes, and decrying the corrupt culture of their new country while simultaneously exploiting its generous immigration and welfare laws." Ressam developed a working relationship with members of the Algerian terrorist group Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and this group also had ties with al-Qaeda. Abderraouf Hannachi recruited Ressam to train at an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. On March 17, 1998, Ressam traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan, where he met Abu Zubaydah, the head of al-Qaeda's training program. After three weeks in Peshawar, Ressam headed to the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan. There he met Zacarias Moussaoui. Ressam and about thirty Algerians were placed under the command of Abu Doha, an Algerian who lived in London. After a stay at the Darunta Training Camp for learning bomb construction, Ressam returned to Canada after eleven months in Afghanistan. His travel back to Canada took him through the Los Angeles International Airport. Ressam took the time to scout out the best places to plant a large bomb. He also returned to Montreal with $12,000, a bomb-making manual, and a supply of hexamine, a booster material for explosives.

Ressam's return to Canada had been easy, but the other members of his cell were detained elsewhere. These other members were to be the leaders of the cell, and their absence meant Ressam had to take a leadership role. He began to recruit others into his cell. Those recruited were Abdelmajid Dahoumane, Mohktar Haouari, and Abdelghani Meskini, but none of them had received any al-Qaeda training. Using a stolen Royal Bank Visa card, Ressam and his cell began planning to build a bomb. His target was the Los Angeles International Airport, and the decision was made to place the bomb near a crowded security checkpoint for maximum casualties. In November 1999 the cell began the actual construction of the bomb in Vancouver, British Columbia. After the bomb was built, the decision was made that only Ressam would transport the bomb because it was thought that customs officers would be more reluctant to pull over a lone driver.

Ressam started transporting the bomb on December 14, 1999. He took the M.V. Coho Ferry from Victoria, British Columbia, to Port Angeles, Washington. Customs inspector Diana Dean became suspicious about how Ressam was behaving. A close inspection found ingredients for a bomb in the spare-tire compartment. Ressam made a break for it but was soon captured. For a while, the custom agents had no idea that the materials they had found were intended for a highly sensitive bomb.

What Ressam did not know was that he and his cell had been under investigation by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) since 1996. CSIS agents knew of his connections to the Algerian terrorist group Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and later al-Qaeda. Their surveillance of Ressam and his cell led

these agents to conclude that they were relatively harmless. Even when a French terrorist expert, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, insisted that Canadian authorities arrest Ressam and his compatriots, the CSIS was slow to respond. What the CSIS did not know was that Ressam had been building a bomb to use in the United States.

After his arrest, Ressam cooperated with American authorities to reduce his prison sentence. In a four-week trial in the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles, Ressam was convicted on April 6, 2001, of conspiracy to commit an international terrorist act, explosives smuggling, and lying to customs officials among the nine counts with which he was charged. With the prospects of a prison sentence of 130 years, Ressam decided to cooperate for a reduced sentence. His information was used in the briefing paper titled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in the U.S.," which President George W. Bush received on August 6, 2001. He also gave valuable information about al-Qaeda and some of its operatives. Ressam began to have doubts about cooperating in 2004 and stopped communicating with authorities. On July 27, 2005, U.S. District Judge John Coughenour sentenced Ressam to twenty-two years in prison. The U.S. prosecutor appealed the sentence as too lenient, and the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals panel ruled in January 2007 against one of the nine felony convictions of Ahmed Ressam. This was the count involving the use of false documents while transporting explosives. Ressam's final sentence is still in adjudication.

Millennium Threat American/Canadian Border
Based on threats received prior to the new millennium, the U.S-Canadian border heightened its security against possible terrorists entry.
On December 14, 1999, U.S. customs officials were able to identify unusual behavior by Ahmed Ressam, who was found to be transporting 130 pounds of explosive chemicals and four timing devices.
Ressam was convicted of conspiracy to detonate a suitcase bomb at LAX on New Year's Eve of 1999.
Ressam chose LAX due to its large size and independent of any terrorist organization's orders to bomb LAX.

Joel Cohen (right) of the Department of Homeland Security stands next to a giant monitor displaying Ahmed Ressam (left) at the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center in Norwalk, California, in 2006. Ressam was convicted of trying to mount a bombing of Los Angeles International Airport in California to coincide with the millennium celebrations held in 2000. (AP IMAGES/Nick Ut.)

See Also
Millennium Plots; Moussaoui, Zacarias; al-Qaeda; Zubaydah, Abu

Suggested Reading
Hal Bernton et al., "Chapter 2: The Fountainhead," *Seattle Times* (June 23, 2002), p. A14; Hal Bernton et al., "Chapter 4: Sneaking In," *Seattle Times* (June 24, 2002), p. A5; Hal Bernton et al., "Chapter 7: Joining Jihad," *Seattle Times* (June 27, 2002), p. A8; Hal Bernton et al., "Chapter 8: Going to Camp," *Seattle Times* (June 28, 2002), p. A12; Hal Bernton et al., "Chapter 10: The Mission," *Seattle Times* (June 30, 2002), p. A10; Hal Bernton et al., "Chapter 11: The Ticking Bomb," *Seattle Times* (July 1, 2002), p. A6; Hal Bernton et al., "Chapter 12: The Crossing," *Seattle Times* (July 2, 2002), p. A6; Ian Mulgrew, "Ressam Gets 22 Years in Prison," *Gazette* [Montreal] (July 28, 2005), p. A1; Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Michelle Shephard, "Dossier Reveals Secrets of Forming Al Qaeda Cell," *Toronto Star* (April 25, 2005), p. A12; Paul Shukovsky, "Terrorist Ahmed Ressam Is Sentenced but U.S. Judge Lashes Out at Bush Policies on Suspects," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* (July 28, 2005), p. A1.

Rowley, Coleen (1954–)

Coleen Rowley is the FBI agent from the Minneapolis field office who clashed with FBI headquarters over the handling of Zacarias Moussaoui's case. She was the principal legal advisor to the Minneapolis field office. She has been outspoken in her belief that the mishandling of the Moussaoui case by FBI headquarters contributed to the success of the terrorists on September 11.

Rowley spent twenty-four years in the FBI. She was born December 20, 1954, and raised in a small town in northeast Iowa. After high school, she attended Wartburg College in Waverly, Iowa. She graduated summa cum laude in 1977 with a degree in French. Her next decision was to enter the College of Law at the University of Iowa, from which she received a JD in 1980. Shortly thereafter, Rowley passed the Iowa bar exam. Her career choice was to become a FBI agent. After passing through the training at Quantico, Rowley was appointed a special agent with the FBI in January 1981. Her first assignment was in the Omaha, Nebraska, field office, but she soon was sent to the Jackson, Mississippi, field office. In 1984 Rowley was assigned to the New York field office, where she spent six years and specialized in organized crime. Because of her expertise in French, she received an assignment with the U.S. embassy in Paris, France, and later at the consulate in Montreal, Canada. Rowley received a promotion and an assignment to the Minneapolis field office as the chief legal adviser in 1990.

Rowley's chief claim to fame was her attack on FBI headquarters for the mishandling of the Moussaoui case. Special agent Harry Samit received a communication from personnel at the Eagan flight school that they believed Moussaoui might be attending their school to train for a terrorist attack. Moussaoui was arrested on a visa problem, but the agents at the Minneapolis office wanted a warrant to gain access to more information. Counterterrorism supervisors David Frasca and Michael Maltbie rejected the warrant requests. Bureau lawyers then turned down the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant request. Nothing was done, despite the growing frustration of the special agents at the Minneapolis field office, until after September 11. Rowley's frustration came to a head.

Rowley reacted negatively to the statement by the director of the FBI that an investigation of Moussaoui would not have prevented September 11. Her

Rowley's Response to Not Receiving Information about the Phoenix Memo

Although I agree it's very doubtful that the full scope of the tragedy could have been prevented, it's at least possible we could have gotten lucky and uncovered one or two more of the terrorists in flight training prior to Sept. 11, just as Moussaoui was discovered, after making contact with his flight instructors.

Quoted in Dan Eggen, "Agent Claims FBI Supervisor Thwarted Probe," *Washington Post* (May 27, 2002), p. A1.

response was a thirteen-page letter that she sent to Mueller on May 21, 2002, in which she outlined the failures of FBI leadership on the Moussaoui case. Rowley accused these FBI leaders of effectively "deliberately sabotaging" the Moussaoui investigation. She indicated that certain facts had been "omitted, downplayed, glossed over, and/or mischaracterized in an effort to avoid or minimize personal and/or institutional embarrassment on the part of the FBI and/or even perhaps for improper political reasons." Rowley criticized FBI headquarters of careerism, and she was indignant that those blocking the Moussaoui case and other terrorist cases were being promoted. Because Rowley knew that this letter

FBI Agent Coleen Rowley of the Minneapolis FBI field office testifies before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2002 at the Capitol in Washington. (AP IMAGES/Joe Marquette.)

was dynamite, she asked for whistle-blower protection against retaliation. At first Mueller kept the letter secret, but word got out. Rowley became an overnight sensation.

Rowley received an invitation to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee in June 2002. The Moussaoui case was off-limits, but she talked about the weaknesses of the FBI organization. She was critical that it took eight layers of bureaucracy before reaching the director. Another aspect of the FBI found lacking was its inadequate computer system. Despite assurances that there would be no retaliation from Mueller, Rowley knew that her FBI career was at an end. She retired from the FBI in 2004 after twenty-four years of service.

Rowley decided to run for political office in Minnesota. Her residence was in Apple Valley, Minnesota. She opted to run against incumbent representative John Kline for the Second Congressional District of Minnesota seat in the U.S. House of Representative in the November 2006 election. Rowley ran on an anti–Iraq War platform. Despite her popularity, she lost to Kline in the election.

See Also

Federal Bureau of Investigation; Moussaoui, Zacarias; Samit, Harry

See Document

Document #30

Suggested Reading

Dan Eggen, "Agent Claims FBI Supervisor Thwarted Probe," *Washington Post* (May 27, 2002), p. A1; Greg Gordon, "Rowley Explains Criticisms," *Star Tribune* [Minneapolis] (June 7, 2002), p. 1A; Susan Milligan, "FBI Whistle-Blower," *The Boston Globe* (June 7, 2002), p. A33; Richard Gid Powers, *Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI* (New York: Free Press, 2004); Robert Russo, "FBI Likened to Little Shop of Horrors," *Gazette* [Montreal] (June 7, 2002), p. B1.

S

Samit, Harry
Harry Samit is an FBI agent who attempted to warn the FBI and other U.S. agencies about the terrorist threat of Zacarias Moussaoui's pilot training. He had served as a U.S. Navy naval aviator and as a naval intelligence officer before joining the FBI. The FBI assigned him to the FBI field office in Minneapolis, Minnesota. After joining the FBI, he earned his small aircraft pilot license. Samit had been in the FBI for only about two years in the summer of 2001, but he was assigned to Squad 5 in the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to investigate terrorism. It was at this time that Samit received a tip about the erratic behavior of a Middle Eastern student at the Pam Am International Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota, near Minneapolis.

Samit conducted an investigation with the assistance of an INS agent attached to the JTTF. They ended up arresting Moussaoui on a visa violation. Clancy Provost, a certified flight instructor at the Pan-Am International Flight Academy, had become suspicious about what was motivating Moussaoui to fly a jumbo jet—in particular, Moussaoui's inquiries about cockpit doors and damage that a fully loaded Boeing 747 could inflict in a crash. It was also noted that Moussaoui was more interested in flying the aircraft than in takeoffs and landings. In addition, the Pan Am International Flight Academy catered to advanced pilots working for commercial airlines flying Boeing 747, Boeing 757, and Boeing 767, and Moussaoui had limited flying time and no small aircraft license.

Samit arrested Moussaoui on August 16, 2001, but his attempts to obtain a criminal search warrant and then a FISA court warrant were denied by FBI headquarters. FBI headquarters opposed a criminal warrant on the grounds that it might hinder a FISA court warrant. Samit's immediate supervisor, Greg Jones, tried to help him, but without success. Samit sent a twenty-six-page memo on August 20, 2001, citing that Moussaoui had been training on Boeing 747 flight simulators and had bought a pair of small knives, leading him to believe that Moussaoui was a terrorist bent on hijacking an airliner. This document arrived at FBI headquarters, but it never made it up the FBI's chain of command. The vital information linking Moussaoui to the Chechen rebels and their connection with

al-Qaeda in the FISA application was removed by the FBI's deputy counsel, thus killing the application. The head of the CIA, George Tenet, did receive a briefing based on FBI information about Islamic fundamentalists learning to fly, but not about Moussaoui. Samit also sent an e-mail to the FBI's bin Laden unit, but he did not receive a response before September 11, 2001.

Becoming frustrated by the FBI, Samit tried to notify the FAA by memo of the possible threat of an attempt to hijack an airliner. Again FBI headquarters censored the memo. Still determined to communicate his suspicions, Samit talked with a Minneapolis FAA official, but nothing came of the contact. Much as others in the Minneapolis office, Samit became increasingly bitter, but he refused to attack the FBI directly as his colleague Colleen Rowley did.

Information about Moussaoui

Special Agent Harry Samit, under cross-examination as Moussaoui's death-penalty trial . . . acknowledged that French intelligence advised the FBI 12 days before the attacks that Moussaoui was "very dangerous." The partially declassified French cable of Aug. 30, 2001, also said Moussaoui had been indoctrinated by Islamic extremists and had been in Afghanistan. But despite those red flags, Samit said, a request for a special national security warrant to search Moussaoui's belongings was—like earlier ones—shot down by headquarters supervisor Michael Maltbie and his boss, David Frasca. He said Maltbie had voiced concerns that an inadequately documented warrant request would hurt his career. Samit said headquarters went so far as to delete from one warrant request information from French intelligence that linked the leader of a Chechen rebel group with whom Moussaoui had associated to al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Headquarters then said Minneapolis agents had failed to tie Moussaoui to an international terror group.

Greg Gordon, "Moussaoui Alerts Ignored, Agent Says," *San Francisco Bee* (March 21, 2006), p. A1.

Samit even informed the CIA's Counterterrorism Center about the Moussaoui case. The CIA reacted with enthusiasm about linking Moussaoui with other intelligence information. FBI headquarters, however, reacted negatively to the CIA's receiving this information. Samit was rebuked for making this contact. Orders came down from FBI headquarters that the Minneapolis field office could contact others only through headquarters.

Samit did go along with the scheme to deport Moussaoui to France where French intelligence would then search his belongings and communicate their findings back to the FBI. Unfortunately, this plan was to be implemented on September 10, 2001. This scheme meant that news of the search would arrive back to the FBI sometime late on September 11 or September 12. Events on September 11 ended this initiative. After September 11, there was no problem obtaining a criminal warrant for Samit. The search found some incriminating evidence, and the most important was the telephone number of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, one of the leaders of the Hamburg Cell.

In his testimony at the Moussaoui trial in 2006, Samit gave his version of the Moussaoui case. He also blasted his superiors at FBI headquarters. He went so far as to accuse them of "criminal negligence, obstruction, and careerism."

See Also

Bin al-Shibh, Ramzi; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Moussaoui, Zacarias; Rowley, Coleen; Tenet, George

See Documents

Document #30; Document #40

Suggested Reading

Greg Gordon, "Terror Timeline Connects the Dots," *Star Tribune* [Minneapolis] (June 4, 2006), p. 16A; Neil A. Lewis, "F.B.I. Agent Testifies Superiors Didn't Pursue Moussaoui Case," *New York Times* (March 21, 2006), p. A12; Jerry Markon and Timothy Dwyer, "FBI Was Warned about Moussaoui," *Washington Post* (March 21, 2006), p. A1; Richard Gid Powers, *Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI* (New York: Free Press, 2004); Richard A. Serrano, "Agent Faults FBI on 9/11," *Los Angeles Times* (March 21, 2006), p. A1; Richard A. Serrano, "9/11 Trial Reveals Troubles Then, and Ahead," *Los Angeles Times* (March 26, 2006), p. A5.

Saracini, Victor J. (1950–2001)

Victor Saracini was the captain of the United Airlines Flight 175 that hijackers seized on September 11, 2001, and flew into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. He had worked as an airline pilot for United Airlines for sixteen years at the time of his death. At the time of the crash, Saracini was either dead or incapacitated.

Saracini made a success of himself after a slow start. He was born on August 29, 1950, and raised in Atlantic City, New Jersey. After dropping out of high school, Saracini worked a variety of jobs before applying to study at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology. He graduated in 1975 with a bachelor of general studies degree. His next career move was attending the Naval Aviation Officer Candidate School. Saracini successfully completed naval aviation training and became a naval pilot. He was commissioned as an ensign in December 1975. He served on S-3A anti-submarine warfare aircraft aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Saratoga. His active-duty service ended in 1980, but he remained in the Naval Reserve at Naval Air Station Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, until 1985. Saracini attained the rank of lieutenant and served as a crewmember on a Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft. After leaving the navy, Saracini worked as a flight instructor at Louisiana Tech University during the years 1980–82. It was at Louisiana Tech that he met and later married his wife—Ellen Saracini. He worked at flying corporate and commercial aircraft until he was able to find a pilot job with United Airlines in 1985. Saracini and his wife had two daughters: Kirsten and Brielle.

Saracini had no expectation of trouble on September 11, 2001, when his United Airlines Flight 175 left Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts, for Los Angeles International Airport. His first hint of trouble was when the air traffic controllers asked him if he could see American Airlines Flight 11. Saracini acknowledged that he could see that aircraft, and he was warned to maintain distance from that aircraft. Sometime around 8:47 a.m., the al-Qaeda hijack team used knives and mace to subdue the pilots and crew. It has been surmised that at this time the hijackers killed Saracini and his copilot, Michael Horrocks. The new pilot was Marwan al-Shehhi, and he turned the aircraft around, directing it toward the New York City area. After lulling the passengers into thinking that the plane would land someplace safely and use them as hostages in negotiations, al-Shehhi crashed the aircraft into the South Tower of the World Trade Center complex. Everyone in the aircraft was instantly killed.

Saracini has been honored in various ways. Louisiana Tech has established a fellowship, the Victor J. Saracini Flight Scholarship. The Veterans Administration named an outpatient clinic north of Philadelphia after him—the Victor J. Saracini

Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic. His wife has worked to establish a memorial—Garden of Reflection—at Memorial Park on Woodside Road in Lower Makefield, Pennsylvania. Finally, he was a dedicated member of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), and this union has honored him.

See Also
United Airlines Flight 175

Suggested Reading
Chris English, "Saracini's Heart, Soul in Sept. 11 Memorial," *Bucks County Courier Times* [Pennsylvania] (May 29, 2005), p. 1.

Scheuer, Michael (1952?-)

Michael Scheuer was the head of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center's Alec Station during the early stages of the war between Osama bin Laden and the United States. He believed from the first that bin Laden constituted a clear and present danger to the United States, but he had difficulty persuading the leadership of the CIA and the Clinton administration about the threat. His strident attacks on those in the CIA and the Clinton administration who prevented the Alec Station from assassinating bin Laden led to his removal as head of the Alec Station in 1999, but he remained vocal on the issue. Since his resignation from the CIA in 2004, he has maintained a high profile by writing two books that castigate those who did not understand the threat of bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

Little is known about Scheuer's personal background. He was born sometime around 1952, but there is little information about where or about the details of his upbringing. As with most CIA agents, personal data are hard to come by. What is known is that Scheuer attended Canisius College in Buffalo, New York, graduating in 1974. He then obtained a master's degree from Niagara University in 1976. His final educational degree was a PhD from the University of Manitoba in 1986. Based on the fact that he served twenty-two years in the CIA and retired in 2004, Scheuer must have joined the CIA in 1982. Scheuer was never a field officer, but he worked as an analyst. Evidently he was good at analysis because in 1996 he was assigned to head the Osama bin Laden Unit in the Counterterrorism Center. This unit soon earned the name Alec Station after Scheuer's adopted son Alec.

Scheuer directed all of the assets of the Alec Station to find ways to neutralize bin Laden. In his three years as head of this unit, he became extremely frustrated in the failure of the Clinton administration to carry out operations to eliminate bin Laden as a threat. Scheuer made plain that collateral damage was acceptable to him if the operation captured or killed bin Laden. The Clinton administration, however, was leery of collateral damage. Another of Scheuer's assignments was drafting the provisions of the rendition process that was later authorized by President Clinton.

Scheuer has a pugnacious personality, and this led to personality conflicts with key people in government circles. He also had difficulty sharing information with the FBI. A personality conflict developed between him and John O'Neill, the counterterrorism expert with the FBI. O'Neill was just as aggressive as Scheuer, and they clashed. Both Scheuer and O'Neill kept material secret from the other agency. Scheuer's behavior became so aggressive that he was relieved as head of Alec Station in 1999. He stayed on in the CIA, and in September 2001 the CIA appointed him special advisor to the chief of Alec Station. He retained his position until he resigned from the CIA on November 12, 2004.

Since his retirement from the CIA, Scheuer has maintained a high profile as a critic of both the Clinton and Bush administrations' counterterrorism efforts. While still with the CIA, he wrote a book that gave the view of the United States from bin Laden's perspective titled *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of the United States* (2003). The outline of this book had originally been written as an unclassified manual for counterterrorism officers, but Scheuer expanded it and received approval of the CIA to publish it. This book created so much controversy that the CIA has amended its policy, now prohibiting CIA agents from writing books while still employed. After his resignation from the CIA, Scheuer wrote another book, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror* (2004). A lifelong Republican, Scheuer has been especially critical of President Clinton for not authorizing operations to neutralize bin Laden. He also attacked the American intelligence community for its failures of leadership. Finally, he was critical of the 9/11 Commission because of its failure to implicate and directly punish officials in the intelligence community who were negligent.

Scheuer has been actively spreading his views in the media. Besides drawing attention to intelligence failures before September 11, 2001, he has been critical of President Bush and his Iraq policies. It is Scheuer's contention that the American invasion and occupation of Iraq has not made the United States safer but rather has emboldened bin Laden, al-Qaeda groups, and other Muslim extremists. Scheuer laments that the Iraq war ended the hunt for bin Laden because he still constitutes a real threat. Although a frequent critic of the CIA, he also sometimes defends it from what he considers baseless charges.

Because elements in the CIA did not go along with the justification for the Iraq invasion, they have been punished. Alec Station's staff was reduced from twenty-five to only twelve. Most of the more experienced analysts were transferred to other positions. Then, in July 2006, the CIA shut down Alec Station with the explanation that the Islamist jihadist movement had diversified. Scheuer reacted to this closing by stating that this shutdown squandered ten years of expertise in the war on terror.

Scheuer's Views on the War on Terror

We are in danger of losing the war on terror. . . . The bin Laden unit was dismantled this summer, which Scheuer describes as an "appalling but not surprising example" of the CIA's distraction from its mission in Afghanistan and from the focus on snaring bin Laden. . . . Scheuer contends that important intelligence assets specifically spy planes, satellite imagery and intelligence analysts have been shifted away from Afghanistan to Iraq. He also emphasizes that the US military's reluctance to put troops on the ground in Afghanistan has plagued its efforts. . . . And he derides Washington's reliance on a conventional military response to a shadowy transnational enemy that will not be defeated by conventional means. "Americans have every right to ask how it is possible that we haven't killed or captured bin Laden. They should be questioning why we have almost 10 times the number of troops in Iraq. . . . I can understand if people are mad. They should be."

Quoted in Charles M. Sennott, "An Evasive Quarry, a Changing Mission," *Boston Globe* (September 12, 2006), p. A1.

Mike Scheuer, a twenty-two-year CIA veteran, and head of the CIA's Osama bin Laden unit until 1999, talks to the AP about the challenges of conducting the war against al-Qaeda, in an interview from his home in Falls Church, Virginia, in 2004. (AP IMAGES/J. Scott Applewhite.)

Scheuer has frequent opportunities to express his views. He has been employed as a news analyst for CBS News, commenting on counterterrorism issues. His affiliation with the Jamestown Foundation as its terrorism analyst has provided him with another forum. Much of his work at the Jamestown Foundation has been with its online publication *Global Terrorism Analysis*. Scheuer has also been active at scholarly conferences speaking on terrorism.

See Also

Alec Station; Bin Laden, Osama; Bush Administration; Central Intelligence Agency; Clinton Administration

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Suzanne Goldenberg, "Agents Who Led Bin Laden Hunt Criticises CIA," *Guardian* [London] (July 8, 2006), p. 14; Greg Gordon, "Ex-CIA Official: Bush Plays into al-Qaeda's Hands," *Sacramento Bee* (November 20, 2004), p. A12; Eric Lichtblau, "Officer Denounces Agency and Sept. 11 Report," *New York Times* (August 17, 2004), p. A14; Dana Priest, "Former Chief of CIA's Bin Laden Unit Leaves," *Washington Post* (November 12, 2004), p. A4; Michael Scheuer, "A Fine Rendition," *New York Times* (March 11, 2005), p. A23; Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Knopf, 2006).

Scholars for 9/11 Truth

The Scholars for 9/11 Truth is an organization of academics and professionals who question the U.S. government's account of the events surrounding September 11, 2001. James H. Fetzer, a retired professor of philosophy from the University of

Minnesota at Duluth, and Steven E. Jones, a retired professor of physics from Brigham Young University, founded the Scholars for 9/11 Truth on December 15, 2005. Fetzer has remained as co-chair and webmaster of the group, but Jones left the group in December 2006. The original size of the group was around three hundred members, of which seventy-six were academics. Sixty-nine of them were in the humanities and social sciences. There were four physicists and three engineers. Critics have questioned the academic credentials of some of the members. Membership has fluctuated because there have been disagreements among members.

Although members hold various viewpoints, most members subscribe to the thesis that a coterie within the U.S. government planned and executed the attacks on September 11, 2001. They point out inconsistencies in the government's treatment. The most common belief is that the collapse of the World Trade Center complex is inconsistent with scientific facts unless controlled explosives were used. Many theorists propose thermal bombs were planted in the buildings. Witness accounts and the conclusion of such experts as firefighter Ray Downey are discounted. Downey was an expert on building collapses, and he predicted the collapse of the twin towers at the site shortly before losing his life there.

Leaders of the Scholars for 9/11 Truth have been active in disseminating their views, but divergent views have caused internal strains. Several members left the group because of the leadership's refusal to accept their arguments that no aircraft hit the World Trade Center complex. Even pictures showing the two aircraft hitting first the North Tower and then the South Tower combined with numerous eyewitness testimonies were not enough for them.

The most serious dissident was Steven E. Jones, a physicist at Brigham Young University before retirement. His argument was that the World Trade Center complex was destroyed by controlled demolitions on September 11. He stated that the physics did not work out and that the buildings could not collapse the way they did unless bombs were used. His controversial remarks and his activities as one of the founders and the co-chair of the Scholars for 9/11 Truth led Brigham Young University to place him on paid leave. He retired from the university on October 20, 2006. Jones began having doubts about Fetzer's claim about the U.S. government's possible use of mini-nukes, or high-energy weapons, against the World Trade Center. He resigned from the Scholars for 9/11 Truth on December 5, 2006. Shortly afterward, Jones started a new organization called Scholars for 9/11 Truth and Justice.

Now there are two organizations competing for the same audience. Of the two, the original group, still led by Fetzer, is more open to extreme theories about September 11. Jones's group has fewer adherents, but he is more careful about extreme claims. He also calls for more scientific research. Both organizations remain high-profile adherents to the idea of U.S. government misconduct on September 11. The problem for both groups is that recognized professionals in the scientific world have rejected their claims, and the groups lack the evidence necessary to overcome these objections.

See Also

Conspiracy Theories; Fetzer, James H.; Jones, Steven E.

Suggested Reading

Andrew Cline, "A Conspiracy against Us All," *National Review* (September 11, 2006), p. 1; Jonathan Curiel, "The Conspiracy to Rewrite 9/11; Conspiracy Theorists Insist the U.S.

Government, Not Terrorists, Staged the Devastating Attacks," *San Francisco Chronicle* (September 3, 2006), p. E1; John Gravois, "A Theory That Just Won't Die: Across America, a Small But Fanatical Cadre of Conspiracy-Minded Academics Believe the U.S. Government Engineered 9/11," *National Post* [Canada] (July 28, 2006), p. A14; Bob von Steinberg, "Some Look Back to 9/11 and See a U.S. Conspiracy," *Star Tribune* [Minneapolis] (September 6, 2006), p. 1A.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11

The Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 was the first attempt to study intelligence failures leading up to September 11. Robert Graham, chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Porter Goss, chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, agreed on the need for a joint committee of the two houses to study intelligence gathering before September 11. For the inquiry to be successful, they agreed that it had to be bipartisan, and it would need to have the full support of the congressional leadership and the White House. Despite assurances of support, the committee ran into opposition from the CIA, the FBI, and the White House. There was also little enthusiasm in Congress; it took Congress five months to announce the inquiry and another four months before the committee began to function.

The Joint Inquiry committee finally received its mandate in early 2002, and the co-chairmen Robert Graham and Porter Goss announced its beginning on February 14, 2002. It had a ten-month deadline to accomplish its task of evaluating the intelligence record before September 11, 2001. In the first months, the investigators for the Joint Inquiry began to compile evidence. Hearings began in June 2002. Those hearings in June, July, and the first half of September were held in closed sessions. In the second half of September, there were open hearings. Hearings in October alternated between open and closed. A final report of the Joint Inquiry appeared on December 10, 2002, but only 24 of the more than 800 pages were released to the public.

Eleanor Hill, a lawyer and former Pentagon inspector general, was the staff director for the committee. Hill had not been the first choice of the committee, but its first choice, L. Britt Snider, had run into difficulty because of his friendship with George Tenet, the director of the CIA. Hill was recommended by Sam Nunn, a former Georgia senator, to Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL). She was a partner in the law firm King and Spalding when she was offered the job working with the Joint Inquiry committee.

Hill's job was to supervise the creation of a variety of staff reports that pointed out intelligence gathering deficiencies. Her crew had to comb through the 150,000 pages of documents from the CIA, and a like number of documents from the FBI. Most of the difficulty was in obtaining access to the documents in the first place. Members of the staff also conducted intensive interviews and attended briefings.

Hill reported to the Joint Inquiry committee on all aspects of the intelligence picture before September 11. Among her reports to the committee was one on the FBI's failure to react to the Phoenix Memo and the refusal of FBI headquarters to

authorize a search warrant for Zacarias Moussaoui's possessions. She also reported that the intelligence community had received at least twelve reports of possible terrorist attacks before September 11 but that nothing had been done about them.

A controversy developed when there was a leak of closed-session testimony from General Hayden about the National Security Agency (NSA). The testimony was about the fact that the NSA had intercepted two al-Qaeda messages on September 10, 2001, indicating that something would happen on September 11, but these fragmentary messages were not translated until September 12, 2001. Despite the classified nature of this material, first the *Washington Times* and then the Cable News Network (CNN) learned of it and publicized it widely. Other newspapers also picked up the story. This leak led Vice President Dick Cheney to attack the Joint Inquiry committee as the source of the leak. Cheney reprimanded both Goss and Graham by telephone. This incident produced negative publicity for the committee and led Goss and Graham to invite the FBI to investigate the leak. Nothing came of the investigation, but it gave critics of the committee more ammunition. It also further clouded an already tense relationship between the inquiry and the Bush administration.

Cooperation from the CIA and the FBI was minimal. Only four CIA witness testified, including George Tenet. None of the key FBI agents appeared before the committee. Senator Shelby complained about the lack of cooperation.

The Bush administration had doubts about the Joint Inquiry committee from the beginning, but it was more than unhappy about the final report. It wanted the final report to be a validation of its position that there was no way September 11 could have been avoided, meaning that no one was responsible. As soon as the White House realized the Joint Inquiry committee did not subscribe to this view, all cooperation ceased.

Republican Senator Richard C. Shelby's Complaint about Lack of Cooperation

We've been assured by Vice President Richard B. Cheney that the administration—that means all the agencies, the CIA, NSA, FBI—would cooperate with this joint investigation. They're not cooperating fully.

Quoted in Joyce Howard Price, "Shelby Says FBI Was 'Asleep or Inept, or Both'," *Washington Times* (May 19, 2002), p. A1.

Officials of the White House worked to block the release of the full report, wanting instead to classify parts of the material retroactively. Consequently, the issuing of the full report was delayed, and significant parts of it were classified as secret. Most notable of the blacked-out sections was the section on Saudi citizens on American soil on September 11. Even the 9/11 Commission had difficulty gaining access to the full report, but in the end the full report came out.

In the final analysis the failure to obtain key documents made the thirty-seven-member Joint Inquiry committee unhappy. The staff had reviewed almost 500,000 pages of documents from intelligence agencies and other sources. Approximately 300 interviews had been conducted, and 600 people had briefed them about intelligence matters. There had been thirteen closed sessions and nine public hearings.

Once the classified report was deposited on December 20, 2002, the battle began on the classified parts of the report. The first agency to look at it was the CIA. The CIA classified whole sections of the report, including material that had

already appeared in the media. This wholesale reclassification was too much for the Joint Inquiry committee's staff. In a meeting with representatives from the CIA, the FBI, and the NSA, the staff went over the report page by page, reclaiming much of the material. The final obstacle was the White House, and its representatives wanted large parts of the report classified. The most notable section blacked out by the White House consisted of twenty-seven pages that dealt with the Saudi government's help given to the September 11 conspirators. White House representatives wanted the changes to the report to be hidden, but the final unclassified version of the report has those areas shaded in black. On July 24, 2003, the final unclassified report appeared.

Although there were gaps in the report because of documents that were never produced, the Joint Inquiry committee did document the failures of U.S. intelligence agencies. Both the CIA and the FBI received special criticism. The staff did uncover new information—the Phoenix Memo, the Moussaoui debacle, warnings about possible use of aircraft as weapons, failures to monitor known al-Qaeda operatives, and lack of coordination between CIA and FBI, to name only a few. Its most important recommendation was for the creation of a cabinet-level position, Director of National Intelligence, to coordinate all American intelligence agencies and their activities.

Senator Richard C. Shelby's Comment on the Responsibility of the FBI for Intelligence Failures

Asked who he believes was responsible for failing to understand the clues received before September 11 attacks, Mr. Shelby said: "I believe it is the FBI that's the responsible party. And I believe the FBI has failed the American people in that regard nothing was done on the information in that Phoenix memo. The FBI was either asleep or inept or both."

Joyce Howard Price, "Shelby Says FBI Was 'Asleep or Inept, or Both'," *Washington Times* (May 19, 2002), p. A1.

See Also
Central Intelligence Agency; Moussaoui, Zacarias; Phoenix Memo

See Documents
Document #26; Document #27; Document #28; Document #29; Document #30

Suggested Reading
Mike Allen, "Bush Seeks to Restrict Hill Probes of Sept. 11," *Washington Post* (January 30, 2002), p. A4; Bill Gertz, *Breakdown: The Failure of American Intelligence to Defeat Global Terror*, rev. ed. (New York: Plume Books, 2003); Eric Lichtblau, "Report Details F.B.I.'s Failure on 2 Hijackers," *New York Times* (June 10, 2005), p. A1; John Prados, "Slow-Walked and Stonewalled," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 59.2 (March/April 2003), pp. 28–37; Dana Priest, "FBI Leak Probe Irks Lawmakers," *Washington Post* (August 2, 2002), p. A1; James Risen, "White House Drags Its Feet on Testifying at 9/11 Panel," *New York Times* (September 13, 2002), p. A12.

Shehhi, Marwan Yousef Muhammed Rashid Lekrab al- (1978–2001)

Marwan al-Shehhi was one of the key figures in the suicide hijacking of the American aircrafts on September 11, 2001. While attending school in Hamburg, al-Shehhi attended the al-Quds Mosque and joined the Islamist extremists in the Hamburg Cell. His friendship with Mohamed Atta and their sharing of a commitment to Islamist religious views made it easy for al-Shehhi to become a member of the September 11 conspiracy. He was the hijackers' pilot for the United Airlines

Flight 175 that crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center complex on September 11, 2001.

Al-Shehhi was raised in a religious environment. He was born on May 9, 1978, and raised in Ras al-Khaimah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Ras al-Khaimah was one of the poorest and most conservative of the emirates. The family was a member of the Shooh Bedouin tribe. His father was the person who called people to pray at the mosques (muezzin) in Ras al-Khaimah. Good grades allowed him to attend the Emirates al-Ain University. After finishing his schooling, al-Shehhi entered the UAE Army. Soon after he entered the military and reached the rank of sergeant, the army awarded him a scholarship to further his education in Germany. His goal was to study marine engineering. The government of the UAE gave him a scholarship of $2,000 monthly with a yearly bonus of $5,000. He entered into a German-language preparatory course in Bonn, which he passed in 1996. Next he enrolled at the University of Bonn, but his father's death in 1997 caused him to fail his coursework when he took an unofficial leave to return to the UAE. Returning to Germany, al-Shehhi passed the next course in 1997. He was an average student with little ambition. One of his teachers called him "aimless and immature."

By the time al-Shehhi returned to Germany, he was becoming increasingly militant in his religious views. Unhappy with the environment in Bonn, he petitioned the UAE Army to allow him to transfer his studies to the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg. The strict religious environment at the al-Quds Mosque satisfied his new religiosity. His friendship with Atta only increased this tendency.

Marwan al-Shehhi's Religious Conviction

Shehhi never voiced the slightest doubts about his beliefs. He never spoke about women as anything other than potential marriage partners, and never spoke to them at all, unless compelled. There was nothing the least bit secular in his background. As one of the few Gulf Arabs in the Harburg group, and the son of a religiously trained father, Shehhi had more formal Islamic education, and had lived a stricter version of Islam his entire life, than the others.

Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), pp. 54–55.

By this time al-Shehhi's relationship with Atta had solidified, with Atta as the leader and al-Shehhi as a faithful follower. They had different personalities, with al-Shehhi playing the role of the "joker" and Atta the serious strategist. Despite his easy-going style, al-Shehhi was the acknowledged expert on Islamic scripture. Together with Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, the three were the heart and soul of the Hamburg Cell. The friends constantly debated how they could make a contribution to the Muslim cause. At first, they wanted to fight on the side of the Chechen rebels in Chechnya. But an al-Qaeda recruiter convinced them that joining al-Qaeda would be a better alternative to fighting in Chechnya. Al-Shehhi traveled with his friends to Afghanistan to train at al-Qaeda training camps.

Al-Shehhi left for Afghanistan in the fall of 1998 for training at the al-Qaeda Khalden camp. While in Kandahar, he—along with Mohamed Atta and Ziad Jarrah—met and talked with Osama bin Laden. Al-Shehhi, Atta, and Jarrah were recruited at this conversation for a special future martyrdom mission. Once they accepted the mission, Mohammad Atef outlined the basic outlines of the September 11 plot.

Returning to Germany, al-Shehhi joined with Atta and Ramzi in working at a warehouse, packing crates of computers for shipping. Never excited about his education, al-Shehhi stopped going to class, and the school dropped him as a student in December 2000.

Al-Shehhi became number two man behind Atta in the September 11 plot. He arrived in the United States separately from Atta, but they kept in touch. They trained together in Florida. Although al-Shehhi was never a skilled pilot, he was able to pilot United Airlines Flight 175 into the South Tower on September 11, 2001.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 11: Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Hamburg Cell; Bin al-Shibh, Ramzi; World Trade Center.

See Document

Document #13

Suggested Reading

Jane Corbin, *Al-Qaeda: The Terror Network That Threatens the World* (New York: Thunder Mouth's Press, 2002); Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005); Stefan Aust et al., *Inside 9-11: What Really Happened* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001).

Smith, Moira (1963–2001)

Moira Smith was the only woman police officer in the New York City Police Department (NYPD) to die at the World Trade Center complex on September 11, 2001. She had been a police officer for thirteen years. Her husband was also a police officer. She died assisting those escaping from the South Tower just before the building collapsed.

Smith came to police work after a short career as a travel agent. She was born on February 14, 1963, in Brooklyn, New York. Her maiden name was Reddy. Both parents were Irish immigrants. She was popular in school. After graduation, she worked as a travel agent. Smith loved traveling, and her job gave her opportunities to do so. Then she decided to join the NYPD.

Smith spent the rest of her life in the police department. After joining the department on July 11, 1988, her first assignment was working in the Transit Police Department. Smith was awarded the Distinguished Duty Medal for her efforts in rescuing people from a derailed subway train on August 28, 1991. Smith decided to transfer from the Transit Police Department to regular police work. Her assignment was with the Thirteenth Precinct. She assumed her duties in the precinct in March 1996.

Smith's personal life was as satisfying as her police career. It was at the Transit Police Department that she met and married her husband—fellow police officer James Smith. They were both avid sports fans. Their marriage began in May 1998, and their daughter Patricia was born in July 1999. In September 2001 her husband was assigned to the police academy.

Smith died on September 11 helping evacuate people from the South Tower of the World Trade Center complex. She was on duty at the Thirteenth Precinct when the news arrived about an aircraft crash at the World Trade Center complex. Her first action was to rush to the scene of the emergency. There Smith gathered a number of people and took them to safety at her precinct. Smith then returned to the World

A photo of New York Police Officer Moira Smith, who died in the World Trade Center on September 11, is taped under her engraved name at the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial in Washington on April 29, 2002. The names of Smith and eleven other law enforcement officers who died in the 9/11 attack are engraved on the memorial. (AP IMAGES/Kenneth Lambert.)

Trade Center complex to help evacuate more people. A photographer from the New York *Daily News* snapped a picture of her leading an injured man to safety from the South Tower. She had returned to the South Tower to help others when the South Tower collapsed, killing her. Several hundred people credited her for saving their lives.

It was not until March that the searchers were able to recover Smith's body. Smith was one of seven bodies found near the South Tower by searchers on March 20, 2002. Despite the fact that it was 4:00 a.m. when her body was found, an honor guard of police wrapped her in a U.S. flag and escorted her body through the wind and rain to the morgue.

Smith has received several honors for her heroism. A hero's salute was given to her at a 2002 Valentine's Day Mass at St. Patrick's Cathedral. The NYPD's Emerald Society Pipes and Drums escorted the family on this occasion. In a December 2002 awards ceremony, Moira Smith was awarded the NYPD's highest award for bravery—the Medal of Honor. Since then, a street has been named after her, and a ferry bears her name.

See Also
New York City Police Department

See Document
Document #14

Suggested Reading
Austin Fenner and Greg Gittrich, "7 More Bodies Found at WTC Site," *Daily News* [New York] (March 21, 2001), p. 3; Marianne Garvey, Mark Stamey, and Clemente Lisi, "Police Pay Tribute to Finest Heroine," *New York Post* (March 24, 2002), p. 17; Susan Hagen and Mary Carouba, *Women at Ground Zero: Stories of Courage and Compassion* (New York: Alpha Books, 2002); Michele McPhee, "Hero Given Last Salute: She Was Mom, Wife & Cop," *Daily News* [New York] (February 15, 2002),

Comment on Moira Smith's Performance as a Police Officer

I was always impressed with the way she did her job. She wasn't careless, but she never hesitated. She liked being out there with people, and she enjoyed the excitement. She was a good cop, and she knew how to handle people. What Moira did on September 11—and this is true for all the officers—wasn't a one-time thing. That's who Moira was. That was what she did every day. She wasn't reckless, but she never backed down.

Comment by Smith's husband, Jim Smith, quoted in Susan Hagen and Mary Carouba, *Women at Ground Zero: Stories of Courage and Compassion* (New York: Alpha Books, 2002), p. 311.

p. 8; Michele McPhee, "In His Girl's Face the Image of Her Lost Mom," *Daily News* [New York] (September 8, 2002), p. 15.

Swift Project

Within weeks of the events of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration launched a secret program to trace the financial records of people suspected of having ties to al-Qaeda. This secret project has been called the Swift Project. It was named after the Brussels banking consortium, Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). The SWIFT serves as a gatekeeper for electronic transactions between 7,800 international institutions, and it is owned by a cooperative with more than 2,200 organizations. Every major commercial bank, brokerage house, fund manager, and stock exchange used its services.

The Bush administration entrusted the CIA and the U.S. Treasury Department to set up and run the Swift Project. Legal justification for the implementation of this project was the president's emergency economic powers. American agents used computer programs to wade through huge amounts of sensitive data from the transactions of SWIFT. Treasury officials have maintained then and now that the Swift Project was exempt from American laws restricting government access to private financial records because the cooperative was classified as a messaging service, not a bank or financial institution. This allowed the U.S. government to track money from a Saudi bank account of a suspected terrorist to a source in the United States, or elsewhere in the world. Evidently it was information of this type that allowed American officials to locate and capture Riduan Isamuddin Hambali, the operations chief of the Indonesian terrorist group Gama'a Islamiyya, in Thailand.

News of the Swift Project became public in 2006. It became identified with the surveillance of American citizens by the U.S. government. Despite considerable negative publicity, the Bush administration has continued to use the Swift Project to track the financial records of organizations and people suspected of giving money to al-Qaeda.

See Also

Bush Administration; Central Intelligence Agency

Suggested Reading

Bryan Bender, "Terrorist Funds-Tracking No Secret, Some Say," *Boston Globe* (June 28, 2006), p. 1; Dan Bilefsky, "Bank Consortium Faces Outcry on Data Transfer," *International Herald Tribune* (June 29, 2006), p. 4; Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, "Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror," *New York Times* (June 23, 2006), p. 1; Josh Meyer and Greg Miller, "U.S. Secretly Tracks Global Bank Data," *Los Angeles Times* (June 23, 2006), p. 1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Eric Lichtblau, "Cheney Assails Press on Report on Bank Data," *New York Times* (June 24, 2006), p. 1.

T

Taliban

The first casualty of the American reaction to the September 11, 2001, attacks was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Mohammed Omar had founded the Taliban in the spring of 1994, and he remained its head until the Northern Alliance, with the assistance of the United States, overthrew the Taliban regime in late 2001. It was Omar's alliance with Osama bin Laden and the sponsorship of al-Qaeda training camps that led to the overthrow of the Taliban.

Omar founded the Taliban in the spring of 1994 in reaction to the feuding among Afghan warlords. He was born in 1959 into a poor Pashtun family in the small village of Nodeh near Kandahar, Afghanistan. His father was a landless peasant belonging to the Pashtun Hotak tribe of the Ghilzia branch of the Pashtuns. His early death left Omar in the hands of relatives. Omar studied at an Islamic school in Kandahar, but he never graduated from it. This failure to graduate did not prevent him from opening a madrasa (religious school) in Singhesar, a village near Kandahar.

Meaning of the Word *Taliban*

The word "Taliban" literally means "students" in Arabic. However, in Persian this plural form of "talib" means "religious student." The word is merely applied to those who seek religious scholarship in traditional circles of learning, namely madrasahs. The students enrolled in theological and Islamic studies in modern universities are not called "talib."

M. J. Gohari, *The Taliban: Ascent to Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 31.

Shortly after fighting broke out between the Soviet army and the Afghans, Omar joined the mujahideen. He served in the ranks of the Younis Khalis' Brigade of the Islamic Party. Omar was in the middle of heavy fighting, and he suffered four wounds, including a shrapnel wound that caused the loss of his right eye. His combat experience and his wound increased his prestige among the Afghan Islamists because it proved that he had suffered for the Muslim cause. After the end of the war in 1989, Omar returned to his religious school.

Omar remained at his school until he became enraged by the conduct of an oppressive warlord who had raped two young women. He gathered a group of

religious students (Taliban), and they hanged the warlord. Pakistani authorities in the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) noted Omar's growing popularity among the Pashtuns after this act. They decided to give military aid to Omar and his Taliban forces. In the March 1996 council of Afghanistan's religious leaders at Kandahar, Omar was selected to be the head of the Taliban, or Commander of the Faithful. Using this religious authority, along with financial and military aid from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Omar and his Taliban forces were strong enough militarily on September 27, 1996, to seize Kabul and control most of Afghanistan.

After the triumph of the Taliban, Omar's strict interpretation of the Koran led him to institute the most severe religious restrictions on the Afghan population. The Taliban had difficulty ruling Afghanistan because its members preferred to focus on religion rather than politics or ways to run a government. Consequently, it was easy to turn to the Koran to rule. The Taliban regime issued a series of rules. Men were subjected to compulsory praying, and they were required to wear beards and turbans. Women lost all rights to hold jobs outside the home, and they could appear in public only when completely covered from head to foot and in the company of a male relative. Art, dancing, music, and television were forbidden. All secular education ended immediately, and boys were required to attend religious schools. Schooling for girls ended entirely. Criminals faced execution or mutilation for their crimes following the laws laid down in the Koran.

Explanation of the Taliban Movement by Vahid Mohdeh, a Former Taliban Official in the Afghan Foreign Ministry

The Taliban movement was not essentially political and its leaders were extremely religious individuals. In some instances such as with Mullah Omar, mystic inclinations were apparent. Many of them had no knowledge beyond a few religious books and their worldly perspective was limited to a couple of provinces in Afghanistan. Their understanding of political matters was completely auditory, the result of listening to radio news or talking with people. The majority of these leaders had no desire to study anything but the Holy Koran and religious texts.

Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 163.

Omar had his Islamist Taliban regime firmly in control of most of Afghanistan, but his forces were still trying to defeat the anti-Taliban coalition of the Northern Alliance in the northern area of Afghanistan. For this the Taliban needed an ally, and bin Laden and al-Qaeda were available. Osama bin Laden had settled in Afghanistan in May 1996 after leaving the Sudan, and his al-Qaeda network had been placed at the disposal of the Taliban regime. To consolidate his relationship with the Taliban, bin Laden swore an oath of allegiance (*bayat*) to Mullah Omar. Al-Qaeda forces fought alongside Taliban forces in the war against the Northern Alliance. In return, the Taliban allowed bin Laden to build training camps to train al-Qaeda operatives.

Omar refused to hand bin Laden over to the United States after the September 11 attacks on the United States. The United States and its allies joined with the Northern Alliance in fighting against the Taliban. Despite the loss of its most important military leader in an al-Qaeda assassination of General Ahmed Shah Masoud, the Northern Alliance was able to overthrow the Taliban regime. Serious

Relationship between Taliban and Osama bin Laden as Described by a Pakistani Journalist

I think that Mullah Omar had a personal relationship with bin Laden. The majority of the Taliban leaders were against bin Laden and that is the reason that whenever I visited Afghanistan to interview bin Laden I was arrested by Taliban. I think that bin Laden was successful in telling Mullah Omar that "I'm fighting a religious war and this is a very important juncture of history and if you are going to surrender in front of the Americans, if you are going to accept the demand that I should be expelled from Afghanistan, you will humiliate the whole nation of Afghans in history." So that's why Mullah Omar was ready to sacrifice everything for Osama bin Laden. But the rest of the Taliban, they were saying that bin Laden is the biggest threat for the first ever Islamic government in modern times and if he is not forced to leave Afghanistan, then we will not be able to spread the world of God through our government. So actually there were two schools of thought in the Taliban and the majority of the Taliban leaders, they were against bin Laden.

Quoted in Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 236.

fighting near Kandahar forced Omar to leave the city on October 7, 2001. Omar remains a fugitive, probably hiding in the tribal lands of northwest Pakistan. His followers are still active in Afghanistan, hoping to restore the Taliban to power.

See Also
Bin Laden, Osama; Qaeda, al-; Zawahiri, Ayman al-

See Document
Document #20

Suggested Reading
Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History of Al Qaeda* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); M. J. Gohari, *The Taliban: Ascent to Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Peter Marsden, *The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan,* rev. ed. (London: Zed Books, 2002); Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (London: Tauris, 2002).

Tenet, George (1953–)

George Tenet was the head of the CIA during the period leading up to and on September 11, 2001. He had been appointed head of the CIA by President Bill Clinton, and his mission had been to revitalize the organization. The CIA had experienced limited success with its two previous heads, leading to low morale and several key retirements. Tenet's background in congressional circles made him a good choice to repair damaged relations between the CIA and Congress.

Tenet came from a humble background. He was born on January 5, 1953, in Flushing, Queens, New York City. His father was a Greek immigrant, and his mother was an ethnic Greek who had fled Communist Albania. They ran a restaurant in Queens—the 20th Century Diner. Tenet was raised in Little Neck, Queens, where he attended Public School 94, Middle School 67, and Cardozo High School. After graduation from high school, Tenet entered Georgetown University, where he graduated in 1976 with a degree from the School of Foreign Service. Since then, he has been a devoted Georgetown basketball fan. He then earned a master's degree from the School of International Affairs at Columbia University in 1978.

Most of Tenet's professional life has been in government service. His first job was as the research director of the American Hellenic Institute. After three years there, he found a position working for Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania. His next job was as a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), and he then served as its staff director. It was his experience on the SSCI

that led president-elect Bill Clinton to select him as a member of the national security transition team. After Clinton became president, Tenet was appointed senior director of intelligence programs at the National Security Council. He held this post from 1993 to 1995.

The Clinton administration decided that Tenet's next position should be in the CIA. Tenet was appointed deputy director of central intelligence in July 1995. He served in this post until the abrupt resignation of Deutch in 1996. During most of 1996 until U.S. Senate confirmed him as the director of central intelligence on July 1997, he served as the acting director. Tenet was a compromise candidate after President Clinton's first choice was rejected. The CIA was in disarray with budget cuts from Congress leading to severe personnel cuts. CIA personnel welcomed Tenet because it was known that he was an effective political operator, and the CIA needed to improve its image with Congress and other outsiders. Besides restoring relations with Congress and building morale, Tenet placed counterterrorism high on the CIA's agenda. He did so because of his increasing concern about the growing influence of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

CIA Official L. Britt Snider's Appraisal of Tenet's Personality

I think he's always been a complex person. Ambitious, but never really a self-promoter. He never took himself too seriously, and he never sought the spotlight. While he's gregarious with people he knows, he actually seems rather shy around people he doesn't know. He's tough-minded but doesn't like to lock horns in controversies or turf battles if he can avoid them. He's fun to be around, but someone who's deadly serious about what he's doing.

Ronald Kessler, *The CIA at War: Inside the Secret Campaign against Terror* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2003), p. 43.

Tenet's relationship with President Clinton was always tenuous. By the time Tenet was head of the CIA, Clinton was in serious trouble with the Republicans in Congress on a range of foreign policy and domestic issues. Intelligence matters were considered important but were low down on the agenda. Tenet rarely saw Clinton to give him briefings. Clinton relied on written intelligence summaries from the CIA. The terrorist incidents in 1998 and 1999 allowed Tenet to win President Clinton's attention, but Clinton still had reservations about trusting the CIA's intelligence. Steve Coll characterized Tenet's strength as his ability to "synthesize and organize the views of others." Clinton was more comfortable with intellectuals. At this time, Tenet's attention was divided between two concerns—

Tenet's State of the CIA in the Late 1990s

The fact is that by the mid- to late 1990s American intelligence was in Chapter 11, and neither Congress nor the executive branch did much about it. Their attitude was that we could surge ahead when necessary to deal with challenges like terrorism. They provided neither the sustained funding required to deal with terrorism nor the resources needed to enable the recovery of the U.S. intelligence with the speed required.

George Tenet and Bill Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 108.

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism—with terrorism lower down on his agenda.

When George W. Bush's term began, Tenet was a holdover from a Democratic administration. In a briefing a week before Bush's inauguration, Tenet was able to establish a positive relationship with Bush with a series of intelligence briefings. He was able to impress the incoming president enough that he was retained as director of the CIA. In addition, the elder President Bush recommended that his son retain Tenet.

Several times Tenet warned Bush about the dangerous capabilities of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Bush and Tenet developed a strong professional relationship based on mutual respect. Every morning Tenet traveled to the White House to give President Bush an intelligence briefing. CIA's presidential briefer on the occasions when Tenet was unavailable or when President Bush traveled was Mike Morell, whose presence ensured that CIA intelligence briefings to President Bush could continue wherever the president was at any given time. In his and Morell's briefings, Tenet warned President Bush at least forty times about the possible danger from an al-Qaeda operation. Bush's reaction was that "the Clinton administration's response to bin Laden only confirmed that the U.S. would do little to go after him." Tenet's positive relationship with the president allowed him to survive the political fallout over the failure of the CIA to gather intelligence on the September 11 plot. Tenet was as surprised as the rest of the intelligence community about September 11, and he confessed as much in later remarks.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, Tenet was in Washington, D.C., having breakfast at the St. Regis Hotel with his friend and mentor, former senator David Boren, when he first learned of the events at the World Trade Center complex. His first comment to Boren was that this was probably a Bin Laden–al-Qaeda operation. He immediately launched an investigation into the hijackers. When the CIA began its investigation, there were some objections from the bureaucracy over privacy issues, but with some pressure the CIA was able to find out the names of the hijackers in short order.

After September 11, Tenet revamped the CIA's counterterrorism efforts. The Counterterrorism Center's staff increased from 340 to 1,500. Every lead about an al-Qaeda terrorist threat was followed up, and around 1,500 suspected al-Qaeda operatives were rounded up around the world in the next two years. President Bush gave Tenet a blank check in the pursuit of terrorists. They became even closer as Bush realized that Tenet's CIA was the only government agency that had any intelligence on bin Laden and al-Qaeda. This information was especially useful because Bush wanted to end bin Laden's sanctuary in Afghanistan even if this meant the overthrow of the Taliban regime. To this end, Bush defended the CIA from critics attacking it for its intelligence failures.

Tenet continued to be in President Bush's favor until the debacle over Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Although Tenet believed the invasion of Iraq was a mistaken policy, he went along after President Bush informed him in the fall of 2002 that war was inevitable. Despite this misgiving, prior to the invasion of Iraq by American and its allies, the CIA presented to President Bush evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction—biological agents such as mustard gas and sarin. Tenet briefed Colin Powell, then secretary of state, on these weapons before Powell's speech before the United Nations on

February 5, 2002. The failure to find weapons of mass destruction was considered another intelligence blunder by the CIA. This time Tenet was seriously weakened because of the intelligence failure. Tenet remained head of the CIA until June 2, 2004, when President Bush accepted his resignation. The official reason for his resignation was a heart condition. His replacement was Porter Goss, former Republican congressman from Florida. Statements made by Goss and his initial appointments made it clear that Goss was coming to the CIA determined to make it loyal to the Bush administration.

Tenet had one of the longest tenures in history as head of the CIA. His seven-year term as CIA director was the second longest in American history. President Bush bestowed on Tenet the Presidential Medal of Freedom on December 14, 2004. Since then, Tenet has returned to his first love, Georgetown University, where he is a distinguished professor in the practice of diplomacy. His 2007 book, *At the Center of the Storm,* gives his defense of his tenure at the CIA. Tenet has also attacked the 2005 CIA inspector general's report on his responsibilities for the CIA's deficiencies before September 11.

Tenet's Response to the CIA's Inspector General's Report

Tenet said that the report is factually inaccurate and that it does not place his actions in the context of the times. In his statement, Tenet emphasized his repeated efforts to sound alarms about al-Qaeda before Congress and inside the White House in the months before the attacks.

Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, "CIA Finds Holes in Pre-9/11 Work," *Washington Post* (August 22, 2007), p. A10.

See Also

Bush, George W.; Bush Administration; Central Intelligence Agency; Clinton Administration; Goss, Porter J.

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Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004); Tyler Drumheller and Elaine Monaghan, *On the Brink: An Insider's Account of How the White House Compromised American Intelligence* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2006); Ronald Kessler, *The CIA at War: Inside the Secret Campaign against Terror* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2003); James Risen, *State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration* (New York: Free Press, 2006); George Tenet and Bill Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007); Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

TIPOFF

TIPOFF is a U.S. State Department watch list, already in existence prior to September 11, 2001, designed to keep terrorists from obtaining visas to enter the United States. It also provided a way to tip off intelligence and law enforcement agencies about potential terrorists already in the United States. This watch list was established in 1987 by John Arriza, a U.S. State Department civil servant. Any agent of an American agency could send a name or a group of names to the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research for inclusion on this list.

Before September 11, the U.S. State Department was the most active in contributing names to this list. In 2001 it had contributed more than 2,000 names. The second most active in contributing names was the CIA, with more than



FBI Director Robert Mueller (left) and CIA Director George Tenet (right) joke with one another on February 11, 2003, before testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee in Washington. (AP IMAGES/Ron Edmonds.)

1,500 names. Other agencies added to the list, but the least active was the FBI. In 2001 the FBI added only 60 names to the list. By September 2001 there were approximately 60,000 names on the TIPOFF list.

The biggest weakness of TIPOFF was that the FAA did not participate because the airline industry opposed it. The FAA maintained a much smaller watch list. This FAA watch list had less than twenty names on it on September 11, 2001. The FAA's leadership maintained that it did not want to burden the commercial airline

industry with having to deal with the huge TIPOFF watch list, which would cause delays and traveler inconvenience and cost money.

What was most striking about the al-Qaeda operatives on September 11 was that none of them were on the TIPOFF watch list. They had been able to gain access to the United States without arousing suspicion despite the fact that a CIA agent had been badgering German officials about the members of the Hamburg Cell and the fact that two known al-Qaeda operatives had attended the January 2000 Kuala Lumpur meeting.

Lack of Awareness at FAA about TIPOFF

The long-time chief of the FAA's civil aviation security division testified that he was not aware of the State Department's TIPOFF list of known and suspected terrorist (some 60,000 before 9/11) until he heard it mentioned during the Commission's January 26, 2004, public hearing. The FAA had access to some TIPOFF data, but apparently found it too difficult to use.

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: Norton, 2005), pp. 83–84.

Despite the defects of TIPOFF, the concept had enough merit that it survived the post–September 11 revamping of procedures and agencies. It has been expanded, and now the FBI contributes names. The FAA now both contributes to and uses the TIPOFF system.

See Also

Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); Qaeda, al-

Suggested Reading

Steven Strasser, ed., *The 9/11 Investigations; Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission; Excerpts from the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Report on 9/11/ Testimony from 14 Key Witnesses, Including Richard Clarke, George Tenet, and Condoleezza Rice* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).

Transportation Security Administration

One of the first facts to come out of the investigations into September 11 was that the FAA had failed to provide the necessary airport security to prevent the September 11 attacks. Rather than reform the old system, a new agency, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), was proposed to handle a revamped federal government security program. This new agency was to be housed in the Department of Transportation (DOT). Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) in record time, and President George W. Bush signed it into law on November 19, 2001. The new legislation made the TSA responsible for all screening issues, including hiring, testing, training, firing, and deploying screening personnel at all airports in the country. Congress gave the new agency deadlines in late November and December 2002 to come up with solutions to aviation security problems. All FAA records and personnel dealing with aviation security were turned over to the new agency.

Soon after its founding, the TSA began to run into trouble. Starting an agency almost from scratch is a daunting enough task, but other factors began to surface. First of all, passengers were skittish about flying after September 11. Then bureaucratic inefficiency, congressional political pressure, and complaints from the airline industry combined to hinder the new agency's mission. John W. Magaw, former

head of the Secret Service, became the first head of the TSA. He hired law enforcement experts at senior levels instead of aviation security experts. Moreover, Magaw hired the senior management, paying them top salaries. Despite spending $6 billion in the agency's first six months, Magaw made few aviation security improvements. Criticism of the TSA became so intense that Magaw resigned in July 2002.

Magaw's replacement was Admiral James Loy, former head of the U.S. Coast Guard. He immediately began loosening security requirements in the interest of customer service. These actions made Loy popular with the airline industry, but it did little to improve aviation security. The Department of Transportation was no better at withstanding pressure from the airline industry than the FAA, and the TSA began to run out of money from its high salaries and lucrative outsourcing contacts to private companies.

Perception of the Reforms of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) signed by President George W. Bush on November 19, 2001, promised a more seamless, sensible, and secure approach to protecting commercial aviation. Nevertheless, the view was held by many inside and outside of the industry that bad public policy and a lack of vision and leadership at the federal level delivered much less to the American people. Eighteen months after the 9/11 attacks, members of Congress, industry associations, independent experts, as well as most everyone else affected by the aviation sector were voicing loud concerns about the state of the new aviation security regimen.

Andrew R. Thomas, *Aviation Insecurity: The New Challenges of Air Travel* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), p. 103.

The TSA had become a bloated agency. It had hired more than 70,000 employees at an annual cost of $8 billion. But the problem with this huge workforce was that tests of the screening system proved no more reliable and efficient than before September 11. The new system depended on eight layers in comparison to the three layers of redundancy to prevent or overcome hijackings. The new eight layers were (1) higher screening standards, (2) increased profiling, (3) better screening at checkpoints, (4) reinforced cockpit doors, (5) more air marshals, (6) armed pilots, (7) passenger and crew reaction, and (8) a shoot-down policy.

The problem with these new layers is that a competent and intelligent hijacker can shortchange these layers by simply waiting until the cockpit door is opened for some reason and then invade the cockpit. Once inside he can hide behind the improved cockpit doors and crash the aircraft before American fighter planes can shoot it down. This weakness in security has yet to be addressed.

Other security measures have also proven to be unsuccessful, including the explosives detection systems (EDA). The TSA has bought thousands of these machines at the cost of $1 million a piece. They are huge luggage-screening machines that use outdated X-ray technology. One major problem is that X-ray machines are incapable of detecting explosives. This technology has been described by Andrew R. Thomas, an expert in airline security, as "density-sensitive but chemically blind." None of these machines are capable of detecting an explosive, so it is left up to the operator to be suspicious about an item because of its shape or density.

Biometrics has been no more successful a tool. This technique uses technology to measure and analyze human body characteristics such as fingerprints, eye

retinas, voice patterns, facial patterns, and hand measurement to authenticate people going into secure areas of the airport. It takes a scanning device, software that scans data into a database, and a database to hold the information. The problem is that biometrics does not work well because it is too easy to bypass. Tests of passengers and airport workers at Logan International Airport during a ninety-day period showed it was too easily fooled.

Another type of security that has serious faults is the Trusted Traveler Program. This system allows frequent flyers to undergo extensive background checks for clearance to allow the passengers to be issued a photo identification card for easy access through security. This idea has become popular in the commercial airline industry. But what if the wrong person obtained access to the Trusted Traveler Card? A terrorist or criminal who could obtain such a card would have open access to the aircraft with few restrictions.

Aviation experts are still concerned about aviation security. They distrust the new TSA for two essential reasons: its ties, much like the FAA, to the DOT's cozy relationship to the airline industry and the lack of leadership to improve aviation security in the TSA. Pressure from the airline industry to relax security standards is still intense. Next, the TSA has become so large and unwieldy that it moves at a glacial pace, and much of its security technology is outdated. In the opinion of many of these aviation experts, the new TSA is not much of an improvement on the FAA.

Aviation security is a thankless task, and it is easy to criticize it for its shortcomings. In its favor, the TSA has instituted a number of useful reforms helping to improve the screening system by better training of screeners and the acquisition of new technology. Also, the TSA leadership is much more alert to the dangers of terrorism.

See Also

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

Suggested Reading

Eric Lipton, "Scissors Ban on Airplanes Will Be Lifted Despite Critics," *New York Times* (December 3, 2005), p. A16; Alexandra Marks, "Well after 9/11, 'No Fly' Lists a Work in Progress," *Christian Science Monitor* (March 24, 2005), p. 2; Robert O'Harrow Jr. and Scott Higham, "TSA Airport Security Contract Examined for Fraud," *Washington Post* (July 1, 2005), p. A7; Robert O'Harrow Jr. and Scott Higham, "Post-9/11 Rush Mixed Politics with Security," *Washington Post* (December 25, 2005), p. A1; Andrew R, Thomas, *Aviation Insecurity: The New Challenges of Air Travel* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003).

U

United Airlines Flight 93

United Airlines Flight 93's Boeing 757-222 was the fourth aircraft hijacked by al-Qaeda hijackers on September 11, 2001. It took off from Newark International Airport at 8:43 a.m. bound for San Francisco International Airport. Normal flight time was six hours. The flight was nearly forty-five minutes late for its scheduled takeoff time of 8:01 a.m. On board were two pilots, Captain Jason M. Dahl and First Officer LeRoy Homer; a crew of five flight attendants; and thirty-seven passengers. It held 11,489 gallons of aviation fuel.

The hijack team had little difficulty passing security. Security checkpoints at Newark International Airport were operated by Argenbright Security under contract to United Airlines. Much as other airport security firms did, Argenbright conducted business at the pleasure of its contractor. Only two of the four hijackers had luggage and only one of them triggered the CAPPS (Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System) process. Ahmed al-Haznawi's luggage was checked for explosives.

This hijack team was the smallest of the four. Ziad Jarrah was the team leader and designated pilot. He sat in first-class seat 1B, nearest to the cockpit door. Other members of the team, Saeed al-Ghamdi, Ahmed al-Haznawi, and Ahmed al-Na'ami, were in seats 3C, 3D, and 6B. Hijackers seized control of the aircraft at 9:28 a.m., just minutes after the pilot received a warning about possible cockpit invasions on the cockpit computer device ACARS (Aircraft Communications and Reporting System). The cockpit door was no obstacle, taking only about 150 pounds of pressure to knock down. In addition, the flight attendants had keys to the cockpit door—another means of access to the cockpit.

Exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit will never be known, but they took control relatively easily. They probably took a key to the cockpit from the flight attendant in First Class. Within minutes of the assault, the hijackers had complete control of the aircraft. Both pilots were down—either killed or seriously incapacitated. Ahmed al-Haznawi, Saeed al-Ghamdi, and Ahmed al-Na'ami took turns controlling the thirty-three passengers and five flight attendants. Matters were complicated by having about a dozen passengers in the first-class section,

with the rest seated in the back of the plane. Unlike the other teams, these hijackers were lenient on passenger discipline. After injuring one of the passengers, the hijackers controlled the others and the crew by threatening them with a bomb. To keep discontent down, they encouraged passengers and crew to contact their families by cell phone. Passengers made more than two dozen phone calls. This relaxed style came back to haunt the hijackers, for passengers who contacted family members learned that three other aircraft had been hijacked and had been turned into flying bombs.

As passengers began to realize there was no possibility of survival, plans circulated among some of the more aggressive men on board to attack the hijackers and regain control of the aircraft. By this time the passengers suspected that the hijackers had no bomb. About a dozen of them had experience in action sports, including football, rugby, and judo. Todd Beamer, Mark Bingham, Tom Burnett, Jeremy Glick, and several others decided to wait until the aircraft cleared populated areas to begin their attack. They were under no illusion about their probable fate, and showed extraordinary courage and compassion for others by waiting for the aircraft to fly over a rural area. They had other allies in CeeCee Ross-Lyles, one of the flight attendants, who was a former police officer; Rich Guadago, an enforcement officer with the California Fish and Wildlife Service; Linda Gronlund, a lawyer who had a brown belt in karate; and William Cashman, a former paratrooper with the 101st Airborne. Finally, Don Greene, vice president of Safe Flight Instrument Group, was a pilot with experience in single-engine aircraft, who could follow instructions to land the aircraft.

Passengers Realized That the Hijackers Were on a Suicide Mission

Evidence from mobile phone conversations made by the passengers suggests that they gradually became aware of what was unfolding in New York and Washington, where the three earlier hijacked planes slammed into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, and that they came to a decision to storm the cockpit and attempt to overpower the hijackers. One of the men, Todd Beamer, is said to have told his fellow passenger "Let's roll" before charging the flight deck.

Andrew Gumbel, "Flight Recorder—The Final Conversation of Doomed Flight UA93," *Independent* [London] (November 17, 2001), p. 8.

The passengers waited for the opportunity. In the meantime, flight attendant Sandy Bradshaw started boiling water to be used against the hijackers. Sometime around 10:00 a.m. the passengers attacked the hijackers using a food tray container to smash into the cockpit area. Earlier the hijackers had all retreated into the cockpit area. A voice recording from the black box (cockpit data recorder) indicated the fierce nature of the struggle. For the next seven minutes the outcome was in doubt.

Jarrah was the pilot, and his contingency plan was to crash the aircraft if it seemed as though the hijackers would lose control of the plane. Evidently this is what happened, for the aircraft crashed upside down at a forty-five degree angle. It created a crater thirty feet or more in diameter. Because the plane crashed in a reclaimed mining area, the ground was relatively soft and the aircraft plunged deep into the ground. The fuel tanks exploded, leaving a blackened crater. Smoke from the explosion allowed local volunteer authorities to find the site soon after the crash. The crash was reported by numerous witnesses, and a visual inspection from

FBI investigators comb the crater left by United Airlines Flight 93, a Boeing 757, in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, about eighty miles southeast of Pittsburgh. FBI assistant agent in charge Roland Corvington said that more than 200 investigators were on the scene. (AP IMAGES/Gene J. Puskar.)

a passing unarmed Air National Guard C-130H cargo jet on a mission from Washington, D.C., to Minnesota confirmed the crash site.

The violence of the crash left no survivors. The black box was excavated fifteen feet into the crater, and the cockpit voice recorder was found twenty-five feet down. Only body parts were recovered. Sixty percent of the recovered remains were identified by a combination of fingerprint verification, dental records, and DNA analysis.

In commercial air disasters the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) handles investigations, but because this was a case of air piracy, the FBI assumed control although the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the NTSB; and the Pennsylvania State Police also assisted. Nothing could be done at the site, however, without the permission of the FBI. Early in the investigation two thousand people worked at the site daily.

The probable target of Flight 93 was the U.S. Capitol. Earlier meetings by al-Qaeda leaders had determined that the White House would present navigational problems. They had preferred that the White House be the target, but the Capitol was a target more easily recognized by inexperienced navigators.

See Also

Beamer, Todd Morgan; Bingham, Mark Kendall; Burnett, Thomas Edward; Dahl, Jason Matthew; Glick, Jeremy; Homer, LeRoy Wilton Jr.; Jarrah, Ziad Samir

See Document

Document #16

Suggested Reading

Stefan Aust et al., *Inside 9/11: What Really Happened* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001); Lisa Beamer and Ken Abraham, *Let's Roll! Ordinary People, Extraordinary Courage*

(Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2002); Glenn J. Kashuba, *Quiet Courage: The Definitive Account of Flight 93 and Its Aftermath* (Somerset, PA: SAJ, 2006); Jere Longman, *Among the Heroes: United Flight 93 and the Passengers and Crew Who Fought Back* (New York: Perennial, 2003); 9/11 Commission, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attack upon the United States* (New York: Norton, 2004); Susan B. Trento and Joseph J. Trento, *Unsafe at Any Altitude: Failed Terrorism Investigations, Scapegoating 9/11, and the Shocking Truth about Aviation Security Today* (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2006).

United Airlines Flight 175

Terrorists gained control of the Boeing 767-222 of United Airlines Fight 77 on September 11, 2001, and crashed it into the South Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. Although this flight was scheduled to leave at 7:59 a.m., it left Logan International Airport at 8:15 a.m., with Los Angeles International Airport its destination. The pilots were Captain Victor Saracini, a fifty-one-year-old Navy veteran pilot, and the First Officer was Michael Horrocks. On board with the two pilots were seven flight attendants and fifty-six passengers. The plane held 23,980 gallons of aviation fuel. Shortly after takeoff, traffic controllers asked Saracini whether he could see American Airlines Flight 11. After he replied affirmatively, the pilots were ordered to maintain distance from the hijacked aircraft.

Among the fifty-six passengers on board were five members of an al-Qaeda terrorist team. The leader of this hijack team and its pilot was Marwan al-Shehhi. Other members of the team were Fayez Rashid Ahmed Hassan al-Qadi Banihammad, Ahmed al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-Ghamdi, and Mohand al-Shehri. The hijackers had little difficulty passing through security. The security checkpoint at Logan International Airport for United Airlines was staffed by personnel from Huntleigh USA. The hijackers had purchased tickets in the first-class section to be close to the cockpit. Much as in the takeover of American Airlines Flight 11, the terrorists organized themselves into sections: two were near the cockpit (in seats 2A and 2B), pilot al-Shehhi was in seat 6C, and the other two sat near the passenger section (in seats 9C and 9D).

The hijackers seized control of the aircraft sometime around 8:47 a.m. They used knives and Mace to subdue the pilots and crew, and then killed the pilots and at least one flight attendant. The hijackers then herded the crew and passengers toward the rear of the aircraft, assuring them everything would be okay. They lulled the passengers into thinking that the plane would land someplace safely and that the hijackers would use them as hostages in negotiations. Not all passengers accepted this argument (see sidebar). One passenger, Peter Hanson, called his father in Easton, Connecticut, and reported the hijackers' takeover. One of the flight attendants also reported the hijacking to the United Airlines office in San Francisco.

Message from Passenger Brian Sweeney to His Wife, Julie

Hey Jules, it's Brian. I'm on a plane and it's hijacked and it doesn't look good. I just wanted to let you know that I love you and I hope to see you again. If I don't, please have fun in life and live your life the best you can. Know that I love you and no matter what, I'll see you again.

Quoted in Greg B. Smith, "9/11 Voices Still Echoing," *Daily News* (March 25, 2002), p. 9.

United Flight 175 approaches the South Tower of the World Trade Center in this September 11, 2001, photo. (AP IMAGES, Carmen Taylor, File.)

Al-Shehhi turned the aircraft around and headed it toward the New York City area. Traffic controllers had lost contact with the plane. The passengers became concerned because of the aircraft's jerky movements. At this point some of the passengers considered storming the cockpit to regain control of the plane. They just did not have enough time. At 9:03 a.m. United Airlines Flight 175 slammed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center complex. The aircraft impacted between floors seventy-eight and eighty-four. Because the aircraft hit at greater speed than American Airlines Flight 11, it damaged the South Tower more severely than the North Tower had been. Consequently, the South Tower collapsed before the North Tower. There were no survivors on United Flight 175.

See Also
World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading
Stefan Aust et al., *Inside 9/11: What Really Happened* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001); 9/11 Commission, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (New York: Norton, 2004).

United 93 (Film)

United 93 is a docudrama that attempts to chronicle events aboard United Airlines Flight 93 on September 11, 2001. British film director Paul Greengrass wrote and directed this docudrama. Greengrass is an experienced director. His previous credits include the acclaimed docudrama *Bloody Sunday,* which recreated the events of the 1972 massacre of Irish civil rights demonstrators by British troops in Northern Ireland, and the thriller *The Bourne Supremacy.* The first appearance of *United 93* was as a TV film titled *Flight 93,* broadcast on January 30, 2006, by the A&E Network. The network showed it several times during 2006. Greengrass then converted the film into a full-scale movie titled *United 93,* which premiered at the Tribeca Film Festival in New York City on April 26, 2006. Later that April, the movie made its appearance nationwide, receiving an R rating because of its language and violence, much to the displeasure of distributor Universal Pictures. Universal booked the film into 1,795 theaters, and it did well financially. Reviews of the movie were generally positive, with several film critics giving it a four-star rating.

The movie attempts to recreate the hijacking and the passengers' attempted takeover. It focuses on the activities of eight passengers—Todd Beamer, Mark Bingham, Tom Burnett, Jeremy Glick, Lauren Grancolas, Donald Greene, Nicole Miller, and Honor Elizabeth Wainio. After interviewing the families of the victims to learn personal details, Greengrass used unknown actors with physical characteristics similar to those on the aircraft. He even used airline employees in some of the roles. The movie hijackers were also unknowns. Four British men of Middle Eastern extraction—two Egyptians, one Moroccan, and one Iraqi—played the hijacker roles.

Greengrass tried to make the movie as realistic as possible. He found an out-of-service Boeing 757 and reconstructed it on London's Pinewood Studios soundstage. His camera operators used handheld cameras to create the aura of confusion and chaos. He relied on the conclusions of the *9/11 Commission Report,* cell phone transcripts, interviews, the cockpit black box recorder, and FAA and military records to make the dialogue as accurate as possible. Greengrass's goal was that the film have "a thriller's breathless quality but not seem exploitative or contrived." He believed the passengers' attempt to retake the aircraft to be heroic, but his feelings were more complex than this.

Paul Greengrass's Feelings about Passengers on United Airlines Flight 93

When I watch that film myself, I feel that . . . when they've reached the cockpit door, and they're wrestling with that guy, and it's the most brutal kind of struggle, I feel that's us today. And when they get through the door and they're wrestling for the controls of the plane with those guys, that feels like that's our tomorrow, if we're not careful.

Quoted in Desson Thomson, "For Paul Greengrass, a Connecting Flight," *Washington Post* (May 1, 2006), p. C1.

See Also
United Airlines Flight 93

See Document
Document #16

Suggested Readings
Joanna Connors, "No Risk in Telling Tale of 9/11 Flight: What Happened That Day Is Something That Belongs to Us All," *Plain Dealer* (April 30, 2006), p. J9; Roger Ebert, "Terror of the Moment: 'United 93' Avoids Clichés, Rolls with Reality of 9/11 Tension," *Chicago Sun Times* (April 28, 2006), p. NC28; Ethan Gilsdorf, "A Serious Man with a Serious Subject: 9/11," *Boston Globe* (April 28, 2006), p. D10; Jere Longman, "Filming Flight 93's Story, Trying to Define Heroics," *New York Times* (April 24, 2006), p. E1; Desson Thomson, "For Paul Greengrass, a Connecting Flight," *Washington Post* (May 1, 2006), p. C1; Tony Wong, "Chilling Seat for 9/11," *Toronto Star* (September 14, 2006), p. D12.

USA PATRIOT Act

One of the first post–September 11 legislative outcomes was adoption of the USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act. The intent of this legislation was to plug holes in domestic intelligence gathering considered to have developed over previous decades. The legislation was controversial because it dropped many of the safeguards that Americans had come to expect for protection against government interference in their private affairs.

The USA PATRIOT Act moved through Congress to the White House in a hurry. In an immediate reaction to the events of September 11, the USA PATRIOT Act was approved in the Senate on October 11, 2001, by a vote of 96 to 1. On October 12, 2001, the House of Representatives approved it with a vote of 337 to 79. The act became law when President George W. Bush signed it on October 26, 2001. Rarely has legislation moved through Congress and been signed into law with such speed. Critics have charged that adoption was too hasty, allowing the Department of Justice under Attorney General John Ashcroft to throw provisions defeated during the Clinton administration into a package passed with few Members of Congress thoroughly understanding it.

Provisions of the original act were controversial for having greatly expanded the power of government, with few checks and balances. The act expanded the range of crimes that could be tracked by government agencies using electronic surveillance. Federal authorities were granted authority to use "roving wiretaps" on any phone that a suspected terrorist might be expected to use. Law enforcement officers could now conduct searches of suspects without notifying them until later, a tactic that became known as a "sneak-and-peek" operation. This particular type of search had previously been used against organized crime figures and major drug dealers. Now FBI agents could obtain secret court orders to search such personal records as business, medical, library, and other files without probable cause in potential terrorism cases. The act made it a federal crime to harbor a terrorist. It also increased criminal penalties for a laundry list of offenses, ranging from conspiracy to commit terrorism to interference with a flight crew. Search warrants became easy to obtain in terrorist-related investigations. The Attorney General was authorized to detain foreign terrorism suspects for a full week without initiating any type of legal proceeding or having to show cause. Finally, the law provided for

Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) peers over President Bush's shoulder with his camera as the President signs the USA PATRIOT Act during a White House ceremony in October 2001. Standing behind the president, from left to right, are Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and Senator Harry Reid (D-NV). (AP IMAGES/Doug Mills.)

new financial and legal tools to end international money laundering. The only restriction on this law was that its surveillance and wiretap provisions were required to be renewed in 2005.

Critics of the USA PATRIOT Act have come from two ends of the political spectrum. Among the leading critics has been the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). From the other end of the spectrum, a second leading critic has been the oldest conservative grassroots lobbying organization in the country, the American Conservative Union (ACU). The ACLU's opposition is based on the argument that the law violates rights to privacy. In contrast, the ACU's opposition stems from its belief in the need to limit federal authority. Both organizations

are hesitant about the use of anti-terrorism investigations to charge American citizens of crimes unrelated to terrorism. The PATRIOT Act has been used to investigate everything from murder to child pornography. Together the ACLU and ACU have lobbied to amend the USA PATRIOT Act to ensure protection for civil liberties.

Two other critics of the USA PATRIOT Act have been business interests and librarians. Business interests object to the act's anti–money-laundering provisions. These provisions were intended to prevent, detect, and prosecute money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and required banks and other financial institutions to establish programs to monitor financial activities. Fines and prison sentences are the penalties for noncompliance with money-laundering restrictions, and representatives of financial institutions have complained about the cost of compliance.

Librarians have challenged the right of FBI investigators to inspect library records, with the American Library Association having initiated several lawsuits against this provision. Besides objecting to the access given the FBI to inspect individuals' library records, librarians also oppose the act's prohibition against informing patrons that their records are the subject of a search. Most court fights to defeat the issuance of National Security Letters (the subpoenas for records, which do not require a judge's approval) have been unsuccessful, but the public's negative opinion of the practice has deterred the FBI from using it except in rare cases.

Supporters of the USA PATRIOT Act have maintained that its restrictions are necessary to fight the war against terrorism, and favor even greater restrictions if they prevent the conduct of terror operations on American soil. The act is required to be periodically renewed, and supporters consider it a necessity as long as terrorist threats continue.

Despite opposition to several of its provisions, the USA PATRIOT Act was renewed on March 7, 2006. With amendments to address a few objections to it, the act was approved in the Senate by a vote of 95 to 4, and in the House by 280 to 138. One amendment excluded libraries that function in a "traditional capacity" from having to furnish the records sought in a National Security Letter. Another amendment gave persons subpoenaed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court the right to challenge the nondisclosure, or gag order, requirement of the subpoena. Finally, two of the act's provisions—the authority of the FBI to conduct roving wiretaps and the power of the government to seize business records with the FISA Court's approval—would be constrained by a four-year sunset requirement.

See Also

Bush Administration; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978

Suggested Reading

Charles Babington, "Congress Votes to Renew Patriot Act, with Changes," *Washington Post* (March 8, 2006), p. A3; Stewart A. Baker, *Patriot Debates: Experts Debate the USA Patriot Act* (New York: American Bar Association, 2005); Howard Ball and Mildred Vasan (eds.), *The USA Patriot Act: A Reference Handbook* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2004); Amitai Etzioni, *How Patriotic Is the Patriot Act?* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Richard C. Leone and Greg Anriq (eds.), *The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003); Paul Rush, "Patriot Act Forges Unlikely Alliance," *Insight on the News* (September 29, 2003), p. 26; John Yoo, *War By Other Means: An Insider's Account of the War on Terror* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).

V

Victims' Compensation Fund

The Victims' Compensation Fund (VCF) was a program allowing the government to partially compensate 9/11 victims with a monetary award. It covered both economic and noneconomic damages, and came in the aftermath of a $15 billion allocation from Congress to save the airline industry from bankruptcy. Members of Congress decided that it would not be prudent to assist the airline industry while ignoring the 9/11 families who had lost loved ones. Another reason for the VCF was to protect the airline companies from costly lawsuits. To do this, Congress set a cap of $1.6 million for each family. But this cap was later raised to cope with problems with the cap. In the final analysis the average award was $1.8 million.

Administrator of the Victim's Compensation Fund was attorney Kenneth Feinberg. Feinberg soon became unpopular with 9/11 families for having promised greater awards than were granted and for his slowness in responding to victims' families. He had an aggressive attitude, arguing that the 9/11 families should join the VCF because they could not sue any party other than the planners of the attacks, which enraged some of the families. Some of this criticism was unjust because he was in charge of a bureaucracy that took time to calculate awards. Feinberg served without pay, and was glad to return to private practice at the end of the process.

The victims' families were slow to sign up for the Fund. Part of their problem was in gauging whether it was wiser to sign up for the VCF than to privately pursue action in the courts. It soon became apparent that the families of those who died in the airliners were more likely to succeed in court than were the families of those who died on the ground. Action in court would be a long-term process with results uncertain, whereas the VCF offered almost immediate financial help with none of the uncertainty of the courts.

The families whose members had held higher-paying jobs were among the most unhappy with the Victims' Compensation Fund. Many of the victims in the twin towers had high-paying jobs that exceeded within five years the amount projected to be awarded. The families of victims of high net worth were initially awarded an amount equivalent to about ten cents on the dollar. Moreover, life insurance and

pension payments counted against the final settlement. Finally, the VCF deducted Social Security payments to children in the final settlement. In the end the U.S. government made it plain that it was a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.

Because the Victims' Compensation Fund was financed by U.S. taxpayers, it became controversial. Many people attacked the 9/11 families for being greedy. This backlash caused much anguish among the families of the 9/11 victims. Some of the families became so angry that they attacked the VCF and Feinberg. When it became apparent that the lawyers were reluctant to press their claims after being pressured by leaders in the legal profession, some of the leaders of the 9/11 families movement began organizing a lobby group. The Jersey Girls—widows of those killed in the North Tower on September 11—were active in this movement.

Response to Charges of Greed by Kimi Bevin, Whose Husband Died on American Airlines Flight 93

The disputes became most bitter over accusations of greed on the part of the families of the dead. "How can people say it is greed? I have been left with a six-year-old daughter in a city where the cost of living is very high, and we are talking about less than three years of my husband's salary. Greed? I don't think so. I don't know how I am going to survive."

Charles Laurence, "Envy over Cash for World Trade Center Victims," *Sunday Telegraph* [London] (September 8, 2002), p. 28.

The work of the Victims' Compensation Fund ended on its deadline of December 22, 2003. It paid out its first claim on August 22, 2002, and its final payment went out in early January 2005. More than $7 billion went to the survivors of 2,880 people who were killed and to 2,680 people who were injured in the attacks or rescue efforts that followed. Families of the people killed collected awards averaging more than $2 million, and the injured drew payouts averaging $400,000. It cost the government $86.9 million to administer the fund. Eighty families opted out of the VCF in order to privately sue the airlines and the FAA. Thirteen families chose to simply ignore the VCF altogether—from grief or for other reasons.

See Also
Jersey Girls

Suggested Reading
Kristen Breitweiser, *Wake-Up Call: The Political Education of a 9/11 Widow* (New York: Warner Books); David W. Chen, "Victims' Kin Find Fault with Overseer of 9/11 Fund," *New York Times* (November 13, 2002), p. B1; Martin Kasindorf, "9/11 Families Filing Claims as Deadline Nears," *USA Today* (December 19, 2003), p. 1; Martin Kasindorf, "Compensation Battles Inflict New Wounds on 9/11 Families," *USA Today* (January 19, 2004), p. 1A; Christopher Lee, "Report on Sept. 11 Fund Is Released," *Washington Post* (November 18, 2004), p. A3; Mark Mueller, "For Some, 9/11 Fund Is No Compensation," *Star-Ledger* [Newark, NJ] (November 21, 2004), p. 3.

Von Essen, Thomas (1945–)

Thomas Von Essen was the Fire Commissioner of the City of New York on September 11, 2001. The commissioner's job is a civilian position with no decision-making role at disaster scenes, but it is political in nature. It was Von Essen's job to advise the mayor, help with the media, and serve as liaison with other city agencies in the event of emergency. Most commissioners had little

experience with firefighting, but Von Essen had been both a firefighter and head of one of the two firefighters unions. Rudy Giuliani had appointed him to be the thirtieth Fire Commissioner of the City of New York in 1996.

Von Essen came to firefighting indirectly. He was born in December 1945 in Queens, New York. His father was a New York City policeman in the 79th Precinct, and his mother was a housewife. The family lived in Ozone Park, a working-class neighborhood in Queens. Von Essen attended a Catholic grade school, Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary Catholic School. His good grades allowed him admittance to Bishop Loughlin High School in Brooklyn. But in high school Von Essen's grades began to suffer until he transferred into a public high school, John Adams High School. His grades improved slightly, and he graduated from high school. Von Essen then enrolled at St. Francis College in Brooklyn with the intent of studying accounting. He later married and had a baby girl. After serving two years in the U.S. Navy on submarines in the late 1960s, he decided to become a firefighter.

Von Essen became a member of the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) in 1970. He spent the next sixteen years working in Ladder Company 42 in the South Bronx. It was a period when the New York City area had numerous fires, and Von Essen became an experienced firefighter in record time. In 1981 he was made his house's union delegate to the Uniformed Firefighters Association (UFA), which then represented 8,700 firefighters. In the midst of his work as a firefighter, Von Essen graduated from St. Francis College in 1972 with a degree in economics. He followed by seeking a master's degree in education from the C. W. Post Campus of Long Island University. After obtaining a master's degree and certified teaching license, Von Essen briefly considered a teaching career before returning to firefighting. In 1983 he ran for the position of Bronx Trustee for the UFA and won. He was elected to the post of secretary of the UFA in 1984 and again in 1987.

After seven years in union administration, Von Essen returned to firefighting in 1990. However, firefighting was no longer exciting to him, and hard feelings from his union activities had surfaced. Von Essen took a leave of absence from firefighting and worked in real estate as assistant manager for the Mendik Company. This experience reinforced a decision to return to firefighting.

Von Essen decided to run for president of the Uniformed Firefighters Association in summer 1993. He won, and took office on August 1, 1993. Previous heads of the UFA had fought with New York City mayors over fire station closings and disputes over pay and working conditions. This all changed with the election of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Giuliani took over as mayor only a few months after Von Essen was elected president of the UFA. Von Essen had rallied the UFA behind Giuliani and against Mayor Dinkins. Although Giuliani appreciated the support from the UFA, he froze salaries for the next few years, making life difficult for Von Essen. In the meantime, Von Essen was able to build a good working relationship with then fire commissioner Howard Safir. When Safir was appointed police commissioner in 1986, Giuliani named Von Essen Fire Commissioner of New York City.

Von Essen was fire commissioner before and during the events of September 11, 2001. Early in his tenure he had used his post to concentrate on safety issues and training for firefighters. His good working relationship with the mayor helped him through several controversies. The most serious of these disputes concerned the

installation of a new digital communication system. Unfortunately, this new communication system was delayed by malfunctions until after September 11, 2001.

Von Essen began his day on September 11, 2001, much like any other day. He was on his way to headquarters in Brooklyn when he and his driver noticed that there had been an explosion at the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex. Suddenly chatter on the fire department radio relayed that an airliner had crashed into the North Tower. His driver immediately took Von Essen to the World Trade Center complex, and he headed to the command post in the North Tower, where he found Chief Pete Ganci in charge of operations. By this time people were already jumping from the upper stories of the North Tower. Although all of the fire chiefs in the emergency command post were experienced firefighters, the lack of current information—the result of failure and overload of the communications system—hindered their decision making. When the second plane hit the South Tower the situation became truly grim. Fighting a fire and rescuing people from two high-rise buildings would be almost impossible. As more and more firefighters joined the fray, the scene became even more chaotic.

Since Von Essen had no command authority, he gathered information to pass on to Mayor Giuliani and his staff. At about this time Ray Downey, the head of Special Operations Command (SOC) and an expert on building collapse, remarked to him that the building they were in could collapse. The chiefs decided to move the command post, as it was becoming too dangerous in the lobby of the North Tower. Von Essen left the command post to report to Mayor Giuliani, and this action probably saved his life. While he was occupied looking for Giuliani, the South Tower collapsed. Once Von Essen found Giuliani he reported that the loss of firefighters, police, and civilians would be heavy. Then the North Tower suddenly collapsed and all was chaos. Von Essen stayed with Mayor Giuliani, and both of them began accepting help from any federal or state agency that offered it. Von Essen soon learned that his close friend, Father Mychal Judge, was dead, and that his friends Pete Ganci and Bill Feehan, Deputy Fire Commissioner, were missing and presumed dead. Feehan was a beloved member of the FDNY who had stayed on with the department past retirement age. A decision was made by the surviving fire chiefs to not fight the fire that had broken out at Seven World Trade Center because it was too dangerous to fight that fire in the unstable building.

In the aftermath of the destruction of the World Trade Center, Von Essen had to deal with a decimated fire department. What bothered Von Essen the most was that the most aggressive and skilled firefighters had been killed in the collapse of the twin towers. Moreover, many of the most experienced chiefs and captains had also been

Von Essen Explains Why So Many Senior Firefighters Lost Their Lives on September 11

It is the nature of our fire department, of our long-standing philosophy of aggressively attacking fires, that many of our leaders and many of the best, most able firefighters were the ones who were going to be lost. The fire department is the only place I know where the higher up a man moves, the greater the chance that he will place himself at risk. The best, most enthusiastic firefighters willingly expose themselves to the highest level of danger.

Thomas Von Essen with Matt Murray, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York* (New York: Regan-Books, 2002), p. 52.

A worker passes by a fifty-eight-ton steel beam, the last remaining beam from the World Trade Center's South Tower, in this 2002 photo. The beam was spray-painted with the numbers of victims lost in the attacks: 37 Port Authority police, 23 New York police officers, and 343 New York firefighters. (AP IMAGES/Kathy Willens.)

killed. There were also the issues of morale and stress among the survivors, who had seen too many of their buddies killed or disappeared.

Von Essen remained the fire commissioner until the end of Giuliani's term of office on December 31, 2001. During that time, he had to weather firefighters' discontent over their reduction in force at Ground Zero in early November 2001. A compromise was eventually worked out, but Von Essen was subjected to severe criticism by both firefighters and families of firefighters. After leaving office Von Essen became a senior vice president with Giuliani's consulting business, Giuliani Partners.

See Also

Cleanup Operations at Ground Zero; Firefighters at Ground Zero

Suggested Reading

Al Baker, "Security; For Emergency Officials Touched by 9/11's Horrors, Fears of Creeping Complacency," *New York Times* (May 21, 2002), p. A17; Eunice Moscoso, "9/11 Hearing Heated; Communication Gap Called 'Scandal' as Victims' Families Grow Emotional," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* (May 19, 2004), p. 1A; Thomas Von Essen with Matt Murray, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002).

W

***Wag the Dog* (Movie)**

The movie *Wag the Dog* had an impact on the Clinton administration's efforts to rally public support for the president's counterterrorism campaign against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The movie's story line involves a sex-obsessed U.S. president in the middle of a reelection campaign whose advisors stage a fake war in Albania to distract voters from the scandal. Dustin Hoffman and Robert DeNiro starred in this popular move, which appeared in December 1997. It bore enough resemblance to the true-life scandal involving President Clinton and White House intern Monica Lewinsky that it resonated politically among those hostile to Clinton. The national media also had a field day with the similarities between the movie and the conduct of President Clinton.

The Clinton administration's efforts to neutralize bin Laden led Republicans in Congress to suggest a comparison with the plot of *Wag the Dog*. This charge surfaced both in the media and among Republican congressmen after Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired into Afghanistan and Sudan on August 20, 1998. Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh went so far as to advance the "wag the dog" thesis to explain Clinton's actions in an article in the *New Yorker*. Soon

Mark Russell Led Pat Buchanan and Bill Press in This Song on CNN's *Crossfire*

If a woman gives you trouble or maybe two or three, and your explanation puts the public in a fog, no problem, pick that red phone up, it's an emergency, and go to war. It's been done before. It's "Wag the Dog."

"Wag the Dog." "Wag the Dog." Go to war, it's been done before, it's "Wag the Dog."

Well, no one will complain with a Hitler-like Hussein, and everyone will understand your war. An Afghanistan distraction from your problems and your pain, namely, Monica and Paula and God knows how many more.

"Wag the dog."

Quoted in Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 358.

Statement of Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen on the "Wag the Dog" Charge

I was prepared at that time and today to say I put my entire public career on the line to say that the President (Clinton) always acted specifically upon the recommendation of those of us who held the positions for responsibility to take military action, and at no time did he ever try to use it or manipulate it to serve his personal ends. And I think it's important to be clear because that "Wag the Dog" cynicism that was so virulent there I am afraid is coming back again, and I think we've got to do everything we can to stop engaging in the kind of self-flagellation and criticism, and challenging of motives of our respective presidents.

Quoted in Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, and Benjamin Rhodes, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Knopf, 2006), p. 160.

afterward it became a common theme broadcast by Clinton's critics, especially right-wing talk radio commentators and other cheerleaders of the "Get Clinton" campaign.

The charge of "wag the dog" made President Clinton and his advisors sensitive to any action that did not have an immediately successful outcome. In a practical sense this made any operation against bin Laden impossible. President Clinton believed that any operation against bin Laden would have to withstand scrutiny in the court of American public opinion. This restriction meant that capture or assassination plots had to avoid collateral damage and had to succeed.

See Also
Bin Laden, Osama; Qaeda, al-

Suggested Reading
David Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002); Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004).

The Wall

"The Wall" was the term used to describe the FBI's barrier between intelligence gathering on one hand, and preparing for and prosecuting a criminal case, on the other. Promotions came to FBI agents who put together cases that led to the conviction of persons accused of criminal behavior. Intelligence gathering, on the other hand, led to information but not to convictions, and not to too much credit to the agents involved. The policy of the FBI before September 11, therefore, was to conduct intelligence gathering just to the point that the information gained could be used to prepare a case for trial. When a case reached the stage of preparation for trial, intelligence gathering stopped and restrictions were imposed against sharing information with other parts of the FBI and other government agencies. In theory, this restriction was enforced in order to ensure that the FBI played by the rules in gathering evidence in criminal cases. Additionally, Rule 6E of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure forbad the disclosure of grand jury material.

Although the Wall stood on legal justification, there were ways to skirt it in the interest of national security. However, FBI lawyers were reluctant to take chances, and the wall between intelligence gathering and criminal prosecution became more rigid. Guidelines for the Wall were further codified in a 1995 Justice Depart-

ment memorandum issued during investigation of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This memorandum stated categorically that intelligence gathering and case preparation/prosecution must be kept separate. These guidelines were reconfirmed by the Justice Department in 2001. Despite this clear delineation between the two activities, the Clinton administration attempted to break down what it considered to be an artificial wall. Attorney General Janet Reno attempted at least once to achieve a more limited interpretation of Rule 6E, but FBI Director Louis Freeh opposed any changes and refused to allow revision of the rules of criminal procedure.

FBI agents found the Wall an insurmountable barrier in intelligence gathering, often protesting that it hindered their efforts to obtain intelligence on potential terrorist operations. The barriers of the Wall had kept FBI agents in the New York field office from gaining information about two of the September 11 hijackers—Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi—until it was too late. One FBI agent went so far as to send an e-mail to FBI headquarters in which he stated that "whatever has happened to this, someday someone will die and, wall or not, the public will not understand why we were not more effective in throwing every resource we had at certain problems."

The Senate and House Joint Inquiry Committee on Intelligence concluded in 2002 that in actuality a series of walls existed. Members of this committee were horrified to find so many walls. They concluded that "these walls separate foreign from domestic activities, foreign intelligence from law-enforcement operations, the FBI from the CIA, communications intelligence from other types of intelligence, the intelligence community from other types of federal agencies, and national-security information from other forms of evidence."

The most severe critic of the Wall was Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL). As a member of the Senate and House Joint Inquiry Committee on Intelligence, he accused the FBI of allowing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court to serve as a wall of "no coordination," leaving the United States open to attack. He further charged that the FBI "had, to suit its own institutional interests, created rules where they did not exist that allowed it to refuse to share the results of criminal investigations, specifically grand jury investigations, with the rest of the intelligence community." Shelby was uncertain whether the FBI could handle the task of coping with the intelligence needs of the country. He was no less critical of the CIA for its refusal to share intelligence with other government agencies.

The Wall and its variants endured until the events of September 11 made them obsolete. It was apparent that there was need for better communications, both within the FBI and among other government agencies. It took Congressional adoption of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2002 to dismantle the Wall.

See Also

Clinton Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation; USA PATRIOT Act

See Document

Document #28

Suggested Reading

David Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002); Bill Gertz, *Breakdown: The Failure of American Intelligence to Defeat Global Terror*

(New York: Plume Books, 2003), rev. ed.; Bob Graham, *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004); Thomas Kean, Lee Hamilton, and Benjamin Rhodes, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Random House, 2002); Richard Gid Powers, *Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI* (New York: Free Press, 2004); John Yoo, *War by Other Means: An Insider's Account of the War on Terror* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).

Weldon, Curtis "Curt" (1947–)

Curt Weldon has been the leading champion of the Able Danger story about an agency of the U.S. government knowing of the presence of Mohamed Atta before September 11. Weldon used his position as a Republican congressman from the 7th Congressional District of Pennsylvania to charge that the government suppressed the fact that a special military intelligence program had identified Mohammad Atta as an al-Qaeda operative before September 11, 2001. His position as vice chair of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees gave him a forum to express his views.

Weldon's early career was as an educator. He was born on July 22, 1947. His family lived in Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania. He was the youngest of nine children. After high school, he attended West Chester University of Pennsylvania. His major was Russian Studies. After graduation in 1969, he was subject to the military draft but failed the physical. He found a position as an educator in the Delaware County schools. His other interest was working with the volunteer Viscose Fire Company in Marcus Hook.

Weldon entered politics in 1977, running for Mayor of Marcus Hook. He served two terms as mayor, from 1977 to 1982. In 1984 Weldon ran for U.S. Congress on the Republican ticket but lost to incumbent Democrat Robert W. Edgar. When Edgar decided to run for the U.S. Senate, Weldon won Edgar's seat in 1986. Although his district leans Democratic, Weldon won election handily from 1986 until 2006. He was defeated in 2006, in part because of a scandal that arose based on reports that he sent lobbying contracts from foreign clients to a company operated by his daughter.

Weldon was one of the more conservative Republicans in the U.S. House, where he held a number of important assignments. Two issues he advanced were promotion of a national missile defense system and improvement of U.S.–Russian relations. He made several fact-finding trips to North Korea and Libya in furtherance of these concerns.

Soon after Weldon learned about Able Danger, he became its champion. Weldon was relentless, both in the House of Representatives and in public, in his attacks on the Clinton administration for having closed down the secret Able Danger program. Weldon did not acknowledge that the program was unauthorized or that it operated through the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although Able Danger was closed during the George W. Bush administration, Weldon did not publicly mention this fact.

Weldon was in full attack mode when his political career came to an abrupt halt in November 2006. Despite his conservative credentials, the district he represented was predominantly Democratic. This fact caught up with him when federal



Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) testifies on "Able Danger" and the nature of intelligence sharing prior to the September 11 attacks before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Capitol Hill, September 21, 2005. James Smith (second from left) and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer (center) listen in the background. Both men were ordered by the Pentagon not to testify. A staff member holds an al-Qaeda organizational chart at right. (AP IMAGES/Dennis Cook.)

authorities began investigating his misconduct in directing consulting contracts to family members. In the November 2006 election, Weldon was decisively defeated by a Democratic candidate.

See Also
Able Danger; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States

See Document
Document #38

Suggested Reading
Andrew C. McCarthy, "It's Time to Investigate Able Danger and the 9/11 Commission," *National Review* (December 8, 2005), p. 1; James Rosen, "A 9/11 Tip-Off—Fact or Fancy?: Debate Still Swirls around Claim That Secret Military Program ID'd Hijackers a Year before Attacks," *Sacramento Bee* (November 24, 2005), p. A1.

World Trade Center

The World Trade Center was one of the signature complexes in New York City. It was a complex of seven buildings on a sixteen-acre tract in the lower end of Manhattan on a superblock bounded by Vesey, Liberty, Church, and West Streets, and it was about three blocks north of the New York Stock Exchange. Nelson and David Rockefeller had proposed such a complex in the 1950s as a way to revitalize lower Manhattan. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) constructed and operated the complex. The U.S. architect was Minoru Yamasaki,

assisted by Antonio Brittiochi and the architecture firm of Emery Roth and Sons, which handled the production work; the Worthington, Skilling, Helle, and Jackson firm served as project engineers. Yamasaki designed a complex with twin towers and three lower-rise structures. His design was selected over those of a dozen other American architects. The North Tower had a height of 1,368 feet and the South Tower 1,362 feet, making them the tallest buildings in the world—until Chicago's Sears Tower surpassed them both in 1974.

Construction of the World Trade Center complex took more than a decade to finish. The groundbreaking was on August 5, 1966. One World Trade Center (North Tower complex) was open to its first tenants late in 1970, although its top floors remained uncompleted until 1972. Two World Trade Center (the South Tower complex) was not finished until 1973. It cost an estimated $1.5 billion to construct the World Trade Center complex. Because the complex was built on six acres of landfill, the foundation for each tower had to be extended more than seventy feet below ground level, to rest on solid bedrock. The ribbon-cutting ceremony took place on April 4, 1973. It took two hundred thousand tons of steel, and controversy developed over the fireproofing of the steel.

The World Trade Center complex was immense. This complex was in the middle of New York City's financial district. Each of the towers had 110 stories. The complex contained 13.4 million square feet of office space—enough to house 50,000 office employees working for 438 companies from twenty-eight countries. It also had 21,800 windows. To provide access to the office space and other operations, each tower had 104 passenger elevators. In each tower were three staircases to be used in case of emergencies.

The World Trade Center complex was essentially a commercial site, but it was also a popular tourist destination. Around 140,000 tourists visited the World Trade Center complex daily to take advantage of its many amenities. In comparison, about 50,000 employees worked in the complex on any given workday. The four-star restaurant, Windows on the World, on the one hundred-and-seventh floor of the North Tower was popular, not only for its food but also because of the view. The twin towers were a major asset to the New York City skyline, but they were also a tempting target.

See Also
World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading
Eric Darton, *Divided We Stand: A Biography of New York City's World Trade Center* (New York: Basic Books, 2001); James Glanz and Eric Lipton, *City in the Sky: The Rise and Fall of the World Trade Center* (New York: Times Books, 2004).

World Trade Center, September 11

On September 11, 2001, the day started normally in the World Trade Center. In the twin towers the number of employees was 14,154. Approximately 14,000 people were present at the time the first commercial aircraft hit the North Tower. American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower at 8:46:40 a.m. The aircraft cut a swath through eight floors—from the ninety-third to the hundredth—as it hit at about 450 miles an hour.

Force of the impact and the resulting fire from aviation fuel destroyed most elevators and most staircases between the floors above the hundredth and below the

ninety-third floors. Nearly one thousand people were trapped on the upper floors of the North Tower. A majority of them worked for Cantor Fitzgerald brokerage company. At least sixty people jumped from the North Tower rather than burn to death. One firefighter was killed after being hit by one of the jumpers.

An emergency call went out to the Fire Department of New York City (FDNY). More than a thousand firefighters from 225 units showed up at the World Trade complex. There were so many vehicles that parking became a problem. Immediately, FDNY commanders realized that they could not extinguish the growing fire in the North Tower, so they concentrated on evacuating people. Because of lack of water, only a few firefighters would engage in trying to put out the fire. Operators for the 911 system told people to stay put, and assured them that firefighters would be coming to rescue them. To those on the top floors of the North Tower the deteriorating conditions made it imperative that help come soon. Some tried to make it to the roof, but the FDNY had decided after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing to lock the heavy doors leading from the floors to the building's sole roof exit. This decision had been made because rooftop rescues by helicopters were a safety risk.

Events at the North Tower caused concern among those in the South Tower. Many of those in the South Tower decided to evacuate the building. Those who tried to evacuate the South Tower were told as they tried to leave the building to return to their offices. This was because the standard firefighting philosophy in high-rise fires was to "stay put, stand by." An announcement broadcast over the intercom at 8:55 a.m. stated that there was no need to evacuate the South Tower. This announcement directly contradicted a decision by Sergeant Al DeVona, ranking Port Authority police officer on the scene, who had ordered that both the North and South Towers be evacuated within minutes of the first crash. DeVona reordered the evacuations at 8:59 a.m. Captain Anthony Whitaker, commander of

Evaluation of the World Trade Center Disaster

To a large extent, the World Trade Center is a disaster that could be as much a result of its fundamental design as was the Titanic. The plane hit the South Tower and distributed the burning fuel throughout. The temperature of the fire was such that steel was stretched throughout. The steel trusses that held the weight of the corrugated steel and the 3 inches of concrete that formed the floor stretched. The weight of the floor was shifted to the interior columns, all 47 of them around the elevators and stairs, but those stretched and weakened columns could not withstand such a burden. The trusses on the fire floors separated from the exterior walls, almost all of them simultaneously, and the exterior walls buckled. Since the weight of the floor was no longer sustained by the exterior wall connections and no longer held by the interior columns, the floor collapsed. But it did not collapse partially; it collapsed fully in a pancaked layer to the floor below. The floor below could not sustain the dynamic weight of a uniform falling body, and it, too, collapsed, to the next floor, and to the next, and to the next, until moving at 120 miles per hour, the building fell in 12 seconds.

Dennis Smith, *Report from Ground Zero: The Story of the Rescue Efforts at the World Trade Center* (New York: Viking, 2002), p. 189.

Analysis of September 11 by First Deputy Police Commissioner Joe Dunne

No one made the right move. No one made the wrong move. No one made a critical mistake. No one made an ingenious decision. We were just in the Hands of God, or fate if you prefer, and those that got out of the place were fortunate and blessed and those that didn't are with God now. There's no rhyme or reason why people made it and why people didn't.

Quoted in Dennis Smith, *Report from Ground Zero* (New York: Viking, 2002), p. 69.

the Port Authority Police, confirmed this order shortly thereafter. Faulty communications equipment made these decisions difficult to implement. Because of the communication problems, the 911 operators could not be informed of the deteriorating situation and they continued to give outdated advice to people to stay where they were.

The difficulty in evacuating the twin towers was compounded by the structural defects of the towers. Decisions made during construction made it difficult for people to evacuate, there being only three staircases. Changes in building codes in 1968 had reduced both the number of staircases and the level of fire protection for high-rise buildings. These changes allowed more rentable space, but meant that the staircases were built for only a few hundred people at a time to walk three or four stories, not for mass evacuation. The location of the three staircases in the center of the building, rather than being dispersed, turned the upper floors of both towers into death traps because the plane crashes in both buildings cut off access to the staircases. With inferior fireproofing, there was nothing to prevent the spread of the fires. The New York City building codes were not an issue because the builder, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, as a regional entity was not required to follow building codes.

The twin towers had been able to sustain the impact of the two airliners, but it was the fire that endangered the structure. Later reports indicated that it was the high temperature of the fire, caused by the ignition of the aviation fuel and intensified by the burning office furniture and paper, that caused the worst damage. Another factor was that the World Trade Center complex buildings had been constructed with thirty-seven pounds of steel per square foot, in contrast to the normal high-rise buildings of that era, which were built with seventy-five pounds of steel per square feet. This type of construction saved millions of dollars during construction and increased the square footage of rental space, making the buildings more profitable. Since steel begins to degrade at 300 degrees and continues to degrade by 50 percent at 1,000 degrees, the high-temperature fire, combined with the reduced amount of steel supporting the buildings, led to weakening of the structure of the buildings.

Comments by Deputy Assistant Chief of FDNY on Those Rescued at the World Trade Center

That day we lost 2,752 people at the World Trade Center; 343 were firefighters. But we also saved 25,000 people. And that's what people should remember because firefighters and rescuers went in and they knew it was dangerous, but they went in to save people. And they saved many.

Quoted in Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, and Benjamin Rhodes, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Knopf, 2006).

The South Tower collapsed first. United Airlines Flight 175

Two firefighters hose down a hot spot as another looks on from above at the site of the destroyed World Trade Center, October 9, 2001. (AP IMAGES/Stuart Ramson.)

hit at higher speed than did American Airlines Flight 11. This higher speed and the resulting explosion and fire in the South Tower caused it to collapse in a heap.

Total deaths at the World Trade Center were 2,749. Of this total, 147 were passengers and crew of the two aircraft. Another 412 of the dead were rescue workers killed when the two towers collapsed. The remaining 2,190 dead succumbed to the plane crashes or in the collapse of the towers. Except for the actions of key individuals and the firefighters, the casualties could have been much higher. Except in the case of those trapped in the North and South Towers above where the planes hit, there was no discernable reason for some people to have died while others survived.

Besides attacking the physical structures of the twin towers, the hijackers also impacted the financial health of the United States. Many businesses simply went out of business in New York City. Many others struggled to regain financial viability. Layoffs in the period between September 12 and January 21, 2002, related to September 11 were calculated at 1,054,653. The attack on the airline industry was

an indirect financial blow in that it accounted for about 9 percent of the total gross domestic product of the United States, and because around eleven million jobs are related directly to commercial aviation.

See Also

American Airlines Flight 11; Firefighters at Ground Zero; Giuliani, Rudolf William Louis "Rudy" III; United Airlines Flight 175

Suggested Reading

Richard Bernstein, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11, 2001, from Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002); Jim Dwyer, "Errors and Lack of Information in New York's Response to Sept. 11," *New York Times* (May 19, 2004), p. B8; Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, *102 Minutes: The Untold Story of the Fight to Survive Inside the Twin Towers* (New York: Times Books, 2005); Dennis Smith, *Report from Ground Zero* (New York: Viking, 2002).

World Trade Center (Movie)

Oliver Stone directed the movie *World Trade Center*, which tells the story of two of the survivors at the World Trade Center complex on September 11. The protagonists were two Port Authority of New York and New Jersey police officers, John McLaughlin and Will Jimeno. They had been trapped beneath falling rubble after the collapse of the twin towers. There were only six people rescued from beneath the debris. Stone became interested in the project after receiving a screenplay from Andrea Berloff.

Unlike in several of his other films, Stone avoided politics to tell a story. He let the drama build around the two main characters and their wives. To add authenticity Stone used input from McLoughlin and Jimeno. The stars of the film were Nicolas Cage, Michael Peña, Maria Bello, and Maggie Gyllenhaal. Most of the scenes were filmed at a soundstage in Playa Vista, California.

The movie opened on August 9, 2005. Most of the reviews by critics were positive. Paramount Pictures had released it as a mainstream film with a rating of PG-13. The Motion Picture Association of America decided on this rating because of the movie's emotional content and some of its disturbing images and language. On opening weekend it grossed over $18 million in the United States and Canada. Its total gross was over $70 million in North America. Worldwide the film grossed over $161 million.

Oliver Stone's Comment on Story Line

It's true—we don't cover the terrorist side in the film. It is concerned only with the survival of these two men. Politics doesn't enter into it—it's about courage and survival.

Quoted in Fiona Hudson, "Stone's Ode to Survival," *Sunday Herald Sun* [Australia] (September 24, 2006), p. E7.

Stone had a reputation for making politically controversial films. Among these films were *JFK*, *Platoon*, and *Natural Born Killers*. When news surfaced that Stone was going to make a movie about September 11, the assumption by many was that it would be an exposé or would outline a conspiracy theory. His right-wing critics were particularly vocal in expressing this fear. Once it became apparent that Stone was crafting a straightforward story line that showed the heroism of that day, conservative spokespersons embraced the movie and recom-

mended it widely. The only segment of the American population disappointed in the movie were those in the 9/11 conspiracy movement. They expected him to outline elements of a U.S. government conspiracy, and when this did not happen, the conspiracy theorists rejected the movie.

See Also
World Trade Center, September 11

Suggested Reading
Sam Allis, "No Longer a Rolling Stone?" *Boston Globe* (August 6, 2006), p. N11; Paul Cullum, "After the Fall; Oliver Stone at Ground Zero," *LA Weekly* (August 10, 2006), p. 1; Ann Hornaday, "America's Character: In the Debris of 9/11, Bravery, Not Conspiracy, Stirred Oliver Stone," *Washington Post* (August 8, 2006), p. CO1; Carla Meyer, "Oliver Stone; Directing History," *Sacramento Bee* (August 6, 2006), p. TK24; Sara Stewart, "Patriot Games—Why Oliver Stone, Hollywood's Biggest Conspiracy Theorist, Put Politics Aside for 'WTC'," *New York Post* (August 6, 2006), p. 40; David Usborne, "How Stone Won Over the Right," *Independent* [London] (July 29, 2006), p. 33.

World Trade Center Bombing (1993)

The first attempt by terrorists to destroy the World Trade Center complex failed in 1993. Islamist terrorists exploded a bomb in the underground garage, level B-2, of One World Trade Center (North Tower) on Friday, February 26, 1993, at 12:18 p.m. They used a yellow Ford Econoline Ryder truck filled with 1,500 pounds of explosives. Their bomb was built from a mix of fuel oil and fertilizer with a nitroglycerin booster.

The conspirators were militant Islamists led by Ramzi Yousef. Yousef confessed to American authorities after his capture that they had selected the World Trade Center complex because it was "an overweening symbol of American arrogance." Other participants were Mohammed Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Mahmud Abouhalima, and—to a lesser extent—Abdul Rahman. Beginning in January 1993, Yousef and his fellow conspirators began to locate and buy the ingredients for the bomb. They needed everything, ranging from a place to work to storage lockers, tools, chemicals, plastic tubs, fertilizer, and lengths of rubber tubing. It took about $20,000 to build the bomb. Yousef wanted more money so that he could build an even bigger bomb. Most of the funds were raised in the United States, but some money came from abroad. Yousef's uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, had sent him $600 dollars for the bomb.

It was Yousef's intention that the explosion bring down the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex, and that its impact on the South Tower would bring it down also. This expectation was too high. The North Tower shook in the explosion, but withstood its force.

Despite the force of the explosion, casualties were rela-

Timing of the Attack and Funding

Yousef told investigating agents that the date had been forced upon the conspirators because they could not afford to pay their rent for the next month. However, Yousef left New York on a first-class ticket, and the FBI discovered $2,615 in cash in the conspirators' apartments.

Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden, and the Future of Terrorism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999), p. 246.

tively low. The bomb produced a crater twenty-two feet wide and five stories deep. The force of the explosion came close to breaching the so-called bathtub, a structure that prevented water from the Hudson River from pouring into the underground areas of the complex and into the subway system. If this breach had occurred, the resulting catastrophic loss of live would have eclipsed the losses from the attacks on September 11, 2001. Six people—John DiGiovanni, Bob Kirkpatrick, Steve Knapp, Bill Backo, Wilfredo Mercado, and Monica Rodriguez-Smith—were killed, and more than 1,000 were injured. The New York City Fire Department responded with 775 firefighters from 135 companies, but they arrived too late to do anything but tend to the wounded and carry away the dead. It took nearly ten hours to get everyone out because the elevators shorted out in the explosion and power to the staircases failed. Evacuations took place in the dark and in the midst of heavy smoke. The towers were repaired and the complex reopened in less than one month. It cost $510 million to repair the damage. The bombing was also significant for showing how vulnerable the World Trade Complex was to terrorist attacks.

At first investigators believed that a transformer had blown up, but once they started examining the site, it became obvious that a large bomb had detonated. Within five hours the FBI and the New York City Police Department had confirmed that the explosion had been caused by a bomb. The next question was who had done it. There had been twenty calls to the police claiming responsibility, but this was not unusual. The top candidate was Balkan extremists, but the investigation was just beginning.

Within weeks the investigating team of 700 agents had identified or arrested all of the World Trade Center bombers. What broke the case was the discovery of a unique vehicle identification number on the frame of the Ryder van. They learned that Salameh had rented the van. He had reported the van stolen and was trying to recover the $400 deposit. Salameh was arrested while trying to collect the deposit. Investigators then turned to identification of his fellow conspirators, and Yousef was finally identified as the leader of the plot.

By the time authorities had identified Yousef as the leader of the plot and maker of the bomb, he was already in Pakistan planning other operations. Ultimately, a CIA-and-FBI team captured him in Pakistan, but not before he had initiated several other plots. Yousef had always been a freelancer, but there is evidence that he had connections with al-Qaeda operatives before and after the World Trade Center bombing. After a series of trials, the participants in the bomb plot received life sentences. Yousef was sentenced to 240 years in solitary confinement.

See Also

Abouhalima, Mahmud; Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh; Yousef, Ramzi Ahmed

See Document

Document #1

Suggested Reading

J. Bowyer Bell, *Murders on the Nile: The World Trade Center and Global Terror* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003); Peter Caram, *The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing: Foresight and Warning* (London: Janus Publishing, 2001); Mike Davis, *Duda's Wagon; A Brief History of the Car Bomb* (London: Verso, 2007); Peter Lance, *1000 Years for Revenge:*

International Terrorism and the FBI: The Untold Story (New York: ReganBooks, 2003); John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden, and the Future of Terrorism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999).

Y

Yousef, Ramzi Ahmed (1968–)

Ramzi Ahmed Yousef gained fame as the leader of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center complex in New York City. For a time Yousef was the most famous terrorist in the world. His exploit of bombing the World Trade Center complex made him a hero in Muslim extremist circles. He used his fame to recruit followers and plan other terrorist operations throughout South Asia, especially in the Philippines.

Yousef's political inclinations and strong scientific abilities prepared him to become a terrorist. He was born on April 27, 1968, in the small town of Fuhayhil, Kuwait, and was given the birth name of Abdul Basit Mahmud Abdul-Karim. His father was an engineer by training, from the Baluchistan region of Pakistan. He worked for Kuwaiti Airlines. Besides being a Baluchi nationalist, Yousef's father was a devotee of the theology of Wahhabism, a strict form of Muslim religious practice initiated by the conservative eighteenth-century cleric Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. (Wahhabism is the form of Sunni Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia.) His mother was a Kuwaiti of Palestinian origin. His uncle was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed of September 11 fame. Because of his non-Kuwait origin, Yousef and his family were treated as second-class citizens in Kuwait, causing him to resent the Kuwaiti regime. One of his childhood friends was Abdul Hakim Murad. After finishing his local schooling and showing promise in mathematics and science, he decided to study abroad. Beginning in 1986, Yousef took a twelve-week course in English at Oxford University. He then attended a small technical school in Wales—the West Glamogan Institute in Swansea, United Kingdom. In summer 1988 Yousef traveled to Afghanistan with the intention of fighting with the Afghans against the Soviets, but instead he spent his time in Peshawar at al-Qaeda training camps. It was at this camp that he first med Mahmud Abouhalima. Yousef obtained a Higher National Diploma in computer-aided electrical engineering in 1989. While still at the university, Yousef affiliated with a local cell of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hassan al-Banna (1906–49) had founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 to restore religious and political practices of the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Leaders

of the Muslim Brotherhood form the opposition to most of the regimes in the Middle East.

Returning to Kuwait, Yousef landed a job with the Kuwaiti government, working as a communications engineer at the National Computer Center for the Ministry of Planning. This position lasted until Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The next year Yousef moved to Quetta, Pakistan, where he married a young Baluchistani woman.

Yousef committed himself to terrorism soon after he left Kuwait. Unlike other terrorists, Yousef was not particularly religious, and his motivation for taking up terrorism was the Palestinian cause. He identified with his Palestinian mother's family. While in Pakistan, Yousef participated in another al-Qaeda training camp, first as a trainee and later as an instructor in the making of bombs. His specialty in camp was making nitroglycerin bombs. At this camp Yousef made contact with terrorists in training from South Asia, particularly from the Philippines. One of his connections was with Abdurajak Janjalani, the future founder of the Abu Sayyaf group in the southern Philippines. Yousef briefly visited Basilian Island in the Philippines in 1991 to instruct at a Muslim guerrilla camp.

Yousef decided to turn his attention toward a terrorist act in the United States. He told a friend that he wanted to attack Israel, but because Israel was too tough a target he decided to attack the United States instead. This friend told him that a lot of Jews worked at the World Trade Center complex in New York City. Yousef was described by Terry McDermott as a "freelancer, the harbinger of a new type of independent, non–state-sponsored global terrorist." He entered the United States in 1992 with the goal of establishing contact with possible terrorist allies. Yousef lacked a valid visa so he filed a claim for political and religious asylum with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at the John F. Kennedy International Airport. Confronted by the choice of deportation or arrest, he chose arrest but authorities released him on his own recognizance with instructions to appear for an asylum hearing. His traveling companion, Ahmed Ajaj, was arrested and later deported. Yousef never showed up at the INS hearing scheduled for December 8, 1992, so after that date his stay in the country became technically illegal.

Yousef's first contacts in the United States were with the militant Islamists at the al-Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn. There he met with the Egyptian Islamist leader Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, formerly the spiritual leader of the Egyptian terrorist organization al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group). Although blind since infancy, Abdel Rahman had a considerable following in both the Middle East and United States. He had entered the United States in July 1990, and consolidated political control at the al-Kifah Refugee Center.

Yousef took advantage of the presence of these militants to plot a bombing attack of the World Trade Center complex. According to Terry McDermott, Yousef was able to recruit a team of "largely marginal, unaccomplished men" to build a bomb. His major accomplice was Mahmud Abouhalima. Yousef's intent was to build a bomb big enough to bring down the World Trade Center complex and kill 250,000 Americans.

A major problem for Yousef was his lack of funds to build the size bomb that he wanted. Yousef's uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, sent him $660 from Pakistan to help, but he needed much more money. The size of the bomb was determined by the amount of money he had available. Ultimately, Yousef had to

limit the size of the bomb because he had only $20,000 available. Yousef and his small team of terrorists built a large bomb in an apartment at 40 Pamrapo Avenue in Jersey City, New Jersey. He was able to purchase fifteen hundred pounds of urea, 130 gallons of nitric acid, and a variety of other chemicals from City Chemical in New Jersey. These ingredients, one hundred pounds of aluminum powder, and hydrogen gas tanks made a 1,500-pound bomb.

On the morning of February 26, 1993, the conspirators loaded the bomb into a large, rented Ford Econoline Ryder van. After the van was parked in the underground garage of the World Trade Center under the North Tower, it was detonated at 12:18 p.m. on February 26, 1993. The explosion killed six and injured more than a thousand. It also produced $300 million in damage. Although the bomb produced a large crater, the World Trade Center complex remained standing. Yousef had hoped that by undermining one of the towers, it would fall and impact the other tower, achieving his goal of killing 250,000 people. By the time of the explosion Yousef was already en route back to Pakistan. Shortly after the detonation, Yousef had an associate send a letter to five American newspapers justifying the bombing. He was bitterly disappointed in the failure of the bomb to do more damage to the World Trade Center, but it did take six lives and caused thousands of injuries.

Intent of Yousef in Bombing the World Trade Center

Yousef did not aim to damage the World Trade Center: he set out to bring the towers down. Placed correctly, he thought, a large enough charge would cause one tower to topple into the other, killing everyone inside. . . . Ramzi's attack reversed the law of historical repetition—it was the farce that preceded the tragedy of September 11. For all his ingenuity, Yousef knew little about physics, civil engineering, or the structural safeguards built into the Twin Towers, so he underestimated the amount of explosives needed to destroy one building. He also did not understand that it was impossible to tip one tower over into the other. Gravity and the enormous inertial mass of the building meant that structural failure would result in pancaking.

Quoted in Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 14.

After leaving the United States, Yousef returned to Quetta, Pakistan, where his family lived. Later he traveled to Karachi, where he had a fateful meeting with his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Yousef had several conversations with his good friend Abdul Hakim Murad, and they discussed ways to attack targets in the United States. Murad, who had a commercial pilot's license and had attended a commercial pilot school in the United States, proposed packing a small airplane full of explosives and dive-bombing into the Pentagon or the headquarters of the CIA. Yousef found this idea intriguing enough that he introduced Murad to his uncle. His uncle asked Murad about pilot training and the availability of aircraft. Nothing further happened with this idea at the time, but the idea had been planted in the mind of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and he presented a variation of it to Osama bin Laden in 1996.

Yousef kept busy planning terrorist operations in Pakistan. His next target was Pakistani politician Benazir Bhutto. Militant Islamists wanted her assassinated, and he was offered $68,000 to carry it out. His plan was to assassinate Bhutto with a bomb, but while he was planting the bomb detonator outside Bhutto's residence, it exploded in his face, injuring an eye. Prompt medical attention saved the eye,

but the explosion attracted the attention of Pakistani authorities. Knowing that he was vulnerable to both American and Pakistani intelligence services, Yousef realized that he had to leave Pakistan. Before he left, however, Yousef traveled to Mashad, Iran, where he planted a C-4 bomb at a Shiite shrine that killed 26 people and injured another 200.

Yousef's next terrorist act was the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, in early 1994. He built a bomb, and loaded it onto a truck. His designated driver became disoriented by Bangkok traffic and had an accident. Panicking, he abandoned the truck. The police had the truck towed to their headquarters. When they opened the truck, they found a huge bomb and the body of the truck's owner.

After this failure in Bangkok, Yousef decided to continue his career as a terrorist elsewhere, and he picked the Philippines as his new his area of operations. The Philippines was an obvious area of operations because it was home to a large cadre of militant Islamists, it was cheap, and Yousef already had contacts there. He moved to the Philippines, along with his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, in spring 1994. After renewing his close ties with the Abu Sayyaf group, Yousef established his base of operations in Manila at the third-class Manor Hotel. By mid-1994 Yousef began planning several plots: one was to blow up eleven U.S. commercial airliners; another was to assassinate U.S. President William Clinton during a visit to the Philippines; and the final plot was to assassinate Pope John Paul II during a papal visit to Manila on January 15, 1995. Yousef and his uncle Khalid Sheikh Mohammed decided that the assassination of Pope John Paul II held the most promise. They settled on using remote-controlled pipe bombs planted along the route to and from the papal ambassador's home where the Pope would reside during his stay in Manila. Yousef experimented with a small nitroglycerine bomb that he tested first at a Manila movie theater on December 1, 1994, and then on an American commercial aircraft on December 8, 1994. Both tests were successful, with one of the bombs killing a passenger and almost causing the Boeing 747 to crash.

The bomb designed by Yousef was ingenious. He passed through Manila Airport carrying liquid nitroglycerin in a contact lens case and a nine-volt battery in the heel of each of his shoes. He assembled the bomb in the bathroom, using a Casio watch as a timer. On the first leg of the flight Yousef armed the bomb, and then he left the plane, headed for Cebu City in the southern Philippines. The bomb exploded two hours later, on the next leg of the flight. It tore a hole in the fuselage and damaged the aileron cables that controlled the plane's wing flaps. It took considerable skill for the plane's pilot to land the aircraft at Naha Airport in Okinawa. There was only one victim—a twenty-four-year-old Japanese engineer named Haruki Ikegami. Yousef has been described by FBI agents, after they studied his miniature bombs, as "a genius when it came to bomb building."

Yousef's next plan was the assassination of the Pope. This plan miscarried in a chemical mishap while Yousef was burning off extra chemicals in his Manila apartment on January 6, 1995. Yousef fled the scene and returned to Pakistan, but Philippine authorities found in his laptop computer the plans for his various plots. Among these plots was the one to fly commercial airliners into the Pentagon, White House, and other prominent targets. They also captured his associate and fellow bomb maker Murad. Under duress Murad identified Yousef and his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Murad also confessed that it was his idea

for an aircraft to dive-bomb into CIA headquarters. This information enabled American and Philippine authorities to place Yousef on an international terrorist list. On the evening of February 7, 1995, Pakistani security forces arrested Yousef in Room 16 at the Su Casa Guest House in Islamabad, Pakistan, after being tipped to his location by former associate Istaique Parker. Parker turned him in because he did not want to participate in a suicide mission and because of the appeal of the $2 million reward that was offered. Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto authorized turning Yousef over to American authorities, who transported him to the United States to stand trial for the World Trade Center bombing.

Yousef stood trial for both the World Trade Center bombing and for conspiracy to plant bombs on U.S. commercial airlines. His first trial was for the charge of conspiring to plant bombs on U.S. commercial airlines. After deciding to plead his case without a lawyer, Yousef was convicted by a jury on September 5, 1996, and was sentenced to life imprisonment in solitary confinement without possibility of parole. In the second and more publicized trial, for the World Trade Center bombing, Yousef was convicted on all charges on February 12, 1997. The judge sentenced him to 240 years in prison, fined him $4.5 million, and imposed restrictions on his visitors. The severity of the sentence resulted in part from witness testimony that Yousef intended to blow up the World Trade Center to let Americans know that they were at war with Islam and to punish their government for its support of Israel. Yousef has been serving his sentence at the federal "supermax" prison in Florence, Colorado.

There has been considerable conjecture about Yousef's relationship with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Yousef undoubtedly had connections with al-Qaeda—he had stayed at al-Qaeda safe houses and received training at al-Qaeda camps. There is even evidence that he was personally acquainted with bin Laden. Despite these connections, Yousef seems to have been operating outside of al-Qaeda. Most of his operations lacked the sophistication associated with al-Qaeda, and his money problems would have been solved if he had had al-Qaeda funding. Yousef has never provided valuable information about anything but his own exploits, so it remains difficult to determine his relationship with other terrorists and terrorist groups. His close relationship with his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—future architect of the September 11 operation—does indicate that Yousef had a lasting impact among Islamist extremists.

See Also

Kifah Refugee Center, al-; Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh; Murad, Abdul Hakim Ali Hashim; World Trade Center Bombing (1993)

See Document

Document #1

Suggested Reading

J. Bowyer Bell, *Murders on the Nile: The World Trade Center and Global Terror* (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2003); Mike Davis, *Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb* (London: Verso, 2007); Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, *Mastermind of Terror: The Truth Behind the Most Devastating Terrorist Attack the World Has Ever Seen* (New York: Arcade, 2003); Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005); John Miller, Michael Stone, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999).

Z

Zadroga, James (1972–2006)
James Zadroga was a former New York City police detective who became a victim of the aftermath of the cleanup of the World Trade Center. At the time of his death he was on disability leave, suffering the effects of his work at Ground Zero. Zadroga was a thirteen-year veteran of the New York Police Department (NYPD).

Zadroga was inside Seven World Trade Center as the building collapsed on September 11. After surviving the collapse, Zadroga spent the next several weeks helping search for victims' remains, his work totaling more than 450 hours of digging through debris and inhaling noxious gases. Despite assurances from Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) officials that no health risks were associated with digging through the debris, Zadroga started exhibiting respiratory disorder symptoms. His health problems led the NYPD to grant him a tax-free disability pension of three-quarters pay in 2004. This settlement did not pay for his medical expenses. In the next two years Zadroga's health problems led to $50,000 in medical bills. Also in 2004, Zadroga's wife died of a brain tumor, leaving him alone to care for their young daughter. Zadroga expressed his anguish in a letter written soon after his illness began. Zadroga died on January 6, 2006, in Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey. He was thirty-four at the time of his death. An autopsy attributed his death to "foreign body granules in his lungs."

Life after Cleanup for NYPD Police Detective

Day after horrible day, I went back down surviving on two hours sleep a day for a three-week period away from home, away from my wife and unborn child. I can't pay my bills and work doesn't want to acknowledge that I'm sick, depressed and disgusted. I feel sorry and sympathize for those families that lost their loved ones, but I feel worse for those members of the service and their families that are going through what myself and family is going through. They remember the dead, but don't want to acknowledge the sick who are living. I'm not the only one out there. There are many suffering with similar, if not the same symptoms as myself.

Quoted in Robert F. Moore and Alison Gendar, "A Cop Dies & Kin Blame 9-11 Debris," *Daily News* (January 7, 2006), p. 5.

Linda and Joseph Zadroga, center top, parents of retired NYPD Officer James Zadroga, react as their son's casket is carried by New York police officers out of the Queen of Peace Church in North Arlington, New Jersey, on January 10, 2006. Zadroga was the first emergency responder to die as a result of exposure to dust and debris at the World Trade Center crash site. (AP IMAGES/Mike Derer.)

The controversy over Zadroga continued after his death. Although the medical examiner in Ocean County, New Jersey, determined that Zadroga's death was directly linked to his 500 hours of work at Ground Zero, the New York City officials refused to recognize his death as being in the line of duty. A statement by Christine Whitman, former governor of New Jersey and head of the EPA on September 11, implied that city officials, and even those working at Ground Zero, were to blame for not heeding warnings about contaminated air. Whitman's statement further inflamed the issue, and elicited the assertion from U.S. Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) that Whitman wanted "to wash her hands of this tragedy, but her EPA told New Yorkers that the air was safe to breathe." Charges and claims continue to cloud the issue while others who worked at Ground Zero continue to experience increasing health problems. The Zadroga family finally received some relief when New York Governor Pataki signed a bill in August 2006 that entitles Zadroga's daughter, Tylerann, to full line-of-duty death benefits until she reaches age nineteen. An effort by the family to have Zadroga listed among the victims of September 11 was opposed by the New York City Medical Examiner, who claimed in October 2007 that Zadroga died of ingested drugs rather than from the dust at Ground Zero. This opinion had been contradicted by previous examinations of the evidence.

See Also

Cleanup Operations at Ground Zero

Suggested Reading
Rosie DiManno, "Toll from 9/11 Climbs, Albeit Too Quietly," *Toronto Star* (January 13, 2006), p. A2; Kathleen Lucadamo, "Finally Some Good News for Family of 9-11 Hero," *Daily News* (August 15, 2006), p. 4; Robert F. Moore, "A Cop Dies & Kin Blame 9-11 Debris," *Daily News* (January 7, 2006), p. 5; Rich Schapiro, "WTC Air Doomed Ex-Cop," *Daily News* (April 12, 2006), p. 7; Paul H. B. Shin, David Saltonstall, and Paul D. Colford, "Dad Wants Christie Locked Up," *Daily News* (September 9, 2006), p. 4.

Zammar, Muhammad Heydar (1961–)

Muhammad Zammar was an al-Qaeda operative who recruited the key leader of the September 11 conspiracy. He was able to convince the members of the Hamburg Cell in the late 1990s to train in Afghanistan, rather than travel to Chechnya to fight with the Chechen rebels. Once they returned from the training camps Zammar kept track of them for al-Qaeda.

Zammar had extensive experience as a fighter for Islamist causes. He was born in 1961 in Aleppo, Syria. At age ten his family moved to West Germany. After high school, he attended a metalworking college and his goal was to work for Mercedes-Benz. Zammar traveled to Saudi Arabia, where he worked for a time as a translator. After returning to Germany, he found a job as a truck driver in Hamburg. His strong religious views led him to abandon truck driving in 1991 and travel to Afghanistan, where he underwent al-Qaeda training. Upon returning to Germany, Zammar spent all of his time as a freelance mechanic and traveled around Europe and the Middle East. He volunteered to fight in Bosnia in 1995. After leaving Bosnia in 1996, Zammar visited Afghanistan, where Osama bin Laden invited him to join al-Qaeda.

On his return to Hamburg, Germany, Zammar became a full-time recruiter for al-Qaeda. He spent so much time as a recruiter for al-Qaeda that he had no time to work as a mechanic. Zammar, his wife, and six children lived on state welfare. He traveled around Germany making speeches praising bin Laden and other jihadist leaders. His association with the Muslim missionary organization Tabligh afforded him some cover, but German police began watching him.

It was at the al-Quds Mosque in Hamburg that Zammar met the members of and then helped to form the Hamburg Cell. He first met and became friends with Mohamed Atta in 1998. He persuaded Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Ziad Jarrah to train at al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan for important missions. Zammar continued as the al-Qaeda contact person for the Hamburg Cell until its key leaders left for the United States.

Zammar continued to act as an al-Qaeda recruiter until his arrest. Many other Muslims in Germany were willing recruits for al-Qaeda, and Zammar was al-Qaeda's principal contact in Germany. German authorities left him alone, but they watched his activities with interest. American intelligence was also displaying concern about Zammar's connections with al-Qaeda. In July 2001 Zammar was briefly detained in Jordan, but was released after a short interrogation. After September 11, German police questioned Zammar, but released him because they believed they had too little evidence to charge him with a crime.

On October 27, 2001, Zammar traveled to Morocco to divorce his second wife; while there he was arrested by Moroccan security forces. The Moroccans sent Zammar to Syria, where he has undergone extensive interrogation at the notorious

Far Falastin Detention Center in Damascus. Zammar remains in Syrian custody, but American officials have learned much about the September 11 plot from him from answers to questions sent through the Syrians. There is evidence that Zammar has undergone torture at the hands of the Syrians, and this has led international organizations to protest. Regardless of how he is treated by the Syrians, Zammar knew the central players in the 9/11 attack and had a general knowledge of the plot, and so he has proven to be a valuable resource.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Hamburg Cell; Jarrah, Ziad Samir; Quds Mosque, al-; Shehhi, Marwan Yousef Muhammed Rashid Lekrab al-

Suggested Reading

Peter Finn, "German at Center of Sept. 11 Inquiry," *Washington Post* (June 12, 2002), p. A1; Peter Finn, "Al Qaeda Recruiter Reportedly Tortured," *Washington Post* (January 31, 2003), p. A14; Peter Finn, "Syria Interrogating Al Qaeda Recruiter," *Washington Post* (June 19, 2002), p. A1; Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005); Steven Strasser (ed.), *The 9/11 Investigations: Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission; Excerpts from the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Report on 9/11; Testimony from 14 Key Witnesses, Including Richard Clarke, George Tenet, and Condoleezza Rice* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).

Zawahiri, Ayman al- (1951–)

Ayman al-Zawahiri is the second most important leader of al-Qaeda, behind Osama bin Laden. As the former leader of the Egyptian terrorism group Islamic Jihad, he has considerable influence over bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri merged his group into al-Qaeda in the late 1990s, making his contingent of Egyptians influential in the operations of al-Qaeda.

Al-Zawahiri came from a prominent Egyptian family of medical doctors and religious leaders. He was born on June 9, 1951, in al-Sharquiyyah, Egypt. Both sides of his family have roots going back to Saudi Arabia, and his mother's family claims descent from the Prophet Muhammed. His father was a professor at Cairo University's medical school. At an early age, al-Zawahiri joined the Muslim Brotherhood; his first arrest by the Egyptian police was at age fifteen in 1966. After studying medicine at the University of Cairo, al-Zawahiri qualified as a physician in 1974, and then received a master's degree in surgical medicine in 1978.

Al-Zawahiri left medicine for political agitation against the Egyptian government of President Anwar Sadat. Inspiring his conversion to Islamic militancy were the writings of Sayyid Qutb, the ideological and spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was shocked by Qutb's execution in 1965 by the Nasser regime—enough so that he considered forming a clandestine Islamist group. While still in medical school, al-Zawahiri was instrumental in founding the terrorist group Islamic Jihad in 1973. This group's mission was to direct armed struggle against the Egyptian state. It did not take the Egyptian government long to ban activities of the Islamic Jihad.

In the aftermath of the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, Egyptian authorities arrested al-Zawahiri. He had learned of the plot against Sadat only a few hours before it went into operation. He had advised against proceeding because the plot was premature and destined to fail. Al-Zawahiri has claimed that prison authorities treated him brutally. After a trial and acquittal for his role in the

assassination plot against Sadat, al-Zawahiri served a three-year prison sentence for illegal possession of arms. His stay in prison only increased his militancy. It was in prison that al-Zawahiri and Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman shared their views. Under torture al-Zawahiri assisted the police in capturing some of his associates in the Islamic Jihad.

After his release from prison, al-Zawahiri resumed his anti-government activities. In 1984 he assumed the leadership of Islamic Jihad after its former head, Lieutenant-Colonel Abbud al-Zumar, was arrested by the Egyptian police. Al-Zawahiri fled Egypt for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1985 in the middle of President Hosni Mubarak's purge of Egyptian dissidents. There he worked in a medical dispensary. It was in Jeddah in 1986 that al-Zawahiri first met Osama bin Laden. The ongoing war against the Soviets in Afghanistan attracted al-Zawahiri, and he decided to move to Pakistan.

Friction between Azzam and al-Zawahiri as Seen by a Member of Egypt's Islamic Group

Ayman [al Zawahiri] had a severe conflict with Dr. Abdullah Azzam. He called him an agent of America, an agent of Saudi Arabia. I have spoken to Dr. al-Zawahiri many times. [He said to us] why do you have a good relationship with Dr. Azzam? Al Zawahiri [tried to maneuver] bin Laden away from Dr. Azzam. Two days before Dr. Azzam [was assassinated] I am in conversations with al Zawahiri [for] two hours and trying to change his mind, but he was very angry. I met al Zawahiri again at the funeral for Dr. Azzam. And Dr. al Zawahiri was very affected and sad. But before [Azzam was] dead he [was saying Azzam] is a spy.

Quoted in Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006) p. 94.

Soon after arriving in Pakistan, al-Zawahiri started coordinating plans between his Islamic Jihad and the Afghan Arabs fighting against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It was in the late 1980s that al-Zawahiri became acquainted with and then allied with Osama bin Laden. He served as the chief advisor to bin Laden in the creation of the al-Qaeda network in 1988. Al-Zawahiri also engaged in a campaign to undermine bin Laden's relationship with Abdullah Azzam. Azzam's assassination benefited al-Zawahiri, but there is no concrete evidence that he played any role in it. The Pakistani security service concluded that six associates of al-Zawahiri carried out the assassination.

Al-Zawahiri's Influence on Osama bin Laden

Zawahiri managed to introduce drastic changes to Osama bin Laden's philosophy after they first met in Afghanistan in the middle of 1986, mainly because of the friendship that developed between them. Zawahiri convinced bin Laden of his jihadi approach, turning him from a fundamentalist preacher whose main concern was relief work, into a jihadi fighter, clashing with despots and American troops in the Arab world. Zawahiri gave bin Laden some of his closest confidants to help him. They later became the main figures in bin Laden's Al-Qaeda.

Montasser al-Zayyat, *The Road to Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden's Right-Hand Man* (London: Pluto Press, 2004), p. 68.

For the next several years in the early 1990s al-Zawahiri played a dual role as a member of al-Qaeda and as a leader of the Islamic Jihad. Al-Zawahiri left Pakistan and moved to Sudan with bin Laden in 1992. His closeness to Egypt allowed him to plot against the Egyptian government of President Mubarak. Al-Zawahiri's goal from the beginning was the

overthrow of the Egyptian government and replacement of it with an Islamic state. As head of the Islamic Jihad, he planned the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak during his visit to Addis Ababa on June 25, 1995. This failure led to the Sudanese government expelling him and his followers from Sudan.

His activities for al-Qaeda kept him traveling around the world. Bin Laden sent al-Zawahiri to Somalia to aid the opposition to American intervention there. Then he was active in building support for the Bosnian Muslims in their separatist war against Yugoslavia. Next he coordinated aid for Albanian Muslims in the Kosovo War. Finally, al-Zawahiri received the assignment to set up terrorist operations in Europe and the United States. He visited the United States in 1996 to inspect sites for possible terrorist operations there. His conclusion was that major terrorist activities could be undertaken against American targets in the United States.

Al-Zawahiri returned to Afghanistan to join bin Laden. He decided to merge his Egyptian Islamic Jihad group into al-Qaeda in 1998 for a combination of political, financial, and operational reasons. In 1997 al-Zawahiri had been implicated in his group's participation in the terrorist massacre of fifty-eight European tourists and four Egyptian security guards at Luxor, Egypt. This terrorist act was so brutal that it caused a backlash in both Egyptian public opinion and among the leadership of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. It led to a schism within its leadership, with a significant number of the leaders concluding a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. Al-Zawahiri opposed the ceasefire with what he considered to be an apostate government. He led a much weakened Egyptian Islamic Jihad into an alliance with al-Qaeda.

Al-Zawahiri's Change of Heart

Zawahiri's alliance with Osama bin Laden changed his philosophy from one prioritizing combat with the near enemy (Egypt) to one confronting the far enemy: the United States and Israel. This development caused some confusion to Islamic Jihad members. Many were reluctant at first, but eventually agreed to be part of the Front in order to benefit from the many advantages it offered.

Montasser al-Zayyat, *The Road to Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden's Right-Hand Man* (London: Pluto Press, 2004), p. 70.

Al-Zawahiri's influence over bin Laden has grown over the years. Bin Laden is neither as intellectual nor as militant as al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri's views were expressed in the tract *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*. In this work al-Zawahiri justified the use of violence as the only way to match the brute military force of the West led by the United States. For this reason it is necessary to target American targets, the tract posits, and the most effective way to do this is by the use of human bombs. The proposed strategy is to inflict enough damage to the United States that its citizens will demand that their government change policies toward Israel and the Arab world. This treatise was written before the September 11 attacks, but such attacks were obviously in its author's mind.

In his position as number two in al-Qaeda, al-Zawahiri serves as the chief advisor to bin Laden. Because of his more radical religious views, al-Zawahiri pushes bin Laden toward more radical positions. Al-Zawahiri was aware of the September 11 plot from the beginning, but stayed in the background. The subsequent loss of Afghanistan as a staging area for al-Qaeda made al-Zawahiri go into hiding along with bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri and bin Laden keep in contact, but they stay in

Osama bin Laden (second from left) and his top lieutenant, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri (second from right), are shown at an undisclosed location with two unidentified men in this image, which was broadcast by Al-Jazeera on Sunday, October 7, 2001. Bin Laden praised God for the 9/11 attacks and swore America "will never dream of security" until "the infidel's armies leave the land of Muhammad," in a videotaped statement aired after the strike launched by the United States and Britain in Afghanistan. (AP IMAGES/Al Jazeera.)

separate areas to avoid the possibility of al-Qaeda's chief leaders being wiped out in a single attack by the Americans and their allies. He continues to act as one of the chief spokesmen for al-Qaeda.

See Also

Atta, Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed; Bin Laden, Osama; Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh; Qaeda, al-

Suggested Reading

Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History of al Qaeda* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); J. Bowyer Bell, *Murders on the Nile: The World Trade Center and Global Terror* (San Francisco: Encounter books, 2003); Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the* West (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004); Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Knopf, 2006).

Zubaydah, Abu (1971–)

Abu Zubaydah was al-Qaeda chief of operations and number three in its hierarchy until his capture in March 2002. His position put him in charge of al-Qaeda training camps that selected the personnel for the September 11 plot. Zubaydah was originally a member of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad, but with al-Zawahiri he made the transition from that group to al-Qaeda in 1996.

Zubaydah has engaged in extremist Islamist activities since his youth. He was born on March 12, 1971, in Saudi Arabia. His original name was Zayn al-Abidin Mohamed Husayn, but he adopted the name Zubaydah early in his career as a radical Islamist. Although born a Saudi, he grew up among the Palestinians in a refugee camp in the Gaza Strip of Palestine. His first political association was with Hamas. Al-Zawahiri recruited him from Hamas to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. When al-Zawahiri moved to Pakistan, Zubaydah went with him. As a teenager he fought with the Afghan Arabs in military operations against the Soviets. In one of these engagements in Afghanistan Zubaydah lost an eye. His abilities allowed him to move up in the hierarchy of al-Qaeda until he became al-Qaeda's chief of operations.

As chief of operations, Zubaydah played a role in all of al-Qaeda's military operations. Zubaydah selected Mohamed Atta for an important future martyr mission while Atta was in training at Khaldan camp in 1998. He was also active in planning the failed Millennium plots in Jordan and the United States. After the failed plots in Jordan and the United States, he became field commander for the attack on the USS *Cole* on October 12, 2000. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was the operational chief for the September 11 attacks, but Zubaydah was a participant in the final draft of the plan, and was also active in post–September 11 plots. American authorities decided that Zubaydah was important enough to either capture or eliminate. What made Zubaydah important in al-Qaeda was his role in keeping all members' files, and in assigning individuals to specific tasks and operations.

A joint operation of Pakistani security, American Special Forces, and FBI Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit arrested Zubaydah in a suburb of Faisalabad, a town in western Pakistan, on March 28, 2002. From intercepted al-Qaeda communications, the National Security Agency learned that Zubaydah might be at a two-story house owned by a leader of the Pakistani militant extremist group Laskar-e-Toiba. In the subsequent assault thirty-five Pakistanis and twenty-seven Muslims from other countries were arrested. Among the captured was Zubaydah. He had been seriously wounded, with gunshots to the stomach, groin, and thigh. A medical unit determined that Zubaydah would survive, and he was taken into American custody.

Zubaydah has been held at an American interrogation camp since his capture. The Americans decided to interrogate him as if they were in Saudi Arabia. Instead of being frightened, Zubaydah asked his phony "Saudi" interrogators to contact a senior member of the Saudi royal family—Prince Ahmed bin Salman bin Abdul-Aziz—who would save him from the Americans. This claim stunned the interrogators. They returned later to confront him for lying. Zubaydah instead gave more details about agreements among al-Qaeda, Pakistani, and Saudi high-level government leaders. He went so far as to indicate that certain Pakistani and Saudi leaders knew about September 11 before the attack occurred. According to him, these officials did not have the details and did not want them, but they knew the general outlines of the plot. After Zubaydah learned that the "Saudi" interrogators were really Americans, he tried to commit suicide. This attempt failed, and Zubaydah no longer volunteered information and denied what he had said earlier.

American investigators quizzed the Saudi government about Zubaydah's comments. Representatives of the Saudi government called his information false and malicious. In a series of strange coincidences three of the Saudis named by

Zubaydah died in a series of incidents in the months after the inquiries—Prince Ahmed died of a heart attack at age forty-one; Prince Sultan bin Faisal bin Turki al-Said died in an automobile accident; and Prince Fahd bin Turki bin Saud al-Kabir died of thirst while traveling in the Saudi summer at age twenty-five. The supposed Pakistani contact, Air Marshal Ali Mir, was killed in an airplane crash on February 20, 2003, with his wife and fifteen senior officers.

Zubaydah remains in American custody at an unknown site, his eventual fate also unknown. Since American interrogators fooled him into talking, he has refused to provide further information about al-Qaeda or the September 11 plot. In September 2006 Zubaydah was transferred to the Guantánamo Bay Detention Center. Also in 2006, Ron Suskind produced the book *One Percent Doctrine*, which claimed Zubaydah was not nearly so important in al-Qaeda as had been thought. Suskind claimed that Zubaydah was mentally ill and only a minor figure in al-Qaeda. Suskind's assertions have been countered by numerous others, including former al-Qaeda operatives. Regardless of the controversy, Zubaydah appeared before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal in Guantánamo on March 27, 2007. There Zubaydah downplayed his role in al-Qaeda, but still claimed some authority. Zubaydah has also become part of another controversy: whether or not he was tortured by CIA operatives. Because the tapes of his interrogation have been destroyed, the nature of the torture is a matter of speculation.

See Also

al-Qaeda; Zawahiri, Ayman al-

Suggested Reading

Jane Corbin, *Al-Qaeda: The Terror Network That Threatens the World* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002); Gerald Posner, *Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003); Ron Suskind, *One Percent Doctrine* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

Chronology of Events Surrounding 9/11

October 25, 1978	President Jimmy Carter signs the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which allowed investigations of foreign persons who are engaged in espionage or international terrorism.
December 26, 1979	Soviet forces invade Afghanistan, beginning the Afghan-Soviet War.
August 11, 1988	Osama bin Laden and Sheikh Abdullah Azzam start the al-Qaeda organization in Afghanistan.
November 24, 1988	Unknown group assassinates Islamist leader Sheikh Abdullah Azzam in Peshawar, Pakistan, with a car bomb, leaving Osama bin Laden in control of al-Qaeda.
February 15, 1989	Soviet forces withdraw from Afghanistan
November 5, 1990	El Sayyid Nosair assassinates Rabbi Meir Kahane in New York City.
July 24, 1992	Mohamed Atta arrives in Germany to begin graduate work.
September 1, 1992	Ramzi Yousef arrives in the United States at the request of Sheikh Abdel Rahman.
February 26, 1993	Bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, by an Islamist terrorist team led by Ramzi Yousef, kills 6 and wounds 1,042.
March 4, 1993	FBI discovers the VIN number of the Ryder van that leads to the arrest of some of The World Trade bombers.

March 4, 1994	Three of the World Trade Center bombers convicted of bombing.
April 9, 1994	Saudi government revokes Osama bin Laden's Saudi citizenship.
December 11, 1994	Ramzi Ahmed Yousef plants bomb on Philippine Air Lines Flight 434 that kills Japanese engineer.
January 6, 1995	Ramzi Ahmed Yousef accidentally causes fire in a Manila apartment that exposes his plot to assassinate the Pope.
January 20, 1995	Abdul Hakim Murad confesses to a plot to fly a small plane into CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.
February 7, 1995	Pakistani authorities arrest Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the head of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, in Islamabad, Pakistan.
September 22, 1995	Ramzi Bin al-Shibh arrives in Germany.
January 17, 1996	Sheikh Abdel Rahman receives life sentence for his role in planning the bombing of New York City landmarks.
April 3, 1996	Zaid Jarrah arrives in Germany to continue his education.
April 28, 1996	Marwan al-Shehhi arrives in Germany with a military scholarship to further his studies.
May 18, 1996	Sudan expels Osama bin Laden, who leaves for Afghanistan.
June 25, 1996	Al-Qaeda operatives explode truck bomb at the al-Khobar in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Americans and wounding hundreds of others.
July 17, 1996	Explosion downs TWA Flight 800 near Long Island, New York.
August 23, 1996	Osama bin Laden's Declaration of Jihad against the Western World.
May 26, 1997	Saudi government first to recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan.
January 8, 1998	Ramzi Ahmed Yousef receives sentence of 240 years for his role in the World Trade Center bombing in 1993.
February 23, 1998	World Islam Front's Declaration of War against Jews and Crusaders by Osama bin Laden and others.

August 7, 1998	Bombing of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, by al-Qaeda operatives.
August 20, 1998	U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles strike al-Qaeda base camps in Afghanistan and Sudan.
October 8, 1998	FAA warns U.S. airports and airlines of al-Qaeda's threat to U.S. civil aviation.
November 1, 1998	Mohamed Atta, Said Bahaji, and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh move into 54 Marienstrasse in the Harburg area of Hamburg, beginning the Hamburg Cell.
June 7, 1999	FBI puts Osama bin Laden on its 10 Most Wanted list.
October 1999	Creation of the special intelligence unit Able Danger
December 1, 1998	U.S. intelligence makes the assessment that Osama bin Laden has been planning attacks inside the United States.
2000	Pentagon lawyers block Able Danger reporting to FBI three times during the year.
January–February 2000	Special intelligence unit Able Danger identifies Mohamed Atta and three associates as possible al-Qaeda agents.
January 5–8, 2000	Al-Qaeda holds summit conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where plans for September 11 are discussed.
January 15, 2000	Logistical team of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hamzi arrive in Los Angeles to prepare for the September 11 operation.
June 3, 2000	Mohamed Atta arrives in the United States at Newark International Airport from Prague, Czech Republic.
July 2000	Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi begin flying lessons at Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida.
July–August 2000	Defense Intelligence Agency employees destroy evidence gathered by Able Danger.
August 12, 2000	Italian intelligence wiretaps al-Qaeda terrorist cell in Milan, Italy, whose members talk about a massive strike involving aircraft and the sky.
October 12, 2000	Al-Qaeda operatives place bomb next to the American destroyer USS *Cole*, killing 17 sailors and injuring 39 others.
October 24–26, 2000	Emergency drill at Pentagon on the possibility of a hijacked airliner crash into building.

December 20, 2000	Richard Clarke proposes plan to attack al-Qaeda, but it is postponed and later rejected by new Bush administration.
December 21, 2000	Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi receive pilot licenses.
December 26, 2000	Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi abandon rented plane on taxiway of Miami Airport after plane's engine fails during takeoff.
January 2001	Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, member of Able Danger, briefs General Hugh Shelton on the group's findings.
January 4, 2001	Mohamed Atta travels to Spain.
January 10, 2001	Mohamed Atta returns to the United States.
February 23, 2001	Zacarias Moussaoui arrives in the United States.
March 7, 2001	Government leaders discuss plan to fight al-Qaeda, but there is no urgency to proceed.
Spring 2001	Able Danger program terminated.
April 1, 2001	Oklahoma police give speeding ticket to Nawaf al-Hazmi.
April 16, 2001	Mohamed Atta receives traffic ticket for driving without a license.
April 18, 2001	FAA warns airlines about possible Middle Eastern hijackers.
April 18, 2001	Marwan al-Shehhi flies to Amsterdam.
April 30, 2001	Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz downplays emphasis on Osama bin Laden at a meeting on terrorism.
May 10, 2001	Attorney General John Ashcroft omits counterterrorism from list of goals of the Justice Department.
May 15, 2001	CIA refuses to share information with FBI about al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia in January 2000.
June 10, 2001	CIA notifies all its station chiefs of a possible al-Qaeda suicide attack on United States targets over the next few days.
June 11, 2001	CIA analyst and FBI agents have shouting match over sharing information about terrorists' identification information.
June 20, 2001	FBI agent Robert Wright sends a memo that charges the FBI of not trying to catch known terrorists living in the United States.

June 21, 2001	Osama bin Laden tells Muslim journalist that an attack on the United States is imminent.
June 28, 2001	CIA Director Tenet issues warning of imminent al-Qaeda attack.
July 2, 2001	FBI warns of possible al-Qaeda attacks abroad but also possibly in the United States.
July 5, 2001	Richard Clarke briefs senior security officials on al-Qaeda threat at the White House and tells them al-Qaeda is planning a major attack.
July 8–19, 2001	Mohamed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Marwan al-Shehhi travel to Spain to finalize attack plans.
July 10, 2001	FBI agent Ken Williams sends memo about the large number of Middle Eastern men taking flight training lessons in Arizona.
July 10, 2001	Head of CIA, George Tenet, briefs Condoleezza Rice and warns of the possibility of an al-Qaeda attack in the United States.
July 17, 2001	Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi meet with al-Qaeda leaders in Taragona, Spain, to make final plans for the September 11 attacks.
July 18, 2001	Both FBI and FAA issue warnings about possible terrorist activity.
August 6, 2001	President George W. Bush receives a briefing entitled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S." at Crawford ranch in Texas.
August 15, 2001	FBI agents in Minneapolis request a FISA search warrant for Zacarias Moussaoui.
August 16, 2001	Arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui by Harry Samit in Minneapolis for visa violation.
August 19, 2001	FBI's top al-Qaeda expert, John O'Neill, resigns from FBI under pressure.
August 20, 2001	Samit sends memo to FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., citing Zacarias Moussaoui as a terrorist threat for an aircraft skyjacking.
August 23, 2001	FBI adds two of the September 11 conspirators, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, to the Terrorist Watch List.
August 23, 2001	Israel's Mossad gives CIA a list of terrorists living in United States on which four 9/11 hijackers are named.

August 23, 2001	John O'Neill begins work as head of the World Trade Center security.
August 24, 2001	Khalid al-Mihdhar buys his 9/11 ticket.
August 25, 2001	Nawaf al-Hazmi buys his 9/11 ticket.
August 28, 2001	FBI's New York office requests to open criminal investigation of Khalid al-Mihdhar, but FBI headquarters turns down request.
August 28, 2001	Mohamed Atta buys 9/11 ticket.
August 29, 2001	Khalid Sheikh Mohammed gives go-ahead for the September 11 attacks in a call from Afghanistan.
August 29, 2001	Mohamed Atta tells Ramzi bin al-Shibh date of attack in code.
September 4, 2001	Cabinet rank advisors approve of Richard Clarke's plan, proposed eight months earlier, to attack al-Qaeda.
September 9, 2001	Maryland police give Ziad Jarrah a ticket for speeding.
September 10, 2001	Attorney General John Ashcroft turns down an increase of $58 million for FBI counterterrorism budget.
September 10, 2001	At a dinner John O'Neill warns that there is distinct probability of an al-Qaeda attack on New York City in the near future.
September 10, 2001	Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz al-Omari check in at a motel in Portland, Maine.
September 11, 2001	Assault on World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
12:45 a.m.	Willie Brown, the mayor of San Francisco, receives a call from security at San Francisco International Airport warning him about air travel on September 11.
6:45 a.m.	Two workers at the instant messaging company Odigo, an Israeli-owned company housed in the World Trade Center, receive messages warning of a possible attack on the World Trade Center.
6:50 a.m.	Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz al-Omari's flight from Portland, Maine, arrives at Logan International Airport.
7:45 a.m.	Mohammed Atta and Abdulaziz al-Omari board American Airlines Flight 11.
7:59 a.m.	American Airlines Flight 11 leaves Boston Logan Airport with destination of Los Angeles.

8:13:31 a.m.	Last routine radio communication from American Airlines Flight 11; the aircraft begins climbing to 35,000 feet.
8:14 a.m.	United Airlines Flight 175 leaves Boston Logan Airport with destination of Los Angeles after 16-minute delay.
8:17 a.m.	Daniel Lewin, former member of the Israel Defense Force's counterterrorist unit Sayeret Matkal, is killed.
8:20 a.m.	American Airlines Flight 77 leaves Washington, D.C., with destination of Los Angeles.
8:21 a.m.	Transponder in American Airlines Flight 11 stops transmitting identification.
8:21 a.m.	Flight attendant Betty Ong, on American Airlines Flight 11, notifies American Airlines of hijacking.
8:25 a.m.	Boston air traffic control center becomes aware of skyjacking of American Airlines Flight 11 and notifies several air traffic control centers that a hijacking is in progress.
8:26 a.m.	American Airlines Flight 11 makes a 100-degree turn to the south, toward New York City.
8:37:08 a.m.	Boston flight control asks the pilots of United Airlines Flight 175 whether they can see American Airlines 11, and they answer in the affirmative.
8:38 a.m.	Boston air traffic control center notifies NORAD of hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11.
8:40 a.m.	FAA notifies NORAD of the American Airlines Flight 11 hijacking.
8:42 a.m.	Last radio communication from United Airlines Flight 175 with New York air traffic control; transponder is inactive.
8:43 a.m.	FAA notifies NORAD of the United Airlines Flight 175 hijacking.
8:43 a.m.	United Airlines Flight 93 takes off from Newark International Airport with its destination San Francisco after a 41-minute delay.
8:46 a.m.	NORAD scrambles Otis fighter jets in search of American Airlines Flight 11.
8:46 a.m.	Transponder signal from United Airlines Flight 175 stops transmitting.

8:46:40 a.m.	American Airline Flight 11 crashes into North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City.
8:47 a.m.	NORAD learns about American Airlines Flight 11 striking the World Trade Center.
8:49 a.m.	United Airlines Flight 175 deviates from its assigned flight path.
8:50 a.m.	Female flight attendant from United Airlines Flight 175 reports to a San Francisco mechanic that the flight had been hijacked.
8:50:51 a.m.	Last radio communication from American Airlines Flight 77.
8:52 a.m.	Flight attendant on United Airlines Flight 175 notifies United Airlines of hijacking.
8:53 a.m.	Otis fighter jets become airborne.
8:54 a.m.	American Airlines Flight 77 makes unauthorized turn to south.
8:55 a.m.	Barbara Olson, a passenger on American Airlines Flight 77, notifies her husband, Solicitor General Theodore Olson, at the Justice Department that her aircraft has been hijacked.
8:56 a.m.	Transponder on American Airlines Flight 77 stops sending signals.
8:56 a.m.	American Airlines Flight 77 begins making a 180-degree turn over southern Ohio and heads back to the Washington, D.C., area.
8:57 a.m.	FAA formally informs the military about the crash of American Airlines Flight 11 into the World Trade Center.
9:00 a.m.	FAA starts contacting all airliners to warn them of the hijackings.
9:01 a.m.	Aide informs President George W. Bush of the crash of American Airlines Flight 11 into the World Trade Center at Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida.
9:02:54 a.m.	United Airlines Flight 175 crashes into the South Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City.
9:03 a.m.	Boston air traffic control center halts traffic from its airports to all New York area airspace.
9:05 a.m.	American Airlines becomes aware that American Airlines Flight 77 has been hijacked.

9:05 a.m. Aide informs President George W. Bush about the second plane hitting the World Trade Center, and he understands that the United States is under attack.

9:06 a.m. FAA formally informs the military that United Airlines Flight 175 has been hijacked.

9:08 a.m. FAA orders all aircraft to leave New York airspace and orders all New York–bound aircraft nationwide to stay on the ground.

9:11 a.m. Two F-15 Eagles from Otis Air National Guard arrive over New York City airspace.

9:15 a.m. New York air traffic control center advises NORAD that United Airlines Flight 175 has also crashed into the World Trade Center.

9:16 a.m. American Airlines aware that American Airlines Flight 11 has crashed into World Trade Center.

9:17 a.m. FAA shuts down all New York City area airports.

9:20 a.m. United Airlines headquarters becomes aware that United Airlines Flight 175 has crashed into the World Trade Center.

9:21 a.m. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey orders all bridges and tunnels in the New York area closed.

9:24 a.m. FAA informs NORAD that American Airlines Flight 77 has been hijacked.

9:24 a.m. NORAD scrambles Langley fighter jets to search for American Airlines Flight 77.

9:24 a.m. United Airlines Flight 93 receives warning from United Airlines about possible cockpit intrusion by terrorists.

9:25 a.m. Herndon Command Center orders nationwide grounding of all commercial and civilian aircraft.

9:26 a.m. Barbara Olson calls her husband again to give him details about the hijacking.

9:27 a.m. Last routine radio communication from United Airlines Flight 93.

9:28 a.m. Likely takeover of United Airlines Flight 93 by terrorists.

9:29 a.m. Jeremy Glick, a passenger on United Airlines Flight 93, calls his wife, who informs him about the attacks in New York City.

9:30 a.m.	President Bush states in an informal address at the elementary school in Sarasota, Florida, that the country has suffered an apparent terrorist attack.
9:30 a.m.	Flight of F-16 Fighting Falcons takes off from Langley Air Force base and head toward New York City until redirected to Washington, D.C.
9:32 a.m.	Dulles tower observes the approach of a fast-moving aircraft on radar.
9:32 a.m.	Secret Service agents take Vice President Cheney to the underground bunker in the White House basement.
9:34 a.m.	Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) advises NORAD that American Airlines Flight 77's whereabouts is unknown.
9:34 a.m.	Herndon Command Center advises Federal Aviation Administration headquarters that United Airlines 93 has been hijacked.
9:35 a.m.	United Airlines Flight 93 begins making a 135-degree turn near Cleveland, Ohio, and heads for the Washington, D.C., area.
9:36 a.m.	Flight attendant on United Airlines Flight 93 notifies United Airlines of hijacking.
9:36 a.m.	Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport asks a military C130 aircraft that has just departed Andrews Air Force base to locate American Airlines Flight 77, and it answers that a 767 was moving low and very fast.
9:37:46 a.m.	American Airlines Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon.
9:40 a.m.	Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta orders the FAA to ground all 4,546 airplanes in the air at the time.
9:41 a.m.	Transponder no longer functions in United Airlines Flight 93.
9:42 a.m.	Mark Bingham, a passenger on United Airlines Flight 93, calls his mother and reports the hijacking.
9:45 a.m.	White House evacuates all personnel.
9:45 a.m.	President Bush leaves the elementary school in Sarasota to board Air Force One.
9:45 a.m.	Todd Beamer, a passenger on United Flight 93, tells a Verizon supervisor that the passengers have voted to storm the hijackers.

9:47 a.m.	Military commanders worldwide are ordered to raise their threat alert status to the highest level to defend the United States.
9:49 a.m.	Flight of F-16s arrives over the Washington, D.C., area.
9:58 a.m.	After receiving authorization from President Bush, Vice President Cheney gives instructions to engage United Airlines Flight 93 as it approaches the Washington, D.C., area.
9:57 a.m.	Passenger revolt begins in United Airlines Flight 93.
9:57 a.m.	President Bush departs from Florida.
10:03:11 a.m.	United Airlines Flight 93 crashes in field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.
10:05 a.m.	South Tower of the World Trade Center collapses.
10:07 a.m.	Cleveland air traffic control center advises NORAD of United Airlines 93 skyjacking.
10:10 a.m.	Portion of Pentagon collapses.
10:15 a.m.	United Airlines headquarters aware that Flight 93 has crashed in Pennsylvania.
10:15 a.m.	Washington air traffic control center advises Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) that Flight 93 has crashed in Pennsylvania.
10:24 a.m.	FAA orders that all inbound transatlantic aircraft flying into the United States be diverted to Canada.
10:28:31 a.m.	North Tower of the World Trade Center collapses.
10:30 a.m.	American Airlines headquarters confirms American Airlines Flight 77 has crashed into the Pentagon.
10:31 a.m.	Presidential authorization to shoot down hijacked aircraft reaches NORAD.
10:32 a.m.	Vice President Cheney tells President Bush that a threat against Air Force One has been received.
10:50 a.m.	Five stories of the Pentagon collapse due to the blast and fire.
11:02 a.m.	New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani asks New Yorkers to stay home and orders an evacuation of the area south of Canal Street.
11:40 a.m.	Air Force One lands at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.

12:04 p.m.	Los Angeles International Airport is evacuated and shut down.
12:15 p.m.	San Francisco International Airport is evacuated and shut down.
1:04 p.m.	President Bush, speaking from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, announces that all appropriate security measures are being taken and all U.S. military has been put on high alert worldwide.
1:48 p.m.	President Bush flies to Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska.
2:00 p.m.	Senior FBI sources tell CNN that they are assuming that the aircraft hijackings are part of a terrorist attack.
4:10 p.m.	Reports surface that Building Seven of the World Trade Center complex is on fire.
4:30 p.m.	President Bush leaves Offutt Air Force Base to return to Washington, D.C.
5:20:33 p.m.	Building Seven (47 stories) of the World Trade Center collapses.
6:00 p.m.	Northern Alliance launches bombing campaign against the Taliban in Kabul, Afghanistan.
6:54 p.m.	President Bush arrives at the White House in Washington, D.C.
8:30 p.m.	President Bush addresses the nation about the events of the day.
October 21, 2001	Osama bin Laden gives his justification for the 9/11 attacks in an interview with an al-Jazeera journalist.
October 24, 2001	House of Representatives passes the USA PATRIOT Act.
October 25, 2001	Senate passes the USA PATRIOT Act
October 26, 2001	President George W. Bush signs the USA PATRIOT Act.
December 26, 2001	Osama bin Laden issues a statement of homage to the 19 martyrs of September 11.
November 15, 2002	National Commission on 9/11 is chartered over the objection of President George W. Bush.
December 20, 2002	Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House of Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 appears.

March 31–April 2003	First public hearings by the National Commission on 9/11.
July 22, 2004	Final report of the National Commission on 9/11.
June 2005	Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) gives floor speech about Able Danger.
August 12, 2005	National Commission on 9/11 issues statement dismissing the Able Danger information as not "historically significant."
August 17, 2005	Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a member of Able Danger, issues a public statement about the identification of Atta and others as al-Qaeda agents by Able Danger as early as 2000.
September 21, 2005	Senate Judiciary Committee holds hearing on Able Danger, but Defense Department prohibits Able Danger officers from participating in the hearings.
March 9, 2006	President Bush reauthorizes the USA PATRIOT Act.

Primary Documents

Document 1

Letter Justifying the Bombing of the World Trade Center (February 7, 1993)

This is the text of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef's letter justifying the bombing of the World Trade Center on February 7, 1993, which he had sent to the New York Times. *It was one of five such letters sent to five news organizations by one of Yousef's colleagues shortly after the bomb exploded. The "army" mentioned in the text was nonexistent, but the letter does express Yousef's hostile attitude toward the United States.*

We are, the fifth battalion in the LIBERATION ARMY, declare [*sic*] our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned building. This action was done in response for the American political, economical, and military support to Israel the state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator countries in the region.

Our demands:

1. Stop all military, economical, and political aids to Israel.
2. All diplomatic relations with Israel must stop.
3. Not to interfere with any of the Middle East countries interior affairs.

If our demands are not met, all of our functional groups in the army will continue to execute our missions against the military and civilian targets in and out of the United States. For your own information, our army has more than hundred and fifty suicidal soldiers ready to go ahead. The terrorism that Israel practices (which is supported by America) must be faced with a similar one. The dictatorship and terrorism (also supported by America) that some countries are practicing against their own people must also be faced with terrorism.

The American people must know, that their civilians who got killed are not better than those who are getting killed by the American weapons and support.

The American people are responsible for the actions of their government and they must question all of the crimes that their government is committing against

other people or they—Americans—will be the targets of our operations that could diminish them. We invite all the people from all countries and all of the revolutionaries in the world to participate in this action with us to accomplish our just goals.

Liberation Army Fifth Battalion
AL-FARBEK AL-ROKN, Abu Bakr Al-Makee

Source: Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals, Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999), pp. 274–275.

Document 2

Osama bin Laden's Declaration of Jihad (August 23, 1996)

Osama bin Laden had been disturbed by the Saudi government's granting of permission for American troops to be stationed on the holy soil of Saudi Arabia. He had gone to the Saudi government and volunteered his services, including those of Arabs that had fought in Afghanistan, to repulse Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. When the Saudis turned his offer down and invited the American troops, bin Laden was infuriated. Bin Laden is a Wahhabi Sunni, and the Wahhabi Sunnis believe that Christianity is a polytheistic religion because of the Christian belief in the Trinity. He subscribed to a saying in the hadith (sayings of the Prophet Mohammad) that reads, "Expel the Polytheists from the Arabian peninsula." Bin Laden issued this judicial edict of jihad, or holy war, on August 23, 1996, with the assistance of the religious council of al-Qaeda. It was an open declaration of war against the United States for their presence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The declaration is a lengthy document, so only the most pertinent parts have been included here.

It is no secret to you, my brothers, that the people of Islam have been afflicted with oppression, hostility, and injustice by the Judeo-Christian alliance and its supporters. This shows our enemies' belief that Muslims' blood is the cheapest and that their property and wealth are merely loot. Your blood has been spilt in Palestine and Iraq, and the horrific image of the massacre in Qana in Lebanon are [*sic*] still fresh in people's minds. The massacres that have taken place in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Fatani, Ogaden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina send shivers down our spines and stir up our passions. All this happened before the eyes and ears of the world, but the blatant imperial arrogance of America, under the cover of the immoral United Nations, has prevented the dispossessed from arming themselves.

So the people of Islam realized that they were the fundamental target of the hostility of the Judeo-Crusader alliance. All the false propaganda about the supposed rights of Islam was abandoned in the face of the attacks and massacres committed against Muslims everywhere, the latest and most serious of which—the greatest disaster to befall the Muslims since the death of the prophet Muhammad—is the occupation of Saudi Arabia, which is cornerstone of the Islamic world, place of revelation, source of the Prophetic mission, and the home of the Noble Ka'ba where Muslims direct their prayers. Despite this, it was occupied by the armies of the Christians, the Americans, and their allies.

I meet you today in the midst of this gloomy scenario, but also in light of the tremendous, blessed awakening that has swept across the world, and particularly the Islamic world. After the scholars of Islam underwent an enforced absence—enforced due to the oppressive Crusader campaign led by America in the fear that these scholars will incite our Islamic *umma* against its enemies, in the same way as did the pious scholars of old (God bless their souls) such as ibn Taymiyya and al-Izz ibn Abd al-Salam—this Judeo-Crusader alliance undertook to kill and arrest the righteous scholars and hardworking preachers. May God sanctify who He wishes. They killed the *mujahid* Sheikh Abdallah Azzam, they arrested Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in Jerusalem, and they killed the *mujahid* Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman in America, as well as arresting—on the advice of America—a large number of scholars, preachers and youth in Saudi Arabia. The most prominent of these were Sheikh Salman al-Auda and Sheikh Safar al-Hawali and their brothers.

This injustice was inflicted on us, too, as we were prevented from talking to Muslims and were hounded out of Saudi Arabia to Pakistan, Sudan, and then Afghanistan. That is what led to this long absence of mine, but by the grace of God there became available a safe base in Khurasan, high in the peaks of the Hindu Kush, the very same peaks upon which were smashed, by the grace of God, the largest infidel military force in the world, and on which the myth of the great powers perished before the cries of the holy warriors: God is greatest!

And today, in the same peaks of Afghanistan, we work to do away with the injustice that has befallen our *umma* at the hands of the Judeo-Crusader alliance, especially after its occupation of Jerusalem and its appropriation of Saudi Arabia. We pray to god that He might bless us with victory—He is our protector and is well capable of doing so.

And so here we are today, working and discussing with each other to find ways of rectifying what has happened to the Islamic world generally and Saudi Arabia in particular. We need to study the appropriate paths to take in order to restore things to good order, and to restore to the people their rights after the considerable damage and harm inflected on their life and religion. This has afflicted every section of society, whether civilian or military or security personnel, whether employees or merchants, young or old, university students, graduates or the unemployed, who now represent a broad section of society numbering hundreds of thousands. The situation in Saudi Arabia has begun to resemble a huge volcano that is about to explode and destroy unbelief and corruption, wherever it comes from. The two explosions in Riyadh and Khobar are merely warning signs pointing to this destructive torrent which is produced by bitter repression, terrible injustice, and the humiliating poverty that we see today.

People are struggling even with the basics of everyday life, and everyone talks frankly about economic recession, price inflation, mounting debts, and prison overcrowding. Low-income government employees talk to you about their debts in the hundreds of thousands of riyals, whilst complaining that the riyal's value is declining dramatically. Domestic debts owed by the government to its citizens have reached 340 billion riyals, and are rising daily due to usurious interest, let alone all the foreign debt. People are wondering are we really the biggest source of oil in the world? They feel that God is bringing this torture on them because they have not spoken out against the regime's injustice and illegitimate behaviour, the most prominent aspects of which are its failure to rule in accordance with God's law, its depriving of legal rights to its servants, its permitting the American occupiers into Saudi Arabia, and its arresting of righteous scholars—inheritors of the Prophets' legacy—and unjustly throwing them in prison. The regime has desecrated its legitimacy through many of its own actions, the most important being:

1. Its suspension of the rulings of the Islamic law and replacement thereof with man-made laws, and its entering into a bloody confrontation with the righteous scholars and pious youth. May God sanctify whom He pleases.
2. Its inability to protect the land and its allowing the enemies of God to occupy it for years in the form of the American Crusaders, who have become the principal reason for all aspects of our land's disastrous predicament.

The voices of the shadows have spoken up, their eyes uncovering the veil of injustice and their noses smelling the stench of corruption. The voices of reform have spoken up, calling for the situation to be put right: they have sent petitions, testimonies, and requests for reform. In the year 1411 AH, at the time of the Gulf War, a petition was sent to the king with around 400 signatures calling for reform in the country, but he made a mockery of them by completely ignoring their advice, and the situation went from bad to worse.

Brother Muslims in Saudi Arabia, does it make any sense at all that our country is the biggest purchaser of weapons from America in the world and America's biggest trading partner in the region, while at the very same time the Americans are occupying Saudi Arabia and supporting—with money, arms, and manpower—their Jewish brothers in the occupation of Palestine and their murder and expulsion of Muslims there? Depriving these occupiers of the huge returns they receive form heir trade with us is a very important way of supporting the *jihad* against them, and we expect you to boycott all American goods.

Men of the radiant future of our *umma* of Muhammad, raise the banner of *jihad* up high against the Judea-American alliance has occupied the holy places of Islam. God told his Prophet: "He will not let the deeds of those who are killed for His cause come to nothing; He will guide them and put them in a good state; He will admit them into the Garden He has already made known to them." And the Prophet said: "There are one hundred levels in Heaven that God has prepared for the holy warriors who have died for Him, between two levels as between the earth and the sky." And the *al-Jami al-Sahih* notes that the Prophet said: "The best martyrs are those who stay in the battle line and do not turn their faces away until they are killed. They will achieve the highest level of Heaven, and their Lord will look kindly upon them. When your Lord looks kindly upon a slave in the world, He will

not hold him to account." And he said: "The martyr has a guarantee from God: He forgives him at the first drop of blood and shows him his seat in Heaven. He decorates him with the jewels of faith, protects him from the torment of the grave, keeps him safe on the day of judgment, places a crown of dignity on his head with the finest rubies in the world, marries him to seventy-two of the pure virgins of paradise and intercedes on behalf of seventy of his relatives," as related by Ahmad al-Tirmidhi in an authoritative *hadith*.

I say to the youth of Islam who have waged *jihad* in Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with their financial, spiritual, linguistic, and scholarly resources, that the battle is not yet over. I remind them of what Gabriel said to the Prophet, after the battle of Ahzab: "When the Messenger of God, prayers and peace be upon him, departed to Medina and laid down his sword, Gabriel came to him and said: 'You have laid down your sword? By God, the angels have not yet laid down their swords. Get up and go with whoever is with you to the Bani Qurayza, and I will go ahead of you to shake their fortresses and strike fear into them.' So Gabriel went off, accompanies by his pageant of angels, the Prophet, and his holy warriors and helpers." This is as it was told by al-Bukhari.

I say to our Muslim brothers across the world: your brothers in Saudi Arabia and Palestine are calling for your help and asking you to share with them in the *jihad* against the enemies of God, your enemies the Israelis and Americans. They are asking you to defy them in whatever way you possibly can, so as to expel them in defeat and humiliation from the holy places of Islam. God Almighty has said: "If they seek help from you against persecution, it is your duty to assist them."

Cavalry of Islam be mounted! This is a difficult time, so you yourself must be tough. You should know that your coming-together and cooperation in order to liberate the holy places of Islam is the right step towards unification of the word of our *umma* under the banner of God's unity. At this point we can only raise our palms humbly to ask God Almighty to provide good fortune and success in this matter.

Source: Bruce Lawrence (ed.), *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 23–30.

Document 3

Declaration of the World Islamic Front (February 23, 1998)

If the 1996 Declaration of Jihad was Osama bin Laden's personal declaration of war against the West and Israel, the Declaration of the World Islamic Front in 1998 was a group declaration of war by al-Qaeda and its supporters. Signatories of the declaration included bin Laden; Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir, or head, of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad; Abu-Yasir Rif'ai Ahmad Taha, a leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group; Sheikh Mir Hamza, secretary of the Islamic Party of Religious Leaders in Pakistan; and Maulana Fazlur Rahman, a leader of the opposition in Pakistan's National Assembly. By having allies, bin Laden was able to answer criticism that he lacked the religious credentials to issue a judicial ruling, or fatwa. This document is an open declaration of hostilities by al-Qaeda and its allies that was to lead directly to the events of September 11, 2001.

Praise be to God, revealer of the Book, controller of the clouds, defeater of factionalism, who says in His Book: "When the forbidden months are over, wherever you find the polytheists, kill them, seize them, besiege them, ambush them." Prayers and peace be upon our Prophet Muhammad bin Abdallah, who said: "I have been sent with a sword in my hands so that only God may be worshipped, God who placed my livelihood under the shadow of my spear and who condemns those who disobey my orders to servility and humiliation."

Ever since God made the Arabian peninsula flat, created desert in it and surrounded it with seas, it has never suffered such a calamity as these Crusader hordes that have spread through it like locusts, consuming its wealth and destroying its fertility. All this at a time when nations have joined forces against the Muslims as if fighting over a bowl of food. When the matter is this grave and support is scarce, we must discuss current events and agree collectively on how best to settle the issue.

There is now no longer any debate about three well acknowledged and commonly agreed facts that require no further proof, but we will repeat them so that people remember them. They are as follows:

Firstly, for over seven years America has occupied the holiest parts of the Islamic lands, the Arabian peninsula, plundering its wealth, dictating to its leaders, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbours and turning its bases there into a spearhead with which to fight the neighbouring Muslim peoples.

Some might have disputed the reality of this occupation before, but all the people of the Arabian peninsula have now acknowledged it. There is no clearer proof than America's excessive aggression against the people of Iraq, using the Peninsula as a base. It is true that all its leaders have rejected such use of their lands, but they are powerless.

Secondly, despite the great devastation inflicted upon the Iraqi people at the hands of the Judeo-Crusader alliance, and despite the terrible number of deaths—over one million—despite all this, the Americans are trying to repeat these horrific massacres again, as if they are not satisfied with the long period of sanctions after the vicious war, or with the fragmentation and destruction.

Today they come to annihilate what is left of this people and humiliate their Muslim neighbours.

Thirdly while these wars are being waged by the Americans for religious and economic purposes, they also serve the interests of the petty Jewish state, diverting attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and its murder of Muslims there.

There is no better proof of this than their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighbouring Arab state, and their efforts to fragment all the states in the region, like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan, into paper mini-states whose weakness and disunity will guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal Crusader occupation of the Peninsula.

All these American crimes and sins are a clear proclamation of war against God, his messenger, and the Muslims. Religious scholars throughout Islamic history have agreed that *jihad* is an individual duty when an enemy attacks Muslim countries. This was related by the Iman ibn Qudama in "The Resource," by Iman al-Kisa'i in "The Marvels," by al-Qurtubi in his exegesis, and by the Sheikh of Islam when he states in his chronicles that "As for fighting to repel an enemy, which is the strongest way to defend freedom and religion, it is agreed that this is a duty. After faith, there is no greater duty than fighting an enemy who is corrupting religion and the world."

On this basis, and in accordance with God's will, we pronounce to all Muslims the following judgment:

To kill the American [*sic*] and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty incumbent upon every Muslim in all countries, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque from their grip, so that their armies leave all the territory of Islam, defeated, broken, and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of god Almighty: "Fight the idolaters at a time, if they first fight you"; "Fight them until there is no more persecution and until worship is devoted to God"; "Why should you not fight in God's cause and for those oppressed men, women, and children who cry out: 'Lord, rescue us from this town whose people are oppressors! By Your grace, give us a protector and a helper!'?"

With God's permission we call on everyone who believes in God and wants reward to comply with His will to kill the Americans and seize their money wherever and whenever they find them. We also call on the religious scholars, their leaders, their youth, and their soldiers, to launch the raid on the soldiers of Satan, the Americans, and whichever devil's supporters are allied with them, to rout those behind them so that they will not forget it.

God Almighty said: "Believers, respond to God and His Messenger when he calls you to that which gives you life. Know that God comes between a man and his heart, and that you will be gathered to Him."

God almighty said: "Believers, why, when it is said to you, 'Go and fight in God's way,' do you dig your heels into the earth? Do you prefer this world to the life to come? How small the enjoyment of this world is, compared with the life to come! If you do not go out and fight, God will punish you severely and put others in your place, but you cannot harm Him in any way: God has power over all things."

God Almighty also said: "Do not lose heart or despair—if you are true believers you will have the upper hand."

Source: Bruce Lawrence (ed.), *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 59–62.

Document 4

Communiqué of the World Islamic Front

Following the formal declaration of the formation of the World Islamic Front in 1998, there was a need to rally potential supporters. The following communiqué was one such effort. It appeared shortly after the Clinton administration retaliated for the embassy bombings in Africa with Tomahawk missiles directed against targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan. The tone of the communiqué is much more strident than the almost scholarly language of the Declaration of the World Islamic Front.

Communiqué of the World Islamic Front

Clinton Scorns More Than a Billion Muslims.

Kill the infidels where they are, drive them out of the places from which they have driven you. America is the leader of the infidel countries. The aggression against Sudan and Afghanistan is an aggression against the Muslims of the entire world. To fight the infidel countries, American and Israel, is a duty for all Muslims. These two aggressions are the height of world terrorism, worthy of pirates or cowboys. . . . This aggression proves the Americans' lack of strategy, which brought Clinton to power. This attack demonstrates American cretinism and its contempt for Muslims. It proves the ineptitude of the CIA, for there was no connection with Sheikh Mujahed Osama bin Laden. . . . These attacks prove the hostility of the 'black dogs and swine, vile beings against men full of pride.' Let us fight in the jihad for our pride and our lands. It is a duty imposed by Sharia to answer aggression from American and its allies.

We must close all their embassies in Muslim countries, boycott their economy. withdraw all our money from their banks and companies, prohibit their use of our air space, and block their means of communication.

Muslims, awake!

Return to your religion, stop supporting your corrupt leaders so that they can stop humiliating you, terrorizing you, and making you into a consumer product.

Source: Roland Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama Bid Laden: Global Terrorism & the Bin Laden Brotherhood* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 184.

Document 5

Al-Qaeda Training Camps in Afghanistan in 2000

British intelligence presented an assessment of al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan in 2000. This report shows the variety and specialties of al-Qaeda's training camps. It also showed that the Pakistani intelligence service, Interservices Intelligence (ISI), played an active role in some of the camps. There is also a suggestive report that al-Qaeda was building a command and control center in a natural cave system in Kunduz province near the border with Tajikistan. It was in one of the al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan that Mohamed Atta and the members of his team trained in the years before September 11.

Training camps for militants involved in Kashmir, in battlefields around the world and in international terrorism are located in Taliban-controlled Nangarhar, Pakhita, Logar and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan and in several cases it is not clear which side of the Pak-Afghan border they are on. Pakistanis, Kashmiries and Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and Palestinians were among those trained in these camps.

Camps in Khost Area

(i) Al Badr-I and Al Badr-II camps in Khost area of Pakhtia province are two major militant training camps in the country. Soon after Taliban captured Kabul, these camps were reported to have been handed over to the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) for its use, after initial reports that Taliban had closed these camps. Al Badr-I was holding among others, about 200 Pakistani recruits being trained to fight against the Indian Forces in Kashmir and for Harkat-ul-Ansar. Al Badr-II had around 160 trainees, mostly Arabs and Sudanese Muslims for the fight in Chechnya and Bosnia They were being given lessons in bomb making, use of automatic weapons, rocket launchers and antiaircraft guns. These camps, which were being used by the followers of Osama Bin

Laden were however, destroyed in August 1998 by the US Tomahawk (cruise) missiles fired from the Arabian Sea with the aim of killing Osama, for his alleged involvement in the bomb blasts in the US Missions in Nairobi and Tanzania. These, as well as those camps located in Khost (Paktia province) at Khawaja Mastoon Gundai, Sati Kundo on Pak-Afghan border and Tora-Bora base near Jalalabad (Nangarhar) and Julrez town (Wardak) 30 miles west of Kabul were however, reportedly rebuilt by Osama. A Command and Control Centre for AI [sic] Qaida outfit of Osama is also learnt to be under construction in a natural cave system in Kunduz province (near Tajik border).

(ii) Besides Al Badr I and II camps, other camps in Khost area are Omar, Al Khuldan and Farooq camps along the Pak-Afghan border and known to be involved in training of Arab-Afghan mercenaries for fighting in Chechnya. A training centre called Abdullah Azzam Training Centre for training of Arabs and Tajiks also exists here. Camps affiliated to Osama Bin Laden for training terrorists for Kashmir operations under the leadership of Egyptians and Algerians are also functioning in Khost area. Mine warfare training is reportedly carried out by the Egyptian militant group Al-Jehad at the Abu Bakr camps on the outskirts of Khost.

(iii) Some of the camps previously located in Peshawar have been shifted to Khost area. Qaida camp is one such example.

(iv) Khost camp—Essentially, Yemeni extremists are trained here, though some Algerian militants have also been trained in the past.

(v) Nearly 700 fundamentalists from Chechyna, Indian Kashmir, Laskar-e-Toiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Somalia etc had undergone 9 month military training at a place locally known as Jarangiya in Khost since 15.01.2000. Col. Latif of ISI is the Incharge of this training centre. Of the 700 fundamentalists, nearly 90 each belong to Kashmir and POK, which includes activists of Lashkar-e-Toiba. 26 Uighur activists from Xinjiang province of China had also undergone training in this camp.

(vi) Two training camps for Kashmiri militants are currently operating in Khost province. These are at Sarobi village in Nadir Shah district and in the premises of a technical school near the Governor's house in Khost.

Other Camps in Pakhtia Provinces

(i) Jaji camp—Known for training Kashmiri militants and earlier linked to Ittehad-e-Isalami (Sayyaf) group. The camp is also known to train Arab mercenaries for the fighting in Kashmir who are linked to Harkat-ul-Ansar. A Syrian is currently believed to be leading the group of Arabs in this camp and was reported to be the main instigator behind the kidnapping of the four western hostages by the Al-Faran group.

(ii) Spin Shaga—A camp for Kashmiri militants.

(iii) Shepuli—A camp for Kashmiri located here.

(iv) Al-Jehad—It is near Zambar (Lz-3223). About 650 militants of LeT from J&K and POK under the supervision of Col. Saifullah Akhtar are being trained there.

(v) Khaldoon camp—It is controlled by OBL and is used for training 1800-2000 militants from Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Philippines.

They are prepared to be deployed in Chechyna, J&K, Sudan, and Lebanon etc. This camps [*sic*] had been directed by an Algerian extremist named Kheddar Abden Nasser (Abu Banane, or Commander Abd-El-Nasser), who died recently following a booby-trap explosion.

(vi) Gurbaz—It is about 4 kms. East of Khaldoon camp. About 150 Uighurs from CAS and Xinjiang province of China are undergoing training there.

Camps in Nangharar Provinces

(i) Teraki Tangi—Kashmiri militants are known to be trained in a camp located here.

(ii) Nazian Shinwar—Known for training Kashmiri militants and earlier linked to Ittehad-e-Islami (Sayyaf) group. The camp is also known to train Arab mercenaries linked to Harkat-ul-Ansar for fighting in Kashmir.

(iii) Muzaffarabad (Distt. [*sic*] Shinwari)—A camp for Kashmiri militants.

(iv) Dehbala—A camp for Kashmiri militants.

(v) Jalalabad camp—A leader of Egyptian militant group Al Gama'a Al Islamiya Shawki Al-Islambuli, was known to have run a training camp for Arab mercenaries in Jalalabad for the Afghan Jehad. Arabs, especially Egyptians, belonging to the Al Gama'a are known to be undergoing training here for terrorist activities abroad. The area between Jalalabad and Torkham along the Pak-Afghan border is known to be a base of Arabs undergoing training.

(vi) Darunta—It is situated at a distance of 20 kms from Jalalabad close to a dam at its western exit. A camp run by Abu Abdullah, an Egyptian, is located here. Approximately 300 mercenaries from Philippines, Pakistan, POK, Kashmir, Malaysia, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria and Sudan are known to be receiving training in this camp. Militants from here have been involved in fighting in Bosnia and Azerbaijan while a large number are currently in Chechnya and Kashmir. An Algerian here reportedly conducted a training course on explosives for Arab terrorists in early 1996. The camp is financed by Islamic terrorist organizations. Pak ISI officers are learnt to be frequently visiting this camp.

(vii) Moroccans were undergoing training at Darunta camp during early 2000. The training of Moroccans included handling of weapons and preparation of IEDs.

Camps in Logar Province

Kanjak Camp

Camps in Kunar Province

(i) Camps for training of Kashmiri militants exist in Barikot, Pir Qala, Sarkana and Pench.

(ii) Toshi camp—Located near Asadabad, the camp is a training centre for large numbers of Kashmiri fighters and is under control of Pak ISI.

(iii) A militant Arab group called Khalifa Group, led by Jordanian-Palestinian national Abu Abdullah Al Refaee, is based in Kunar. It recently threatened

to raise an Islamic army to wage war against the West. The group is reportedly in league with Takfiris, yet another militant Arab militant group.

(iv) The Ikhwan ul Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) is also active in Kunar province for consolidating their basis in the region bordering the Central Asian States, especially Tajikistan.

(v) Another Egyptian militant group Al-Jehad led by Islambuli, has training bases in Kunar and Nangarhar province of Afghanistan and also a camp in Jalozai region in NWFP, Pakistan. The group receives financial assistance from private individuals in Saudi Arabia through the 'Human Concern International' Organisation registered in Canada. This organization undertakes social projects in Afghanistan.

(vi) Azad Abbas—It is located in the Taliban-controlled Kunar province. Its armed unit is Hizbal-Mujahideen. It [*sic*] prominent leaders are Vat Ziad (Pakistani). It is supported by Pak JI, ISI and is know [*sic*] to be imparting training to Pakistanis and Arabs.

Camps in Kabul Province

(i) The Muslim Brotherhood is known to provide training to Kashmiri militants in camps located in Paghman area of Kabul province. There are also reports of camp being run by Taliban some 15 kilometers outside Kabul city.

(ii) Lava Raking—It is located near Panhuman in Kabul province and is under the Taliban control.

(iii) Sarobi—It is located near Kabul, Makah Al Adam and Pak ISI support it. Its trainees constitute members from Arab, [*sic*] Algerian, [*sic*] Tunisia and Kashmir.

(iv) A Services Bureau, a branch of the Peshawar Services Bureau, is in existence in Kabul and provides support to mercenaries, especially Arabs.

Camps in Jawzjan Province

A training camp for imparting training in light weapons exists in Jawzjan. After training, the mercenaries are sent to Kashmir as well as to the battlefront to fight alongside the Taliban against NA.

Camps in Balkh (Mazar-e-Sharif)

(i) Saidabad—300 families of Uzbek fighters are housed here. 50 Chechen families have also been accommodated in Mazar-e-Sharif. Further, there is a military camp at one end of Saidabad, in an area called Dasht-e-shor where 200 Uzbek receive military training.

(ii) Base-e-Sokhta—located between Mazar town and air base. It is a large place and provides training for Chechens.

Camps in Bamyan Province

The Taliban are reported to have established two new militant training camps in Bamyan besides the existing camp in Bagram, run by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

(military Wing of the Sipah-e-Sahaba). The Bagram (Bamyan) camp, under one ABDUL JABBAR, is currently imparting training to 50 Pak mercenaries.

Camps in Ghor Province

An Osama-run camp is reported to be in existence in Ghor province, where the pace of training activities has been increased.

Camps in Kandhar Province

A training camp for imparting training in light weapons exists in Kandhar. After training, the mercenaries are sent to Kashmir as well as to the battlefront to fight alongside the Taliban against NA.

Source: Roland Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), pp. 263–267.

Document 6

Al-Qaeda's Instruction on Living in the Western World While on a Mission

All al-Qaeda operatives received training on how to be inconspicuous while on a mission. Trainers identified the most intelligent trainees with the most potential to pass unnoticed in the Western World. Language expertise and personal appearance were of the utmost importance. To insure that the training would last, a manual of behavior was prepared and given to those on operations in the Western world. Here is an excerpt from a lengthy document that gives an insight into this training.

MEMBER SAFETY

Defining Members' Safety:

This is a set of measures taken by members who perform undercover missions in order to prevent the enemies from getting to them.

It is necessary for any party that adopts Jihad work and has many members to subdivide its members into three groups, each of which has its own security measures. The three groups are: 1. The overt members; 2. The covert members; 3. The commander.

Measures that Should be Taken by the Overt Member:

1. He should not be curious and inquisitive about matters that do not concern him.
2. He should not be chatty and talkative about everything he knows or hears.
3. He should not carry on him the names and addresses of those members he knows. If he has to, he should keep them safe.

4. During times of security concerns and arrest campaigns and especially if his appearance is Islamic, he should reduce his visits to the areas of trouble and remain at home instead.
5. When conversing on the telephone he should not talk about any information that might be of use to the enemy.
6. When sending letters, he should not mention any information that might be of use to the enemy. When receiving letters, he should burn them immediately after reading them and pour water on them to prevent the enemy from reading them. Further, he should destroy any traces of the fire so the enemy would not find out that something was burned.

Measures that Should be Taken by the Undercover Member:

In addition to the above measures, the member should . . .

1. Not reveal his true name to the Organization's members who are working with him, nor to the [Islamic] Da'wa [Call].
2. Have a general appearance that does not indicate Islamic orientation [beard, toothpick, book, (long) shirt, small Koran).
3. Be careful not to mention the bothers' common expressions or show their behaviors (special praying appearance, "may Allah reward you," "peace be on you" while arriving and departing, etc.)
4. Avoid visiting famous Islamic places (mosques, libraries, Islamic fairs, etc.)
5. Carry falsified personal documents and know all the information they contain.
6. Have protection preceding his visit to any place while moving about (apartment, province, means of transportation, etc.).
7. Have complete and accurate knowledge of the security status related to those around him in his place of work and residence, so that no danger or harm would catch him unaware.
8. Maintain his family and neighborhood relationships and should not show any changes towards them so that they would not attempt to bring him back [from the Organization] for security reasons.
9. Not resort to utilizing letters and messengers except in an emergency.
10. Not speak loudly.
11. Not get involved in advocating good and denouncing evil in order not to attract attention to himself.
12. Break the daily routine, especially when performing an undercover mission. For example, changing the departure and return routes, arrival and departure times, and the store where he buys his goods.
13. Not causing any trouble in the neighborhood where he lives or at the place of work.
14. Converse on the telephone using special code so that he does not attract attention.
15. Not contracting the overt members except when necessary. Such contacts should be brief.
16. Not fall into the enemy's excitement trap either through praising or criticizing his Organization.
17. Performing the exercises to detect surveillance whenever a task is to be performed.

18. Not park in no-parking zones and not take photographs where it is forbidden.
19. Closing all that should be closed before departing the place, whether at home or his place of undercover work.
20. Not undergo a sudden change in his daily routine or any relationships that precede his Jihad involvement. For example, there should not be an obvious change in his habits of conversing, movement, presence, or disappearance. Likewise, he should not be hasty to sever his previous relationships.
21. Not meet in places where there are informers, such as coffee shops, and not live in areas close to the residences of important personalities, government establishments, and police stations.
22. Not write down on any media, specially [sic] on paper, that could show the traces and words of the pen by rubbing the paper with lead powder.

Measures that Should be Taken by the Commander:

- The commander, whether in overt or covert work, has special importance for the following reasons.
  1. The large amount of information that he possesses.
  2. The difficulty of the command in replacing the commander.
  3. Therefore, all previously mentioned security precautions regarding members should be heightened for the commander.
- Important Note: Married brothers should observe the following:
  1. Not talking with their wives about Jihad work.
  2. The members with security risks should not travel with their wives. A wife with an Islamic appearance (veil) attracts attention.

Source: Stefan Aust et al., *Inside 9-11: What Really Happened* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), pp. 289–292.

Document 7

Martyr's Blood

It is difficult for Westerners to understand the Muslim idea of martyrdom. Committing suicide for a political cause is a foreign concept in the West. But among Muslim extremists, martyrdom has a strong religious component. In the following excerpt from his essay, Morteza Motah-Hary explains the concept of martyrdom in words that the nineteen members of the September 11 plot understood well.

What does a martyr do? His function is not confined to resisting the enemy, and in the process, either giving him a blow or receiving a blow from him. Had that been the case we could say, that when his blood is shed, it goes to waste. But at no time is a martyr's blood wasted. It does not flow on the ground. Every drop of it is turned into hundreds and thousands of drops, nay into tons of blood, and is transfused into the body of his society. That is why the Holy Prophet has said: 'Allah does not like any drop, more than the drop of blood shed, in His way.' Martyrdom means transfusion of blood into a society, especially a society suffering from anemia. It is the martyr who infuses fresh blood into the veins of the society.

MARTYR'S COURAGE AND ZEAL

The distinctive characteristic of a martyr, is that he charges the atmosphere with courage and zeal. He revives the spirit of valor and fortitude, courage and zeal, especially divine zeal, among the people who have lost it. That is why Islam is always in need of martyrs. The revival of courage and zeal is essential for the revival of a nation.

MARTYR'S IMMORTALITY

A scholar serves the society through his knowledge. It is on account of his knowledge that his personality is amalgamated with the society, just as a drop of water is amalgamated with the sea. As the result of this amalgamation a part of personality,

namely his thoughts and ideas become immortal. An inventor is amalgamated with the society through his inventions. He serves the society, but making himself immortal, by virtue of his skill and inventions. A poet makes himself immortal through his poetic art, and a moral teacher through his wise sayings.

Similarly, a martyr immortalizes himself in his own way. He gives invaluable fresh blood to the society. In other words, a scholar immortalizes his thoughts, an artist his art, an inventor his inventions, and a moral teacher his teachings. But a martyr, through his blood, immortalizes his entire being. His blood for ever flows in the veins of the society. Every other group of people can make only a part of its faculties immortal, but a martyr immortalizes all his faculties. That is why, the Holy Prophet said: 'Above every virtue, there is another virtue, but there is no virtue higher than being killed in the way of Allah.'

MARTYR'S INTERCESSION

There is a *hadith* which says, that there are three classes of people who will be allowed to intercede with Allah on the Day of Judgment. They are the prophets, *ulema* and martyrs. In this *hadith*, the *Imams* have not been mentioned expressly, but as the report comes down from our *Imams*, it is obvious that the term, '*Ulema*' stands for the true divines, who par excellence include the *Imams* themselves.

The intercession of the prophets is quite apparent. It is the intercession of the martyrs, which we have to comprehend. The martyrs secure this privilege of intercession because they lead the people onto the right path. Their intercession will be portrayal of the events which took place in this world.

The Commander of the Faithful, Imam Ali (P) says: 'Allah will bring forward the martyrs, on the Day of Judgment, with such pomp and splendor, that even the prophets if mounted, will dismount to show their respect for them.' With such grandeur, will a martyr appear on the Day of Judgment.

Source: Adam Parfrey (ed.), *Extreme Islam: Anti-American Propaganda of Muslim Fundamentalism* (Los Angeles: Feral House, 2001), pp. 9–10. Permission granted by Feral Press to reprint this statement. www.feralhouse.com.

Document 8

Memorandum from Richard A. Clarke for Condoleezza Rice Informing Her about the Al-Qaeda Network (January 25, 2001)

On January 25, 2001, Richard A. Clarke, a holdover from the Clinton administration and the head of counterterrorism efforts in that administration, sent a memorandum to Condoleezza Rice, then National Security Advisor to the Bush administration, about al-Qaeda. This memo was Clarke's first effort to have the Bush administration take into account the danger emanating from Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

MEMORANDUM FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE
FROM: Richard A. Clarke
SUBJECT: Presidential Policy Initiative/Review—The Al-Qaida Network

Condi asked today that we propose major Presidential policy reviews or initiatives. We urgently need such a Principal level review on the al Qida network.

Just some Terrorist Group?

As we noted in our briefings for you, al Qida is not some narrow, little terrorist issue that needs to be included in broader regional policy. Rather, several of our regional policies need to address centrally the transnational challenge to the US and our interests posed by the al Qida network. By proceeding with separate policy reviews on Central Asia, the GCC, North Africa, etc. we would deal inadequately with the need for a comprehensive multi-regional policy on al Qida. Al Qida is the active, organized, major force that is using a distorted version of Islam as its vehicle to achieve two goals:

- to drive the US out of the Muslim world, forcing the withdrawal of our military and economic presence in countries from Morocco to Indonesia;
- to replace moderate, modern, Western regime in Muslim counties with theocracies modeled along the lines of the Taliban.

Al Qida affects centrally our policies on Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, North Africa and the GCC. Leaders in Jordan and Saudi Arabia see al Qida as a direct threat to them. The strength of the network of organizations limits the scope of support friendly Arab regimes can give to a range of US policies, including Iraq policy and the Peace Process. We would make a major error if we underestimated the challenge al Qida poses, or over estimated the stability of the moderate, friendly regimes al Qida threatens.

Pending Time Sensitive Decisions

At the close of the Clinton Administration, two decisions about al Qaida were deferred to the Bush Administration.

- First, should we provide the Afghan Northern Alliance enough assistance to maintain it as a viable opposition force to the Taliban/al Qida? If we do not, I believe that the Northern Alliance may be effectively taken out of action this Spring when fighting resumes after the winter thaw. The al Qida 55th Brigade, which has been a key fighting force for the Taliban, would then be freed to send its personnel elsewhere, where they would likely threaten US interests. For any assistance to get there in time to effect the Spring fighting, a decision is needed now.
- Second, should we increase assistance to Uzbekistan to allow them to deal with the al Qida/IMU threat? [remainder of content of this section removed at the request of the CIA as operational detail]

Three other issues awaiting addressal now are:

- First, what the new Administration says to the Taliban and Pakistan about the importance we attach to ending the al Qida sanctuary in Afghanistan. We are separately proposing early, strong messages to both.
- Second, do we propose significant program growth in the FY02 budget for anti-al Qida operations by CIA and counter-terrorism training and assistance by State and CIA?
- Third, when and how does the Administration choose to respond to the attack on the USS Cole. That decision is obviously complex. We can make some decisions, such as those above, now without yet coming to grips with the harder decision about the Cole. On the Cole, we should take advantage of the policy that we "will respond at a time, place, and manner of our own choosing/and not be forced into knee jerk responses."

Attached is the year-end 2000 strategy on al Qaida developed by the last Administration to give to you. Also attached is the 1998 strategy. Neither was a "covert action only" approach. Both incorporated diplomatic, economic, military,

public diplomacy and intelligence tools. Using the 2000 paper as background, we could prepare a decision paper/guide for a PC review.

1. Threat Magnitude: Do the Principles agree that the al Qida network poses a first order threat to US interests in a number of regions, or is this analysis a "chicken little" over reaching and can we proceed without major new initiatives and by handling this issue in a more routine manner?
2. Strategy: If it is a first order issue, how should the existing strategy be modified or strengthened? Two elements of the existing strategy that have not been made to work effectively are a) going after al Qida's money and b) public information to counter al Qida propaganda.
3. FY02 Budget: Should we continue the funding increases into the FY02 for State and CIA programs designed to implement the al Qida strategy?
4. Immediate [blacked out] Decisions: Should we initiate [blacked out] funding to the Northern Alliance and to the Uzbek's?

Please let us know if you would like such a decision/discussion paper or any modifications to the background paper.

Concurrences by: Mary McCarthy, Dan Fried, Bruce Reidel, Don Camp

Source: Barbara Elias, *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book*, no. 147. (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB147/clarke%20memo.pdf).

Document 9

Letter from Brian F. Sullivan, Retired FAA Special Agent to U.S. Senator John Kerry (May 7, 2001)

This letter, from a retired FAA Special Agent to U.S. Senator John Kerry, is important because it shows recognition of the problems with aviation security by a person in the field. The letter expressed Sullivan's concern about lax screening at checkpoints. He was also concerned about the culture in the FAA that promotes people up the chain of command even as they blocked needed reforms.

May 7, 2001
The Honorable John F. Kerry
304 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Kerry:

There was a very disturbing investigative report last night (Sunday evening May 6) on Channel 25 FOX News at 10PM regarding airport security. Although the report focused on Logan Airport and TF Green in Rhode Island, as a recently retired FAA Special Agent, I know this is a national problem, not one simply unique to New England Region. I've asked my friend Steve Elson, another former FAA Special Agent, to forward a video copy of the report to you. Both of us are willing to testify before Congress should the need arise and we are both committed to doing whatever is necessary to improving our aviation security system. We are hopeful that you would show the video to your peers, Senator McCain and members of any House committee dealing with aviation security.

The FAA does everything it can to prevent news reports of this nature under the guise of being a public safety issue, which should not be given a public form. Unfortunately, the report once again demonstrated what every FAA line agent already knows: the airport passenger screening system simply doesn't work as intended. The FAA would prefer to continue to promulgate a façade of security,

than to honestly assess the system. Management knows how ineffective the current system is, but continues to tell Congress that our airport screening is an effective deterrent.

FAA official point of a 95+% success rate of FAA screening checkpoint tests, particularly when reassuring the flying public and Congress. They do this even though they know that every time a Red Team, or news reporter in this instance, tests the system, the exact opposite occurs with a failure rate of 95+%. The difference is realistic testing versus tests designed to avoid enforcement litigation problems with the airlines. It is a clear example of self fulfilling prophecy, whereby the tests are designed to produce a desired outcome, rather than to truly reflect the status of aviation security.

FAA management will point to a decline in incidents of hijacking since the system was put into effect in the '70s. My question is, "Have they kept up with the times?" Do you see a horde of Cuban exiles just waiting to commit air piracy to return to Havana? Or, has the threat become more refined over the years? I've stood along the Potomac and watched our big air ships fly in low and slow along the river. What protection is there against a rogue terrorist with a Stinger missile? While the FAA has focused on screening for handguns, new threats have emerged, such as chemical and biological weapons. Do you really think a screener could detect a bottle of liquid explosives, small battery and detonator in your carry on baggage? And with the concept of Jihad, do you think it would be difficult for a determined terrorist to get on a plane and destroy himself and all other passengers? The answers to these questions are obvious.

The FAA was dubbed "The Tombstone Agency" by Mary Schiavo, the former DOT OID. The reason is that the agency never seems to act until there has been an air tragedy. Think for a moment how vital the air transportation industry is to our overall economic well being as a nation. Think what the result would be of a coordinated attack which took down several domestic flights on the same day. The problem is that with our current screening system, this is more than possible. Given time, considering current threats, it is almost likely. We don't have to wait for a tragedy to occur to act. There are simple, cost effective means to improve the system now.

The DOT OIG has become an ineffective overseer of the FAA, particularly since Mary Schiavo's departure. Scathing reports have been developed on airport/airline security and FAA facility security. Still, the culture continues to perpetuate itself and managers have been promoted up the chain despite the fact that they've supported this façade of security and abused line agents who dare to speak the truth. The answer here is not to fire a few hapless low paid screeners or continue to issue meaningless fines against the airlines. The answer is to change the prevailing culture within Civil Aviation Security at the FAA from one concerned with continuing to support the façade, to one committed to protecting the traveling public. Let our agents do their job. Don't stifle initiative and independent thought and observations. Don't continue to silence those who refuse to buy the party line and actually attempt to reveal the façade.

It is time for the truth to be known, before an incident occurs. It is not in the best interests of public safety to continue this façade of security. Hopefully, FOX 25 will distribute this report to all its national affiliates and encourage similar testing. National TV news magazines could also help bring focus. Perhaps we can

force a public forum where line agents, could testify before Congress and finally secure an honest assessment of aviation security, as well as some positive change.

Thank you,
Brian F. Sullivan
FAA Spec Agent (Ret.)

Source: Andrew R. Thomas, *Aviation Insecurity: The New Challenges of Air Travel* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), pp. 225–226. Permission obtained from Brian F. Sullivan to reprint this letter.

Document 10

Letter from Michael Canavan, Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security to FAA Federal Security Managers (May 30, 2001)

Over the years the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had developed an overly strong relationship with the aviation industry. This letter reveals how close this relationship was. The FAA was willing to compromise on aviation security because the aviation industry wanted only the basics. It was not so much that the aviation industry was uninterested in safety, but that it was more concerned about cost and profitability. This letter to FAA federal security managers from Michael Canavan, FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, calls for flexibility in dealing with the aviation industry. Rather than acting as a regulatory agency, the FAA was to be a partner with the aviation industry in solving problems.

Action: Compliance and enforcement philosophy
From: Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, ACS-1
To: Managers, Civil Aviation Security Division 700's, Federal Security Managers

As we work with the aviation industry, it is important to remember that our primary goal as a regulatory agency is to gain compliance. While I know there are circumstances that present difficult choices, it would be helpful to explain our approach to compliance and enforcement issues.

As I outlined in the ACS strategic plan, the safety and security of the flying public will depend upon the FAA and industry maintaining a candid, respectful, and mutually responsive business relationship. To be effective in this relationship, we need to be flexible. While I expect regulated parties to comply with regulatory requirements, there will be times when we find areas of noncompliance. When we do, I want to fully consider the actions the party has taken to fix the problem. I want to work with industry to develop action plans to permanently correct

problems that have resulted in violations. To encourage industry to join us in this effort I do not expect us to impose a civil penalty against a regulated party for certain unaggravated violations, if we believe the party has successfully implemented a permanent fix that will resolve violations. To answer questions you may have about this new philosophy and how it will work, detailed guidance will be provided to you shortly.

I want to continue to give our partners a realistic opportunity to comply with the regulations and to work with us.

Source: Andrew R. Thomas, *Aviation Insecurity: The New Challenges of Air Travel* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), p. 227. Letter from Canavan in the possession of Brian F. Sullivan, who has given permission to reprint this government document.

Document 11

Presidential Daily Briefing (August 6, 2001)

Presidents receive daily briefings from various agencies. This particular Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) has become controversial because it included a warning from the CIA that Osama bin Laden wanted to strike at targets in the United States. A representative of the CIA presented the PDB at Crawford, Texas on August 6, 2001. This document was declassified and approved for release on April 10, 2004.

Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US

Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of the World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bring the fighting to America."

After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according a [blacked out] service.

An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an [blacked out] service at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the operative's access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.

Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.

Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.

Al-Qaida members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qaida members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s.

A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a (blacked out) service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of "Blind Shykh" 'Umar' Abdel-Rahman and other US-held extremists.

Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.

The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives.

Source: Steven Strasser (ed.), *The 9/11 Investigations* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), pp. 546–547.

Document 12

Brian Sullivan's E-mail to Michael Canavan, FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security about Aviation Security (August 16, 2001)

Michael Canavan's May 30, 2001, letter, in which he defined his preferred approach for dealing with aviation security compliance issues, caused uncertainty among the FAA's rank and file. This uncertainty led to this e-mail from Brian Sullivan, an FAA agent. He made the case that what was actually going on differed from the philosophy announced by Canavan. Problems of aviation security were pointed out by FAA agents but were not being acted upon. Sullivan wanted senior FAA personnel to check on the progress of a problem to make sure something was done.

Subject: Compliance and Enforcement Philosophy
From: Brian Sullivan
To: Michael Canavan

Your C&E makes sense and is "well intentioned" but is being abused by field management to close cases without findings, and as the basis for not opening cases, despite the fact that violations persist.

Your intent was to work with the regulated parties and develop action plans to permanently correct problems. Here's what's really happening: A problem is identified. Instead of opening a case, we work with industry to develop the required plan. The agents go out and find that the problem persists, but field management won't allow them to open a case, incorrectly citing your May 30th memorandum as the basis for their decision. As a result we have a paper fix. Nice looking plans, but no real fix. The façade of security continues. Our line agents continue to experience the frustration of not being allowed to do their jobs.

The only way to confirm what I am saying is to check on the ground. What's the old military saying, "What goes right is what a commander checks," or

something like that? When the FOX25 report was done at Logan in May, the reporter went back a few weeks later, after the dust had settled, and re-checked the same screening checkpoints with the same negative result, despite assurances from the BOS CASFO and airport/airlines. I know FOX could easily determine if these current action plans work as intended. Let me suggest that it would be better if you looked at some of the action plans and test them with a red team see if they actually work. I know our field agents have re-checked violations after the action plans have been developed only to find that the same violation persists. Plans aren't worth the paper they are written on unless they work. The only way to determine if they really work is to test them with an "honest broker" and that can't be done by our line agents if their management won't open up cases when problems persist.

If you doubt what I'm saying, this is very easy to check. I know you get more with honey than you can with vinegar, but compliance requires both the carrot and the stick, if it is to be truly effective. The industry is primarily concerned with the bottom line ($) and will give security the attention it merits, only if we are perceived as both willing to work with them, while at the same time committed to both compliance and enforcement. If they think we are soft and they can get away with paper plans, that is exactly what they'll do. The key is to insure that the action plans do, in fact, permanently correct the problems which have resulted in violations. That is not happening. When the plans don't correct the problem, we have to have field management willing to open up cases and support our line agents who find that violations persist.

I hope this is helpful information. I'm not looking for a response. I just want to help you make your philosophy work as intended

Best wishes. We are hearing some good things since your arrival.

Source: Andrew R. Thomas, *Aviation Insecurity: The New Challenges of Air Travel* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), p. 229. Permission to reprint this e-mail has been given by Brian F. Sullivan.

Document 13

Mohamed Atta's Letter of Advice for Hijackers (September 2001)

Mohamed Atta allegedly wrote a five-page handwritten document in Arabic to prepare the members of his al-Qaeda team for their mission on September 11, 2001. This letter was found in Atta's suitcase, which was left behind at Logan Airport in a suitcase with other papers because Atta was late in boarding American Airlines Flight 11. There is some question whether Atta wrote this document, but it is certainly written in language that he believed in. The document served as both a spiritual exhortation for the mission and a checklist for the teams.

The Last Night

1. Make an oath to die and renew your intentions. Shave excess hair from the body and wear cologne. Shower.
2. Make sure you know all aspects of the plan well, and expect the response, or a reaction from the enemy.
3. Read al-Tawba and Anfal [traditional war chapters from the Koran] and reflect on their meanings and remember all of the things that God has promised for the martyrs.
4. Remind your soul to listen and obey [all divine order] and remember that you will face decisive situations that might prevent you from 100 percent obedience, so tame your soul, purify it, convince it, make it understand and incite it. God said: "Obey God and his messenger, and do not fight amongst yourselves or else you will fail. And be patient, for God is with the patient."
5. Pray during the night and be persistent in asking God to give you victory, control and conquest, and that he may make your task easier and not expose us.

6. Remember God frequently, and the best way to do it is to read the Holy Koran, according to all scholars, as far as I know. It is enough for us that it [the Koran] are [*sic*] the words of the Creator of the Earth and the planets, the One that you will meet [on the Day of Judgment].
7. Purify your soul from all unclean things. Completely forget something called "this world" [or "this life"]. The time for play is over and the serious time is upon us. How much time have we wasted in our lives? Shouldn't we take advantage of these last hours to offer good deeds and obedience?
8. You should feel complete tranquility, because the time between you and your marriage [in heaven] is very short. Afterward begins the happy life, where God is satisfied with you, and eternal bliss "in the company of the prophets, the companions, the martyrs and the good people, who are all good company." Ask God for his mercy and be optimistic, because [the prophet], peace be upon him, used to prefer optimism in all his affairs.
9. Keep in mind that, if you fall into hardship, how will you act, and how will you remain steadfast and remember that you will return to God and remember that anything that happens to you could never be avoided, and what did not happen to you could never have happened to you. This test from Almighty God is to raise your level [a reference to the levels of heaven] and erase your sins. And be sure that it is a matter of moments, which will then pass, God willing, so blessed are those who win the great reward of God. Almighty God said: "Did you think you could go to heaven before God knows whom [*sic*] amongst you have fought for Him and are patient?"
10. Remember the words of Almighty God: "You were looking to the battle before you engaged in it, and now you see it with your own two eyes." Remember: "How many small groups beat big groups by the will of God." And his words: "If God gives you victory, no one can beat you. And if he betrays you, who can give you victory without Him? So the faithful put their trust in God."
11. Remind yourself of the supplications and of your brethren and ponder their meanings. [The morning and evening supplications, and the supplications of entering a town, and . . . the supplications said before meeting the enemy.]
12. Bless your body with some verses of the Koran [done by reading verses in one's hands and then rubbing the hands over whatever is to be blessed], the luggage, clothes, the knife, your personal effects, your ID, your passport, and all of your papers.
13. Check your weapons before you leave and long before you leave. (You must make your knife sharp and you must not discomfort your animal during the slaughter.)
14. Tighten your clothes [a reference to one making sure his clothes will cover his private parts at all times], since this is the way of the pious generations after the prophet. They would tighten their clothes before battle. Tighten your shoes well, wear socks so that your feet will be solidly in your shoes. All of these are worldly things [that humans can do to control their fate, although God decrees what will work and what will not] and the rest is left to God, the best One to depend on.

15. Pray the morning prayer in a group and ponder the great rewards of that prayer. Make supplications afterward, and do not leave your apartment unless you have performed ablution before leaving, because (The angels will ask for your forgiveness as long as you are in a state of ablution, and will pray for you). This saying of the prophet was mentioned by [Yaba ibn Shair] al-Nawawi in his book, *The Best of Supplications.* Read the words of God: "Did you think that We created you for no reason. . . ." from the al-Mu'minum chapter.

The Second Stage

When the taxi takes you to (M) [this initial could stand for matar, airport in Arabic] remember God constantly while in the car. (Remember the supplication for entering a car, for entering a town, the supplication of place and other supplications.) . . .

When you have reached (M) and have left the taxi, say a supplication of place ["O Lord, I ask you for the best of this place, and ask you to protect me from its evils"], and everywhere you go say that prayer and smile and be calm, for God is with the believers. And the angels protect you without you feeling anything. Say this supplication: "God is more dear than all of his creation." and Say: "O Lord, protect me from them as you wish.". . . [More supplications follow]:

1. They will come back [from battle] with God's blessings.
2. They were not harmed.
3. And God was satisfied with them.

[Many Koranic verses and statements of the Prophet follow.]

Fear is a great worship. The allies of God do not offer such worship except for the one God, who controls everything . . . with total certainty that God will weaken the schemes of the non-believers. God said: "God will weaken the schemes of the non-believers."

You must remember your brothers with all respect. No one should notice that you are making the supplication, "There is no God but God," because if you say it 1,000 times no one will be able to tell whether you are quiet or remember God. [More Koran verses]

Also, do not seem confused or show signs of nervous tension. Be happy, optimistic, calm because you are heading for a deed that God loves and will accept [as a good deed]. It will be the day, God willing, you spend with the women of paradise.

Smile in the face of hardship young man/For you are heading toward eternal paradise..

You must remember to make supplications wherever you go, and anytime you do anything, and God is with his faithful servants, he will protect them and make their tasks easier, and give them success and control, and victory and everything. . . .

Third Stage—When You Ride the Plane

When you ride the (T) [probably for tayyara, airplane in Arabic], before your foot steps in it, and before you enter it, you make a prayer and supplications. Remember

that this is a battle for the sake of God. As the prophet, peace upon him, said: An action for the sake of God is better than all of what is in this world, or as he said. When you step inside the (T), and sit in your seat begin with the known supplications that we have mentioned before. Be busy with the constant remembrance of God. God said: "Oh ye faithful, when you find the enemy be steadfast, and remember God constantly so that you may be successful." When the (T) moves, even slightly, toward (Q) [unknown reference], say the supplication of travel. Because you are traveling to Almighty God, so be attentive on this trip. . . .

And then it takes off. This is the moment that both groups come together. So remember God, as he said in his Book: "Oh Lord, pour your patience upon us and make our feet steadfast and give us victory over the infidels." And his works: "And the only thing they said Lord, forgive our sins and excesses and make our feet steadfast and give us victory over the infidels." And his prophet said: "O Lord, you have revealed the book, you move the clouds, you gave us victory over the enemy, conquer them and give us victory over them." Give us victory and make the ground shake under their feet. Pray for yourself and all of your brothers that they may be victorious and hit their targets and [unclear] and ask God to grant you martyrdom facing the enemy, not running away from it, and for him to grant you patience and the feeling that anything that happens to you is for him.

Then every one of you should prepare to carry out his role in a way that would satisfy God. You should clench your teeth, as the pious early generations did.

When the confrontation begins, strike like champions who do not want to go back to this world. Shout, "Allahu Akbar," because this strikes fear in the hearts of nonbelievers. God said: "Strike above the neck, and strike at all of their extremities." Know that the gardens of paradise are waiting for you in all their beauty, and the women of paradise are waiting, calling out, "Come hither, friend of God." They have dressed in their most beautiful clothing.

If God decrees that any of you are to slaughter, you should dedicate the slaughter to your fathers . . . because you have obligations toward them. Do not disagree, and obey. If you slaughter, do not cause the discomfort of those you are killing, because this is one of the practices of the prophet, peace be upon him. On one condition: that you do not become distracted . . . and neglect what is greater, paying attention to the enemy. That would be reason, and would do more damage than good. If this happens, the deed at hand is more important than doing that, because the deed is an obligation, and [the other thing] is optional. And an obligation has priority over an option.

Do not seek revenge for yourself. Strike for God's sake. One time Ali bin Abi Talib [a companion and close relative of the Prophet Muhammad], may God bless him, fought with a nonbeliever. The nonbeliever spit on Ali, may God bless him. Ali . . . did not strike him. When the battle was over, the companions of the prophet asked him why he had not smitten the nonbeliever. He said, "After he spat at me, I was afraid that I would be striking at him in revenge for myself, so I lifted my sword." After he renewed his intentions, he went back and killed the man. This means that before you do anything, make sure that your soul is prepared to do everything for God only.

Then implement the way of the prophet in taking prisoners. Take prisoners and kill them. As Almighty God said, "No prophet should have prisoners until he has soaked the land with blood. You want the bounties of this world [in

exchange for prisoners] and God wants the other world [for you], and God is all-powerful, all-wise."

If everything goes well, every one of you should pat the other on the shoulder in confidence. . . . Remind your brothers that this act is for Almighty God. Do not confuse your brothers or distract them. He should give them glad tidings and make them calm, and remind them [of God] and encourage them. How beautiful it is for one to read God's words, such as: "And those who prefer the afterlife over this world should fight for the sake of God." And his words: "Do not suppose that those who are killed for the sake of God are dead, they are alive. . . ." And others. Or they should sing songs to boost their morale, as the pious first generations did in the throes of battle, to bring calm, tranquility, and joy to the hearts of his brothers.

Do not forget to take a bounty, even if it is a glass of water to quench your thirst or that of your brothers, if possible. When the hour of reality approaches, the zero hour . . . wholeheartedly welcome death for the sake of God. Always be remembering God. Either end you life while praying, seconds before the target, or make your last words: "There is no God but God, Muhammad is his messenger."

Afterward, we will all meet in the highest heaven, God willing.

If you see the enemy as strong, remember the groups [that had formed a coalition to fight the Prophet Muhammad]. They were 10,000. Remember how God gave victory to his faithful servants. God said: "When the faithful saw the [size of the enemy army], they said, this is what God and the prophet promised, they said the truth. it only increased their faith."

And may the peace of God be upon the prophet.

Source: Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin (eds.), *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 233–238.

Document 14

Oral Testimony from Survivors of the World Trade Center

The events of September 11 are almost impossible to comprehend, but the best testimony to the horrors of that day comes from the survivors. These survivors witnessed acts of heroism and unselfishness along with panic and desperation. They all commented on the number of people jumping to their deaths from the upper floors, and the terror of the collapse of first the South Tower and then the North Tower. Eyewitness testimony may be suspect in court trials, but as a way to personalize a tragedy it is indispensable.

Testimony of Joseph Pfeifer, Chief, Battalion 1, New York City Fire Department

I worked the night before in the firehouse, which is at 100 Duane Street, in lower Manhattan. Then that morning, somewhere around eight-thirty, we had a call to a possible gas leak in the street. So we went to the gas leak and there was a slight odor of gas in the street. No big deal. I had Engine 7 and Ladder 1 check some of the exposures. There was nothing inside the buildings. So we called Con Ed, and we were wrapping up with the operation there and standing around in the street. And then we hear this very loud plane coming overhead.

In Manhattan, you rarely hear planes because of the high buildings. So we all looked up. In almost disbelief, we see the plane pass, and it's flying so low. Our eyes followed it as it passed behind the buildings, and then it reappeared, and it appeared to me that it aimed right into the building. It smashed into the building. There was a large fireball. And then a couple of seconds later you heard the sound of the explosion. I told everybody to get in the rigs because we're going down there, to the Trade Center.

I got into a battalion car with Jules Naudet, the French film guy who made the 9/11 documentary tape. If you saw the tape, you saw our faces blank with

disbelief that a plane was heading toward the Trade Center, followed by the actual impact. I picked up the department radio and I told them that a plane just hit the World Trade Center, and to transmit a second alarm. That was done immediately. That was the first official report of this happening.

We're heading down West Broadway, and I'm thinking to myself, What's the next step? What's the next thing I need to do? I picked up the radio again, and I told the dispatcher that this was a direct attack. I said I want a third alarm transmitted. "Have the second-alarm units report to the Trade Center, and the third-alarm units stage at Vesey and West Street."

We proceeded to the trade Center. We pull up to the front, underneath the canopy. I get out of the car. The firefighters get their gear. I throw my gear on, and we proceed into the building. As we go in, we see a couple of people badly burned right in the lobby. I proceeded to the fire command center of the Trade Center. I was met by a deputy fire safety director. I asked him if he knew what the floor the plane hit because it's very hard to tell from the outside exactly what floor. And he wasn't able to give me an exact floor. He said between the 78 and 80, but he wasn't sure.

My first thought was to organize, to find out information and then try to organize the firefighters that I had asked for. I needed to find out if we had any elevators. In the Trade Center, each of the towers had ninety-nine elevators. So it wasn't a simple job. It was not just walking over and checking one elevator bank. I had to send a number of people, from a number of companies, to see if any of the elevators were available to us. And what we found out, after a couple of minutes, was that we had no elevators. So we had to send people upstairs to find out what was going on and to attempt a rescue. I knew that we had somewhere around twenty floors of people above the fire, and I knew they were trapped. I knew the fire itself was too big to put out.

Deputy Peter Hayden came in and he took charge of the operation. My role was to support him, supply him with information, and continue communicating with the guys going up. Groups of firefighters were coming in. And we would brief them and then tell them the plan, and send them up. One of the engine companies that came in was Engine 33, which was my brother Kevin's. He was a lieutenant in 33, which is out of Great Jones Street, off the Bowery.

I was standing behind the fire command station, which is a high desk-type thing. And I remember seeing him walking over to me. And I said to myself, "What's he doing here?" He told me he was going to go on a special vacation and he was taking a number of mutuals off so he could study for the captain's test. So I thought his last tour had been the day before. I was very surprised to see him. But he came over to me, and I told him where we thought the lowest level of the fire possibly was, at 78. And I told him we didn't have any elevators available. And then we just spent a couple of seconds just looking at each other, with a real feeling of concern for each other. It was just a couple of seconds of staring at each other. And then he knew what he had to do and he slowly walked away to his men, who were standing maybe twenty feet away. I watched him walk away, and that was the last time I saw him.

This was maybe five minutes before the second plane hit. A lot of the high-ranking citywide tour commanders of the fire department stated coming in. We're trying to evaluate what's going on, what we have and who's coming in. We're

trying to explain our rescue plan to people when the second plane hits the South Tower. We heard that. We saw debris coming down. A number of the chiefs got together. Deputy chief Peter Hayden and myself, citywide tour commander Donald Burns and Battalion Chief Orio Palmer. It was decided that we'd just split the group in half. One group would go into the South Tower. The other would stay in the North Tower.

Peter Hayden said, "I need Joe Pfeifer to stay with me. We'll take North Tower."

And Donald Burns said, "I'll take Orio, and we'll set up a command in tower 2."

What we tried to do at that point was to check out the repeater, the building repeater, because we were going to command channels. Orio and I tested it out together, and it failed. It did not work at all. So we had a communication difficulty right from the beginning.

So they went into the South Tower and we stayed with the North, knowing there was no communication between the two towers.

We tried a number of other communications solutions. We tried the repeater in the car. We also went to a different command channel. But our best system was knocked out with the first plane. Everything else from there would not be as good. High-rise communications are difficult at best because of the technology problems with radios.

I new that the B stairs had a special standpipe phone, which meant they had a jack where you could plug in a phone and talk down to the fire command board. So I physically gave people red phones. I said, "Hey, listen, right next to the standpipe you'll see a box. Plug this in and we'll have direct hard-wire communication."

We tried every possible means of communication that day. But even cell phones weren't working. But what goes through my head is that with each of the systems we tried, the redundancy of the systems still failed. I felt very frustrated. You can almost see it in the 9/11 film, the frustration on my face. I'm trying to call different chiefs, trying to access what's going on upstairs, and not being able to get through. Some of the messages did get through. We found we were able to talk at different levels at different times and at different spots in the building. We had a lot of people trapped in elevators, and we had a number of firefighters having chest pains. And we got those messages down, and we started to get people up to assist. But it was spotty at best.

It was almost like the closer you were, the less you knew. That's what happened. We weren't getting full intelligence reports of what was going on. If you watched the 9/11 tape, I don't think you saw any ranking law enforcement in the lobby. The helicopters were up, but we had no means to communicate with them. We tried a number of times to do that, but it wasn't happening and no one was coming in to volunteer any of that information to us. As we look back, we were the least informed. Resources were up there. Helicopters were able to assess the damage. My question is 'Who did they tell?' They didn't tell us. Or if they told anybody, whoever they told had a responsibility to tell us. But I think instead of blaming people, as we move forward I think we should just acknowledge that this is one of the areas that both departments need to work on, police and fire.

We heard this loud rumbling sound, which was the South Tower collapsing, but we didn't know that at the time. I thought that the elevators were coming down, or part of the building or the plane or something was crashing through the lobby, because it started to fill quickly with debris.

We ran around a little corner toward 6 World Trade. We pushed everybody around the corner. We actually huddled down at the base of the escalator, the escalator that leads up to 6 World Trade and then to the North Bridge over West Street. But now this whole area, which was brightly lit, became totally black. We stayed there until the rumbling stopped, and we knew we were alive.

But I thought it was a localized collapse. I never even suspected that the second tower collapsed. I figured whatever happened we're in the middle of it and we're okay.

I said, "Tower 1 command to all units. Evacuate the building. Evacuate the building." And that was heard, I got acknowledgement. Then I heard it go up farther, meaning that somebody, one of the chiefs, picked up the transmission. Then I heard it repeated again on the handy talkies, so I knew my call to get everybody out of the building was heard. And later on talking to firefighters, they said they heard me.

But I never knew the second tower collapsed. Nor did I hear any message of that. But I had to get the other guys out of the building because something was wrong and we were no longer able to assess what was going on. Now were in a mode where we have to figure out how to escape. We didn't know what occurred, so the concern was to get everybody out and regroup.

We went across the West Bridge with Jules and an EMS lieutenant. I went back and forth a few times and still didn't know that the South Tower had collapsed. You couldn't see it. What you saw was smoke. Many times when you get a big fire, smoke covers the building and you don't see the building. But you know the building is still there. So when we looked, we were at a bad angle. It was just dust that covered where the building would be. A minute later Chief Hayden came and was standing in the street, and still I did not know that the South Tower collapsed.

We were only out there a few minutes when we heard a loud rumbling sound, almost like a train if you're standing underneath an overpass. And somebody yelled, "The building's coming down. Run." I ran toward the river, and I guess Jules was with me. I had all my gear, the bunker gear, but I didn't have a mask. and I guess Jules ran faster than I, and as we get about twenty yards up the block, I see him huddled between a couple of cars in just a T-shirt. I figured, I have the helmet and the gear. I'll be able to protect him. So I actually jumped on top of him. He didn't know it was me at that time. And then I heard all the crashing and the steel and now the street goes totally black. As a firefighter you kind of expect blackness inside of a burning building. But outside in broad daylight, you don't.

At that point, I thought we were going to die. I could only think of my wife and kids and how much I would like to see them again. I thought of Kevin right after. I thought, he's going to be okay. We told him to get out, he'll be okay. There are a lot of firemen around. It's hard for me to find him. He'll come and find me. You know, I'm there with a white helmet. I'm a lot more visible than all the other guys. All the other guys look the same. So I thought, he'll see the white helmet and he'll find me.

I tried to call him on the radio. It didn't work. And I said, "Okay, the radio's not doing well today anyway." And then a number of hours passed by and still no Kevin. So I decided to take a walk around the site. Let me see if there's anybody from 33. And I saw 33's rig, and for some reason I checked the riding list, even though I knew he was in the building.

I remember walking north on West Street, walking through the blackness of downtown because there were no lights. It was at that point I realized my brother was gone, and hundreds of firefighters were gone, and all I could think of was how much we really used to love working downtown, and all the times we used to talk on the phone, or at the house, or at parties about the job, and I realized that all that was gone.

We had the memorial for my brother. And then in February, I got a phone call to come to the Trade Center right away. And I knew they had found him. I went down to the Trade Center and they were in the process of digging him out. For me, that was the toughest part. I was pretty cool and calm in that command mode, but I think at that point I left it all behind and I just knelt there next to his body in the midst of all the steel and the rubble. And then we carried him through the field of twisted steel and it was almost overwhelming because everything became a reality of what took place there and how horrible it was.

We actually brought him up a dirt hill and we had about a hundred firefighters salute as we passed by with a flag over his body. We put in an ambulance, and I jumped in. They closed the doors and I sat there. And there were a lot of tears. But after sitting there alone with him for a while, I started to remember all the good times we had. He only lived six blocks away from me in Middle Village, so I always saw him. So in the middle of tears, there was some sort of peace or tranquility. I remember sitting in the ambulance saying how horrible this was. This was the worst I could imagine. And then after a few minutes I felt a calmness. It's very strange, but it was my time with him, which I'm really glad I had. Not only did I see him going into the towers, but I brought him out.

A couple of days after September 11, I met Dennis Tardio, who was the captain of Engine 7. He stopped me on the stairs to the firehouse, and he said to me, "I owe my life to your brother."

I asked him what he meant. He said when he was coming down the stairs, he was coming down the C stairs, and for some strange reason he made eye contact with my brother. And my brother called him over and said, "Dennis, you can't get down these stairs. It leads you out into all the debris" He said, "You need to switch to the B stairs."

Dennis got out of the building and within thirty seconds the building came down. He said if it weren't for Kevin, he wouldn't be here. And I know for a fact, if they had gone down the other stairs, it would have led out onto the mezzanine level and there would never have been enough time to get out of the building.

Testimony of Robert Leder, Executive, SMW Trading Company

Our office is on the eighty-fifth floor of 1 World Trade Center. I was looking outside the window, facing the Empire State Building, when I saw the plane coming into the building. There was such a dramatic change of atmospheric pressure from the plane hitting. The building swayed from the impact, and it nearly knocked me off of my chair. Our ceiling imploded. Some of our walls began to implode. I saw people coming past the window. I don't think these were people who jumped. I think people must have sucked out of the windows because of the pressure.

The first thing that came to my mind was to call my wife. I told her that the World Trade Center had just been hit by a plane. She didn't believe me, and she just went about her business. Right after I spoke with her, I opened a door to see

what was going on and this black billowing smoke came straight at us. I shut the door right away. I wasn't sure what was going on in the hallway. The whole office reeked of jet fuel, or kerosene. I started to get really nervous because I wasn't sure if we were going to be able to get out. People wanted to say in my office. They said, "Relax, everything's going to be fine."

And my exact words were, "I'm getting the fuck out of here, and I don't care what anybody else does."

I had no idea where the stairwell was. I just never thought of looking for one. We saturated our jackets with water, and people across the hall directed us to the stairwell. We started to go down and it was packed. But there was a quick pace and the stairwell wasn't smoky. Maybe there was a little bit of smoke, and there was a little bit of stench of burning, but it wasn't that bad.

By the time we got down to the seventy-something floor, fires were coming out of where a wall used to be. It was almost like a scene out of a horror movie. But it was not as chaotic as I thought it was going to be. Everybody was orderly and well mannered. Everybody was staying on the right-hand side of the stairs and letting people that were severely hurt go down on the other side. And this was before we saw any firefighters or police officers coming up. As we got farther and farther down, people started to calm down more, thinking that we're getting out and everything was going to be okay.

At around the 50th floor, I got a cell phone call through to my wife. I told her everything was okay and I'd call her when I got out. This must have been a minute before the second plane hit. I never heard it. We had no idea that 2 World Trade was struck by a plane. Thank God we didn't know. If we had, there would have been panic.

It was around the thirtieth floor when firefighters started to come up. They were all running up on the left side and we were going down on the right side. One after another, just running up with all their gear. You saw each one of these young firefighters running up with all their gear, and they knew what was going on with the other World Trade Center building. But they never said a word. You couldn't even see it in their faces.

The smoke actually started to get thicker as we got farther and farther down. At the twenty-second floor, I stopped my friend Billy and we helped an elderly woman. She had this huge bag with her that was filled with things from her desk, and she looked like she was having trouble. I grabbed her bag and I walked in front of her. Billy walked behind her, and we walked slowly. People were now passing us. It must have taken us an extra ten to fifteen minutes to get outside.

Once there, I was almost fixated on the debris, the body parts and blood. My friend Billy had to snap me out of it and wake me up. We were walking between the Gap and the PATH train when people started to scream, "Run, Run, Run. Oh, my God." We had no clue what was happening. And then we felt this wave and started to hear a rumbling. And the next thing you knew it was darkness. I thought it was over, I thought we were dying. I didn't know what was happening, but we threw the elderly lady to the ground and all three of us got into a ball against a little wall and we prayed. I'm not a religious person, but I prayed to God, hoping that we would be okay.

I still did not know if I was alive or dead. My eyes were wide open and I couldn't see anything. It was blacker than black. I couldn't even cough or breathe because

I had so much soot in my throat and in my mouth. And then it started to settle, and I realized I was alive.

I started to scream for some sort of a light. "Does anybody have a lighter?" Nobody answered me. My friend Billy finally said something. The lady was also okay. Finally, a huge floodlight went on, and then another, and I began to see all the EMS workers who were there with us. And they kept leading us out. I've never really noticed EMS workers, or police officers or firefighters. But I was there and now I know. These people are the most amazing people I've ever come across. They were not out for themselves. They stayed in there, making a light path fro everybody else to find a way out.

When I finally got out it looked like a nuclear winter. I was walking, but I was in shock. I still had no clue what was going on. I was walking down the street and looking down and seeing all the e-mails and pictures, and then seeing this white manila folder with the letter J on it from a law office or a doctor's office. This is after 2 World Trade Center collapsed, and it didn't even occur to me that it collapsed. I was still thinking, How did this happen from a small plane hitting out building?

My life dramatically changed on that day. I'm not the same person. I don't feel safe anymore. I don't conduct myself in the same manner that I used to because I'm always on alert. I'm a quieter person now. I fear death now. I'm waiting for it to happen. I haven't had a restful sleep since this whole thing happened. I've been taking medication to help me sleep, but it doesn't work. I mean, there are days that I sleep because I'm so tired that my body has no other choice. But more often than not, I get maybe three hours of sleep a night. I'm a restless person, that's my nature. But I'm worse than I ever was, and it's not good. I feel myself just breaking down, my whole body. I've been getting help, but it doesn't seem to be doing much.

Obviously, time heals everything as you get further and further away. But the memory stays. I have nightmares. The visions I saw aren't going away. Seeing all that carnage sticks in my mind. Seeing the plane and feeling the plane hit was terrible. It was just a frightening experience. Now I carry a flashlight in my bag and an air filter mask that was given out at my exchange a week after the attacks. I'm waiting for something else to happen. And if something else is going to happen, I feel it will happen in New York. I didn't go to the World Series game because of the stress. My wife was frightened for me to go. My choice was letting her be frightened for the whole night, or just going home, which is what I ended up doing. I gave the tickets away. And these are things that I love, going to ball games, going to football games. Now I avoid crowds. I won't do it. And that's very sad, but I don't see there ever being a remedy to it.

Testimony of Bernard B. Kerik, Former Police Commissioner, New York Police Department

I was in my office that morning. I had just finished exercising. I had a workout room in the back of my office, and I went in the back to take a shower. I'd locked the outside door to my inner office, and all of a sudden I heard this banging on the door. You know, kicking, banging, people yelling. So I ran out and opened the door. I had a towel wrapped around me. Hector Santiago and John Picciano, my chief of staff, were there and they were yelling at me that a plane had just hit tower 1.

I said, "All right. Shut up. Calm down." They were screaming, and I said, "Relax. It's okay." In my mind, I was thinking that it was a small plane flying up the Hudson. You know, we deal with tragedy every day in this city—and accidents, major accidents and the like.

But they kept saying, "No you don't understand. It's the whole top of the building. It's enormous."

I said, "All right, get out of the way." So I walked out into my office with a towel draped around me. I walked through my personnel office and into my conference room. When I got in front of the TV, I was stunned by what I saw. I turned around and replied, "Who the hell said this was a plane?"

They said, "Well, that's what they're yelling over the radio." So I ran back to my desk and I called the mayor. He was uptown at a breakfast. I spoke to him and said, "Look, something has just happened at the towers. I'm heading down there. I'll meet you at the command center," which was the Office of Emergency Management in 7 World Trade.

I was dressed within minutes. I got in my car with Hector and Craig Taylor. We got to West Broadway between Barclay and, Vesey and I said, "Stop the car." I got out and I looked up at the tower. I could see the smoke and the debris, and then I saw these things coming from the top of the building. It was so high up. I thought it was debris. But as it got closer to the ground I realized that people were jumping from the building. I've been in this business for twenty-six years and I've done everything under the sun. I've been involved in gun battles. I had partners that were killed. Hector and I were in a shooting. He got shot. But I've never felt as helpless as I did on that morning. You couldn't yell to these people and ask them to stop, or make them stop. I guess that had a choice: stay within a two-thousand-degree inferno, or jump. And they were jumping.

I told the guys to back the car away from he building. We were only about a half-block from the towers. They backed the car up Barclay Street. I was talking on the radio, telling the guys to bring in resources, activating rapid mobilizations from around the city, calling in cops from every precinct.

I turned around to say something to Hector when there was this enormous explosion. I looked up and the other building, building 2, was sort of exploding and igniting above. And I thought, Now what's happened? How did that building ignite this other building. I don't know what was going through my head, but all of a sudden somebody yelled, "Run." And Hector grabbed me by the shirt, and we started running up West Broadway. Debris and body parts and the plane and the building, it was all coming down right on top of us. Hector got his in the back of the leg with a piston or some piece of the plane. We ducked behind the post office behind 7 World Trade and waited for the entire thing to stop.

I looked back out. I saw the damage. At that point, I could hear aviation and the pilots yelling on the radio that it was a commercial airliner. I realized at that minute that we were under attack. I yelled to John to get on the telephone to call headquarters, but there was no phone service. The cell phones were down, so we're calling on the radio. I'm yelling for them to get aviation to close down the airspace. We needed air support, and I'm screaming at these guys to get me air support.

They're looking at me, like "Is there a fucking number to call for an F-16?" Like "Who do we call? How do we do that?"

But aviation had taken care of that and closed down the airspace. They had called in the military. I ordered the entire city to be shut down at that point. All bridges and tunnels closed. No entry. No exit. My main concern at that point was that there could be other secondary attacks set up on the ground. They're hitting us from above, did they do anything on the ground? Are they on the ground? My other concern was who the hell they were. Who are they? You know, as all of these events were unfolding, you're trying to put it all together. You're trying to think of so many things at once.

Then I thought about other targets—police headquarters, City Hall, the U.N., the Empire State Building. That's what was running through my mind. And as I thought of each target, I would tell my staff to start evacuating these buildings.

Within three or four minutes after the second plane hit, the mayor pulled up. I ran up the block and I stopped his car just north of Barclay. He got out of the car. He stood there with me. We were looking at the building and I was telling him what had just happened.

He made a comment to me, some kind of comment, like "We're in uncharted territory. The city has never experienced anything like this." I forget exactly how he said it, but it was something to that effect. And then he asked where the command posts were going to be, and I told him they were going to have to set one up on West Street or on the west side of the towers.

He said, "All right, let's go around to West Street. We'll go down west and we'll look at the damage from the other side of the building and see what they are doing there."

So we walked west on Barclay and then south on West Street. We stopped and met with First Deputy Commissioner Bill Feehan from the fire department; Chief Peter Ganci; ESU Sergeant John Coglin; Mychal Judge, the chaplain; and Ray Downey. They were setting up their staging area right across from tower 1. My guys kept pushing me to get into a command center, and I was telling the mayor, "Look, we have to go back north on West Street. We've got to get out of here."

The mayor wanted to talk to the White House. I said, "We've got to get you out of here and into a command center. You can call the White House from there." So we said goodbye to everybody and started walking. Mychal Judge grabbed the mayor and said, "Be careful and God bless you."

So we all went into 75 Barclay with the mayor; his chief of staff, Tony Carbonetti; Joe Lhota, the deputy mayor of operations; Steve Fishner, the criminal justice coordinator; and Sunny Mindel, the mayor's press secretary. The mayor got on the phone. They got through to the White House. As he was talking on the phone, somebody's pager said that the Pentagon had been hit. I've known the mayor for about eleven or twelve years, and I've never seen him look as worried or concerned about anything as much as he did when he was on the phone with the White House. He put the phone down and he said, "Well, that's not good at all. They've hit the Pentagon and they're evacuating the White House." It was a clear signal that this was no longer just about New York City. It was about the United States.

Then all of a sudden somebody slammed the door open in this office where we were standing and yelled to hit the deck. and just as they said it, the whole damned building started to shake. I started walking to the door to look outside and all the windows outside in that outer hallway of 75 Barclay started to shatter. Then there

was this gush of smoke and soot, like this black dust. Hector grabbed me by the middle of my back and started pushing me to the back of the building. And everybody sort of followed. We didn't know what was going on. I didn't know if 75 Barclay was coming down, if another building was hit.

We went out through a back door and wound up in this maze of hallways. And every exit door was locked. We couldn't get out of this building, and it was filling up with smoke and debris. I remember thinking. All the shit I've been through in my entire life and I'm going to suffocate in this damn building.

Then in one of the basement areas we saw two maintenance guys. I don't know where they were coming from. I don't know what they were doing, but they were definitely as surprised to see us as we were to see them. We said, "We need to get out of here. We need to get as far away from the towers as possible. Can you open these doors?"

One of them said, "Yeah, absolutely." So he opened the doors, and we were in the lobby, I think, of 100 Church Street. The front of the lobby had these huge glass windows, and outside was solid pure white. You couldn't see anything. As we were standing there, in walked a guy covered in this white stuff from head to toe. His eyes were totally red and bloodshot. And it was my deputy commissioner of administration, Tibor Kerekes. We were in Korea together. We were in Saudi Arabia two different times together. He worked for me in New Jersey. He's my best friend. He walked in the door and his eyes were solid bloodred. He had been outside when the building fell and he ducked into one of those little three-foot openings in the side of the post office building. He stood there as all this debris came down around him. And now he was running into us. The mayor and I took him to the side. We were pouring water on his face and cleaning out his eyes.

We regrouped and started walking north on Church. We walked into the Tribeca Grand Hotel thinking we'd take the place over and set up the government in there. The advance people were up there, and they were running all over the building, getting phones, doing all this stuff. The mayor and I walked into the lobby. We looked around, and when we looked up, we saw that the entire ceiling was glass. There was an instantaneous feeling of being uncomfortable, I looked at the mayor, he looked at me, and we just walked right out the door. We didn't say anything. We just kept walking and everybody followed us right out of the building. We got back on Church Street and kept walking north.

We got to a firehouse. Everybody was gone. The firehouse was locked up. We had to break in. We broke in the door and then started making some phone calls and started putting together some mobilization plans. We needed to create a command center for city government. I said, "Let's go to the police academy. We can run the city from there." And that's what we did. We set up an enormous conference room in the police academy where the mayor and the fire commissioner and myself were able to call in all the other agencies and started working on a response to the attack.

I don't remember where we were when tower 1 came down. But I can remember the look on Tommy Von Essen's face. He knew that a lot of his guys were in those buildings. I can just remember seeing him at the academy. He was in a daze. We all were in a daze.

As for the mayor, I guess you'd have to know him to understand this. If there was a major tragedy on December 31, if something had happened on the

afternoon of the 31st, his last day in office, he would have reacted no differently than he did in September. I made a comment to him, I guess it was around December 20, a week or so away from the end of his term. He used to have daily staff meetings at eight o'clock every day. And Tommy and I used to joke about it, because before September 11 we didn't go to the dailies. We went once a week. Now we were going to dailies and it was a week away from the end of his term, and I said, "Why do we have to have a daily? Next week we're outta here." I was joking.

And the mayor said, "Why? Because you're the police commissioner and I'm the mayor until December 31, that's why."

It was just another lesson in dealing with the mayor and working with him, and witnessing his work ethic and his integrity and what he did and how he did it. He set the tone on September 11. We didn't do anything that we hadn't done before. It was just far more enormous and far bigger than anything we had ever one, imagined, and two, experienced. I mean, I was a really active cop. I'm probably the highest decorated police commissioner that's ever served this city. I was awarded the medal of Valor. I'd been involved in gun battles. I knew. I'd been around. And yet to witness this, and to be there, was like nothing that I would have ever imagined.

Martin Glynn's Tribute to Police Officer Moira Smith

I was one of the last people to see Police Officer Moira Smith before she perished in the collapse of the World Trade Center. I remember her very vividly because my experience was personal, intense, and unique. This is to document what she was doing in those final minutes.

I have to background this story by saying that my wife has been a flight attendant for a major US Airline for over twenty years. During that time, she has received extensive training in emergency evacuation procedures. I have seen her practice the drill for evacuating passengers from a fiery aircraft on many occasions. I always felt that she was very sincere about executing her responsibility in such a situation. Her rehearsals included details that would never occur to the average person. For example, she was trained to touch a door with the back of her hand before opening it. If the door was so hot that it burned her hand, she would still be able to use the front of her hand to hold a rope should that be necessary. The dedication and intensity with which she executed these exercises left me no doubt about her intention to perform in an emergency situation.

On 9/11, I entered 2 WTC moments before the first tower was struck. I took the express elevator to the 78th floor sky lobby and everything appeared normal. I entered the local elevator and pressed 84. The elevator stopped on the 82nd floor and a young man leapt into the car just as the door was closing. He was screaming, "Terrorists, go down." I asked him what he had seen, but he was in such a state of shock he couldn't communicate. He was crouched in the corner and kept saying, "Fire! Fire!"

The elevator continued up to my floor but I didn't get out. I kept trying to find out what the young man had seen. When we got back down to the sky lobby, the scene has changed completely. The floor was packed, and people were lined up ten deep in front of the express elevators to go back down. We weren't sure if the elevators were going to be running, so many of us started down the stairs.

At first, it was a slow march. There were people streaming into the descending crowd on every floor. However, when we had gone down about ten floors, the flow of people joining us stopped. I thought that perhaps the situation had clarified, and I decided to view the scene for myself.

The first reentry door was on the sixtieth floor. I asked a fellow who was walking around locking up offices where I could go to see the North Tower. He pointed down a hallway and said, "It's that way, but don't look. It's too horrible!"

I went anyway. When I got to the window, I looked up and saw the flames shooting out of the top floors. I looked down and saw three distinct large pools of blood. I reckon the largest was thirty yards across. The bodies were mixed in with the wreckage and I could make out several legs sticking out of the debris. I looked back up just to see a man in a white shirt jumping from a top floor. I saw his face clearly. My eyes followed him down till the ground came into focus, then I looked away.

My reaction was very physical and intense. My stomach turned, my knees became wobbly, and my eyes saw black. I almost passed out.

I thought that by exiting the building under these circumstances I would add to the confusion and impede the rescue workers. I decided to sit down and wait for the emergency to get under control. I had been sitting for about 15 minutes, when the second plane hit our building. We knew something enormous had happened because the building shook and the temperature rose by ten degrees in an instant.

There were about ten of us who had been sitting around in the reception area on that floor. We all got up quickly and hurried down the steps. The staircase was open now and we were moving quite fast.

After we had gone down several floors, we came to a cripple woman lying on a landing between floors. Her walking cane was by her side and she was looking at the people hurrying by. She was yelling, 'I'm going to die. I'm going to die.' I felt a pang of guilt as I continued past her with the rest of the crowd. My mind flashed images of my wife alone in the bed and my sons without a father. Nothing else mattered, I had to get out.

When we got down to about the fifth floor, we caught up with the tail end of the main crowd. The trek down the steps became a slow march again. I looked back to see who was behind us. There I saw an Oriental fellow carrying the crippled woman on his back.

I didn't fault myself for being a coward. Rather, I admired him for being calm and composed in this emergency situation. I thought, 'I could have done that too—or at least I could have helped out—but I'm not thinking—I'm panicked.' As we stood there in the dimly light staircase, I was thinking about the carnage I would witness when we came out into the plaza lobby. I was trying to brace myself. To be prepared for the worst.

We exited the stairwell to a ramp which led toward the main plaza. A slow moving line progressed along the ramp to a down escalator which connected to the underground passageway being used to exit the compound. Moira stood at the end of the ramp directing the traffic down the escalator. She had her flashlight in her right hand and she was waving it like a baton. She was repeating over and over—"Don't look! Keep Moving."

I immediately had the sensation that I knew what had happened there before. I thought: groups of people had come through here and stopped to look at the

horror of the situation. There was mass hysteria and the exit paths were blocked. She broke it up and got things moving again. Now she's making sure it doesn't happen again.

It was a very intense personal experience for me. It was like I was in a scene that I had witnessed before only this time—instead of my wife rescuing strangers—it was me being rescued by Moira.

I came to the end of the ramp and I was standing squarely in front of Moira, I leaned to the left to try to look past her to see the plaza. She quickly matched my motion and blocked my vision saying "don't look." Our eyes made direct contact. My eyes said to her, "I know how bad it is and I understand what you're doing." Her face was full of pain and her eyes said to me, "In this horrific situation, this is the best and only thing I can do."

The mass of people exiting the building felt the calm assurance that they were being directed by someone in authority who was in control of the situation. Her actions seemed ordinary, even commonplace. She insulated the evacuees from the awareness of the dangerous situation they were in, with the result that everything preceded smoothly.

In my company—sixty one people perished—one hundred eighty survived. Afterwards, I asked several of my fellow employees if they had noticed the woman police officer at the escalator landing. They said, "Yeah—she was directing traffic."

A statue of Moira—holding her flashlight while evacuating the building—would be an excellent way to pay tribute to the heroism of the NYPD on 9/11. As a work of art, it would work on many levels.

- It commemorates the Supreme Sacrifice in an understated way that will encourage viewers to look twice.
- It will have special meaning for women. Moira's job on 9/11 was without heraldry, yet she may have been responsible for saving more lives than anyone else.

Greg Trevor, Official in the Public Affairs Department of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

A Race to Safety: What Was It Like Inside One World Trade Center?

My life was spared by 11 minutes.

On Sept. 11, my coworkers and I escaped One World Trade Center at 10:18 a.m. The building collapsed seconds before 10:29 a.m.

I owe my life to three things: a knit tie, a quick-thinking Port Authority Police officer; and the foresight of the architects and engineers who designed the World Trade Center strong enough to withstand direct hits from jets—and enable an estimated 25,000 people to escape.

When the first of two 767s hit the Twin Towers at 8:46 a.m., I was standing behind my desk on the south side of the 68th floor of One World Trade Center, in the Public Affairs Department of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

I had been working or nearly two hours, and had just finished a phone call to a colleague at Newark International Airport. I stood to stretch my legs and looked

out the window at the Statue of Liberty, which sparkled from the sunlight of that unusually bright morning.

I was nearly knocked to the floor by the impact of the first plane, which slammed into the north side of Tower One more than 20 floors above me. I heard a loud thud, followed by an explosion. The building felt like it swayed about 10 feet to the south. It shuddered back to the north, then shimmied back and forth.

Out the window I saw a parabola of flame fall toward the street, followed by a blizzard of paper and glass. Then I heard two sounds: emergency sirens on the street, and phones ringing across the 68th floor—calls from reporters wondering what had happened.

Dazed but anxious to get out, I ran to the office of my department Director, Kayla Bergeron. She was already on the phone to the Port Authority's Chief Operating Officer Ernesto Butcher. I got on Kayla's other line and contacted the Port Authority Police Department's headquarters in Jersey City.

Within a few minutes, we gathered the staff, threw files and notepads into our bags, and prepared to evacuate the floor. It began to fill with grainy smoke.

We forwarded the office phones to the Port Authority's Central Police Desk in Jersey City, so the media could leave messages while we escaped. Ana Abelians, a member of our staff, said two media calls were holding. I replied, "You get one, I'll get the other one, we'll get rid of them and get the hell out of here."

I picked up the pone. "Greg Trevor here."

"Hi, I'm with NBC national news. If you could hold on for about 5 minutes, we're going to put you on for a live phone interview."

"I'm sorry, I can't. We're evacuating the building."

"But this will only take a minute."

"I'm sorry, you don't understand. We're leaving the building right now."

He seemed stunned. "But but, this is NBC NATIONAL news." (Apparently, I don't have to risk by life for the local NBC affiliate, but no sacrifice is too great for the NATIONAL news.)

I said "I'm sorry" once more, then hung up.

For more than an hour, we joined thousands of fellow World Trade Center workers who patiently descended the emergency stairwells.

I wasn't scared at first. My initial feelings were disorientation and disbelief. When we entered the stairwell, all we knew was that a plane had struck the building. It didn't make sense. (How could a plane hit a 110-story building on such a clear day?) Because we were in the stairwell, we didn't feel the impact of the second plane hitting Two World Trade Center.

I tried to call my wife, Allison, several times by cell phone, but couldn't get through. Fortunately, I reached my colleague, Pasquale DiFulco, through my interactive pager.

Pasquale, who began the day on vacation and was watching CNN, called Allison to let her know I was safe. He also used his pager to tell us what was really going on.

> 9:32 a.m. page from Pasquale: AA 676 from Boston crashed into 1wtc. FBI reporting plane was hijacked moments before crash saw second plane crash live on CNN into 2 wtc. Bush just made announcement possible terrorist attack.
>
> 9:36 a.m.: At least 1,000 injuries—CNN

9:41 a.m.: Fire at the Pentagon

9:43 a.m. page to Pasquale: Oh Christ

9:43 a.m. page from Pasquale: Pentagon and White House being evacuated

9:46 a.m.: Fire on mall in Washington

9:49 a.m.: FAA closes all flights nationwide

9:52 a.m.: Plane hit Pentagon

9:54 a.m.: Capitol treasury also evacuated

Despite this news, our long walk in search of safety remained calm and orderly. We had conducted regular fire drills, so we knew what to do. Every few floors, we would stop, move to the right of the stairwell and make room for injured people walking down—and firefighters and Port Authority officers running up.

Then we reached the fifth floor just before 10 a.m.

We heard a loud rumble. The building shook violently. I was thrown from one side of the stairwell to the other.

We didn't know it at the time, but Tower Two had just collapsed.

Our stairwell filled with smoke and concrete dust. Breathing became difficult. The lights died. A steady stream of water, about 4 inches deep, began running down the stairs. It felt like we were wading through a dark, dirty, rapid river—at night in the middle of a forest fire.

The smartest decision I made that day was to wear a knit tie to work. I put the blue tie over my nose and mouth to block the smoke and dust. To keep from hyperventilating, I remembered the breathing exercises my wife and I learned in our Lamaze classes.

Someone yelled that we should put our right hand on the shoulder of the person in front of us and keep walking down. We descended one more flight, to the fourth floor, when I heard someone say: "Oh shit, the door's blocked."

The force from the collapse of Tower Two had apparently jammed the emergency exit. We were ordered to turn around and head back up the stairs, to see if we could transfer to another stairwell.

Now we were wading against the current of that dark, dirty river. Others were still trying to walk down. People were starting to panic.

For the first time, I was afraid we wouldn't make it. I whispered a quick prayer: "Lord, please let me see my family again."

Then I closed my eyes, and made mental pictures of my family's faces: Allison's beautiful brown eyes; our 5-year-old son Gabriel's deep blue eyes and dimples; our 2-year-old son Lucas' blond ringlets.

I remember thinking: Their faces will keep me calm. And if I die, they will be the last thing on my mind.

During this ordeal, Pasquale sent me a series of frantic pages that didn't go through.

10 a.m. page from Pasquale: Please tell my I r OK Please respond. Another explosion at wtc

10:02 a.m.: Part of 2 wtc has collapsed. Is everyone ok?

10:06 a.m.: Please respond

10:12 a.m.: Where are you? 2 wtc just collapsed?

I don't know how many minutes it took for emergency workers to clear the exit. But when they did, thank God that Port Authority Police Officer David Lim was there.

David is a K-9 officer whose partner, Sirius, was killed in the attacks. He was later trapped in the rubble for nearly five hours. David had the presence of mind to figure out a way to get us all turned around and headed back downstairs. Over and over, he shouted: "Down is good! Down is good!"

When I heard that, I shouted "Down is good!" up the stairwell. Like an echo, I heard others shout "Down is good!" up the line.

Now we darted down the stairs as quickly as possible.

The emergency exit led to the mezzanine level of Tower One. We walked several hundred feet to a glass door that led outside.

The mezzanine was filled with dull-beige concrete dust—on the floor, in the air, caked against the floor-to-ceiling windows. It felt like we were walking through a huge, dirty snow globe that had just been shaken.

It was even worse when we walked outside, near Six World Trade Center. The plaza was a minefield of twisted metal, covered by a layer of concrete dust several inches thick. I am grateful for that dust, because it means I didn't see any bodies.

As we were leaving the building, my pager buzzed with a message from Al Frank, a reporter with the Newark Star-Ledger who has covered the Port Authority for years.

10:17 a.m. page from Al Frank: Are you okay?

I replied a minute later, as we were walking along the outside of Six World Trade: We're out of the building. Everyone is fine.

Relieved but fatigued, we sprinted down the stairs between Six and Five World Trade, then turned up Church Street and headed north.

I looked back at the Trade Center. The upper third of Tower One was on fire. There was so much smoke and dust, I couldn't tell that Tower Two had collapsed.

At 10:24 a.m., I received a page from Kayla, my boss, who was walking about half a block behind me: Where shall we go?

I walked back to her and said we should go to the entrance of the Holland Tunnel, because I knew Port Authority Police officers would be there.

We continued walking north toward the Holland. A few minutes later, we heard an NYPD officer shout: "Run for your lives!"

We ran north for several blocks. We felt a deafening rumble, followed by a thick cloud of black smoke and brown dust.

When we finally outraced the cloud, we had almost reached the Holland Tunnel. I was standing next to coworker, John Toth, who was limping with a bloody knee.

"John, are you all right?"

"They're gone, Greg."

"Who's gone, Jon?"

"Not who. Both towers, they're gone."

I didn't believe him. Then I looked back to where the Twin Towers should have been.

All I saw was smoke and sky. One World Trade Center had stayed up for more than 1 hour and 40 minutes after the first attack, enabling thousands of us to escape.

We walked the remaining blocks to the mouth of the Holland Tunnel. Military jets flew overhead.

Our clothes, hair and faces still covered with dust, we crammed into Port Authority Police cars, which took us to our temporary offices in Jersey City.

About an hour later, I wrote the first draft of our first statement after the attacks on the only form of communication I had left—my interactive pager.

Our hearts and our prayers go out to the families of the countless people—including many members of the Port Authority family—who were killed today in this brutal and cowardly attack. All PA facilities are closed until further notice. We at the PA are going everything within out power to assist the families of the victims, and to co-operate with federal, state and local authorities to capture the perpetrators of this attack and bring them to justice.

My personal recovery has been steady in the months that have followed the attacks on the World Trade Center.

Our department worked out of Jersey City for more than two months—at first, in rotating 12-hour shifts. As we mourn the loss of 75 friends and colleagues, we have answered the deluge of questions from media around the world—about security, the recovery and our own experiences.

I returned to Ground Zero for days after the attacks. The experience was unnerving and humbling—not because of what's there, but what used to be there. I looked up at the hole in the sky where our offices used to be, and thought about how easily we could have been trapped up there.

I often feel waves of sadness, thinking about the loss and the suffering.

I think about the 37 Port Authority Police officers and commanders who died helping others escape—particularly Captain Kathy Mazza, the first woman Commandant of the Port Authority Police Academy.

She led a group of Police Academy instructors into Tower One a few minutes after the first attack. Most of them didn't make it out. Kathy, a former operating room nurse and one of the finest people I've ever known, was the first female Port Authority Police officer in the department's 73-year history to be killed in the line of duty.

Sometimes when I'm walking down a street, I stop, lean back my head, take a deep breath of clean air—and remember those frightful minutes when we were denied this pleasure.

Cigarette smoke bothers me a lot, but food tastes much better.

My thighs ached for four days from the stairwell evacuation. My wife says my skin was dull gray for the first two days.

In mid-December, I was in bed for a week with pneumonia—a condition caused in part by the stress and exhaustion from September 11 and its aftermath.

Although my children don't fully understand what happened, they want to cuddle more.

Therapy has been very helpful. It has shown me that I am at the beginning of a very long journey. Some days I make a lot of progress; other days I stand still.

My goal is to get as far down the road as possible. But no matter how far I go, I know that there's no way I'll get back to Sept. 10.

I've saved my tie—still caked in smoke and dust—in a sealed bag. I've also saved my dust-covered shoes.

Source: Mitchell Fink and Lois Mathias (eds.), *Never Forget: An Oral History of September 11, 2001* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002): Joseph Pfeifer, pp. 17–22; Robert Leder, pp. 51–53; Bernard B. Kerik, pp. 109–113. Source for Martin Glynn testimony is http://www.moirasmith.com/. Source for Greg Trevor testimony is http://www.coping.org/911/survivor/race.htm/. Oral testimonies and tribute by Martin Glynn used by permission. Greg Trevor and his wife Allison Salerno Trevor can be reached at allisonsalerno@verizon.net.

Document 15

Pentagon Attack

The attack on the Pentagon has received much less attention than that on the World Trade Center, or than United Airlines Flight 93, but it was still a major attack. Casualties were high, with many of the survivors suffering bad burns. Lieutenant Colonel Ted Anderson's account gives an idea of what happened on September 11 at the Pentagon.

Ted Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Legislative Liaison Officer to the U.S. Congress in the Pentagon

My portfolio deals with current operations for the army worldwide. So I go in extremely early, between 4 and 5 A.M., in order to read overnight cable traffic from Europe and destinations beyond. From there, I try to get in a little physical training and then begin the normal duty day with everybody else.

We had a morning meeting scheduled at 7:45, which I attended. I picked up a cup of coffee on the way back, chitchatted with a few folks, and made it back into the office. Then I noticed that all of my colleagues were huddled near an overhead television. Probably four or five lieutenant colonels and three civilian secretaries and everybody seemed extremely quiet. We're usually a pretty rambunctious group of folks. Some of the ladies were crying. I had no idea what had happened. And then I stared at the TV, and it showed the towers, both burning. Then the clip came on showing the replay of the second airplane striking tower 2. Two of the aviators in our office said, "Well, that's it. There's all the proof you need right there. That's no accident." And I knew he was right. And immediately I knew that this was some kind of state-sponsored terrorism. Renegade terrorists cannot conduct a coordinated attack that successfully.

I walked back to my cubicle and sat down. I pulled up my e-mail and then all of a sudden I just got this real eerie feeling. I don't know, call it nineteen years in the army, combat experience, deployments worldwide, constant level of preparedness. So I immediately got up from my cubicle and walked out the mall entrance to the

guard location, where the defense protective services folks are at. I knew the guys on duty. I asked them if they were aware of what had occurred in New York. They were just getting some of the details. And I stated, "Hey, look, guys, we need to upgrade security here. Has anybody given any thought of upgrading the threat level."

And he said, "Sir, I'm sure that they're talking about that now. Let me radio in." So he called in and found out that sergeants and the officers at the headquarters location were in a meeting talking about what upgraded security precautions they should take. So I felt a little bit better. I mean, we had talked about what a tremendous target the Pentagon was and how vulnerable we were, previously.

I walked back to my office, sat down, and pulled up some more of the e-mail and started corresponding with the daily activity across the Potomac on the Hill, and my phone rang. It was my wife, who lives in Fayetteville, North Carolina. My wife is a sixth-grade schoolteacher at Stedman Middle School, and she was in class with her students and they had the TV on and were watching the activity live and discussing what was going on. And my wife said, "Hey, I know somebody in Washington. Let's call him and we'll get an instant update as to what's going on and what they think in Washington."

So we talked briefly, and she was relaying information to her students as I was describing it to her. I told her that we could only assume at this point that it was some sort of coordinated attack. But I also told her to make sure that her students understood that we should not jump to conclusions and point fingers at anyone, because we had done that in the Oklahoma tragedy and we were extremely embarrassed that we had alienated the entire Arab community. I could hear her explaining that to her students, all about the Oklahoma bombing, when the plane hit the Pentagon. It was a loud roar, and I mean the building literally shook. And there was a sucking sound, which I believe was the oxygen escaping as the jet fuel poured into the corridors right down the hall from us and ignited, taking all the oxygen out of the air.

Our ceiling caved in. The lights went out, but the phone was still working, I was still on with my wife. I was a little stunned, just for an initial second, and then I said, "Listen, we have been bombed. I have to go." And I hung up the phone. I didn't even wait for a response.

I didn't know at first that it was a plane. I initially assumed for about the first two minutes that a bomb had been left somewhere in the building, and the bomb went off.

I screamed for everybody in the office to get out. I got up and moved, and that was the last time I was ever in that cubicle. We lost everything: twenty years of medical records, everything on my hard drive, personal files, my Class A uniform, everything.

I moved out into the hallway out the back door and went into the main corridor between corridors 4 and 5. The plane actually hit between corridors 2 and 3. I positioned myself in the main corridor and was looking up and down the corridor to see if I could see smoke or fire or anything. And I noticed people just meandering out of their offices, looking around, having basic discussions, and I just started barking orders to get out of the building. Now here I am, dressed for legislative business with Congress. I've got on a nice suit with a striped shirt, tie, and suspenders And I am screaming at full-bird colonels and general officers to move out of the building, just barking orders, screaming. And they listened to me. They

all started moving and they tried to get out of the mall entrance but the guards had mistakenly thought that they were under attack from the outside of the building. So they secured that entrance. They had taken out most of their small arms, machine guns, etc., and brought them all out. It looked like they were preparing to defend the doors there. So I started moving people toward the center of the Pentagon. This all took place within two minutes.

The Pentagon is structured by a series of rings. The center of the Pentagon is the A-ring, and then it goes out in rings B, C, D, and E. The E-ring is the last ring around the building. It is basically the wall, the last corridor before you exit the building. So I'm at the E-ring and I kick open a fire exit and scream for people to follow me out that way. I motion for them to move off to the northeast, toward north parking. We have two parking lots, north parking and south parking. I think you've got enough for about fifty thousand parking spaces on each side. I turned to my left and I saw a field of scattered debris. It was all gray and metallic. Everybody was moving to my right, and I turned to my left and ran toward the debris. There's nobody with me except Chris Braman, a noncommissioned office, an NCO, and he is in civilian clothes. He's a cook for the chief of staff of the army, and he was wearing black pants and a polo shirt with his emblem on it.

As we get to the debris field, I know that it's an airplane because of the chunks of charred steel. I'm running at full speed and I'm seeing the billowing smoke and the flames from around the helipad area of the Pentagon. I'm not paying attention to what I'm doing and I fell right into huge pieces of the aircraft and trip over it. I picked myself up and ran directly toward the fire, and at this point I notice that there are two fire trucks on that side which are maintained at the helipad area. It's basically the fire department at the Pentagon. One truck is parked outside and a truck is parked inside the garage. The outside truck was completely engulfed in flames from taking part of the impact of the airplane. The other truck was protected. It was inside the garage and there were three firefighters on duty, two of which I knew, and they pulled the truck out of the garage and were beginning to turn the water cannon on top of the truck. They were the only people out there. I didn't see anybody else.

I got as close to the building as I could, trying to find a door that we could get into. We found two women out on the ground next to the building. Initially, I thought that they had been blown out of their offices, or they had just jumped, but I found out later that they had been thrown out by people who were rescuing folks inside the building.

One woman was conscious. The other was unconscious. I picked up the conscious lady. She had a broken hip and was in horrible, horrible pain. She had flash burns as well. Both ladies had been terribly flash-burned. We were pretty close to the fire now. The fire was bearing down on us. The heat was horrendous. I made sure she understood that I was there, and that we were going to pull her out of there and move her away from the building. I told her it was going to hurt, and I picked her up and threw her on my back. She screamed in pain. I ran her about four hundred yards to the other side of the helipad and laid her down.

The NCO carried the other lady and followed me. We laid them there and other people came up to render aid to them.

Chris and I ran back to the building. We found a window that was pretty well blasted out and we tore the remaining shards of glass along the bottom out and

gained entry. Inside we just screamed for people to come toward our voices. We couldn't see anything. The smoke was billowing and it was hard to breathe.

I got on the floor and I felt my way down the wall and I felt a body right in front of the door. It was a woman, extremely heavyset. She was conscious. She was bleeding from the ears and the mouth and she was definitely in shock. She was pinned against a wall by a huge safe. It was a six-drawer safe that had fallen and it was wedged up against her. We were either going to leave her there and let her burn, or we were going to waste some serious time getting her out of there. We had no choice. We had to go ahead and try to get her out. It seemed like forever, but we were finally able to pull her free. We weren't able to lift her. We had to drag her from the building.

Chris and I went back into the building and this time we were trying to figure out what we were going to do. We wanted to crawl from the outside door to the E-ring corridor. As we were trying to get out bearings, some type of fuel outside next to the fire department area blew up. A propane storage tank, I think. And when this thing blew up, it knocked us both down inside that office that we were in. When I pulled myself up, the whole time trying to shield my face with my elbow, I noticed this bright flash that went by me. I thought it was the ceiling caving in. And I heard Chris scream, "Help me." It was a person on fire, trying to get out of the building. Chris knocked him down and I jumped on top of him. We smothered the fire on this guy. He wasn't totally engulfed in flames, just the front part of this guy, from his head down to his lower torso including his legs. We rolled him on the ground and he was screaming, fully conscious, and we picked him up immediately and just carried him out. We got him as far away from the building as we could and gently laid him down. He was burned, horribly, horribly burned from the top of his head all the way to the bottom of his feet. He had no color in his eyes. It was all white.

There are three things that I remember from that day more than anything else. That is one of them. I could see it was a civilian because he had a suit on. You could see that he had a white shirt on, but the whole front of everything had been burnt away. The back of his collar was still affixed, the belt to his pants was still affixed and melted into the side of his body. Everything else was just charred black down the front.

Now this guy is screaming and we were finally able to figure out that he was saying something. He was yelling, "There are people behind me, in the corridor. You have to get the people in the corridor out." He was just screaming this over and over again.

Chris and I looked around and we noticed that more firemen were showing up. Arlington County Fire Department was there, along with Fairfax County Fire Department and Washington, D.C., Fire Department. We ran back toward the same door and all we needed to do now was negotiate this twenty-five feet to that E-ring corridor, and we'll get to the people in that corridor. If we could just get to them, we can lead them back out.

We were getting ready to make entry again, and the firemen stopped us. We had a little confrontation there, I must tell you. I've been instructed by the army to not explain what really happened there, but it was a very lively conversation. I grabbed one of the firefighters and basically told him, "Look, I know you're doing your job, and I know you have our best interests at heart, but here's the bottom

line. You have two choices, you can either stay out here, or you can go in with us, and that's basically all I want to talk about. We're wasting time."

Other firemen showed up and they physically restrained us and pulled us away from the building. I am completely and totally out of my mind at this point, reverting to full combat mode. So did Chris. He had been in the Ranger regiment. He fought in Mogadishu. And as far as I was concerned, this was a combat situation. You've got all the horrors of combat. You've got the smells, the sounds of agony and despair. You've got everything there, all of the elements of combat except for the actual lead that's flying through the air. Nobody's shooting at you.

Still, it's an unwritten code that we live by. If you saw *Black Hawk Down*, you know we don't leave anyone behind. I knew there were people inside the building, as did Chris, and it didn't matter that they were civilians. It didn't matter that they were contractors or vendors. We were all one team, one fight. I consider the civilians for the Department of Defense just as important, if not more important then the military folks. The DOD civilians basically run the army and the Pentagon. I knew there were wounded in there and we needed to go in and get them. You can't leave your wounded behind, period. But I was restrained and pulled back.

A three-star general showed up, along with a couple other generals, and I explained to them what was going on. This three-star general basically felt the same way I did, and he went to the on-site fire commander and said, "Look, I will take full responsibility. We're going to mount a rescue effort. We've got two guys here that have already been inside. They will lead our rescue effort, but we need to make an attempt to go in and get our people out." He was overruled by the fire captain.

I have since come to know that the fire captain was correct. I am now certain that they saved my life, and I'm certain they saved Chris's life, as well. My whole outlook on the American firefighter changed that day. I've become Mr. Fan of the Fire Department. Those guys were the real heroes of the day for me. I have talked to firemen who later went into that area and there was no way out. That last burned guy we brought out was the last person of the building alive on the exterior side of the Pentagon. He is alive. The two ladies we brought out both lived. The heavyset woman, unfortunately, died.

Later that afternoon I was able to call and relay a message to my wife that I was okay. The firemen were fully involved in fighting the fire now. They were inside the structure and they were totally involved. I just sat and watched. I was in awe of them the whole afternoon. As darkness fell, the 3rd Infantry Regiment across the river, the old-guard soldiers, showed up in mass, about 250 soldiers, and they relieved us. Basically we were told to go home. "Thanks, you guys did a great job, but the infantry's here to take over."

I remember laying down outside along with a buddy of mine from the same office and we were trying to figure out how we were going to get home. Of course, we didn't bring anything out of the building with us. Everything was inside, including my car keys. Our cars were in the north parking lot and that part of the lot was now a crime scene because part of the aircraft had fallen there, so it was roped off. So we're trying to figure out where the closest metro is. The Pentagon metro site was closed down, so we needed to walk over to Crystal City, which was probably a ten-minute walk at most. So we started strolling off, two

well-dressed guys who looked like they had fallen off the turnip truck and dragged through an onion field. We were caked in soot and blood, and it was just nasty looking. I mean, we looked like hell. So we walked over to Crystal City and walked down the metro station, which was running free. The gates were open. We got on a train headed toward Springfield, Virginia, and people looked at us in disbelief. But nobody said anything to us. We looked like bomb victims. And one of the other things that I remember—the first was about that guy's eyes—the second thing is that nobody spoke on the train. It was total silence. Everybody was in shock. Even couples that were together, nobody was talking. They just stared out of the train, stared at each other in just total disbelief.

I got off at my stop and had to walk about four blocks to my house. I didn't have my keys with me, so I had to ask the manager of the building to let me in. He tried to let me in, but his key didn't work so he had to pull the lock off. I was exhausted, I went out and laid down in the grass and went to sleep. The maintenance guy had to come and find me. When I got in, I took a forty-minute shower, cried for thirty minutes, and then spent the rest of the night trying to answer about fifty voice mails. The phone just kept ringing all night. People called from Bulgaria, from Puerto Rico, from Colombia, all over the United States. Finally, you can only tell the story so many times. It physically wears you out. At about eleven o'clock, I had had it and I went to sleep. I slept for a couple of hours and then woke up, you know, and thought it was all a bad dream. I popped on the news, and, of course, I couldn't get away from the story. This was about two in the morning and I just decided to get up and go to work. I put on my battle dress uniform, my fatigues and my boots. I grabbed gear figuring that I'm going to be at work for a while. I got in a car and drove up the 595. And as soon as I turned onto 595, I could see the glow, the orange glow in the distance. As I got closer to it, the glow got brighter. Coming over the break in the horizon you could see that the building was on fire. The ceiling portion of the Pentagon was burning, and it was out of control. I remember very distinctly at about three-ten in the morning, parking my car and seeing this building on fire and people going into work. And that's the last of the three things I'll always remember about that day: Ten thousand people showed up to work at the Pentagon that morning and the building was still on fire. It just made me extremely proud of what I was doing and where I was working to know that a building can be burning out of control and still ten thousand people came to work because they knew number one, we were probably going to be at war, and number two, that there were still dead people in the building who needed to be brought out and identified.

Source: Mitchell Fink and Louis Mathias (eds.), *Never Forget: An Oral History of September 11, 2001* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002): Ted Anderson, pp. 145–151. Oral testimony used by permission.

Document 16

United Airlines Flight 93

Of all the events on September 11, the hijacking of United Airlines Flight 93 was the most dramatic because of the heroic reaction of its passengers. Realizing that the hijackers were on a suicide mission, the passengers attempted to regain control of the aircraft. The fact that they failed to save their own lives does not diminish their effort. Here is the account of Tom Burnett's role in the effort to regain control of the airliner.

Deena Burnett, Wife of Tom Burnett, Passenger on United Airline Flight 93

Tom was in New York for a business meeting. I did not talk to him on the tenth. Normally, he called at least once a day unless he was terribly busy, and he did call on the tenth, but I was out. He left a message on the answering machine and for whatever reason he did not call my cell phone. I took it to mean that he was very busy. It was very unusual not to talk to him.

On the morning of September 11, I was awakened by the three children running into my room, as normal for most mornings. They came in a little before six [Pacific time] and I immediately got up and out of bed. It was Anna Clare's first day of preschool, so we were very excited about getting downstairs and getting breakfast over and being on time. Anna Clare and our two five-year-old twins, Halley and Madison, told me what they wanted for breakfast. I turned on the television. Our kitchen and family room are connected and you can easily see the television. I normally turn it on to check the weather so I can see how to dress the children.

I noticed that on every station there was a news report about the World Trade Center, and as I turned it back to channel 7, ABC News, they showed an airplane flying through one of the towers. I thought, my goodness, air traffic control must be terribly messed up. They're sending airplanes into the towers by accident.

The phone rang, and it was my mom, who said, "Deena, have you seen the television? They're saying this is an American Airlines flight that's gone into the towers, Tom's in New York, isn't he?"

I said, "Yes, he is, but don't worry, Mom, that's not his plane. He wouldn't be on American. He'd be flying United or Delta."

She said, "Well, do you know what time he was leaving?"

And I said, "No, but it should have been fairly early in the morning. He said he'd be home by noon." I could tell by her voice that she was concerned, and I reassured her: "Mom, don't worry. Planes crash all the time and Tom's never on them. Of all the thousands of planes in the sky, the likelihood of that being Tom's is just very slim. It can't possibly be his." She said, "Okay, I'll stop worrying," and she hung up.

I turned the news up again. The more I watched and listened, the more concerned I became. I kept trying to do the math in my mind: if he's coming in at noon and there's a three-hour time difference and it's a five-hour flight, what time would he have taken off and which airport would he have taken off from?

And then I thought, okay, I can call his cell phone. I tried to remember if he had an itinerary. Normally he would have left one with me, but it was such a short trip that he did not leave one. I thought about called his secretary, Kim, and realized it was too early to call, that she wouldn't be in at the office. I couldn't find her home phone number and didn't want to wake her anyway. And then I thought about calling his mom. Maybe she would know what time he was leaving and what flight he was on. And while I was trying to decide whether or not I should worry her, the phone rang again and it was Tom's mother. I made breakfast for the children while I was on the phone with her. And her first question was "Do you know where Tom is?"

I said, "No, I don't. I was hoping you would know." And while we were trying to provide each other with information and figure out the situation, the phone rang in on call-waiting, and I said, "Oh, let me go. That may be him."

And so I clicked over, and I looked at the phone and I saw on the caller ID that it was Tom's cell phone. I was relieved, thinking that if he was on his cell phone, he was in the airport somewhere and was fine. I brought the phone back to my mouth and ear and said, "Tom, are you okay?"

And he said, "No, I'm not. I'm on an airplane that's been hijacked. It's United Flight 93." And he told me what was going on. "They're already knifed a guy. I think one of them has a gun." I started asking questions, and he said, "Deena, just listen." He went over the information again and said, "Please call the authorities," and he hung up.

I just felt a jolt of terror run through my whole body. It was as if I'd been struck by lightning. I couldn't believe how I felt. I started reaching for the phone book, and for papers, going back and forth in the kitchen, pacing up and down the counter, trying to figure out who to call. I didn't know what I was looking for. Then I thought, 911. I have to call 911. Maybe they can tell me who I need to call for a hijacking. I dialed their number, and while the phone was ringing I thought, they're going to think I am nuts. What can I say to them to make them believe me?

A woman answered 911. She asked, "Is this an emergency?"

And I said, "Well, yes. I don't know. Yes. My husband is on a pane that's been hijacked. He called me from the airplane and told me that they have guns on board the plane."

And she started repeating me. "Your husband's on a plane that's been hijacked?" I said yes, and she said, "Okay, let me transfer you." She transferred me to another lady, I believe a supervisor, who eventually transferred me to a man at the FBI. And he transferred me to a special agent. As I was explaining the situation and Tom's phone call, the phone rang in again on call-waiting, and I said, "I have to go."

He said, "Call me back if it's him," and I wrote his number down quickly.

And I clicked over and it was Tom again, and the first thing he said was, "They're in the cockpit." And I told him about the World Trade Center. He hadn't known about it yet. As soon as I told him, he relayed that information to the people sitting around him.

And he said, "Oh, my God, it's a suicide mission." And he started asking questions: "Who's involved? Was it a commercial airplane? What airline was it? Do you know how many airplanes are involved?" He was really pumping me for information about what was going on, anything that I knew. And he was relaying my answers to people sitting around him. Then he told me he had to go and he hung up.

I started calling United to find out what kind of plane he was on and they told me it was a 757. And of course, they didn't know anything about the hijacking.

I was sitting in a chair. I had fed the girls their breakfast. They were sitting on the sofa watching an airplane fly into the World Trade Center and saying, "Mom is that Dad's plane?" And I said no. Because when he first called, they had gathered around me and they wanted to talk to him, and I said that he would talk them later. They seemed to be fine with that. I just reassured them that Dad was fine and they shouldn't worry about him.

And then a news reporter came on saying that the Pentagon had been hit, and I started wailing. I mean, really wailing, making a noise that I did not know I could make, thinking that it was Tom's plane that had hit the Pentagon. I began to tremble. The girls were watching me and they started laughing. I had made a strange noise, not a crying noise but a sound of sorrow and grief and pain.

And when they saw the tears fall down my face and that I wasn't laughing, that I wasn't playing with them, they began to get concerned, and they ran over to me, and they started crying. I realized at that point that I needed to get control of myself, that I was alarming the children. And so I tried to contain myself.

The phone rang again and it was Tom and he said, "Deena."

I said, "Tom, you're okay," thinking that he had survived the plane crash. He said no. And I said, "They just hit the Pentagon." And I knew that he was assessing the situation and trying to figure out how to solve the problem that they were in.

He repeated the same questions: "Who's involved? How many planes are involved? Which airlines?" And he told the people around him that a plane had just hit the Pentagon, and I could hear people talking and spreading the news in the background and I could hear their concern and I could hear people gasping as if they were surprised and shocked. Tom came back on the phone and said, "I'm putting a plan together. We're going to take back the airplane."

I asked, "Who's helping you?"

He said, "Different people, several people. There's a group of us. Don't worry. We're going to do something." Then he said, "I'm going to call you back," and

he hung up. And then he called back about five minutes till seven. I didn't even say hello. I just said, "Tom."

He asked, "Is there anything new?" I said no. He was very quiet this time, very calm. He had been very calm and collected through the other conversations, but he was very solemn in this conversation, and I couldn't hear anything in the background. I could hear the roar of the engines and I could tell that he was sitting in a seat and very still and not walking around like he had been. He asked, "Where are the kids?"

I said, "They're fine. They're sitting at the table. They're asking to talk to you."

He said, "Tell them I'll talk to them later."

"I called your parents. They know about your plane being hijacked," I told him.

He scolded me: "You shouldn't have worried them. How are they doing?"

"They're okay. They're with Mary and Martha."

"Good." It was just silent, and I could feel my heart racing. Tom said, "We're waiting until we're over a rural area. We're going to take back the airplane."

I became very frightened and I begged, "No, no, Tom. Just sit down, be still, be quiet, and don't draw attention to yourself."

He said, "No, Deena. If they're going to crash this plane into the ground, we're going to have to do something."

I asked, "What about the authorities?"

He said, "We can't wait for the authorities. I don't know what they can do anyway. It's up to us." He said, "I think we can do it." And neither of us said anything for a few seconds.

Then I said, "What do you want me to do? What can I do?"

"Pray, Deena, just pray."

"I am praying. I love you."

Tom said, "Don't worry. We're going to do something," then he hung up. And he never called back.

I kept waiting. I held onto the telephone for almost three hours waiting for him to call back to tell me that he had landed the plane and that everything was fine and that he would be home later. I started thinking about what I could cook for dinner. I was thinking about sending the kids to school, and who could come pick them up, because I didn't want to miss his phone call when he called. I thought about calling his parents to tell them that everything was fine, that Tom was in control, but I was afraid I would miss his call if I called anyone. So I just sat there.

A policeman showed up around the third or fourth phone call to sit with me. A neighbor who had seen the police car came over to see if the children were okay. Tom's sister, Mary, called from her cell phone, and I told her about the hijacking. Their other sister Martha and she went over to their parents' house, and called me to let me know that they were there. So there were actually many telephone calls coming in that morning, between his phone calls. Police officers and FBI agents called on the phone to ask if I had talked to Tom again. I updated them briefly, so I wouldn't tie up my telephone.

By the time his fourth phone call came, firemen had shown up on the front lawn. The children went in and out of the house, looking at all the police cars and fire trucks. I dressed them for school while still holding onto the telephone.

At about ten o'clock I realized that I had been running around the house all morning in my pajamas. I had Tom's old blue robe on. I had not showered or

anything. I had not heard from Tom for about three hours, and I just thought I really needed to get dressed. So I went upstairs. I had the telephone with me. And it was really the first time I had released it. I put it. I put it on the ledge by the shower so that in the event I didn't hear it, I could see it ring. I never took my eyes off the telephone while I was showering. It was a very fast shower. I got dressed, and I went downstairs. The policeman was standing at the bottom, and I could tell by the look on his face that something was wrong. I asked him what was wrong, and he said, "I think I have bad news for you."

I remember turning toward the television and seeing that there had been another plane crash. And I ran over to the TV and I asked, "Is that Tom's plane?"

And he said, "Yes, it's Flight 93." I just felt my knees buckle and he pretty much carried me over to the sofa. I was so weak I couldn't even feel the ground beneath me. And I just started crying. It felt as though the tears were coming from the depths of my heart. I was just incredibly, incredibly sad. And I felt so alone. I've never felt such emptiness as I experienced those few moments.

I handed the policeman the telephone. But I kept thinking, people can survive a plane crash. And if he survived, he's going to call. But I looked down and I noticed that the phone battery was dead. The policeman hung it back up on the charger.

It was very difficult. All I wanted to do was go to church. I knew that my children were fine. They had gone off to school, and the principal had called to let me know that the kids were okay and that they did not know about the airplane yet. Several parents were picking up their children from school that day, but I decided to let mine stay in school. I thought that being there was better than being at home and seeing me fall apart. I felt like I needed some to decide how to handle the emotions. And so I went to church. The policeman took me to church, and by the time I left, I knew that the media was looking for me. I went out the back door. The media was already there, questioning the priest who had been brought in earlier that day. I went home. The policeman who had been staying with me all day told me that I needed to brace myself because they were going to find out who I was and where I lived, and I needed to be ready for the onslaught of the media.

I remember being incredibly frightened about speaking to the press. I didn't know what to say. I didn't know what to do. But by six that evening, they had found our house and began knocking on the door and asking to come in or have me come out. And I spent the evening just crying and being with friends and having neighbors come in and out and having family call me on my cell phone to offer their condolences.

And so the next day, I decided that I would face the media, hoping that if I did interviews for one day, they'd leave us alone and we could go on with our lives. They came in droves, packs and packs of news reporters, and many as could fit in my living room. And I remember them saying that my husband was being touted as a hero. It made me laugh to think about Tom's reaction to being called a hero.

They asked me why I was laughing, and I said, "If you knew my husband, you would know that he would laugh at being called a hero. He would tell you that all he was trying to do was get home to his family." He realized the danger of the situation he was in, and he assessed the situation and tried to solve the problem based on the fact that he was a good man and knew right from wrong. He knew it was the right thing to do, not because he was trying to be a hero.

I found that having people call him a hero was a very difficult balance, maybe even an impossible balance. There was incredible pride on my part for his actions on Flight 93. And yet, there was the incredible pain of this loss that we suffered and the fact that my children no longer had a father, and that their father had been cut so short of being able to accomplish what he had planned to in life. I think we will struggle with the balance of the loss versus the pride.

Source: Mitchell Fink and Louis Mathias (eds.), *Never Forget: An Oral History of September 11, 2001* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002): Deena Burnett, pp. 190–196. Oral testimony used by permission.

Document 17

Dog Handlers at Ground Zero

Finding survivors in the wreckage of the World Trade Center was a daunting task. Dog teams were indispensable to that effort. As days passed, the searchers could only hope to find bodies and body parts so that the victims could be identified and their families could have closure. The dog teams were even more critical to these later efforts. It was hard on the dogs, but they performed admirably.

Mark Dawson, Canine Handler for FEMA at Ground Zero

I'm a paid firefighter and a canine handler for Massachusetts Task Force 1, which is part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency program, FEMA. We are one of twenty-eight teams in the country.

We arrived in New York City at 10 P.M. on 9/11. We went down to the site on Church Street for a review of the area we were going to search. We gathered information and split up into two groups, a day shift and a night shift. I worked the night shift for the next eight days.

There were still some large fires burning in the crater area on the night of the attacks. First I went to the edge of the rubble at building 2 with my dog, Elvis, who is a six-year-old black Lab, an advanced, certified dog in the FEMA program. I was taken aback by the devastation and I wondered whether we could work effectively in the pile. Elvis worked extremely well through a lot of hazardous areas. There were large void spaces under the surface of the rubble. We were able to climb down into them on ladders. We also lowered the dogs with rope harnesses down into void spaces that we weren't able to climb to, or that ladders couldn't reach. We got to one elevator shaft area the first night. We heard a pass alarm, which is the device firefighters use in an emergency situation, so they can be located. But in this case, there was no one in the area. It was just the device.

After that, we went to another area, about five stories down. There were streams of water and an out-of-control fire. Sometimes we were pulled out of areas because of the possible collapse of several buildings. We did a search of the first

and basement floors of 4 World Trade Center and came up with no victims and no alerts in the area. Then we were asked to go down to an area where they thought they heard some pinging. We went a full story down into a large void area a store area. We did a search and came across a number of mannequins. Apparently, it was a Halloween shop and they were used to display things. Elvis was searching through that area and he showed some unusual behavior when he approached the mannequins. They looked like deceased bodies.

We then worked the rest of the mall area into the subway. We went into a Hallmark store, and it was pretty weird because the cards and everything were still on the shelves. There's all this destruction around you, and then there's this card shop where all the cards are perfectly placed in a row. It was pretty eerie. There were no indications of any survivors. In a lot of the shops it appeared like people had dropped everything and run out. Things were still in place. Back in the clerk's room, the money trays were still sitting on the desks.

We did a number of void searches on the second night, and again we came up with no live victims. Elvis is not a cadaver dog. Elvis is an air-scent dog. He has been exposed to cadaver work, but when he does hit a cadaver, his tail will go between his legs. He's usually very cautious, as if he's nervous of the area. We did have two indications of cadavers the third night, on the back side of the building 6. One was confirmed. We work with two dogs in the area. If a dog has an indication or an alert, we bring a second dog in to verify it. Then we bring the technical search people in with cameras and listening devices to pick up sight or sound of any trapped victims. Then the rescue guys follow to extricate the subject.

On the fourth night, or maybe the tail end of the third night, thunderstorms rolled through, and they did not allow us to go back on the pile because the metal was slippery. They were concerned with risk and safety issues. So we ended up doing building searches of the surrounding buildings. Elvis and I went to the Federal Building with a team out of Sacramento and searched the eighteen stories. We found some plane parts on the roof and systematically worked each floor after that. Again the scene was eerie. Usually when you do buildings searches, things aren't in place. But here we were finding offices with briefcases on the desks, Dunkin' Donuts coffee cups with only one or two sips gone, jackets and sport coats on the backs of doors and chairs.

We learned in Oklahoma that a dog's drive decreases over a period of several days when there is a lack of live finds. The cleanliness of the dogs is also important. Some of the dogs were depressed, and a bath would start to spark them up and drive them back to work again. Knowing these things, we positively rewarded our dogs for every act that they did. Whenever we came out of an area without finding anyone, we hid a rescuer, which would serve as a live victim for Elvis. That kept his drive and his spirits up.

What we did down there proved to be beneficial to the animals. As a FEMA team we're made up of a little bit of everybody: doctors, regular citizens, engineers, firefighters, police officers. And although we don't see the magnitude of what the firefighter see, we do deal with death on a daily basis.

Elvis's drive has not changed one bit. He still loves his job. If I tell him he's going to go search somewhere, he runs to the front door. There are so many things that we do with our animals to get them ready for days like September 11,

and since then I think we're even a little more alert too. As we go by buildings today, we think of possible search scenarios. It's part of the world right now. But you know, we can do the job if called upon again.

Source: Mitchell Fink and Louis Mathias (eds.), *Never Forget: An Oral History of September 11, 2001* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002): Mark Dawson, pp. 235–237. Oral testimony used by permission.

Document 18

President George W. Bush's Address to the Nation (September 11, 2001)

Americans were in a state of shock on September 11, 2001. The unthinkable had happened: a terrorist attack on the United States had killed over 3,000 Americans without any way to fight back. President Bush had been as startled as anybody else in the United States. In this speech, which he gave during the evening of September 11, 2001, he tried to reassure Americans that its government was going help in the recovery and deal with the terrorists.

Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes or in their offices: secretaries, businessmen and –women, military and federal workers, moms and dads, friends and neighbors.

Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror. The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness and a quiet, unyielding anger.

These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong. A great people has been moved to defend a great nation.

Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve.

America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.

Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature, and we responded with the best of America, with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could.

Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government's emergency response plans. Our military is powerful, and it's prepared. Our emergency

teams are working in New York City and Washington, D.C., to help with local rescue efforts.

Our first priority is to get help to those who have been injured and to take every precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks.

The functions of our government continue without interruption. Federal agencies in Washington which had to be evacuated today are reopening for essential personnel tonight and will be open for business tomorrow.

Our financial institutions remain strong, and the American economy will be open for business as well.

The search is under way for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources for our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.

I appreciate so very much the members of Congress who have joined me in strongly condemning these attacks. And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world leaders who have called to offer their condolences and assistance.

America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.

Tonight I ask for your prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I pray they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us spoken through the ages in Psalm 23: "Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil for you are with me."

This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time.

None of us will ever forget this day, yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.

Thank you. Good night and God bless America.

Source: Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin (eds.), *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 319–320.

Document 19

Interview with Mullah Omar Muhammad (September 21, 2001)

Mullah Omar (Umar) Muhammad was the head of the Taliban government of Afghanistan until the fall of 2001. He had gained power by winning battles with his Taliban soldiers. His government imposed a harsh brand of Islamic law. Muhammad had received Osama bin Laden with open arms even though bin Laden had already initiated attacks against the United States. Though he rarely met or talked to representatives of the world outside of Afghanistan, he gave an interview, which was broadcast on September 21, 2001 on Voice of America, in which he gave his reasons why he did not expel bin Laden after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States.

Question: Why don't you expel Usama bin Ladin?

Umar: This is not an issue of Usama bin Ladin. It is an issue of Islam. Islam's prestige is at stake. So is Afghanistan's tradition.

Question: Do you know that the United States has announced a war on terrorism?

Umar: I am considering two promises. One is the promise of God, the other is that of Bush. The promise of God is that my land is vast. If you start a journey on God's path, you can reside anywhere on this earth and will be protected. . . . The promise of Bush is that there is no place on earth where you can hide that I cannot find you. We will see which one of these two promises fulfilled.

Question: But aren't you afraid for the people, yourself, the Taliban, your country?

Umar: Almighty God . . . is helping the believers and the Muslims. God says he will never be satisfied with the infidels. In terms of worldly affairs, America is very strong. Even if it were twice as strong or twice that, it could not be strong enough to defeat us. We are confident that no one can harm us if God is with us.

Question: You are telling me you are not concerned, but Afghans all over the world are concerned.

Umar: We are also concerned. Great issues lie ahead. But we depend on God's mercy. Consider our point of view: if we give Usama away today, Muslims are not pleading to give him up would then be reviling us for giving him up. . . . Everyone is afraid of America and wants to please it. But Americans will not be able to prevent such acts like the one that has just occurred because America has taken Islam hostage. If you look at Islamic countries, the people are in despair. They are complaining that Islam is gone. But people remain firm in their Islamic beliefs. In their pain and frustration, some of them commit suicide acts. They feel they have nothing to lose.

Question: What do you mean by saying America has taken the Islamic world hostage?

Umar: America controls the government of the Islamic countries. The people ask to follow Islam, but the governments do not listen because they are in the grip of the United States. If someone follows the path of Islam, the government arrests him, tortures him or kills him. This is the doing of America. If it stops supporting those governments and lets the people deal with them, then such things won't happen. America has created the evil that is attacking it. The evil will not disappear even if I die and Usama dies and others die. The United States should step back and review its policy. It should stop trying to impose its empire on the rest of the world, especially on Islamic countries.

Question: So you won't give Usama bin Ladin up?

Umar: No. We cannot do that. If we did, it means we are not Muslims . . . that Islam is finished. If we were afraid of attack, we could have surrendered him the last time we were threatened and attacked. So America can hit us again, and this time we don't even have a friend.

Question: If you fight America with all your might—can the Taliban do that? Won't America beat you and won't your people suffer even more?

Umar: I'm very confident that it won't turn out this way. Please note this: there is nothing more we can do except depend on Almighty God. If a person does, then he is assured that the Almighty will help him, have mercy on him and he will succeed.

Source: Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 247–249. Permission to reproduce this interview granted by Oxford University Press.

Document 20

Environmental Protection Agency's Press Release (September 13, 2001)

One of the ongoing controversies stemming from September 11 has been the health problems experienced by workers who hunted for survivors, located bodies, and cleaned up the debris at the World Trade Center. There was a tremendous cloud of dust and debris in the air for weeks after the collapse of the twin towers and other buildings. One of the first actions of the U.S. government was to send Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) agents to test the air quality. In a series of press releases beginning on September 13, Christie Whitman, head of the EPA, reassured the rescue crews and the public that the level of air contaminants was low. This information was later to be questioned after a significant number of workers at the site began to have respiratory illnesses that led to long-term disabilities or death. The document presented here is the first of the EPA press released that came out on September 13.

EPA Initiates Emergency Response Activities, Reassures Public about Environment Hazards

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christie Whitman today announced that the EPA is taking steps to ensure the safety of rescue workers and the public at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon disaster sites, and to protect the environment. EPA is working with state, federal, and local agencies to monitor and respond to potential environmental hazards and minimize any environmental effects of the disasters and their aftermath.

At the request of the New York City Department of Health, EPA and the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have been on the scene at the World Trade Center monitoring exposure to potentially contaminated dust and debris. Monitoring and sampling conducted on Tuesday and Wednesday have been very reassuring and potential exposure of rescue crews and the public to environmental contaminants [*sic*].

EPA's primary concern is to ensure that rescue workers and the public are not exposed to elevated levels of asbestos, acidic gases or other contaminants from the debris. Sampling of ambient air quality found either no asbestos or very low levels of asbestos. Sampling of bulk materials and dust found generally low levels of asbestos.

The levels of lead, asbestos and volatile organic compounds in air samples taken on Tuesday in Brooklyn downwind from the World Trade Center site, were not detectable or not of concern.

Additional sampling of both ambient air quality and dust particles was conducted Wednesday night in lower Manhattan and Brooklyn, and results were uniformly acceptable.

"EPA is greatly relived to have learned that there appears to be no significant levels of asbestos dust in the air in New York City," said Administrator Whitman. "We are working closely with rescue crews to ensure that all appropriate precautions are taken. We will continue to monitor closely."

Public health concerns about asbestos contamination are primarily related to long-term exposure. Short-term, low-level exposure of the type that might have been produced by the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings is unlikely to cause significant health effects. EPA and OSHA will work closely with rescue and cleanup crews to minimize their potential exposure, but the general public should be very reassured by initial sampling.

EPA and OSHA will continue to monitor and sample for asbestos, and will work with the appropriate officials to ensure that rescue workers, cleanup crews and the general public are properly informed about appropriate steps that should be taken to ensure proper handling, transportation and disposal of potentially contaminated debris or materials.

EPA is taking steps to ensure that response units implement appropriate engineering controls to minimize environmental hazards, such as water sprays and rinsing to prevent or minimize potential exposure and limit releases of potential contaminants beyond the debris site.

EPA is also conducting downwind sampling for potential chemical and asbestos releases from the World Trade Center debris site. In addition, EPA has deployed federal On-Scene Coordinators to the Washington, D.C. Emergency Operations Center, Fort Meade, and FEMA's alternative Regional Operations Center in Pennsylvania and has deployed an On-Scene Coordinator to the Virginia Emergency Operations Center.

Under its response authority, EPA will use all available resources and staff experts to facilitate a safe emergency response and cleanup.

EPA will work with other involved agencies as needed to:

- procure and distribute respiratory and eye protection equipment in cooperation with the Dept. of Health and Human Services;
- provide health and safety training upon request;
- design and implement a site monitoring plan;
- provide technical assistance for site control and decontamination; and
- provide some 3,000 asbestos respirators, 60 self-contained breathing apparatuses and 10,000 protective clothing suits to the two disaster sites.

New York Governor George E. Pataki has promised to provide emergency electric generators to New York City in efforts to restore lost power caused by Tuesday's tragedy, and EPA will work with State authorities to expedite any necessary permits for those generators.

OSHA is also working with Consolidated Edison regarding safety standards for employees who are digging trenches because of leaking gas lines underground. OSHA has advised Con Edison to provide its employees with appropriate respirators so they can proceed with emergency work, shutting off gas leaks in the city.

Source: Office of Inspector General U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Report No. 2003-P-00012 (http://www.epa.gov/wtc/stories/headline_091301.htm).

Document 21

Statements by Federal Emergency Management Agency on Its Response to the Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon before the United States Senate's Committee on Environment and Public Works (October 16, 2001)

In 2001, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operated twenty-eight teams from around the United States. It was FEMA's responsibility to react to the events of September 11, and following those events, FEMA mobilized twenty-six of those teams to travel to New York City and Washington, D.C. Of these teams twenty-one went to New York and five to Washington. Despite some deficiencies caused by the lack of equipment at times, these FEMA teams operated effectively under harsh conditions. These three statements, given on October 16, 2001 before the Senate's Committee on Environment and Public Works, show how they performed and the difficulties that they had to deal with in a scene of destruction.

STATEMENT OF JOE M. ALLBAUGH, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Actually, I'll be brief in my remarks because I know you have several questions. I'd just like to begin by telling that these folks sitting on the front row are the true heroes of everyday American life. They represent heroes, many men and women who put their lives on the line, whom we often take for granted, as Senator Voinovich said. They're always first in line for budget cuts and last in line for recognition. I think, as a result of September 11, that maybe these brave men and women will be due the admiration that they so richly deserve, putting their lives on the line every minute of every day all across this country.

Five weeks ago this morning, our world was transformed. At that time, President Bush told me to make sure that the Federal Government would provide whatever

assistance was needed in New York, Pennsylvania and at the Pentagon. That mission is still a work in progress, but I can assure you and the American public that FEMA's response was swift and comprehensive and our commitment of continued support is unwavering.

Since September 11, I've spent many days at Ground Zero in New York City. I visited the site in Pennsylvania, was inside the Pentagon the Saturday after the event. Those places are where the true heroes are—those who were in their offices at work, grabbing a cup of coffee, on an airplane; and those who were first to respond to the tragic events—the firefighters, the police officers, the emergency medical technicians.

All are gone now, but I can assure you they're not forgotten. Our prayers are still with those folks and their families. Working hand-in-hand with Governor Pataki, Mayor Giuliani, Fire Commissioner Tommy Von Essen and Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik and many others, we've begun the painful process of recovery.

Beginning on September 11, FEMA deployed 26 of our 28 national urban search and rescue teams. Twenty-one went to New York, ultimately, the last one checking out of New York a week ago this last Sunday. Five went to northern Virginia at the Pentagon site. The New York City Office of Emergency Management's Task Force was among the first responders at the World Trade Center. Its leader, Chief Ray Downey, a person I was lucky to know, a great partner of FEMA, was on the scene. Tragically, he and his team never made it out.

I watched our rescue teams join New York City's finest and Virginia's finest, working shoulder to shoulder around the clock to find their brothers and sisters and fellow citizens. These sites are truly hallowed ground. Now our rescue teams have gone home and we are fully engaged in the recovery process. We have millions of tons of debris still to be moved out of New York City. It will take months. As of this morning, we've only moved out 300 million tons. It doesn't sound like very much compared to what we have to move.

Before and since the President signed the disaster declarations for Pennsylvania, for New Jersey, for Virginia and New York, FEMA activated the Federal response plan. To your point, Senator Voinovich, I think what we planned to do in this event worked just like it was supposed to, according to the Federal response plan.

We activated our emergency operations center here and in our 10 regions. We established disaster field offices in Virginia, New York and New Jersey and declared these disasters with public assistance at 100 percent for eligible cost. Our biggest concern currently is to make sure that the right assistance is getting to the right people. Many people need counseling; they will need counseling for a long time to come. Many qualify for individual assistance. I want to make sure that those people are helped.

In addition, we are there to help States and local governments with their public assistance needs, such as their public buildings, roads, streets, and emergency protective measures, making sure that these men and women are reimbursed for their time, material, their equipment in proper fashion.

In the past month, thousands of Federal employees have been working day and night at our disaster field offices at these three sites. Today we still have 1,300 employees deployed to New York City. Our job is not finished, but we will see it through to the end.

In the meantime, we're currently looking at all aspects of our disaster response in those three States to determine the lessons learned to be better prepared for the future. We're also working with President Bush and his Administration on any new legislative needs. As we continue to move forward with the recovery, I will let you know promptly if there is any new need for authorities.

Let me conclude on a personal note, if you don't mind. I attended about 10 days ago and spoke at the funeral of Captain Terry Haddon in New York City. Two weeks prior to that, on August 29, I had the fortune to sit down with his coworkers at Rescue One on 43rd Street in New York City to have a lunch with those individuals. Chief Ray Downey was there, with 13 or 14 of us around the table. We had a great time.

I try to stop in our country's firehouses every opportunity that I'm out on the road. It is amazing what I'm able to learn, what their needs are, what their wishes, wants, hopes. They are a true family in those firehouses all across the country. In that short 1½–2 hours, I became, I thought, a small part of their family.

The night before Terry's funeral, I attended a wake in New York City, and his wife Beth, who subsequently found out that she was pregnant with their first child after September 11—Terry never knew—handed me a small card. On one side it was a short life history of Terry. On the back part of the card was the Fireman's Prayer. I'd like to close just with the last sentence of that prayer, because I think it says so much about men and women who wear the uniform of our country's military. It says so much about the firemen and firewomen and the police officers and the emergency responders and all those individuals who lost their lives on September 11.

It goes like this: "If, according to my fate, I am to lose my life, please bless with Your protecting hand my family, friends and wife." For Terry Haddon, Ray Downey, Joey Angelini, Dennis Mohica and thousands of other souls that were lost on that fateful day, I hope that those of us still living and thriving can help provide that protecting hand to all the families and loved ones.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD P. PLAUGHER, CHIEF, ARLINGTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA, FIRE DEPARTMENT

Thank you very much. It is indeed a pleasure to be here this morning. It's also a great deal of pleasure and an honor to represent the men and women, not only of the Arlington County Fire Department, but also of the Nation. Hopefully my remarks will assist the cause of improving our capability to respond to any type of incident.

Again, I want to thank you are allowing me to be here today. I understand that you as a committee are deeply concerned, as are all of us, with the tragic events of September 11. These events have a profound impact on the men and women of my fire department and on the Nation's fire service as a whole.

I have prepared remarks which I hope will be entered into the record, and I'll just highlight a couple of the key points in order to be brief here this morning, to allow my colleagues ample time to testify.

It is an opportunity for me, however, to talk about the incident at the Pentagon. First of all, you need to know, I think, is that our response to the Pentagon began when one of our engine companies who was responding to another routine call noticed the plane and its route to the Pentagon and was actually a witness to the

incident. Immediately, the northern Virginia automatic mutual aid program was activated. Units from Fort Myer, Alexandria, Fairfax County and the National Airport Fire Department responded from the initial alarm.

The second alarm units included units from the District of Columbia as well as from Montgomery County and Prince George's County, MD. These first responding fire units fought a fire that was triggered by 6,000 gallons of jet fuel in the world's largest office building.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency, in their response to the attack on the Pentagon and its aftermath, was superb. FEMA and their front line urban search and rescue teams, which were mobilized from Fairfax County, Virginia Beach, Montgomery County, MD; Memphis, TN, and then later on, we received assistance from New Mexico to provide relief for the exhausted rescue personnel.

I must tell you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that the FEMA urban search and rescue teams made an outstanding contribution to our effort. These teams are comprised of dedicated professionals whose hard work and unyielding efforts should not be overlooked.

Two resources that were brought to bear to the incident scene by FEMA come to mind and stand out in my mind. First was the search dog capability. It's a unique and absolutely critical, necessary component of a structural collapse search that allows for swift and thorough search for victims that could not otherwise have been possible. Second, the urban search and rescue team brings in specially trained urban search and rescue structural engineers that allow us to then proceed into the building with safety being paramount to all the personnel on the scene.

However, there's a couple of areas that I think we can do to improve our business, and that is the business of response to our community, particularly in these types of incidents. That is what the director was just talking about, the ability to have a clear understanding of the local first responders, of what does the urban search and rescue team bring to an incident, and particularly the capability of this being taught at the National Fire Academy.

I also think that we need to have a clear understanding of the capability that is being developed for these urban search and rescue teams. In other words, what I mean is there needs to be a standardized list of equipment that is well understood and that we can count on when deployed. It also occurs to me that this complement of equipment and response capability should be developed with a panel of experts that seeks out local advice so that the folks of us who have been there will allow them to be able to adjust their response capability based upon our now new experiences.

We just heard again about the need for additional equipment. Most urban each and rescue teams—which in my earlier career in Fairfax County, I was fortunate enough to be one of the founding members of the team, and participated in its early structure—we realize that they are multiple deep in personnel, but not multiple deep in equipment. We think that now is the time that we could fix that.

We are, in fact, very lucky and very privileged in the Washington Metropolitan area to have two urban search and rescue teams in our midst, both Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County, VA. This is a unique situation in our community.

However, one of the things that we also focused on, and we realized early on in this particular incident at the Pentagon, is that there was a need for some command overhead teams. These command overhead teams would be chief officers

who would be experienced in dealing with these incidents and bring to bear that extra chief level officer capability. We think that maybe there's an opportunity for this to come out in the future.

The level of cooperation and mutual assistance between FEMA and the Arlington County Fire Department was excellent. There are many moving parts to an effective response to a terrorist incident. Each of us must have a good expectation of our own responsibilities of the different agencies.

In the final analysis, what transpired at the Pentagon, under the circumstances, was dealt with professionally and to the best of each of our abilities. We at the Arlington County Fire Department learned valuable lessons with regard to our own abilities and our limits. It is our hope that we can use those lessons to further a more effective preparedness approach.

I personally testified last spring before the House Transportation Committee on a piece of legislation designed to address this issue. A Senate companion bill, Senate bill 1453, the Preparedness Against Terrorism Act of 2001, was recently introduced by Senator Bob Smith and referred to this committee. This bill codifies the Office of National Preparedness at FEMA that President Bush created earlier this year. It creates a President's Council that will be charged with the development of a single national strategy on terrorism preparedness, that will include measurable preparedness goals.

We applaud Present Bush's designation of Governor Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania as our new Homeland Security coordinator. However, it seems to us that Senate bill 1453 could and would bring focus and legal authority to this new effort. It is my understanding that the Bush Administration has significant input into this bill, and I urge you to make whatever modifications are necessary to address Governor Ridge's role and to act favorably on the bill in sending it to the full Senate for consideration as quickly as possible.

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY L. METZINGER, FIRE CAPTAIN, SACRAMENTO, CA METROPOLITAN FIRE DISTRICT; MEMBER, FEMA URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE TEAM

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I'm Captain Jeff Metzinger. I'm with the Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District in northern California. I'm also a member of California's Urban Search and Rescue Team, California Task Force 7.

Like the others here, I am also honored and very humbled to be talking to you this morning, representing the thousands of firefighters across this country who put their lives on the line every day.

We were dispatched to the World Trade Center on the morning of September 11, as so many other teams were. I keep a journal with me wherever I go, and I brought it with me today and I'm going to read some excerpts for you. It's a habit I've had for a long time, and I think there's some value in there.

I'll start out on Wednesday, September 12.

We're finally leaving for New York City and everyone is anxious to get to work. As we approach the Hudson River from New Jersey, you can see a large column of smoke coming up from the site where the World Trade Center used to stand.

This is my first trip to New York City, and I feel sad about what I see. The traffic is incredible, even with a full police escort. The corners are filled with people,

and we're just now a few blocks away from the large smoke column I had seen earlier. We arrive at the Javits Convention Center by 7 p.m. and set up our base of operations. There's other teams coming in as well, including teams from Los Angeles, Missouri, Indianapolis, Riverside, California, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Ohio.

Our 62 person team is divided into two teams, where we alternate 12-hour shifts, working 24 hours around the clock. It's assigned to the Blue team, working the night shift. The first night, on September 13, we loaded into the bus and headed into our sector to go to work. We met up with the Gray team and did a pass-on Street.

The scene was surreal. There were people everywhere. Smoke continued to drift from the massive piles of rubble. The expanse of the disaster is difficult to comprehend. Several searches were conducted by our search dogs in the vicinity of Tower Seven. The technical search cameras were also used, but we had no luck finding any victims.

The following night, our team was working again, looking for an assignment. The dogs alerted an area, but at a very dangerous location. It was too unstable to enter. That night there was thunder, lightning, wind and heavy rains pounding upon us. Frequently, debris—large pieces of metal were blowing off the roofs of adjacent buildings. Our task force leader determined it wasn't safe for us to go any farther, we didn't want to lose any further lives.

The next afternoon we had a briefing from our task force leader at our base and were told that President Bush would be visiting our facility that day. I was privileged to meet and shake hands with President Bush, with Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, and the governor and the mayor were also present. It was quite an experience, and their visit was very much appreciated by all.

That night on the bus we were headed back to work, still hundreds of people lining the streets of New York City, cheering us as we go by. Traffic was so congested that we finally stopped the bus, got off and walked the last few blocks to the Church and Dey command post. Tonight our search team is finally getting to do some work, putting up a rope system to lower one of our members down into the debris crater near Church Street. The objective here is to place a cellular phone antenna down lower that might assist with victim locations.

The following night we were headed back to work and again people were lining the streets, cheering, waving flags, holding signs, lighting candles. It was a sight that warmed us even as we went in. This particular night, our search and rescue teams were assigned to search the buildings around the outer perimeter of the plaza area. There are several 30-plus story buildings around the World Trade Center plaza. We conducted searches from basement to roof, every door was opened, every space was checked. We climbed the stairwells, taking on one building at a time.

We didn't find any victims. Every floor of every building we searched was marked and completed. The assignment took a lot of toll on our legs that night.

On Sunday, during our briefing, we were told that three top New York fire chiefs were laid to rest that day. Firefighter Chaplain Ward Cockerton said a prayer for the victims and for the safety of the team members that are still working here.

Tonight we're going to work between buildings five and six, possible going underground. We hear that there's up to six levels below the street grade. So we

reported to the Church and Dey command post that night and I personally got assigned my first job as head rigger, which is my assignment with the team. Steve of Massachusetts Task Force One was there, and he and I worked with four New York City iron workers through the night, using a 90-10 crane, moving tons of debris all night long.

The following day we were back at work on the same crane, and a new group of iron workers. We made a connection with some guys by the name of Mike, Rich and Kevin. They're all great people. I found that the New York iron workers and construction workers are just incredibly great folks.

We cut and moved tons of steel again tonight. In the middle of the night I found a child's doll in the rubble, and I realized suddenly how much I missed my family. I heard our response team found a victim this morning, a police officer. Our hopes for a live rescue are starting to dim.

The next day we were back on the bus to the work site again. I'm already tired. We've averaged about 3 hours of sleep per night. Even when we get time to rest, you can't sleep.

Heading back to the crane, we worked all night again, moving steel, looking for bodies. I've noticed for several nights that there's very little debris that's recognizable. There's no desks, there's no chairs, carpet or sheet rock or anything else you'd associate with an office building, just the steel structure. There are still no victims in the area we're working in.

On September 18, we're back in the pile again, moving steel and searching for victims. Today the smell of death is more evident. I found a business card of a man with an office on the 83rd floor of one of the towers, and I wondered what his fate was at that moment. I said a prayer for him and hoped he is alive and well. I'm still not sure what his fate is.

Around midnight that night, the crane operation was halted while they were moving in a larger crane. When the crane shut down, I joined forces with some of the New York firefighters. Two of the battalion chiefs were out there with their sleeves rolled up, working right alongside of us. We were moving debris by hand, and that was a very solemn night. Went home tired that day.

The following day, Thursday, September 20, we started heading home, packing our equipment. It's been a long 10 days and everyone is exhausted. The team physician just diagnosed me with bronchitis. The dust we've been breathing all week finally caught up to us. Many others in the team had the same complaint of headache, sore throat, sinus congestion and sometimes fever. But most of all, everybody's troubled that we didn't find any victims.

Finally, on Friday, we land back in northern California, Travis Air Force Base, and we get a full police escort all the way back to Sacramento. Every freeway overpass for 40 miles was covered with fire engines, police cars and citizens cheering us home. It was a warm reception.

We arrived in Sacramento to a similar greeting of family, friends, co-workers and media. I realized then for the people of Sacramento that we were their connection to this tragedy on the East Coast. It felt good to be home, but I felt like a part of me was still in New York. When I go to sleep, I still dream that I'm there. It doesn't leave us.

I just want to close and say that firefighters and law enforcement and EMS people are going to continue to be the first responders arriving at these incidents, and

the toll is tremendous. The toll is tremendous on what I saw on the New York City firefighters, and for those of us who just came there and left, it took a toll as well, physically and mentally. We owe it to ourselves to be prepared for future incidents, to take care of our responders and make sure that we are afforded everything that we can possibly to do to be ready for the next one.

Source: U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, *FEMA's Response to the Sept. 11th Attacks* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), pp. 44–55.

Document 22

Dawn Interview with Osama bin Laden (November 10, 2001)

The Pakistani newspaper Dawn conducted a wide-ranging interview with Osama bin Laden concerning his views on the September 11 attacks. Bin Laden gave this interview on November 10, 2001, in the middle of the American campaign to overthrow the Taliban and capture or kill him. In this interview bin Laden states his reasons for war against the United States and the use of terrorism against civilians. At this time bin Laden was still reluctant to take responsibility for the September 11 attacks, but he acknowledged that al-Qaeda had access to chemical and nuclear weapons.

Question: After [the] American bombing of Afghanistan on October 7, you told al-Jazira television that the September 11 attacks had been carried out by some Muslims. How did you know they were Muslims?

Bin Ladin: The Americans themselves released a list of suspects of the September 11 attacks saying that the persons named were involved in the attacks. They were all Muslims, of whom fifteen belonged to Saudi Arabia, two were from the United Arab Emirates, and one from Egypt. . . . [A] *fateha* [funeral] was held for them in their homes. But America said they were hijackers.

Question: In your statement of October 7, you expressed satisfaction over the September 11 attacks, although a large number of innocent people perished in them. Hundreds among them were Muslims. Can you justify the killing of innocent men in the light of Islamic teachings?

Bin Ladin: This is a major point in jurisprudence. In my view, if an enemy occupies a Muslim territory and uses common people as a human shield, then it is permitted to attack that enemy. For instance if bandits barge into a home and hold a child hostage, then the child's father can attack the bandits, and in that attack even the child may get hurt. America and its allies are massacring us in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir and Iraq. The Muslims have the right to attack America in

reprisal. The Islamic *Sharia* says Muslims should not live in the land of the infidel for long. The September 11 attacks were not targeted at women and children. The real targets were America's icons of military and economic power. The holy prophet (peace be upon him) was against killing women and children. When he saw a dead woman during a war he asked, Why was she killed? If a child is above thirteen and wields a weapon against Muslims, then it is permitted to kill him. The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government, they elect their president, their government manufactures arms and gives them to Israel, and Israel uses them to massacre Palestinians. The Congress endorses all government measures, and this proves that . . . [all of] America is responsible for the atrocities perpetrated against Muslims. [All of] America because they elect Congress. I ask the American people to force their government to give up anti-Muslim policies. The American people had risen against their government's war in Vietnam. They must do the same today. The American people should stop the massacre of Muslims by their government.

Question: Can it be said that you are against the American government, not the American people?

Bin Ladin: Yes! We are carrying on the mission of our Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). The mission is to spread the word of God, not to indulge in massacring people. We ourselves are the target of killings, destruction, and atrocities. We are only defending ourselves. This is defensive *jihad*. We want to defend our people and our land. That is why I say that if we don't get security, the Americans, too, would not get security. This is a simple formula that even an American child can understand. This is the formula of live and let live.

Question: The head of Egypt's al-Azhar [Islamic university] has issued a *fatwa* against you saying that the views and beliefs of Usama bin Ladin have nothing to do with Islam. What do you have to say about that?

Bin Ladin: The *fatwa* of any official *alim* [religious figure] has no value for me. History if full of such *ulama* [clerics] who justify *riba* [economic interest], who justify the occupation of Palestine by the Jews, who justify the presence of American troops around Harmain Sharifain [the Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia]. These people support the infidels for their personal gain. The true *ulama* support the *jihad* against America. Tell me, if Indian forces invaded Pakistan what would you do? The Israeli forces occupy our land and the American troops are on our territory. We have no other option but to launch *jihad*.

Question: Some Western media claim that you are trying to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons. How much truth is there in these reports?

Bin Ladin: I heard the speech of [the] American president Bush [on November 7]. He was scaring the European countries that Usama wanted to attach with weapons of mass destruction. I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as a deterrent.

Question: Where did you get these weapons from?

Bin Ladin: Go to the next question.

Question: Demonstrations are being held in many European countries against American attacks on Afghanistan. Thousands of protesters were non-Muslims. What is your opinion about these non-Muslim protesters?

Bin Ladin: There are many innocent and good-hearted people in the West. American media instigates them against Muslims. However, some good-hearted

people are protesting against American attacks because human nature abhors injustice. The Muslims were massacred under the UN patronage in Bosnia. I am aware that some officers of the state department had resigned in protest. Many years ago the U.S. ambassador in Egypt had resigned in protest against the policies of President Jimmy Carter. Nice and civilized people are everywhere. The Jewish lobby has taken America and the West hostage.

Question: Some people say that war is no solution to any issue. Do you think that some political formula could be found to stop the present war?

Bin Ladin: You should put this question to those who have started this war. We are only defending ourselves.

Question: If America got out of Saudi Arabia and the al-Aqsa mosque was liberated, would you then present yourself for trial is some Muslim country?

Bin Ladin: Only Afghanistan is an Islamic country. Pakistan follows the English law. I don't consider Saudi Arabia an Islamic country. If the Americans have charges against me, we too have a charge sheet against them.

Question: Pakistan's government decided to cooperate with America after September 11, which you don't consider right. What do you think Pakistan should have done but to cooperate with America?

Bin Ladin: The government of Pakistan should have the wishes of the people in view. It should not have surrendered to the unjustified demands of America. America does not have solid proof against us. It just has some surmises. It is unjust to start bombing on the basis of those surmises.

Question: Had America decided to attack Pakistan with the help of India and Israel, what would we have done?

Bin Ladin: What has America achieved by attacking Afghanistan? We will not leave the Pakistani people and the Pakistani territory at anybody's mercy. We will defend Pakistan. But we have been disappointed by [Pakistan's leader] General Pervez Musharraf. He says that the majority is with him. I say the majority is against him.

Bush has used the word "crusade." This is a crusade declared by Bush. It is no wisdom to barter off blood of Afghan brethren to improve Pakistan's economy. He will be punished by the Pakistani people and Allah.

Right now a great war of Islamic history is being fought in Afghanistan. All the big powers are united against Muslims. It is *sawad* [a good religious deed] to participate in this war. . . .

Question: Is it correct that a daughter of Mullah Umar is your wife or your daughter is Mullah Umar's wife?

Bin Ladin: [laughs] All my wives are Arabs and all my daughters are married to Arab *mujahidin*. I have a spiritual relationship with Mullah Umar. He is a great and brave Muslim of this age. He does not fear anyone but Allah. He is not under any personal relationship or obligation to me. He is only discharging his religious duty. I, too, have not chosen this life out of any personal consideration.

Source: Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin (eds.), *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 261–264. Used by permission of Dawn Group of Newspapers, Karachi, Pakistan.

Document 23

Bin Laden's Homage to the Nineteen Students (December 26, 2001)

On December 26, 2001, the Arab news network al-Jazeera broadcast a statement by Osama bin Laden in which he issued an homage to the nineteen students that had carried out the attacks on September 11, 2001. Prior to this statement, bin Laden had made no publication statement owning up to his role in the events of September 11, and he had made allusions that it was the responsibility of another group. By December 2001, the Taliban had lost control of the military situation in Afghanistan to the Northern Alliance and its American allies, and bin Laden was on the run. With little to lose, bin Laden took the opportunity to honor the nineteen martyrs of September 11. An important point to note in this statement is bin Laden's emphasis on strikes against the American economy. It seems that attacking against the economy of the United States is at least as important as the military campaign. The following is most of that statement, with some opening prayers omitted.

Three months after the blessed strikes against global unbelief and its leader America, and approximately two months after the beginning of this vicious Crusader campaign against Islam, we should discuss the meaning of these events, which have revealed things of the greatest importance to Muslims. It has become all too clear that the West in general, with America at its head, carries an unspeakable Crusader hatred for Islam. Those who have endured the continuous bombing from American aeroplanes these last months know this only too well.

How many innocent villages have been destroyed, how many millions forced out into the freezing cold, these poor innocent men, women, children who are now taking shelter in refugee camps in Pakistan while America launches a vicious campaign based on mere suspicion?

If America had evidence that could prove with degree of certainty who did this deed [9/11], then it would attribute it to Europe, to the IRA, for example. There

were many ways in which it could have dealt with the problem, but even though it was merely a matter of suspicion, the real, ugly face of Crusader hatred for the Islamic world immediately manifested itself in all is clarity.

At this point I would like to emphasize the fact that the struggle between us and America is of the utmost gravity and importance, not only to Muslims but to the entire world. On the basis does America accuse this group of emigrants who wage *jihad* for God's sake, against whom there is no evidence other than that of injustice, oppression, and hostility?

The history of the Arab *mujahidin* who waged *jihad* for the grace of God Almighty is as clear as can be. In the face of the Soviet Union's despicable terrorism against children and innocents in Afghanistan twenty years ago, these Arab *mujahidin* rose up and left their jobs, universities, families, and tribes to earn the pleasure of God, to help God's religion and to help these poor Muslims.

It is inconceivable that those who came to help the poor people today came to kill innocents, as is being alleged. History recounts that America supported everyone who waged *jihad* and fought against Russia, but when God blessed these Arab *mujahidin* with going to help those poor innocent women and children in Palestine, America became angry and turned its back, betraying all those who had fought in Afghanistan.

What is happening in Palestine today is extremely clear, and something about which all of humanity since Adam can agree. Some may get corrupted, and people differ on many issues, but there are some whom God Almighty keeps from corruption, in contrast to those whose souls have become deviant and have reached an excessive degree of oppression and hostility. But one issue on which people are agreed, even if they themselves have been the victims of oppression and hostility, is that you cannot kill innocent children.

The deliberate killing of innocent children in Palestine today is the ugliest, most oppressive, and hostile act, and something that threatens all of humanity.

History knows that one who kills children, even if rarely, is a follower of Pharaoh. God Almighty favoured the sons of Israel when He helped them escape from Pharaoh. "Remember when We saved you from Pharaoh's people, who subjected you to terrible torment, slaughtering your sons and sparing only your women." Slaughtering children was something for which the head of oppression, unbelief, and hostility, Pharaoh, was famous, yet the sons of Israel have done the same thing to our sons in Palestine. The whole world has witnessed Israeli soldiers killing Muhammad al-Durreh and many others like him.

People across the entire world, both in East and West, are contravening their faiths by denying these deeds, but America goes on supporting those oppressors and enemies of our sons in Palestine. God Almighty has decreed that if someone reaches such an excessive degree of hostility that he kills another unlawfully, this is the most abhorrent deed, but it is yet more abhorrent to kill innocent children. God Almighty says: "On account of (his deed), We decreed to the Children of Israel that if anyone kills a person—unless in retribution for murder or spreading corruption in the land—it is as if he kills all mankind, while if any saves a life it is as if he saves the lives of all mankind."

So in fact it is as if Israel—and those backing it in America—have killed all the children in the world. What will stop Israel killing our sons tomorrow in Tabuk, al-Jauf and other areas? What would the rulers do if Israel broadened its territory

according to what they allege is written in their false, oppressive unjust books, which said that "Our borders extend as far as Medina?" What will rulers do except submit to this American Zionist lobby?

Rational people must wake up, or what befell Muhammad al-Durreh and his brothers will happen tomorrow to their sons and women. There is no strength or power save in God.

The matter is extremely serious. This disgraceful terrorism is practiced by America in its most abhorrent form in Palestine and in Iraq. This terrible man Bush Sr., was the reason for the murder of over a million children in Iraq, besides all the other men and women [who have been killed].

The events of 22nd Jumada al-Hani, or Aylul (September 11) are merely a response to the continuous injustice inflicted upon our sons in Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, southern Sudan, and other places, like Kashmir. The matter concerns the entire *umma*. People need to wake up from their sleep and try to find a solution to this catastrophe that is threatening all of humanity.

Those who condemn these operations [9/11] have viewed the event in isolation and have failed to connect it to previous events or to the reasons behind it. Their view is blinkered and lacks either a legitimate or a rational basis. They merely saw others in America and the media decrying these operations, so they did the same themselves.

These people remind me of the wolf who, seeing a lamb, said to it: "You were the one who polluted my water last year." The lamb replied: "It wasn't me," but the wolf insisted: "Yes it was." The lamb said: "I was only born this year." The wolf replied: "Then it was your mother who polluted my water," and he ate the lamb. When the poor ewe saw her son being torn by the wolf's teeth, her maternal feelings drove her to give the wolf a hard butt. The wolf cried out: "Look at this terrorism!" And all the parrots repeated what he said saying "Yes, we condemn the ewe's butting of the wolf." What do you think about the wolf eating the ewe's lamb?

These blessed, successful strikes are merely a reaction to events in our land in Palestine, in Iraq, and in other places. America has continued this policy with the coming of George Bush Jr., who began his term with violent air strikes on Iraq to emphasize the policy of oppression and hostility, and to show that the blood of Muslims has no value.

This blessed reaction came by the grace of God Almighty showing very clearly that this haughty, domineering power, America, the Hubal of the age, is based on great economic power, but it is soft. How quickly it fell from the sky, by the grace of God Almighty.

It was not nineteen Arab states that did this deed [9/11]. It was not Arab armies or ministries who humbled the oppressor who harms us in Palestine and elsewhere. It was nineteen post-secondary students—I beg God Almighty to accept them—who shook America's throne, struck its economy right in the heart, and dealt the biggest military power a mighty blow, by the grace of God Almighty.

Here we have clear proof that this destructive, usurious global economy that America uses, together with its military force, to impose unbelief and humiliation on poor peoples, can easily collapse. Those blessed strikes in New York and the other places forced it to acknowledge the loss of more than a trillion dollars, by the grace of God Almighty. And they used simple means—the enemy's airplanes and

schools—without even the need for training camps. God gave them the chance to teach a harsh lesson to these arrogant people who think that freedom only has meaning for the white race, and that other peoples should be humiliated and subservient, not even rising up when they strike us, as they did previously in Iraq.

I say that American military power, as demonstrated recently in Afghanistan, where it poured down all its anger on these poor people, has taught us great and important lessons in how to resist this arrogant force, by the grace of God Almighty.

By way of example, if the front line with the enemy is 100km long, this line should also be deep. In other words, it is not enough for us to have a defense line 100, 200, 300 metres deep. It should be a few kilometres deep, with trenches dug all the way along and through it, so that the intensity of the American bombing is exhausted before it destroys these lines, and so that light, quick forces can move from one line to another and from one defense position to another.

We made use of this tactic after the intense American bombardment on the northern and Kabul lines, and in this way the years pass and, with the will of God Almighty, American will not break the *mujahidin* lines.

Furthermore, it is well known that there are two elements to fighting; there is the fighting itself and then there is the financial element, such as buying weapons. This is emphasized in many verses of the Qur'an, such as the following: "God has purchased the persons and possessions of the believers in return for the Garden."

So the struggle is both financial and physical. Even if he distance between us and the American military base is very great, and our weapons do not match up to their planes, we are able to soak up the pressure of these strikes with our broad defense lines. And in another way it is possible to strike the economic base that is the foundation of the military base, so when their economy is depleted they will be too busy with each other to be able to enslave poor peoples.

So I say that it is very important to focus on attacking the American economy by any means available. Here we have seen the real crime of those who claim to call for humanity and freedom. Just a tiny quantity [of explosives]—7 grams' worth—is more than enough to account for anyone. But America, in her hatred for the Taliban and for Muslims, drops bombs weighing 7 tons on our brothers in the front lines. That is equivalent to seven thousand kilograms, or seven million grams, even though 7 grams is more than enough for one person.

When the young men—we beg God to accept them—exploded less than two tons [of explosive] in Nairobi, America said that this was a terrorist strike, and that this is a weapon of mass destruction. But they have no qualms about using two bombs weighing seven million grams each.

After the Americans bombed entire villages for no reason other than to terrify people and make them afraid of hosting Arabs or going near them, their minister of defense got up and said that that was their right, meaning effectively that they had their right to annihilate people so long as they were Muslim and not American. This is the clearest and most blatant crime. Everyone who hears them saying that they did such things "by mistake" knows that this is the clearest and most brazen lie.

Some days ago, the Americans announced that they hit al-Qaeda positions in Khost and had dropped a bomb on a mosque, which they said was a mistake. After investigations it became clear that scientists in Khost were saying their Ramadan

evening prayers and had a meeting afterwards with the hero *mujahid* sheikh Jalal al-Din Haqqani, one of the foremost leaders of the *jihad* against the Soviets, who has resisted this American occupation of Afghan land. So they bombed the mosque and Muslims while they wee at prayers, killing 105 of them. God save Sheikh Jalal, we hope that He blesses his life.

This is Crusader hatred. So those who speak out and say that they condemn terrorism, but do not pay attention to the consequences, should take note. Our terrorism against America is a praiseworthy terrorism in defense against the oppressor, in order that America will stop supporting Israel, who kills our sons. Can you not understand this? It is very clear.

America and the western leaders always say that Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and other such militias, are terrorist organizations. If self-defense is terrorism, what is legitimate? Our defense and our fight is no different to that of our brothers in Palestine like Hamas. We fight for "There is no God but God." The world of God is the highest and that of God's enemies is the lowest. So let us relieve the oppression of the poor people in Palestine and elsewhere.

Every possible analysis clearly shows all sensible Muslims should stand in the trenches, because this is the most dangerous, aggressive, violent, and fierce Crusader war against Islam. With God's will, America's end will not be far off. This will be nothing to do with the poor slave bin Laden, whether dead or alive. With God's grace, the awakening has begun, which is one of the benefits of these operations. I hope that God Almighty will take those young men to martyrdom and bring them together with the Prophet, the martyrs, and the righteous.

Those young men did a very great deed, a glorious deed. God rewarded them and we pray that their parents will be proud of them, because they raised Muslims' heads high and taught America a lesson it won't forget, with God's will.

As I warned previously in an interview on the ABC channel, by involving itself in a struggle with the sons of Saudi Arabia, America will forget the Vietnam crisis, with the grace of God Almighty. What is yet to come will be even greater.

From Saudi Arabia fifteen young men set out—we pray to God to accept them as martyrs. They set out from the land of faith, where lies the Muslims' greatest treasure, where faith returns, as our Prophet rightly said, to Medina, just as the snake returns to its hole. Another two came from the Eastern Peninsula, from the Emirates, another from the Levant, Ziad al-Jarrah, and another from the land of Egypt, Mohammed Atta, may God accept all of them as martyrs.

With their actions they provided a very great sign, showing that it was this faith in their hearts that urged them to do these things, to give their soul to "There is no god but God". By these deeds they opened a great door for good and truth. Those we hear in the media saying that martyrdom operations should not be carried out are merely repeating the desires of the tyrants, America and its collaborators.

Every day, from east to west, our *umma* of 1200 million Muslims is being slaughtered, in Palestine, in Iraq, Somalia, Western Sudan, Kashmir, the Philippines, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Assam. We do not hear their voices, yet as soon as the victim rises up and offers himself on behalf of his religion, people are outraged. 1200 million Muslims are being slaughtered without anyone even knowing, but if anyone comes to their defense, those people just repeat whatever the tyrants want them to say. They have neither common sense nor authority.

There is a clear moral in the story of the boy, the king, the magician, and the monk, of people offering themselves for "There is no god but God". There is also another meaning, which is that victory is not only a question of winning, which is how most people see it, but of sticking to your principles.

God mentioned the people of the trench and immortalized their memory by praising them for being resolute in their faith. They were given a choice between faith and being thrown into the fire. They refused not to believe in God, and so they were thrown into hell. At the end of the story of the boy, when the tyrant king ordered that the believers should be thrown in the pit, a poor mother came carrying her son. When she saw the fire she was afraid that harm would befall her son, so she went back. But the Prophet relates, her son told her: "be patient, mother, for you are in right."

No Muslim would ever possibly ask: what did they benefit? The fact is that they were killed—but this is total ignorance. They were victorious, with the blessings of God Almighty, and with the immortal heavens that God promised them. Victory is not material gain; it is about sticking to your principles.

And in the sayings of our Prophet, there is the story about the uneducated boy, the magician and the monk. One day an animal was blocking the road, and the boy said, "Today, I'll find out who is better, the monk or the magician." Because he was lacking in knowledge, he did not as yet understand which one was better, so he asked God to show him. If the monk was more beloved to God Almighty, then he would be able to kill the animal. So the boy picked up the rock and threw it at the animal, and it dropped dead. The monk turned to him and said: "My son, today you are better than me," even though he was far more knowledgeable than this ignorant young boy. Nevertheless, God Almighty lit up this boy's heart with the light of faith, and he began to make sacrifices for the sake of "There is no god but God."

This is a unique and valuable story which he youth of Islam are waiting for their scholars to tell them, which would show the youth that these (the 9/11 attackers) are the people who have given up everything for the sake of "There is no god but God," and would tell them what the scholar told the boy: "Today, you are better than us."

This is the truth. The measure of virtue in this religion is, as the saying of our Prophet goes, the measure of faith—not only collecting knowledge but using it. According to this yardstick, whoever fights them [unbelievers] physically is a believer, whoever fights them verbally is a believer, and whoever fights them with his heart is a believer. Nothing can be more essentially faithful than this. These people fought the great unbelief with their hands and their souls, and we pray to God to accept them as martyrs.

The lord of martyrs Hamza bin Abd al-Muttalib, said that God illuminated a unknown man's heart with faith, and he stood up against an unjust imam, who rebuked him and killed him, as is written in the *al-Jami al-Sahih*.

He won a great victory that not one of the noble followers or companions could achieve. God Almighty raised him up to the status of lord of the martyrs. This is something that our Prophet emphasized. so how could any sane Muslim say, "What did he benefit from it?" This is clear error and we ask God for good health.

God opened the way for these young men to tell America, the head of global unbelief, and its allies, that they are living in falsehood. They sacrificed themselves for "There is no god but God."

We have spoken much about these great events, but I will sum things up by emphasizing the importance of continuing *jihadi* action against American, both militarily and economically. America has been set back with the help of God Almighty, and the economic bleeding still goes on today. Yet still we need more strikes. The youth should strive to find the weak points of the American economy and strike the enemy there.

Before I finish, I should mention those heroes, these true men, these great giants who erased the shame from the forehead of our *umma*. I should like to recite poetry in praise of them and all those who follow the same path as Muhammad.

But before that, I would like to stress one point, which is that these battles going on around the clock today in Afghanistan against the Arab *mujahidin* and particularly the Taliban, have clearly shown just how powerless the American government and it soldiers really are. Despite the great developments in military technology, they can't do anything without relying on apostates and hypocrites. So what is the difference today between Babrak Karmal, who brought in the Russians to occupy his country, and the deposed president Burhan al-Din (and *din* has nothing to do with him)? What difference is there between the two? One brought Russians to occupy the land of Islam and the other brought Americans. As I said, this clearly shows the weakness of the American soldier, by the grace of God Almighty. So you should seize this chance, and the youth should continue the *jihad* and work against the Americans. I'll finish with some lines of poetry in memory of those heroes from the land of Hijaz, the land of faith, from Ghamid and Zahran, from Bani Shah, from Harb, from Najd, and we pray to God to accept them all, and in memory of those who came from Holy Mecca, Salem and Nawaf al-Hazmi, Khaled al-Mihdhar, or those who came from Medina, the radiant, who left life and its comforts for the sake of "There is no god but God."

I testify that these men, as sharp as a sword,
Have persevered through all trials,
How special they are who sold their souls to God,
Who willingly bared their chests as shields.
Though the clothes of darkness enveloped us and the poisoned tooth bit us,
Though our homes overflowed with blood and the assailant desecrated our land,
Though from the squares the shining of swords and horses vanished,
And the sound of drums was growing
The fighters' winds blew, striking their towers and telling them:
We will not cease our raids until you leave our fields.

[poem by Yusuf Abu Hilala]

Source: Bruce Lawrence (ed.), *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 145–157. Reprinted with permission.

Document 24

White House Declaration on the Human Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (February 7, 2002)

The decision to classify al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees as unlawful detainees has become controversial. After some deliberation about the status of al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners, White House and Justice Department lawyers finally came up with the classification of "unlawful detainees," a classification that meant that these detainees were not prisoners of war and thus had no rights under the Geneva Convention. This ruling, which President George W. Bush accepted, has meant that the detainees basically have no rights except those determined by the U.S. government. This ruling has been attacked by both the international community and elements within the United States. This document explains the justification for the unlawful detainees ruling.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 7, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: Human Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees

1. Our recent extensive discussions regarding the status of al-Qaida and Taliban detainees confirm that the application of Geneva Convention

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, (Geneva) to the conflict with al-Qaida and the Taliban involves complex legal questions. By its terms, Geneva applies to conflicts involving "High Contracting Parties," which can only be states. Moreover, it assumes the existence of "regular" armed forces fighting on behalf of states. However, the war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups with broad, international reach commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, sometimes with the direct support of states. Our nation recognizes that this new paradigm—ushered in not by us, but by terrorists—requires new thinking in the law of war, but thinking that should nevertheless be consistent with the principles of Geneva.

2. Pursuant to my authority as commander in chief and chief executive of the United States, and relying on the opinion of the Department of Justice dated January 22, 2002, and on the legal opinion rendered by the attorney general in his letter of February 1, 2002, I hereby determine as follows:
   a. I accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al-Qaida in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because, among other reasons, al-Qaida is not a High Contracting Party to Geneva.
   b. I accept the legal conclusion of the attorney general and the Department of Justice that I have the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the United and Afghanistan, but I decline to exercise that authority at this time. Accordingly, I determine that the provisions of Geneva will apply to our present conflict with the Taliban. I reserve the right to exercise the authority in this or future conflicts.
   c. I also accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al-Qaida or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and common Article 3 applies only to "armed conflict not of an international character."
   d. Based on the facts supplied by the Department of Defense and the recommendation of the Department of Justice, I determine that the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva. I note that, because Geneva does not apply to our conflict with al-Qaida, al-Qaida detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war.
3. Of course, our values as a nation, values that we share with many nations in the world, call for us to treat detainees humanly, including those who are not legally entitled to such treatment. Our nation has been and will continue to be a strong supporter of Geneva and its principles. As a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.
4. The United States will hold states, organizations, and individuals who gain control of United States personnel responsible for treating such personnel humanely and consistent with applicable law.
5. I hereby reaffirm the order previously issued by the secretary of defense to the United States Armed Forces requiring that the detainees be treated humanely

and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.

6. I hereby direct the secretary of state to communicate my determinations in an appropriate manner to our allies, and other countries and international organizations cooperating in the war against terrorism of global reach.

Source: Erik Saar and Viveca Novak, *Inside the Wire: A Military Intelligence Soldier's Eyewitness Account of Life at Guantanamo* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), pp. 275–277.

Document 25

Testimony of Dr. W. Gene Corley on Behalf of the American Society of Civil Engineers before the Subcommittee on Environment, Technology and Standards and Subcommittee on Research of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science (May 1, 2002)

Dr. W. Gene Corley testified before the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Science's Subcommittee on Environment, Technology and Standards and Subcommittee on Research on the scientific reasons for the collapse of the twin towers on September 11, 2001. A team of civil engineers had studied the problem and posited probable reasons for the collapse, but its members also called for more research on the issue. This eighteen-page report, written in response to this call, is too large to be reproduced verbatim, but there was considerable redundancy. Consequently, the first six pages of the report have been reproduced.

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York City's World Trade Center, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Structural Engineering Institute of the American Society of Civil Engineers (SEI/ASCE), in association with New York City and several other federal agencies and professional organizations, deployed a team of civil, structural, and fire protection engineers to study the performance of buildings at the World Trade Center (WTC) site.

Founded in 1852, ASCE represents more than 125,000 civil engineers worldwide and is the country's oldest national engineering society. ASCE members represent the profession most responsible for the nation's built environment. Our members work in consulting, contracting, industry, government and academia. In addition to developing guideline documents, state-of-the-art reports, and a multitude of different journals, ASCE, an American National Standards Institute (ANSI) approved standards developer, establishes standards of practice such as the

document known as ASCE 7 which provides minimum design loads for buildings and other structures. ASCE 7 is used internationally and is referenced in all of our nation's major model building codes.

The events of following the attacks in New York City were among the worst building disasters and resulted in the largest loss of life from any single building event in the United States. Of the 58,000 people estimated to be at the WTC Complex, over 3,000 lives were lost that day, including 343 emergency responders. Two commercial airliners were hijacked, and each was flown into one of the two 110-story towers. The structural damage sustained by each tower from the impact, combined with the ensuing fires, resulted in the total collapse of each building. As the towers collapsed, massive debris clouds, consisting of crushed and broken building components, fell onto and blew into surrounding structures, causing extensive collateral damage and, in some cases, igniting additional fires and causing additional collapses. In total, 10 major buildings experienced partial or total collapse and 30 million square feet of commercial office space was removed from service, of which 12 million belonged to the WTC complex.

Scope of the Study

The purpose of the FEMA/ASCE study was to see what could be learned to make buildings safer in the future. Building performance studies are often done when there is major structural damage due to events such as earthquakes or blasts. A better understanding of how buildings respond to extreme forces can help us design safer structures in the future.

Specifically, the scope of the FEMA/ASCE study was to:

- Review damage caused by the attack;
- Assess how each building performed under the attack;
- Determine how each building collapsed'
- Collect and preserve data that may aid in future studies; and
- Offer guidelines for additional study.

The team examined:

- The immediate effects of the aircraft impact on each tower;
- The spread of the fire following the crashes;
- The reduction in structural strength caused by the fires;
- The chain of events that led to the collapse of the towers; and
- How falling debris and the effects of the fires impacted the other buildings at the World Trade Center complex.

The team recommendations are present for more detailed engineering studies, to complete the assessments and produce improved guidance and tools for building design and performance evaluation.

World Trade Center 1 and World Trade Center 2

As each tower was struck, extensive structural damage, including localized collapse, occurred at the several floor levels directly impacted by the aircraft. Despite this massive localized damage, each structure remained standing. However, as each

aircraft impacted a building, jet fuel on board ignited. Part of this fuel immediately burned off in the large fireballs that erupted at the impact floors. Remaining fuel flowed across the floors and down elevator and utility shafts, igniting intense fires throughout upper portions of the buildings. As these fires spread, they further weakened the steel-framed structures, eventually triggering total collapse.

The collapse of the twin towers astonished most observers, including knowledgeable structural engineers, and, in the immediate aftermath, a wide range of explanations were offered in an attempt to help the public understand these tragic and unthinkable events. However, the collapse of these symbolic buildings entailed a complex series of events that were not identical for each tower. To determine the sequence of events, likely root causes, and methods of technologies that may improve or mitigate the building performance observed, FEMA and ASCE formed a Building Performance Study (BPS) Team consisting of specialists in tall building design, steel and connection technology, fire and blast engineering, and structural investigation and analysis.

The SEI/ASCE team conducted field observations at the WTC site and steel salvage yards, removed and tested samples of the collapsed structures, viewed hundreds of images of video and still photography, conducted interviews with witnesses and persons involved in the design, construction, and maintenance of each of the affected buildings, reviewed available construction documents, and conducted preliminary analyses of the damage to the WTC towers.

With the information and time available, the sequence of events leading to the collapse of each tower could not be definitively determined. However, the following observations and findings were made:

- The structural damage sustained by each of the two buildings as a result of the terrorist attacks was massive. The fact that the structures were able to sustain this level of damage and remain standing for an extended period of time is remarkable and is the reason that most building occupants were able to evacuate safely. Events of this type, resulting in such substantial damage, are generally not considered in building design, and the fact that these structures were able to successfully withstand such damage is noteworthy.
- Preliminary analyses of the damaged structures, together with the fact the structures remained standing for an extended period of time, suggest that, absent other severe loading events, such as a windstorm or earthquake, the buildings could have remained standing in their damaged states until subjected to some significant additional load. However, the structures were subjected to a second, simultaneous severe loading event in the form of the fires caused by the aircraft impacts.
- The large quantity of jet fuel carried by each aircraft ignited upon impact into each building. A significant portion of this fuel was consumed immediately in the ensuing fireballs. The remaining fuel is believed either to have flowed down through the buildings or to have burned off within a few minutes of the aircraft impact. The heat produced by this burning jet fuel does not by itself appear to have been sufficient to initiate the structural collapses. However, as the burning jet fuel spread across several floors of the buildings, it ignited much of the buildings' contents, permitting fires to evolve across several floors of the buildings simultaneously. The heat output from these

fires is estimated to have been comparable to the power produced by a large commercial generating station. Over a period of many minutes, this heat induced additional stresses into the damaged structural frames while simultaneously softening and weakening these frames. This additional loading and damage were sufficient to induce the collapse of both structures.

- The ability of the two towers to withstand aircraft impact without immediate collapse was a direct function of their design and construction characteristics, as was the vulnerability of the two towers to collapse as a result of the combined effects of the impacts and ensuing fires. Many buildings with other design and construction characteristics would have been more vulnerable to collapse in these events than the two towers, and few may have been less vulnerable. It was not the purpose of this study to assess the code-conformance of the building design and construction, or to judge the adequacy of these features. However, during the course of this study the structural and fire protection features of the building were examined. The study did not reveal any specific structural features that would be regarded as substandard, and, in fact, many structural and fire protection features of the design and construction were found to be superior to the minimum code requirements.

What Caused the Collapse of the Towers?

Our analysis showed that the impact alone did not cause the collapse of the towers, but instead, left the towers vulnerable to collapse from any significant additional force, such as from high winds, an earthquake, or in the case of the Twin Towers, the fires that engulfed both buildings. Without that second event, the team believes the towers could have remained standing indefinitely.

Although steel is very strong, it loses some of its strength when heated. To prevent that loss of strength, structural steel is protected with fireproofing and sprinkler systems. In the towers, fires raged through several floors simultaneously, ignited by the jet fuel and fed by a mixture of paper and furniture. The impact dislodged some fireproofing on the structural beams and columns, which made them vulnerable to fire damage. With the sprinkler system disabled, the fires raged uncontrollably, weakening the steel and leading to the collapse of the buildings.

Several building design features have been identified as key to the buildings' ability to remain standing as long as they did and to allow the evacuation of most building occupants. These included the following:

- Robustness and redundancy of the steel framing system;
- Presence of adequate egress stairways that were well marked and lighted; and
- The conscientious implementation of emergency exiting training programs for building tenants.

Similarly, several design features have been identified that may have played a role in allowing the buildings to collapse in the manner that they did and in the inability of victims at and above the impact floors to safely exit. These features should not be regarded either as design deficiencies or as features that should be prohibited in future building codes. Rather, these are features that should be subjected to more detailed evaluation, in order to understand their contribution to

the performance of these buildings and how they may perform in other buildings. These include the following:

- The type of steel floor truss system present in these buildings and their structural robustness and redundancy when compared to other structural systems;
- Use of impact-resistant enclosures around egress paths;
- Resistance of passive fire protection to blasts and impacts in buildings designed to provide resistance to such hazards; and
- Grouping emergency egress stairways in the central building core as opposed to dispersing them throughout the structure.

Building Codes

During the course of this study, the question of whether building codes should be changed in some way to make future buildings more resistant to such attacks was frequently explored. Depending on the size of the aircraft, it may not be technically feasible to develop design provisions that would enable structures to be designed and constructed to resist the effects of impacts by rapidly moving aircraft, and the ensuing fires, without collapse. In addition, the cost of constructing such structures might be so large as to make this type of design intent practically infeasible.

Although the attacks on the World Trade Center are a reason to question design philosophies. The BPS Team believes there are insufficient data to determine whether there is a reasonable threat of attacks on specific buildings to recommend inclusion of such requirement in building codes. Some believe the likelihood of such attacks on any specific building is deemed sufficiently low to not be considered at all. However, individual building developers may wish to consider design provisions for improving redundancy and robustness for such unforeseen events, particularly for structures that, by nature of their design or occupancy, may be especially susceptible to such incidents. Although some conceptual changes to the building codes that could make buildings more resistant to fire or impact damage or more conducive to occupant egress were identified in the course of this study, the BPS Team felt that extensive technical, policy, and economic study of these concepts should be performed before any specific code change recommendations are developed. This report specifically recommends such additional studies. Future building codes revisions may be considered after the technical details of the collapses and other building responses to damage are better understood.

Surrounding Buildings

Several other buildings including the Marriott Hotel (WTC 3), the South Plaza building (WTC 4), the U.S. Customs building (WTC 6), and the Winter Garden experienced nearly total collapse as a result of the massive quantities of debris that fell on them when the two towers collapsed. The St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church just south of WTC 2 was completely destroyed by the debris that fell on it.

WTC 5, WTC 7, 90 West Street, 130 Cedar Street, Bankers Trust, the Verizon building, and World Financial Center 3 were impacted by large debris from the collapsing twin towers and suffered structural damage, but arrested

collapse to localized areas. The performance of these buildings demonstrates the inherent ability of redundant steel-framed structures to withstand extensive damage from earthquakes, blasts, and other extreme events without progressive collapse.

The debris from the collapses of the WTC towers also initiated fires in surrounding buildings, including WTC 4, 5, 6, 7; 90 West Street; and 130 Cedar Street. Many of the buildings suffered severe fire damage but remained standing. However, two steel-framed structures experienced fire-induced collapse. WTC 7 collapsed completely after burning unchecked for approximately 7 hours, and a partial collapse occurred in an interior section of WTC 5. Studies of WTC 7 indicate that the collapse began in the lower stories, either through failure of major load transfer members located above and electrical substation structure or in columns in the stories above the transfer structure. The collapse of WTC 7 caused damage to the Verizon building and 30 West Broadway. The partial collapse of WTC 5 was not initiated by debris and is possibly a result of fire-induced connection failures. The collapse of these structures is particularly significant in that, prior to these events, no protected steel-frame structure, the most common form of large commercial construction in the United States, had ever experienced a fire-induced collapse. Thus, these events may highlight new building vulnerabilities, not previously believed to exist.

In the study of the WTC towers and the surrounding buildings that were subsequently damaged by falling debris and fire, several issues were found to be critical to the observed building performance in one or more buildings.

General Observations, Findings and Recommendations

These issues above fall into several broad topics that should be considered for buildings that are being evaluated or designed for extreme events. It may be that some of these issues should be considered for all buildings; however, additional studies are required before general recommendations, if any, can be made for all buildings. The issues identified from this study of damaged buildings in or near the WTC site have been summarized into the following points.

a. Structural framing systems need redundancy and/or robustness, so that alternative paths or additional capacity is available for transmitting loads when building damage occurs.
b. Fireproofing needs to adhere under impact and fire conditions that deform steel members, so that the coatings remain on the steel and prove the intended protection.
c. Connection performance under impact loads and during fire loads needs to be analytically understood and quantified for improved design capabilities and performance as critical components in structural frames.
d. Fire protection ratings that include the use of sprinklers in buildings require a reliable and redundant water supply. If the water supply is interrupted, the assumed fire protection is greatly reduced.
e. Egress systems currently in use should be evaluated for redundancy and robustness in providing egress when building damage occurs, including the issues of transfer floors, stair spacing and locations, and stairwell enclosure impact resistance.

f. Fire protection ratings and safety factors for structural transfer systems should be evaluated for their adequacy relative to the role of transfer systems in building stability.

What Significant Recommendations Does the Team Make in Its Report?

What may be most important is that the BPS Team does not recommend any immediate changes in building codes. The Team believes that there are a number of areas that need further study, and that there are some things that building designers could do to improve safety for occupants in building that might be possible terrorist targets.

In general terms, the FEMA/ASCE report suggests that critical building components such as the structural frame, the sprinkler system or the exit stairwells be designed to be more redundant, more robust, or both. Redundancy means, for example, that if some structural columns were shattered, the building would be designed to transfer the weight to other columns. Robustness means making the building stronger and better able to resist impact without collapse.

The team is also strongly urging additional study of the collapse of the buildings.

What Key Findings Impact All Existing Buildings?

The team found that some connections between the structural steel beams failed in the fire. This was most apparent in the collapse of World Trade Center Building 5, where the fireproofing did not protect the connections, causing the structure to fail.

The team is calling for more research and analysis of the how the connections weakened and how best to strengthen their resistance to future fires. Typically, fire resistance tests are limited to steel members, not to the steel connections. Furthermore, fireproofing is sprayed on the connections the same way it is applied to the trusses, though the steel in the trusses and joints may be made of different alloys.

Source: U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Science, *9/11-Understanding the Collapse of the World Trade Center* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), pp. 29–43.

Document 26

Report by Eleanor Hill from the Joint Inquiry Staff Statement on the Intelligence on the Possible Terrorist Use of Airplanes (September 18, 2002)

The use by terrorists of commercial aircraft as a weapon in a suicide mission came as a surprise to the American public and terrorist experts alike. Yet the American intelligence community was aware of hints that terrorists had an interest in hijacking commercial aircraft. Just how much knowledge the American intelligence community had about this tactic was revealed in a report from the Joint Inquiry of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence and the House's Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held between September 18 and 26, 2002. Eleanor Hill made this statement on the subject on September 18, 2002.

Central to the September 11 attacks was the terrorists' use of airplanes as weapons. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, there was much discussion about the extent to which our Government was, or could have been, aware of the threat of terrorist attacks of this type and the extent to which adequate precautions were taken to address that threat. We therefore asked the question: Did the Intelligence Community have any information in its possession prior to September 11, 2001 indicating that terrorists were contemplating using airplanes as weapons?

Based on our review to date of the requested information, we believe that the Intelligence Community was aware of the potential for this type of terrorist attack, but did not produce any specific assessments of the likelihood that terrorists would use airplanes as weapons.

Our review has uncovered several examples of intelligence reporting on the possible use of airplanes as weapons in terrorist operations. As with the intelligence reports indicating Bin Ladin's intentions to strike inside the United States, the credibility of the sources is sometimes questionable, and the information is often

sketchy. Nevertheless, we did find reporting on this kind of potential threat, including the following:

- In December 1994, Algerian Armed Islamic Group terrorists hijacked an air France flight in Algiers and threatened to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. French authorities deceived the terrorists into thinking the plane did not have enough fuel to reach Paris and diverted it to Marseilles. A French anti-terrorist force stormed the plane and killed all four terrorists;
- In January 1995, a Philippine National Police raid turned up materials in a Manila apartment indicating that three individuals—Ramzi Yousef, Abdul Murad and Khalid Shaykh Mohammad—planned, among other things, to crash an airplane into CIA headquarters. The Philippine National Police said that the same group was responsible for the bombing of a Philippine airliner on December 12, 1994. Information on the threat was passed to the FAA, which briefed U.S. and major foreign carriers;
- In January 1996, the Intelligence Community obtained information concerning a planned suicide attack by individuals associated with Shaykh Omar Adb al-Rahman and a key al-Qa'ida operative. The plan was to fly to the United States from Afghanistan and attack the White House;
- In October 1996, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese plane over Israel and crash it into Tel Aviv. An individual would board the plane in the Far East. During the flight, he would commandeer the aircraft, order it to fly over Tel Aviv, and then crash the plane into the city;
- In 1997, one of the units at FBI headquarters became concerned about the possibility of a terrorist group using an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for terrorist attacks. The FBI and CIA became aware of reporting that this group had purchased a UAV. At the time, the agencies' view was that the only reason that this group would need a UAV would be for either reconnaissance or attack. There was more concern about the possibility of an attack outside the Untied States, for example, by flying a UAV into a U.S. Embassy or a visiting U.S. delegation;
- In August 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. The information was passed to the FBI and the FAA. The FAA found the plot highly unlikely given the state of that foreign country's aviation program. Moreover, they believed that a flight originating outside the United States would be detected before it reached its intended target inside the United States. The FBI's New York office took no action on the information, filing the communication in the office's bombing repository file. The Intelligence Community has acquired additional information since then indicating there may be links between this group and other terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida;
- In September 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that Usama Bin Ladin's next operation could possibly involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. airport and detonating it; this information was provided to senior U.S. officials in late 1998;

- In November 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that the Turkish Kaplancilar, and Islamic extremist group, had planned a suicide attack to coincide with celebrations marking the death of Ataturk. The conspirators, who were arrested, planned to crash an airplane packed with explosives into Ataturk's tomb during a government ceremony. The Turkish press said the group had cooperated with Usama Bin Ladin. The FBI's New York office included this incident in one of its Usama Bin Ladin databases:
- In February 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained information that Iraq had formed a suicide pilot unit that it planned to use against British and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. The CIA commented that this was highly unlikely and probably disinformation;
- In March 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding plans by al-Qa'ida member, who was a U.S. citizen, to fly a hang glider into the Egyptian Presidential Palace and then detonate the explosives he was carrying. The individual, who received hang glider training in the United States, brought a hang glider back to Afghanistan. However, various problems arose during the testing of the glider. He was subsequently arrested and is in custody abroad;
- In April 2000, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding an alleged Bin Ladin plot to hijack a 747. The source, who was a "walk-in" to the FBI's Newark office, claimed that he had been to a training camp in Pakistan where he learned hijacking techniques and received arms training. He also stated that he was supposed to meet five to six other individuals in the United States who would also participate in the plot. They were instructed to use all necessary force to take over the plane because there would be pilots among the hijacking team. The plan was to fly the plane to Afghanistan, and if they would not make it there, that they were to blow up the plane. Although the individual passed an FBI polygraph, the FBI was never able to verify any aspect of his story or identify his contacts in the United States; and
- In August 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding a plot to either bomb the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. The Intelligence Community learned that two people, who were reportedly acting on instructions from Usama Bin Ladin, met in October 2000 to discuss this plot.

The CIA disseminated several of these reports to the FBI and to agencies that would be responsible for taking preventive actions, including the FAA. The FAA has staff assigned to the DCI's CTC, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, and to the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service go gather relevant intelligence for domestic use. The FAA is responsible for issuing information circulars, security directives and emergency amendments to the directives alerting domestic and international airports and airlines of threats identified by the Intelligence Community.

Despite these reports, the Intelligence Community did not produce any specific assessments of the likelihood that terrorists would use airplanes as weapons. Again, this may have been driven in part by resource issues in the area of intelligence analysis. Prior to September 11, 2001, the CTC had forty analysts to analyze

terrorism issues worldwide, with only one of the five branches focused on terrorist tactics. As a result, prior to September 11, 2001, the only terrorist tactic, on which the CTC performed strategic analysis was the possible use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (CBRN) because there was more obvious potential for mass casualties.

At the FBI, our review found that, prior to September 11, 2001, support for ongoing investigations and operations was favored, in terms of allocating resources, over long-term, strategic analysis. We were told, during the course of our FBI interviews, that prevention occurs in the operational units, not through strategic analysis, and that, prior to September 11, the FBI had insufficient resources to do both. We were also told that the FBI's al-Qa'ida-related analytic expertise had been "gutted" by transfers to operational units and that, as a result, the FBI's analytic unit had only one individual working on al-Qa'ida at the time of the September 11 attacks.

While focused strategic analysis was lacking, the subject of aviation-related terrorism was included in some broader terrorist threat assessments, such as the National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) on terrorism. For example the 1995 NIE on terrorism mentioned the plot to down 12 U.S.-owned airliners. The NIE also cited the consideration the Bojinka conspirators gave to attacking CIA headquarters using an aircraft loaded with explosives. The FAA worked with the Intelligence Community on this analysis and actually drafted the section of the NIE addressing the threat to civil aviation. The section contained the following language:

> Our review of the evidence . . . suggests the conspirators were guided in their selection of the method and venue of attack by carefully studying security procedures in place in the region. If terrorists operating in this country [the United States] are similarly methodical, they will identify serious vulnerabilities in the security for domestic flights.

The 1997 update to the 1995 NIE on terrorism included the following language:

> Civil aviation remains a particularly attractive target in light of the fear and publicity the downing of an airliner would evoke and the revelations last summer of the US air transport sectors' vulnerabilities.

As a result of the increasing threats to aviation, Congress passed Section 310 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, requiring the FAA and the FBI to conduct joint threat and vulnerability assessments of security at select "high risk" U.S. airports and to provide Congress with an annual report. In the December 2000 report, the FBI and FAA published a classified assessment that suggested less concern about the threat to domestic aviation:

> FBI investigations confirm domestic and international terrorist groups operating within the U.S. but do not suggest evidence of plans to target domestic civil aviation. Terrorist activity within the U.S. has focused primarily on fundraising, recruiting new members, and disseminating propaganda. While international terrorists have conducted attacks on U.S. soil, these acts represent anomalies in their traditional targeting which focuses on U.S. interests overseas.

In short, less than a year prior to the September 11 attacks and notwithstanding historical intelligence information to the contrary, the FBI and FAA have assessed the prospects of a terrorist incident targeting domestic civil aviation in the United States as relatively low.

After September 11, 2001, the CIA belatedly acknowledged some of the information that was available regarding the use of airplanes as weapons. A draft analysis dated November 19, 2001, "The 11 September Attacks: A Preliminary Assessment," states:

> We do not know the process by which Bin Ladin and his lieutenants decided to hijack planes with the idea of flying them into buildings in the United States, but the idea of hijacking planes for suicide attacks had long been current in jihadist circles. For example, GIA terrorists from Algeria had planned to crash an Air France jet into the Eiffel Tower in December 1994, and Ramzi Yousef—a participant in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing—planned to explode 12 US jetliners in mid-air over the Pacific in the mid-1990s. Likewise the World Trade Center had long been a target of terrorist bombers.

Despite the intelligence available in recent years, our review to date had found no indications that, prior to September 11, analysts in the Intelligence Community were:

- Cataloguing information regarding the use of airplanes as weapons as a terrorist tactic;
- Sending requirements to collectors to look for additional information on this threat; or
- Considering the likelihood that Usama Bin Ladin, al-Qa'ida, or any other terrorist group, would attack the Untied States or U.S. interests in this way.

Source: Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. Senate and the Permanent Select Committee of Intelligence House of Representatives, *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of Sept. 11, 2001* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), vol. 1, pp. 26–31.

Document 27

Report by Eleanor Hill from the Joint Inquiry Staff on the Intelligence Community's Knowledge of the September 11 Hijackers Prior to September 11, 2001 (September 20, 2002)

In another report from the Joint Inquiry Staff of the Senate's Selection Committee on Intelligence and the House's Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Eleanor Hill outlined the investigation of U.S. government agencies on the three known terrorist suspects before September 11. These three later participated in the suicide attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

Three September 11 Hijackers Who Came to the Attention of the Intelligence Community Prior to September 11, 2001

What follows is a description of how the Intelligence Community developed information on three of the hijackers, and when the Intelligence Community had, but missed, opportunities both to deny them entry into the United States and, subsequently, to generate investigative and surveillance action regarding their activities within the United States. At this stage, we must also reiterate that this is only an unclassified summary of these events. While the Joint Inquiry Staff has studied this intelligence trail in great detail, some aspects involving intelligence sources and methods remain classified. A separate and more detailed classified report is also being submitted to the two Committees.

As mentioned earlier, the Joint Inquiry Staff has also requested that the written statements of the CDI and Director of the FBI be declassified. When they become available, they will further describe what the Intelligence Community now knows about the September 11 plot.

As background, we mention here that watchlists are important to U.S. Government efforts aimed at preventing criminals and terrorists from entering the

United States from overseas. The State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Customs Service all maintain watchlists of named individuals. Names are added to the watchlists based on information provided by the Intelligence Community and various law enforcement agencies. When individuals apply for visas to enter the United States or present themselves to immigration officers at U.S. ports of entry—airports, seaports, and land border crossings—U.S. consular officers, INS officers, and Customs agents check their names against watchlists maintained by their respective agencies. If an individual's name is on a U.S. Government watchlist, he or she may be denied visas or denied entry into the United States.

The story begins in December 1999 with the Intelligence Community on heightened alert for possible terrorist activity as the world prepared to celebrate the new Millennium. A meeting of individuals believed at the time to be associated with Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist network took place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia from January 5 to 8, 2000. Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi were among those attending the meeting in Malaysia, along with an individual later identified as Khallad bin-Atash, a key operative in Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist network. The meeting took place at a condominium owned by an individual named Yazid Sufaat. Sufaat is the same individual who would later, in October 2000, sign letters identifying Zacarias Moussaoui as a representative of his company. U.S. authorities found these letters in the possession of Moussaoui after the September 11 attacks. Although it was not known what was discussed at the Malaysia meeting, the CIA believed it to be a gathering of al-Qa'ida associates. Several of the individuals attending the meeting, including al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, then proceeded to another Southeast Asian country.

By the time these individual entered Malaysia, the CIA determined Khalid al-Mihdhar's full name, his passport number, and birth information. Significantly, it also knew that he held a U.S. B-1/B-2 multiple-entry visa that had been issued to him in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on April 7, 1999 and would not expire until April 6, 2000. Soon after these individuals departed Malaysia for another country on January 8, 2001, the CIA also received indications that Nawaf's last name might be al-Hazmi. Unbeknownst to the CIA, another arm of the Intelligence Community, the NSA, had information associating Nawaf al-Hazmi with the Bin Ladin network. NSA did not immediately disseminate that information, although it was in NSA's database. At this stage, Salim was known to the rest of the Intelligence Community as an associate of Khalid's and Nawaf's and that he was possibly Nawaf's brother. Al-Mihdhar's and Nawaf al-Hazmi's names could have been, but were not, added at this time to the State Department, INS, and U.S. Customs Service watchlists denying individuals entry into the United States.

A CIA communication in early January 2000 states that al-Mihdhar's travel documents, including his multiple entry visa for the United States, were shared with the FBI for further investigation. No one at the FBI recalls having received such documents at the time. No confirmatory record of the transmittal of the travel documents has yet been located at either the CIA or the FBI. In addition, while the Malaysian meeting was in progress, a CIA employee sent an e-mail to a CIA colleague, advising that he had briefed two FBI agents about what the CIA had learned about al-Mihdhar's activities. The CIA employee told us that he had, at the time, been assigned to work at the FBI Strategic Information

Operations Center to fix problems "in communicating between the CIA and the FBI." His e-mail, however, makes no mention of the CIA's determination that al-Mihdhar held a U.S. multiple-entry visa. The CIA employee notes in his e-mail that he had told the second FBI agent that:

> . . . this continues to be an [intelligence] operation. Thus far, a lot of suspicious activity has been observed but nothing that would indicate evidence of an impending attack or criminal enterprise. Told [the first FBI agent] that as soon as something concrete is developed leading us to the criminal arena or to known FBI cases, we will immediately bring FBI into the loop. Like [the first FBI agent] yesterday, [second FBI] stated that this was a fine approach and thanked me for keeping him in the loop.

The CIA employee told the Joint Inquiry Staff that he does not recall telling the FBI about Mihdhar's visa information and potential travel to the United States.

When interviewed by the Joint Inquiry Staff, neither FBI agent initially recalled discussions with the CIA employee about al-Mihdhar. The first agent did locate his own handwritten notes that indicated that he did speak with the employee about the Malaysia activities, probably in early January 2000. The second agent knows the CIA employee but does not recall learning about al-Mihdhar or the Malaysia meeting until after September 11, 2001. An e-mail from the second FBI agent to a superior at FBI headquarters has been located that relates the basic facts of the conversation with the CIA employee. The e-mail makes no mention of al-Mihdhar's visa information or possible travel to the United States. It concludes with "CIA is reporting relevant information as it becomes available."

The CIA maintained its interest in al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi after their departure from Malaysia, with assistance from foreign authorities. A February 2000 CIA cable in response to a request by foreign authorities to become involved reiterated CIA's primacy in the case and intent "to determine what the subject is up to."

In early March 2000, CIA headquarters, including both the CTC and the special Bin Ladin unit, received information from an overseas CIA station involved in the matter that Nawaf al-Hazmi had entered the United States via Los Angeles International Airport on January 15, 2000. No further destination for Khalid al-Mihdhar was noted in the CIA cable. The cable carrying the information was marked "Action Required: None, FYI." The following day, another overseas CIA station noted, in a cable to the Bin Ladin unit at CIA headquarters, that it had "read with interest" the March cable, "particularly the information that a member of this group traveled to the U.S. . . ." The CIA did not act on this information. Nor did it consider the possibility that, because Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar had been together in Malaysia and continued on together to another Southeast Asian country, there was a substantial probability that they would travel further together. In fact, al-Mihdhar, who had traveled with al-Hazmi, continued on with him to the United States on January 15, 2000.

Again, at this point, these two individuals, who later participated in the September 11 attacks, could have been added to the State Department's watchlist for denying individuals entry into the United States. Although the individuals had already entered the United States, the sharing of this information with the FBI and

appropriate law enforcement authorities could have prompted investigative efforts to locate these individuals and surveil their activities within the United States. Unfortunately, none of these things happened. The Joint Inquiry Staff has interviewed the individual at CIA headquarters who had direct responsibility for tracking the movement of individuals at this meeting in Malaysia. That person does not recall seeing the March message. In his testimony before the Joint Inquiry on June 18, 2001, the DCI acknowledged that the CIA should have acted to add these individuals to the State Department's watchlist in March 2000 and characterized this omission as a mistake.

During the course of our interviews, we attempted to identify the reasons why that mistake occurred. We were told that there was, at the time, no formal system in place at the CTC for watchlisting suspected terrorists with indications of travel to the United States. CIA personnel also told us that they received no formal training on watchlisting. One CIA employee said they learned about the watchlisting process through "on-the-job training." Another CIA employee who had been aware of al-Mihdhar's participation in the Malaysia meeting told us that, prior to September 11, 2001, it was "not incumbent on CTC's special Bin Ladin unit to watchlist such individuals." Finally, a CTC employee who in 2000 handled the cable traffic on the Malaysia meeting told us that the meeting was not considered "important" (relative to other counterterrorist activities occurring at that time) and that there was "not enough people" to handle CTC's workload at the time. As a result, informational cables—such as the March 2000 message—received less attention than "action" items. Several other employees told us that they typically did not have time to even read information cables.

The failure to watchlist al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi or, at a minimum, to advise the FBI of their travel to the United States, is perhaps even more puzzling because it occurred shortly after the peak of Intelligence Community alertness to possible Millennium-related terrorist attacks. In the fall of 1999, there was debate within the Intelligence Community about whether intelligence information that had been collected earlier that year meant that Usama Bin Ladin's network intended to carry out terrorist attacks in the midst of the celebrations ushering in the new Millennium. Intelligence information, along with the arrest of Ahmed Ressam at the U.S.-Canadian border, prompted the U.S. Government and various foreign governments to arrest, detain, and otherwise disrupt numerous individuals associated with Bin Ladin's network in various locations around the world. These disruption operations occurred between December 1999 and February 2000. Thus, the Malaysia meeting of January 5-8, 2000 and the March 2000 information that al-Hazmi had entered the United States developed at a time when the Intelligence Community had only recently confronted the real possibility of a Bin Ladin attack. However, it apparently was still focused on the organization and aftermath of the previous operations.

In interviews with the Joint Inquiry Staff, a number of working level CIA personnel who were following the Malaysia meeting and other terrorist activities in the Millennium timeframe have characterized the Malaysia meeting as just one of many counterterrorist efforts occurring at that time. In contrast, documents reviewed by the Joint Inquiry Staff show that the Malaysia meeting was deemed sufficiently important at the time that it was included—along with several other counterterrorist activities—in several briefings to the DCI in January 2000. We

were told, however, that the matter was "dropped" when the CIA employee handling the matter moved on to other issues and, as a result, no CIA officer was following the al-Mihdhar group by the summer of 2000.

By March 2000, al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi had settled into a residence in San Diego. In the course of their time in San Diego, they used their true names on a rental agreement, as al-Mihdhar also did in obtaining a California motor vehicle photo identification card. In May 2000, they took flight lessons in San Diego but abandoned the effort. On June 10, 2000, al-Mihdhar left the Untied States on a Lufthansa flight from Los Angeles to Frankfurt.

Nawaf al-Hazmi remained in the United States. On July 7, 2000, a week shy of the expiration of the six-month visa to stay in the United States that he had been granted on January, 2000, al-Hazmi applied to the INS for an extension to his visa. He used on his INS application the Lemon Grove, California address for the residence that the shared with al-Mihdhar before the latter's departure in early June 2000. The INS recorded receipt of the extension request on July 27, 2000. The INS has advised the Joint Inquiry Staff that it assumes a receipt was generated and sent to al-Hazmi at the address he listed. Lemon Grove is the community al-Hazmi lived in until December 2000. At that time, he moved to Mesa, Arizona with Hani Hanjour, who in December had just returned to the United States and would later be the most likely hijacker to have piloted American Flight 77. The INS does not have a record of a further extension request by al-Hazmi, who remained in the United States illegally after his initial extension expired in January 2001.

On October 12, 2000, two individuals with ties to Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist network carried out an attack on *USS Cole* as the Navy destroyer was refueling in Aden, Yemen. In the course of its investigation of the attack, the FBI developed information indicating that an individual named Tawfiq Mahomed Saleh Atash, also known as Khallad, had been a principal planner in the *Cole* bombing and that two other participants in the *Cole* conspiracy had delivered money to Khallad at the time of the January 2000 Malaysia meeting. The FBI shared this information with the CIA, and it prompted analysts at CIA to take another look at the January 2000 meeting in Malaysia.

In that process, the CIA acquired information in January 2001 indicating that Khallad had attended the meeting in Malaysia. This information was significant because it meant that the other attendees, including al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, had been in direct contact with the key planner in Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist network behind the *Cole* attack. However, CIA again apparently did not act and did not add Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi to the State Department's watchlist for denying individuals entry into the United States. At this time, Khalid al-Mihdhar was abroad, while Nawaf al-Hazmi was still in the United States.

In May 2001, personnel at the CIA provided an Intelligence Operations Specialist (IOS) at FBI headquarters with photographs taken in Malaysia, including one of al-Mihdhar. The CIA wanted the FBI to review the photographs to determine whether an individual in custody in connection with the FBI's *Cole* investigation (who had carried the money to a Southeast Asian country for Khallad in January 2000) could be identified in the photographs. When interviewed, the FBI IOS who received the photographs told the Joint Inquiry Staff that the CIA

told her about Mihdhar's meeting in Malaysia and travel to another Southeast country, but said nothing about his potential travel to the United States. Nor did the CIA advise the FBI that the photographs were from a meeting that it believed Khallad had attended. Again, no action was taken to watchlist al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi.

On June 11, 2001, FBI headquarters representatives and CIA representatives met with the New York FBI agents handling the *Cole* investigation. The New York agents were shown, but not given copies of, the photographs and told they were taken in Malaysia. When interviewed, one of the New York agents recalled al-Mihdhar's name being mentioned. He also recalled asking for more information on why the people in the photographs were being followed and for access to that information. The New York agents were advised they could not be told why al-Mihdhar and the others were being followed. An FBI headquarters representative told us in her interview that the FBI was never given specific information until it was provided after September 11, 2001. The CIA analyst who attended the New York meeting acknowledged to the Joint Inquiry Staff that he had seen the information regarding al-Mihdhar's U.S. visa and al-Hazmi's travel to the United States. But, he stated that he would not share information outside of the CIA unless he had authority to do so and unless that was the purpose of the meeting.

On June 13, 2001, Khalid al-Mihdhar obtained a new U.S. visa in Jeddah, using a different passport than the one he had used to enter the United States on January 15, 2001. On his visa application, he checked "no" in response to the question of whether he had ever been in the United States. On July 4, 2001, al-Mihdhar re-entered the United States.

On or about July 13, 2001, a CIA officer assigned to the FBI accessed CIA's electronic database and located a CIA cable, for which he had been searching, that contained information the CIA had acquired in January 2001 indicating that Khallad had attended the meeting in Malaysia. The presence of Khallad in Malaysia deeply troubled the CIA officer, who immediately sent an email from FBI headquarters to the DCI's CTC saying of Khallad: "This is a major league killer, who orchestrated the *Cole* attack and possibly the Africa bombings."

A review at the CIA of all prior cables concerning the Malaysia meeting was launched, a task that fell to an FBI analyst assigned to the CTC. On August 21, 2001, the FBI analyst put together two key pieces of information. These were the intelligence that the CIA had received in January 2000 that al-Mihdhar had a multiple entry visa to the United States and the Information it had received in March 2000 that Nawaf al-Hazmi had enter the United States on January 15, 2000. Working with an INS representative assigned to the CTC, the analyst obtained information that al-Mihdhar had entered the United States on January 15, 2000 and had departed on June 10, 2000. Additional investigation revealed that al-Mihdhar had re-entered the United States on July 4, 2001, with a visa that allowed him to stay in the United States through August 22. CIA suspicions were further aroused by the timing of al-Mihdhar's and al-Hazmi's arrival in Los Angeles in January 2000, the same general timeframe in which Algerian terrorist and Bin Ladin associate Ahmed Ressam was to have arrived in Los Angeles to conduct terrorist operations.

On August 23, 2001, the CIA sent a cable to the State Department, INS, Customs Service, and FBI requesting that "Bin Ladin related individuals"—al-Mihdhar, Nawaf

al-Hazmi, and two other individuals at the Malaysia meeting—be watchlisted immediately and denied entry into the United States "due to their confirmed links to Egyptian Islamic Jihad operatives and suspicious activities while traveling in East Asia." Although the CIA believed al-Mihdhar was in the United States, placing him on the watchlist would enable authorities to detain him if he attempted to leave.

Meanwhile, the FBI headquarters' Usama Bin Ladin Unit sent to the FBI's New York field office a draft document recommending the opening of an intelligence investigation on al-Mihdhar ". . . to determine if al-Mihdhar is still in the United States." It also stated that al-Mihdhar's confirmed association with various elements of Bin Ladin's terrorist network, including potential association with two individuals involved in the attack on *USS Cole*, "make him a risk to the national security of the United States." This document was sent to New York in final form on August 28. New York FBI agents told us that they tried to convince FBI headquarters to open a criminal investigation on al-Mihdhar, given the importance of the search and the limited resources that were available to intelligence investigations. FBI headquarters declined to do so because there was, in its view, no way to connect al-Mihdhar to the ongoing *Cole* investigation without using some intelligence information.

At the State Department, a visa revocation process was begun immediately. Al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Khallad, and the other individual who had been at the Malaysia meeting were added to the watchlists maintained by INS and Customs Service, on the chance that they had not yet entered the United States.

The FBI contacted the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the State Department on August 27, 2001 to obtain al-Mihdhar's and Nawaf al-Hazmi's visa information. The visa information was provided to the FBI on August 29, 2001. It revealed that, on entering the United States on July 4, 2001, al-Mihdhar had indicated on his application that he would be staying at a Marriott hotel in New York City. An FBI agent working with a Naval Criminal Investigative Service agent determined on September 5, 2001 that al-Mihdhar had not registered at any New York area Marriott hotel, including the Marriott World Trade Center Hotel. On September 10, 2001, the New York FBI field office prepared a request that the FBI office in Los Angeles check registration records for all Sheraton Hotels located in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. The request also asked the Los Angeles field office to check with Untied Airlines and Lufthansa for travel and alias information since al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi had used those airlines when they entered and when al-Mihdhar departed the United States. The Los Angeles FBI office conducted the search after September 11, 2001, with negative results.

In short, the CIA had obtained information identifying two of the 19 hijackers, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, as suspected terrorists carrying visas for travel to the United States al long as eighteen months prior to the time they were eventually watch-listed on August 24, 2001. There were numerous opportunities during the tracking of these two suspected terrorists when the CIA could have alerted the FBI and other U.S. law enforcement authorities to the probability that these individual either were or would soon be in the United States. That was not done, nor were they placed on watchlists denying them entry into the United States. In his closed-door testimony of June 18, 2000, before the Joint Inquiry, as mentioned earlier, the DCI acknowledged that the CIA had made a mistake in not watch-listing these two individuals prior to August 2001.

It is worth noting that the watchlists mentioned above are aimed at denying named individuals from entering the United States. Prior to September 11, 2001, these watchlists were not used to screen individuals boarding domestic flights within the United States. Thus, even though al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi had been placed on U.S. watchlists two weeks prior to September 11, 2001, this did not prevent them from boarding American Flight 77 on September 11.

Beyond the watchlist issue, the story of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi also graphically illustrates the gulf that apparently existed, at least prior to September 11, 2001, between intelligence and law enforcement counterterrorist efforts. An effective defense against terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida requires close collaboration between both law enforcement and foreign intelligence agencies as well as within the FBI between the unit responsible for criminal investigations and the unit responsible for counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations. There are a number of factors that make effective integration of law enforcement and intelligence investigations against terrorism difficult. These include differences in experience, tactics, objectives, legal authorities, and concern for protecting intelligence sources and methods. A brief explanation of certain legal distinctions between law enforcement and foreign intelligence investigations is important to understand aspects of how CIA and FBI dealt with information about the hijackers as well as the FBI's handling of the Moussaoui investigation.

The May 17, 2002 opinion of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) concerning "minimization procedures" that control the dissemination of information collected by the FBI pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) addresses the legal issue of the appropriate relationship between the law enforcement and foreign intelligence aspects of counterterrorism investigation. Historically, the U.S. Government has recognized two distinct, albeit occasionally overlapping, spheres of investigative activity; domestic criminal investigations and foreign intelligence collection. The former is the exclusive province of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies; the National Security Act of 1947 forbids the CIA from having any internal security or law enforcement powers. Domestic law enforcement activity is carefully circumscribed by constitutional protections in the 4th, 5th, and 6th amendments and various statutory controls on electronic surveillance and physical searches. In general, the government is required to establish probable cause to believe a search will obtain evidence of criminal activity in order to obtain a search warrant in a criminal investigation.

Foreign intelligence collection, on the other hand, is the responsibility of the Intelligence Community under the guidance of the DCI. Collection of such information is carefully regulated when U.S. persons are the targets or when electronic surveillance or physical searches are conducted in the United States against foreign powers or their agents pursuant to FISA. The rules governing foreign intelligence collection are different than those pertaining to the collection and dissemination of information for law enforcement purposes. In general, this differentiation is explained by the national security purpose of foreign intelligence collection, i.e, to enable the conduct of foreign policy and military operations and to counter hostile intelligence services and international terrorists. While it is possible that evidence of criminal conduct may be obtained in the course of such a surveillance,

the FISC's May 17 opinion holds that the acquisition of such evidence may not be the primary purpose of such a surveillance. Surveillance for domestic law enforcement purposes, by contrast, obviously may be conducted for the purpose of subsequent criminal prosecution.

The existence of two categories of surveillance rules and the perceived need to keep them discrete raises practical problems in managing an investigation that straddles the divide as counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations often do. The first question is whether to apply criminal or foreign intelligence rules in a particular case. The second is how to regulate coordination and interaction between intelligence and law enforcement personnel.

One way to ensure against violation of rules limiting such coordination and interaction is the imposition of a "wall" that requires someone not involved in either the foreign intelligence surveillance or the criminal investigation to decide what information should be passed from intelligence personnel to criminal investigators. That is one issue the FISC addresses in the May 2002 opinion mentioned above.

There is, however, a second type of wall that can also limit the flow of information to criminal investigators from intelligence agencies; that wall exists to protect foreign intelligence sources and methods from disclosure in a criminal prosecution. Intelligence agencies often provide information to the FBI, for example, with a limitation that it may only be used for lead purposes as distinct from evidentiary purposes. In the case of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, evidently, assisting the important *USS Cole* criminal investigation was deemed insufficient to justify breaching the "wall" that prevented the full sharing of relevant intelligence information with the agents handling that criminal investigation.

An August 29, 2001 e-mail exchange between FBI headquarters and a FBI agent in New York is illustrative. The agent, who had been involved in the *Cole* criminal investigation since the day of that attack, asked FBI headquarters to allow New York to use the full criminal investigative resources available to the FBI to find al-Mihdhar. Headquarters responded that its National Security Law Unit advised that this could not be done. This was the exchange:

- From FBI Headquarters: "A criminal agent CAN NOT be present at the interview. This case, in its entirety, is based on [intelligence]. If at such time as information is developed indicating the existence of a substantial federal crime, that information will be passed over the wall according to the proper procedures and turned over for follow-up criminal investigation." [Emphasis in original.]
- From FBI agent, New York: "Whatever has happened to this—someday someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain 'problems.' Let's hope the [FBI's] National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now. UBL is getting the most "protection.'"

Within two weeks after the September 11 attacks, the FBI prepared an analysis of Bin Ladin's responsibility as part of the State Department's development of a "White Paper" that could be shared with foreign governments. That analysis

relied, at least in part, on the connection between the attack on the *USS Cole* investigation and al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi:

> Even at this early state of the investigations, the FBI has developed compelling evidence which points to Usama Bin Ladin an al-Qa'ida as the perpetrators of this attack. By way of illustration, at least two of the hijackers met with a senior al-Qa'ida terrorist, the same al-Qa'ida terrorist which reliable information demonstrates orchestrated the attack on the *USS Cole* and who was involved in the planning of the East Africa Embassy Bombings.

The two hijackers referred to were al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. The senior al-Qa'ida terrorist was Khallad. The place that they met was Malaysia. Thus, the facts linking these two individuals to Khallad and therefore to Usama Bin Ladin formed the crux of the case made by the State Department to governments around the world that Usama Bin Ladin should be held accountable for the September 11 attacks.

Source: Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. Senate and the Permanent Select Committee of Intelligence House of Representatives, *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of Sept. 11, 2001* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), vol.1, pp. 310–330.

Document 28

Statement of a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (September 20, 2002)

In a statement before the Joint Committee on Intelligence, an unnamed FBI special agent expressed his unhappiness with "the wall" that separated intelligence gathering from criminal investigations. This barrier meant that once a criminal investigation had been launched, information could no longer be shared with the intelligence-gathering agents in the FBI or with any other agency of the U.S. government. Legal opinion at FBI headquarters was that this distinction was sacrosanct. Even if the information concerned national security there could be no exceptions. This reasoning was part of the FBI's risk-avoidance strategy before September 11.

Mr. Chairmen, Vice Chairman Shelby, Ranking Member Pelosi, and members of the Committees, I am a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation assigned to the New York field office. I appreciate your invitation to appear before your committees today in connection with you Joint Inquiry into the tragic events of September 11, 2001. I fully understand the responsibility with which you have been charged. I intend to cooperated with you and answer your questions to the best of my ability.

I am speaking to you today as an individual agent. The views I express, therefore, are my own, not necessarily those of the FBI, although I believe that my concerns are shared by many fellow agents. I hope by appearing here today I might help in a small way to assure that the men and women of the FBI and others in the Intelligence Community, have access to the information necessary to carry out their sworn duty to protect the people of the United States.

I have no wish in the remarks that follow to be critical of any person. Whether they are at (FBI) Headquarters or in the field, FBI personnel work their hearts out to perform our mission. I am before you today to address practices that frustrate us all. Much has been written about how the FBI does not share information with

local law enforcement agencies, but the American people must realize that the FBI does not always have access to the information itself, nor is all information the FBI possesses available to all of its agents. It is my belief that the former problem is due to the fear that the Bureau may "run ahead" or "mess up" a current or future operation of one of our sister agencies—and the latter is primarily due to decisions that have snowballed our of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court. A concept known as "The Wall" has been created within the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Communities. From my perspective, and in its broadest sense—"The Wall" is an information barrier placed between elements of an intelligence investigation and those of a criminal investigation. In theory— again same perspective—it is there to ensure that we, the FBI, play by the rules in our attempts to gather evidence in a criminal case and Federal prosecution.

I have tried to write this statement knowing full well that its contents and my testimony will be studied by the enemy. Along those lines—much detail has been left out and if I may humbly remind everyone that questions regarding sources, other possible operations, and investigative methods in this forum should be approached with extreme caution.

As an aside, may I say I firmly believe prevention is best served by allowing the Law Enforcement Community—Federal and local—to conduct sound, sometimes exigent investigations, with access to all information that the US Government and Liaison Governments possesses. These investigations build sources, evidence, connections and information—and are not simply reactive. I would like to assure the American people that in my almost seven (7) years in the Bureau, the FBI has always been in the Prevention—if I may—"Game."

Before going further, I would like to offer a few words of introduction so that you [are] aware of the background that I bring to the questions before the Committees. Between 1985 and 1993, I served in the military. After a brief stint in the private sector, I joined the FBI in December 1995, and was assigned to the New York Field Office's Joint Terrorism Task Force in July 1996. From July 1996 through October 1997, I worked on the TWA Flight 800 investigation. In October 1997, I was assigned to the squad that had responsibilities for Taliban and Pakistan matters. Following the East Africa Embassy bombings in August 1998, I was part of the first team on the ground, spending a cumulative total of over 30 weeks abroad investigating the bombings.

In early 1999, I joined the New York Field Office's Usama Bin Laden (UBL) case squad, which is responsible for the overall investigation of UBL and Al-Qaeda. Immediately after the attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen on October 12, 2000, I was assigned as one of the case agents and worked on that case—Adenbom—until the attacks of September 11, 2001. Since then I have also worked on general UBL matters and have been deployed 12 weeks overseas, working along side other Intelligence Community components. I mention this fact because, although there are issues about the sharing of information with FBI investigators by the CIA—my experience is the FBI and the Intelligence Community have worked successfully together. The people of the United States should take great pride in the service and sacrifice of the men and women of all the US Agencies and DOD deployed overseas—many of whom I have had the privilege of working with overseas.

Briefly, "The Wall" and implied, interpreted, created or assumed restrictions regarding it, prevented myself and other FBI Agents working a criminal case of the

New York Field Office from obtaining information from the Intelligence Community, regarding Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi in a meeting on June 11, 2001. At the time, there was reason to believe that Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi had met with a suspect connected to the attack against the USS Cole. The situation came to a head during the fourth week of August 2001, when, after it was learned that Al-Mihdhar was in the country, FBI HQ representatives said that FBI New York was compelled to open an "intelligence case" and that I nor any of the other "criminal case" investigators assigned to track Al-Qaeda could attempt to locate him. This resulted in a series of e-mails between myself and the FBI HQ analyst working the matter.

In my e-mails, I asked where this "The New Wall" was defined. I wrote on August 29, 2001: "Whatever has happened to this—someday someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain 'problems'. Let's hope the National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, UBL, is getting the most protection." I was told in response that "we [at Headquarters] are all frustrated with this issue," but "These are the rules. NSLU does not make them up." I hope, Messrs. Chairmen, these proceedings are the time to break down the barriers and change the system which makes it difficult for all of us, whether we work at FBI, HQ or in the field, at the FBI or elsewhere, to have and be able to act on the information that we need to do our jobs.

Personally, I do not hold any US Government affiliated individual or group of individuals responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001. I truly believe that if given a chance, anyone of them would given or sacrificed anything to have prevented what occurred. Then, and now, I hold the system responsible. Information is power in this system of Intelligence and Law Enforcement. This will never change—nor could or should it. In addition to "The Wall", the system as it currently exists, however, seduces some managers, agents, analysts, and officers into protecting turf and being the first to know and brief those above. Often these sadly mistaken individuals, use "The Wall" described herein, and others—real and imagined—to control that information.

I, myself, still have two key questions today that I believe are important for this committee to answer. The detailed answers to them will deserve, and be afforded, the scrutiny of a nation, and must stand the test of time and exhaustive investigation. First, if the CIA passed information regarding Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi to the FBI prior to the June 11, 2001 meeting—in either January 2000 or January 2001—then why was that information not passed, either by CIA or FBI Headquarters personnel immediately to the New York case agents, criminal or "Intel", investigating the murder of 17 sailors in Yemen when more information was requested? A simple answer of "The Wall" is unacceptable. Second, how and when did we, the CIA and the FBI, learn that Al-Mihdhar came into the country on either or both occasions, in January 2000 and or July 2001 and what did we do with the information?

On September 11, 2001, I spent the morning on the streets with other agents and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JFFT) personnel around the World Trade Center, providing whatever help we could. I and several of my co-workers were within blocks when both towers came down. Within minutes of the second strike on the

Southern Tower, we asked a senior fireman heading towards the South Tower what we could do. At the time, he was getting out of his fire truck and looking at the towers. By the Grace of God he turned to us and replied that he did not know what we could do—but that we were not going anywhere close to the buildings without a respirator. I do not know who he was but I truly believed he saved our lives. I also believe that based on the direction that he was looking, towards the Southern Tower, that moments later he entered that tower and perished in the attack. It's taken a while for his response, but I believe that the task before this committee, and in some small way—me being here today—is what that brave fireman is telling us, all of us, "what we can do."

If we do not change the system—if I may say again—"someday someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain 'problems'."

Thank you for this opportunity and privilege of appearing before you today. I would, of course, welcome your questions.

Source: Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. Senate and the Permanent Select Committee of Intelligence House of Representatives, *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of Sept. 11, 2001* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), vol.1, pp. 368–370.

Document 29

Report of the Joint Inquiry Staff by Eleanor Hill on the FBI's Handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication (September 24, 2002)

One of the controversies of the September 11 investigations was the failure of the FBI headquarters to react to the report of an FBI's Phoenix field agent about the number of Middle Eastern men taking pilot lessons and the potential danger to U.S. security. The Joint Inquiry Staff investigated this failure and presented its report on September 24, 2002, before the Joint Senate and House Committees on Intelligence.

The Phoenix Electronic Communication

The Joint Inquiry Staff's interim statement to the Committees on September 18, 2002 discussed the indications of an impending terrorist attack detected by the Intelligence Community in the summer of 2001 and the warnings that intelligence resulted in. In that same timeframe, an FBI special agent in the FBI's Phoenix field office generated a document that has been subsequently described in media reports as the "Phoenix memo." It is known within the FBI as the Phoenix Electronic Communication, or "Phoenix EC." "EC" is an FBI term of art. ECs are the primary type of document used by the FBI for internal communications. In this statement, we use the terms "Phoenix memo" and "Phoenix EC" interchangeably.

The Joint Inquiry Staff reviewed the Phoenix EC and its handling by FBI headquarters with the following questions in mind:

- What did the EC say?
- Why did the special agent write it?
- Who handled it within FBI headquarters and what reaction did it elicit?
- Does FBI headquarters' handling of the document illuminate any broader, systemic problems within the FBI?

Introduction

On July 10, 2001, a Special Agent (SA) in the FBI's Phoenix Division sent an EC to individuals in the Usama Bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) and the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) within the Counterterrorism Division at FBI headquarters and to several SAs on an International Terrorism squad in the New York Field Office. In the EC, the SA outlined his concerns that there was a coordinated effort underway by Usama Bin Ladin to send students to the United States for civil aviation-related training. He noted that there were an "inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest" attending this type of training in Arizona and speculated that this was part of an effort to establish a cadre of individuals in civil aviation, who would be in position to conduct terrorist activity in the future.

The EC contained a number of recommendations that the agent asked FBI headquarters to consider implementing. Apparently, the communication did not raise any alarms at FBI headquarters or in the New York office. In fact, New York personnel who reviewed the EC found it to be speculative and not particularly significant. New York already knew that many Middle Eastern flight students, including several associated with Bin Ladin, trained in the United States. They believed that Bin Ladin needed pilots to transport goods and personnel in Afghanistan, and, at the time, viewed pilots connected to Bin Ladin in that light. About a week after its receipt, headquarters personnel determined that no follow-up action was warranted in the Phoenix EC recommendations. No managers at FBI headquarters took part in that decision or even saw the communication before September 11, 2001. No one apparently considered the significance of the Phoenix EC in light of what else confronted the FBI counterterrorist team during the summer of 2001: the unprecedented increase in terrorist threat reporting, the investigation and arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui in August 2001, and the possible presence of Bin Ladin associates al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi in the United States.

Our review of the circumstances surrounding the Phoenix memo reveals a number of weaknesses at the FBI that, if left uncorrected, will continue to undercut counterterrorist efforts. The FBI handling of the Phoenix EC is symptomatic of a focus on short-term operational priorities, often at the expense of long-term, strategic analysis. Throughout this review, we have found that the FBI's ability to handle strategic analytic products, such as the Phoenix EC, was, at best, limited prior to September 11, 2001. Inadequate information sharing within the FBI, particularly between the operational and analytic units, is also highlighted by our review of the Phoenix EC. Several of the addresses on the EC, especially at the supervisory level, did not receive it prior to September 11 due to limitations in the electronic dissemination system. Those limitations are consistent with the complaints we have repeatedly heard throughout this inquiry about the FBI's technology problems. Finally, the case-driven, law enforcement approach, while important and extremely productive in terms of the FBI's traditional mission, does not generally "incentivize" attention to big-picture, preventive analysis and strategy. This is particularly true where there is no direct and immediate impact on an ongoing criminal prosecution.

In that context, the Joint Inquiry Staff found that the Phoenix memo was not the first time the FBI had confronted concerns about Middle Eastern individuals studying aviation topics in the United States. In 1998, the FBI's chief pilot in Oklahoma City drafted a memo expressing concern about the number of Middle

Eastern flight students there and his belief that they could be planning a terrorist attack. Also in 1998, the FBI had received reporting that a terrorist organization planned to bring students to the United States to study aviation and that a member of that organization had frequently expressed an intention to target civil aviation in the United States. Yet another terrorist organization, in 1999, allegedly wanted to do the same thing, triggering a request from FBI headquarters to 24 field officers to investigate and determine the level of the threat. To date, our review has found that the field officers conducted little to no investigation in response to that request.

Our inquiry found that, given the lack of information sharing across units in FBI headquarters, personnel who saw the Phoenix memo had no knowledge of any of these prior instances involving other terrorist groups. Since the prior reporting did not directly relate to al-Qa'ida, they were unable to evaluate the Phoenix EC in the context of what was known about likely terrorist strategies favored by other, similar groups. As terrorist groups increasingly associate with and support each other, information sharing and overarching strategic analysis is critical to success in counterterrorist efforts. This is particularly important to the FBI's efforts here in the United States, where the members of the various groups tend to associate with each other.

Finally, while the Phoenix EC does not include by name any of the hijackers involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks, our review confirmed that the FBI now believes that one of the individuals named in the EC was connected to Hani Hanjour, who is now believed to have piloted American Flight 77. The individual named in the EC has been connected both through witness statements and flight school records to Hanjour. This individual first came to the attention of the FBI in 1999, but when the FBI went to investigate him, they determined that he had left the United States, and an investigation was not opened. The FBI was apparently unaware that he had returned to the United States in the summer of 2001 and may have been associating with Hanjour and several other Islamic extremists. These issues will be discussed at greater length in subsequent sections.

Summary of the Phoenix EC

In an interview with the Joint Inquiry Staff, the special agent in Phoenix who wrote the EC said that he first became concerned about aviation-related terrorism in the early 1990s. He was working on two cases in which Libyans with suspected terrorist ties were working for U.S. aviation companies. One of these individuals had a Masters degree in a technical field, yet was working in menial jobs at the airport as a skycap and then a baggage handler. The other individual was working as a technical avionics officer for a domestic airline and was charged with overseeing the complete overhaul of aircraft and with checking for structural integrity. In addition, several Bin Ladin operatives had lived and traveled to the Phoenix area in the past, one of whom was Wadih El-Hage, a Bin Ladin lieutenant convicted for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings. He had lived in the Tucson area for several years in the 1980s. The Phoenix SA believes that El-Hage established a Usama Bin Ladin support network in Arizona while he was living there and that this network is still in place.

The agent stated that the idea of possible terrorists having easy access to aircraft conjured up visions of Pan Am 103. The Phoenix agent told the Joint Inquiry

Staff that, in authoring the EC, he never imagined terrorists using airplanes as was done on September 11. His primary concern was that Islamic extremists, studying everything from aviation security to flying, could be learning how to hijack or destroy aircraft and to evade airport security.

In April 2000, the agent interviewed the individual who was the subject of the Phoenix EC. When he interviews foreign nationals they usually tend to be at least somewhat intimidated in their first contact with the FBI. By contrast, this individual told the agent directly that he considered the U.S. government and military legitimate targets of Islam. In looking around the individual's apartment, the agent noticed a poster of Bin Ladin and another poster of wounded Chechnyan mujaheddin fighters. He was also concerned by the fact that this individual was from a poor Middle Eastern country and had been studying a non-aviation related subject prior to his arrival in the United States.

The agent also described for us another incident that increased his suspicion about the Middle Eastern flight students in the Phoenix area. During a physical surveillance of the subject of the Phoenix EC, the agent determined that he was using a vehicle registered to another individual. In 1999, the owner of the car and an associate of his were detained for trying to gain access to the cockpit of a commercial airliner on a domestic flight. They told the FBI that they thought the cockpit was the bathroom and they accused the FBI of racism. They were released after an investigation, the FBI closed the case, and the two were not prosecuted. A year later, the individual's name was added to the State Department's watchlist after intelligence information was received indicating that he may have gotten explosive and car bomb training in Afghanistan. In August 2001, the same individual applied for a visa to re-enter the United States and, as a result of the watchlisting, was denied entry.

In May 2001, after a brief time investigating a series of arsons, the Phoenix special agent was reassigned to work international terrorism matters. To get back up to speed, he reviewed case files of terrorism cases on his squad. In the course of the review, he became increasingly concerned by the number of individuals of potential investigative interest enrolled in aviation training. At that point, he began to draft the EC, which he completed by July 10, 2001.

The Phoenix EC focuses on 10 individuals who were the subjects of FBI investigations. These individuals were Sunni Muslim, and were from Kenya, Pakistan, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, India, and Saudi Arabia. Not all were in flight training; several were aeronautical engineering students, and one was studying international aviation security. One of the individuals under investigation was the primary focus of the Phoenix EC.

This individual had come to the Phoenix agent's attention when it was learned that he was a member of the al-Muhajiroun, whose spiritual leader was a strong supporter of Bin Ladin and who had issued a number of *fatwas* against the United States, one mentioning airports as a possible target. The subject of the Phoenix investigation was enrolled at Embry Riddle University and was taking aviation-related security courses. As a member of the al-Muhajiroun, he was organizing anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli rallies and calling for jihad. The investigation of this individual led to the opening of investigations on six of his associates, also involved in aviation training. The remaining three subjects in the Phoenix EC, although involved in aviation subjects, were not known to associate with the others.

We asked the Phoenix agent whether he had received any intelligence from FBI headquarters or from other Intelligence Community agencies that contributed to the suspicions he raised in the EC. According to him, the Phoenix office did not receive FBI, Intelligence Community, or foreign intelligence service products on a regular basis. He told us that he believes that prior to September 11, 2001 the FBI was not running counterterrorism as a national level program; he often has felt that he's "out on an island" in Phoenix. He said that, prior to headquarters downsizing, the FBI used to do a better job of disseminating intelligence products to the field. He does not believe that sufficient resources are devoted to counterterrorism even though it is officially a Tier I program. In his words, counterterrorism and counterintelligence have always been considered the "bastard stepchild" of the FBI because these programs do not generate the statistics that other programs do, such as Violent Crimes/Major Offenders or drugs.

The Phoenix EC makes four recommendations and requests that FBI headquarters consider implementing them:

- Headquarters should accumulate a list of civil aviation university/colleges around the country;
- FBI offices should establish liaison with the schools;
- Headquarters should discuss the Phoenix theories with the intelligence community;
- Headquarters should consider seeking authority to obtain visa information on individuals seeking to attend flight schools.

Phoenix Office's Actions Prior to Sending the EC

While he was developing the EC, the Phoenix agent attended a meeting in May-June 2000 of a local intelligence working group. At the meeting the agent told the attendees about the individual under investigation who was attending Embry Riddle University. He asked if anyone had information on Islamic extremists showing up at aviation schools. No one offered any information. The agent told the Joint Inquiry Staff that he had also discussed his theories with other members of the Phoenix Joint Terrorism Task Force. The Joint Inquiry Staff's examination of records had determined that he also requested the routine intelligence community checks be run on the subjects of the EC. In March 2001, the agent's supervisor in Phoenix attended a meeting in Long Beach where he mentioned the Phoenix theories about civil aviation. The CIA was made aware of the FBI information, but had no relevant information to offer.

As he was drafting the EC, the Phoenix agent contacted an Intelligence Operations Specialist (IOS) at FBI headquarters whom he had known for a number of years to use as a sounding board. The IOS provided him with several names to include on the addressee list. Around the same time, another agent at the same Phoenix squad called the FAA's counterterrorism representative at FBI headquarters to inquire about the legality of the Middle Eastern students attending aviation schools. The FAA representative said that, as long as the students were in legal immigration status, their attendance was legal.

Headquarters' Response to the EC

When he sent the EC to the Counterterrorism Division at FBI headquarters the Phoenix agent requested in a "lead" that both the RFU and UBLU consider implementing the suggested actions that he had set out.[1] On July 30, 2001, an Intelligence Assistant (IA) in the RFU at FBI headquarters assigned the lead to an IOS. The IOS appears to have been picked, not because the assignment was within her programmatic area of responsibility, but because her name was the first non-supervisory name on the addressee list. At the time, this was typical of the way in which leads were assigned in the unit. The IOS recalls the lead arriving in her electronic folder on the system but did not receive a hard copy of the document from the IA. After reviewing the EC, the IOS determined that the project should be handled by someone in the UBLU.

The RFU IOS contacted a UBLU IOS to effect a transfer. The UBLU IOS did not want the lead transferred but agreed to take responsibility for her unit's response. The UBLU IOS also received a hard copy of the document. The UBLU IOS then consulted two other IOSs in her unit, mentioning specifically the paragraph in the EC about obtaining visa information. Their discussion centered on the legality of the proposal and whether it raised profiling issues. The IOS also decided to forward the EC to the Portland office because an individual named in the EC, with ties to suspected terrorists arrested in the Middle East in early 2001, was an employee of an airline and had previously lived and studied in the northwestern United States.

On August 7, 2001, after receiving no objection from the Phoenix office, the EC was forwarded to an intelligence analyst in Portland via e-mail, stating that the document "basically puts forth a theory on individuals being directed to come here to study aviation and their ties to extremists. Nothing concrete or whatever, but some very interesting coincidences. I thought it would be interesting to you considering some of the stuff you were coming up with in PD [Portland]. Let me know if anything strikes you." The Portland analyst has told the Joint Inquiry Staff that she had spoken to the UBLU IOS on several occasions about the aviation-related ties of terrorist subjects in the Portland and Seattle areas. She did not take action on the communication or disseminate it any further, as it was only sent to her for informational purposes.

The UBLU IOS informed the Joint Inquiry Staff that she affixed a note to her copy of the EC, on which she jotted down several items to follow up on. She recalls that her first item was to review the intelligence investigations of another individual who was the only Usama Bin Ladin pilot she knew about.[2] She assumes she would have also written that she should call agents in two FBI field offices who

[1]This is an FBI system through which the office sending a communication can request that the receiving office(s) take some follow-up action or conduct additional investigation. In the "lead" section of the communication, the sending office can outline exactly what action or investigation that it is requesting that the receiving office conduct. Once the lead has been completed (or "covered" in FBI vernacular), the receiving office will inform the sending office as to the results of the investigation or as to the action taken.

[2]According to documents reviewed by the Joint Inquiry, this individual was not the only pilot with ties to Usama Bin Ladin known to the FBI at that time.

were familiar with this individual. The note was on her copy of the EC that she provided to the Department of Justice Inspector General (IG). The IG has informed the Joint Inquiry Staff that they recall seeing the note during their interview of the IOS but cannot locate it.

On August 7, 2001, both IOSs decided that the lead should be closed. In the electronic system, the RFU IOS noted that the lead was "covered-consulted with UBLU, no action at this time, will reconvine [sic] on this issue." The UBLU IOS maintains that she fully intended to return to the project once she had time to do additional research, but that September 11 occurred, and she had not yet had an opportunity to return to the project.

Both IOSs also said they considered assigning the Phoenix project to a headquarters analytic unit but decided against it. In an interview with a supervisory agent in the UBLU, the Joint Inquiry Staff was told that the EC should have been assigned to an analytic unit because it was a long-term, labor-intensive suggestion, and the analytic units would have more time to devote to it then the operational units. There appear to be a number of factors bearing on why the project was not assigned to the analysts that will be discussed later in this statement.

Did FBI Headquarters Management Review the Phoenix EC Prior to September 11?

The chiefs of both the RFU and UBLU informed the Joint Inquiry Staff that they did not see the Phoenix communication prior to September 11. Moreover, neither remembers even hearing about the flight school issue until after September 11. At the Joint Inquiry Staff's request the FBI audited their central records system; the audit supports their statements.

Both the IOSs are unsure, but think they might have mentioned the EC to their unit chiefs prior to September 11. The UBLU IOS said in an interview with the Joint Inquiry Staff that she told her supervisor that Phoenix had sent in a communication about Usama Bin Ladin sending pilots for training and that she planned to do some research before determining what to do about the recommendations in the EC. However, in her interview with the Department of Justice IG in November 2001, she stated that she had not discussed the EC with any supervisory personnel until after the EC was closed. The RFU IOS said she could not recall but might have mentioned the EC to her supervisor in passing.

FBI Headquarters Weaknesses Demonstrated by Handling of Phoenix EC

The manner in which FBI headquarters handled the Phoenix EC provides a valuable window into the FBI's operational environment prior to September 11 and illustrates several procedural weaknesses that have been recognized and are currently being corrected.

The manner in which the Phoenix EC was handled demonstrated how strategic analysis took a back seat to operational priorities prior to September 11. That many in the U.S. Government believed an attack of some type was imminent in the summer of 2001 apparently only served to further de-emphasize strategic analysis. For example, the IOS handling the Phoenix EC was primarily concerned with an individual in the EC who was connected to individuals arrested overseas; the IOS paid less attention to the flight school theories. For

his part, the RFU Chief said he was seeing about 1000 pieces of mail daily and could not keep up. His solution was to assign the review of intelligence reports to his IOS. Even the analytic unit responsible for strategic analysis was largely producing tactical products to satisfy the operational section. In fact there was no requirement to handle projects with nationwide impact, such as the Phoenix EC, any different than any other project. This has now been changed. Any lead of the type such as Phoenix represented now can be raised to the section chief level.

The handling of the Phoenix EC also exposed information sharing problems between FBI headquarters elements. A number of analysts commented that the UBLU and RFU frequently do not share information with the International Terrorism Analytic Unit. The supervisor of the UBLU said that the Investigative Services Division, of which the analytic unit is a part, was not a major player and that often information was not shared with it.

Had the project been transferred to the analytic unit, the capability to conduct strategic analysis on al-Qa'ida was limited because five of the unit's analysts had transferred into operational units. The Joint Inquiry Staff has been told that every time a competent new analyst arrived, the UBLU or RFU would either try to recruit them as IOSs or would refuse to share information. This allowed the UBLU and RFU to control the information flow. The end result, unfortunately, is that there is no one left whose role is to perform strategic analysis.

Even if the project had been assigned to the al-Qa'ida analyst in the analytic unit, there can be no guarantee that the various reports about using airplanes as weapons and terrorists sending students to flight school in the United States would have been pieced together. However, there was only one analytic unit at FBI headquarters responsible for counterterrorism, and there were five operational units. It is easier to share information within one unit than it is among five units.

The handling of the Phoenix EC also illustrates the extent to which technological limitations affect information flow at the FBI. A number of individuals who were addressees on the EC have stated that they did not see it prior to September 11. Audits of the system support their statements. The FBI's electronic system is not designed to ensure that all addressees on a communication actually receive it. Instead the electronic version of the document is sent to the unit and then forwarded electronically only to the individual to whom the lead is assigned. Furthermore, the system is capable of recognizing units only if they are precisely designated in the leads section; otherwise, a unit would not receive the communication. In the case of an inaccurate address the communication would be sent into either the Counterterrorism Division's main electronic folder or to the International Terrorism Operations Section's folder where it would sit until the secretaries checked their folders and forwarded it on to the appropriate unit for handling. In fact, the electronic system was considered so unreliable that many FBI personnel, both at the field offices and FBI headquarters, use e-mail instead. In the case of important communications, they double-check to ensure it is not being neglected. Several FBI personnel interviewed conceded that it was possible that "routine" leads, on which there was no direct communication, were falling through the cracks. RFU and UBLU policies in effect at the time the Phoenix EC was sent gave the person to whom the lead was assigned the discretion to make the determination as to which people in the unit needed to see the report. One

person said that he was not certain why the Phoenix agent put all the addresses on the EC but believes the IOS probably made the decision that this was more of an issue for the UBLU and did not need to be routed around to all of the people on the addressee list in the RFU.

The Joint Inquiry Staff has been informed that the FBI recently determined that there are 68,000 outstanding and unassigned leads assigned to the counterterrorism division dating back to 1995. Since many FBI personnel have not been using the electronic system for these purposes, it is difficult to know how many of these leads have actually been completed. The counterterrorism division's management is currently looking into this situation.[3]

Links from the Phoenix EC to September 11, 2001

FBI officials have noted, both in public statements and Congressional testimony that the September 11 hijackers did not associate with anyone of investigative interest. However, there is evidence that hijacker Hani Hanjour, who was unknown to the Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies prior to September 11, 2001, was an associate of an individual mentioned in the Phoenix EC. This individual had been engaged in flight training in the United States, and the FBI believed that he was possibly a radical fundamentalist. The evidence connecting this individual to Hanjour is described below. There are several possible reasons, which will also be discussed below, why this individual's association with Hanjour did not bring Hanjour to the FBI's attention prior to September 11, 2001.

The FBI believes that, beginning in 1997, Hanjour and the individual named in the Phoenix EC trained together at a flight school in Arizona. Several instructors at the flight school say they were associates and one thinks they may have carpooled together. Through various record checks, the FBI has confirmed five occasions when the Phoenix subject and Hanjour were at the flight school on the same day. On one occasion in 1999, the flight school logs indicate that Hanjour and this individual used the same plane. According to the flight instructor, the individual mentioned in the Phoenix EC was there as an observer. The rules of the flight school were such that for this individual to observe, Hanjour would have had to approve of his presence in the aircraft. Another individual informed the FBI after September 11, 2001 that this individual and Hanjour knew each other, both from flight training and through a religious center in Arizona.

The FBI's evidence linking the two in the summer of 2001 is not as strong. The FBI has located records from a flight school in Phoenix indicating that on one day in June 2001, Hanjour and several other individuals signed up to use the Cessna simulator. The next day, the two individuals who signed up with Hanjour the previous day, came to the facility with the individual mentioned in the Phoenix EC. An employee of the flight school has informed the FBI that he recalls a fourth individual being there with him but cannot remember who. Another employee of the flight school has placed Hanjour and this individual together during that time frame, although she was not completely confident in her identification.

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[3]The Joint Inquiry Staff has asked the FBI for further details and explanation on the status of these outstanding leads, and what actions are being taken to address this situation.

The FBI attempted to investigate this individual in May 2001, but discovered that he was out of the country. The FBI was apparently unaware that he returned to the United States soon after, and may have been associating with Hanjour and several other Islamic extremists.[4] A Phoenix agent told the JIS that had the individual been in the country in May 2001, they would have opened an investigation. However, the Phoenix office generally did not open investigations on individuals whom they believed had permanently left the United States. Although there were no legal bars to opening an investigation. FBI HQ discouraged this practice. The Phoenix office also did not notify the INS, State Department, or the CIA of their interest in this individual.

No one can say whether the FBI would have developed an investigative interest in Hanjour had they opened an investigation on the individual mentioned in the Phoenix EC prior to September 11, 2001. The Joint Inquiry Staff is also not suggesting that if they had, it would have necessarily led to the discovery of the September 11 plot. However, this example provides additional evidence that at least some of the hijackers may have been less isolated and more integrated into their communities than was previously thought. If the hijackers were, in fact, associating with individuals of investigative interest, and were not keeping to themselves as has been portrayed, there are more significant questions as to whether or not they should have come to the FBI's attention prior to the attacks. These associations continue to raise questions about the FBI's knowledge and understanding of the radical fundamentalist network in the United States prior to September 11, 2001.

This case also raises question about the FBI's policy and practice prior to September 11, 2001 regarding the initiation of investigations on individuals outside of the United States. The Phoenix FBI agent noted that this policy and practice have since been changed. It also provides a valuable illustration of how crucial it is for the FBI to coordinate its investigations internally and with other U.S. Government agencies, particularly when individuals are traveling into and out of the United States.

For this system to work effectively, and for the FBI to be aware when individuals of previous investigative interest return to the United States, they have to have close contact with INS and CIA. Unfortunately, it appears that prior to September 11, 2001, there was no system in place to ensure coordination. In this case, the FBI did not notify the INS, State Department, or the CIA of their interest in the Phoenix subject. Therefore, this individual was able to get into the United States without any notification to the FBI that he had returned. Supposedly coordination with INS and CIA is much better now, and the FBI does a better job of notification to those agencies.

Finally, the Phoenix subject's name was not provided to the TIPOFF watchlist at the State Department nor the NAILS watchlist at INS. The individual's name and information regarding his terrorist associations and background were provided to the TIPOFF program by the FBI and the CIA after the September 11

[4]The Joint Inquiry Staff is still attempting to determine whether the FBI's Phoenix office was aware of this individual's presence in the United States in the summer of 2001. The JIS has interviewed three agents in Phoenix about this issue, and received slightly contradictory answers. The JIS has asked the FBI for clarification on this issue.

attacks. It is only by identifying this individual to the TIPOFF and NAILS watchlist that the FBI could have been assured that he would be kept out of the United States.

Previous FBI Focus at U.S. Flight Schools

The Phoenix EC was not the first occasion that the FBI had been concerned about terrorist groups sending individuals to the United States for aviation study. The EC should be understood in this broader context. It is also important to note that neither individuals involved in drafting the Phoenix EC nor the FBI personnel who worked on it at FBI headquarters were aware of this broader context.

In 1981, the U.S. military was involved in hostilities with the Libyan Air Force in the Gulf of Sidra. President Reagan made the decision to deport all Libyan students in the Untied Stated involved in either aviation or nuclear studies. In May 1983, the INS published a rule in the Federal Register, terminating the nonimmigrant status of Libyan nationals or individuals acting on behalf of Libyan entities engaged in aviation-or nuclear-related education. The INS turned to the FBI for assistance in locating any such individuals. On May 6, 1983, FBI headquarters sent a "priority" communication to all field offices, asking the field offices for assistance in complying with the INS request. The Joint Inquiry Staff has not been able to locate all of the relevant records, so it is not clear how many students the FBI located and deported.

In 1998, the Chief Pilot of the FBI's Oklahoma City Field Office contacted an agent on the office's counterterrorism squad to inform him that he had observed a large number of Middle Eastern males at Oklahoma flight schools. An intra-office communication to the counterterrorism squad supervisor was drafted noting the Chief Pilot's concern that the aviation education might be related to planned terrorist activity, and his speculation that light planes would be an ideal means of spreading chemical or biological agents. The communication was sent to the office's "Weapons of Mass Destruction" control file. It appears to have been for informational purposes only. There is no indication that any follow-up action was either requested or conducted.

The FBI received reporting in 1998 that a terrorist organization might be planning to bring students to the United States for training at a flight school. The FBI was aware that individuals connected to the organization had performed surveillance and security tests at airports in the United States and made comments suggesting an intention to target civil aviation. There is no indication that this organization actually followed through on their plans.

In 1999, reporting was received that yet another terrorist organization was planning to send students to the United States for aviation training. The purpose of this training was unknown, but the terrorist organization leaders viewed the requirement as being "particularly important" and were reported to have approved an open-ended amount of funding to ensure its success. In response, an operational unit in the Counterterrorism Section at FBI headquarters sent a communication to 24 field offices, asking them to pay close attention to Islamic students in their area from the target country who were engaged in aviation training. This communication was sent to the Phoenix Office's International Terrorism squad, but the Phoenix SA does not recall this reporting. The Phoenix SSA was not assigned to the Phoenix Office at the time.

The communication requested that field offices "task sources, coordinate with the INS, and conduct other logical inquiries, in an effort to develop and intelligence baseline" regarding this terrorist group's use of students. To this point, there is no indication that the FBI field offices conducted any investigation after receiving the communication. The analyst who drafted the communication indicated that he did receive several calls from field offices, but that the calls were either to seek additional guidance or to raise concerns about the Buckley Amendment implications of investigating at schools. (The Buckley Amendment is part of the 1974 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, which bars post secondary educational institutions which receive federal funding from releasing student's personal information without their written consent.)

In November 1999, to address these concerns, the FBI sent a letter to INS explaining the intelligence and requesting a database search for individuals studying in the United States from the target country. Any information provided by the INS would be sent to the field offices, which would conduct appropriate investigations in coordination with local INS agents. According to interviews, the INS never provided any information in response to the request.

The project was subsequently assigned to the International Terrorism Analytic Unit at FBI headquarters. The analyst assigned to the project determined that there were 75 academic institutions offering flight education in the United States. He also located via the Internet an additional 1000 flight schools. In November 2000, the analyst sent a communication to the FBI field offices, informing them that no information was uncovered concerning this terrorist group's recruitment of students studying aviation and stated that "further investigation by FBI field offices is deemed imprudent" by FBI headquarters.

The former unit chief of the operational unit involved in this project told the Joint Inquiry Staff that he was not surprised by the apparent lack of vigorous investigative action by the field offices. He believes that the field offices' calls requesting additional guidance or raising Buckley Amendment issues were just "excuses" and that the field offices should have known full well how to go about this effort. In his view, this type project was like "drilling for oil," in that you drill in many different spots, almost all of which are unsuccessful but the reward from one successful "drilling" is worth the effort. In his opinion, the field offices did not like to undertake difficult labor-intensive projects like this with a high risk of failure. The FBI's culture often prevented headquarters from forcing field offices to take investigative action that they were unwilling to take. He told us that the FBI was so decentralized, and the Special Agents in Charge wielded such power, that when field agents complained to a supervisor about a request from headquarters, FBI headquarters management would generally back down.

Missed Opportunity to Connect Phoenix to Similar Investigations?

The personnel working on the Phoenix EC at FBI headquarters were not aware of the prior reporting on terrorist groups sending aviation students to the United States and did not know that FBI headquarters had undertaken a systematic effort in 1999 to identify Middle Eastern flight students in the United States. This is not surprising considering the lack of information sharing in the FBI. According to interviewees, this is a problem not only at FBI headquarters but at the field offices

as well. Agents often will only be familiar with cases on their own squad and will not know about investigations on other squads.

Had the headquarters personnel working on the Phoenix EC known about the 1999 efforts by FBI headquarters to locate foreign nationals at flight schools, it might have affected how they handled the EC. The IOSs handling the EC were concerned about the legal implications of following through on the recommendations but were unaware of similar efforts in the past whereby the INS and FBI had established an arrangement to provide the FBI with foreign nationals' student visas for investigative purposes. Unfortunately, instead of approaching FBI lawyers to determine whether there were legal obstacles to implementation, the IOSs decided among themselves that the EC raised profiling issues.

This lack of information sharing among personnel working different targets poses increasing problems for the FBI faced with a national security environment and the growth of the "International Jihad" movement, making it difficult to link individuals to specific foreign powers or terrorist groups. Some FBI personnel expressed concern that the FBI's labeling of individuals as associated with particular terrorist organizations is not always accurate. For example, an individual affiliated with al-Qa'ida may associate with Hamas members in the United States and be labeled Hamas based on these associations. If such an individual is being worked out of another unit, the traditional lack of information sharing makes it unlikely the al-Qa'ida unit will learn about the investigation. This affects the unit's ability to develop a comprehensive understanding of al-Qa'ida presence and operations in the United States. There may also be al-Qa'ida information directly relevant to the investigation about which personnel working Hamas are unaware.

New York FBI Office Actions in Connection with the Phoenix EC

The Phoenix EC was sent to two investigators in the FBI's New York field office who specialize in Usama Bin Ladin cases. They were asked to "read and clear" but were not asked to take any follow-up action. A Joint Inquiry Staff audit of electronic records shows that at least three people in New York saw the EC prior to September 11. It does not appear to have received much attention or elicited concern. Two of the three do not recall the communication prior to September 11, 2000. The third remembered reading it but said it did not resonate with him because he found it speculative.

The New York agents interviewed stated that they were well aware that Middle Eastern men frequently came to the United States for flight training. This was not surprising as it was considered the best and most reasonably priced place to train. According to them, many foreign nationals got their commercial flight training here.

A communication noting that Middle Eastern men with ties to Usama Bin Ladin were receiving flight training in the United States would not necessarily be considered particularly alarming because New York personnel knew that individuals connected to al-Qa'ida had previously received flight training in the United States. In fact, one of these individuals trained at the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma, the same place where Zacarias Moussaoui trained prior to his arrival Minnesota. Mohammed Atta and another of the hijackers visited this same flight school but decided not to enroll there. The commonly held view at the FBI prior to September 11 was that Bin Ladin needed pilots to operate aircraft he had

purchased in the United States to move men and material. Also, several pilots with al-Qa'ida ties testified for the U.S. Government during the course of the Embassy bombing trial.

However, the FBI had also received reporting that was not entirely consistent with this view of Usama Bin Ladin's pilots. Two of the pilots had been through al Qa'ida training camps in Afghanistan where they were trained to conduct terrorist domestic U.S. aircraft.

Source: Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. Senate and the Permanent Select Committee of Intelligence House of Representatives, *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of Sept. 11, 2001* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), vol.1, pp. 436–450.

Document 30

Report of the Joint Inquiry Staff by Eleanor Hill on the FBI Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui (September 24, 2002)

The Joint Inquiry Staff investigated the FBI's mishandling of the Zacarias Moussaoui case and issued a report for the Senate and House's intelligence committees on September 24, 2002. This report was critical in the steps taken to arrest Moussaoui and the failure to capitalize on his arrest.

Zacarias Moussaoui came to the attention of the FBI during a period of time when the Intelligence Community was detecting numerous indicators of an impending terrorist attack against U.S. interests somewhere in the world. Moussaoui was in the custody of the INS on September 11, 2001. Our review has, in part, focused on whether information resulting from the FBI's investigation of Moussaoui could have alerted the U.S. Government to the scope and nature of the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.

Moussaoui has been indicted and faces a criminal trial this fall. Among other things, Moussaoui has been charged with conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy "with the result that thousands of people died on September 11, 2001." In order to avoid affecting the course of that proceeding, the Joint Inquiry Staff has limited the amount of detail in this presentation while attempting to provide a general understanding of the facts of the investigation.

Our review of the FBI's investigation to date has identified three issues in particular, to which I would draw Members' attention:

- Differences in the way the FBI's field offices and headquarters components analyzed and perceived the danger posed by the facts uncovered during the FBI's investigation of Moussaoui prior to September 11, 2001.
- The tools available to the FBI under the Constitution and laws of the United States to investigate that danger, notably the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Act (FISA), and whether FBI personnel were well organized and informed about the availability of those tools; and
- Whether the substance, clarity, and urgency of the threat warning provided by the FBI to other parts of the Intelligence Community corresponded to the danger that had been identified.

For purposes of this interim report, the American public should understand that under FISA, the FBI can obtain a court order authorizing a physical search or electronic surveillance, such as a wiretap, if it can demonstrate that the subject: (1) is an agent of a foreign power, which can be a foreign country or an international terrorist group, and (2) is, among other things, engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefore, on behalf of that foreign power. Court orders issued under FISA are classified and are issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).

The FBI's focus at the time Moussaoui was taken into custody appeared to the Joint Inquiry Staff to have been almost entirely on investigating specific crimes and not on identifying linkages between separate investigations or on sharing information with other U.S. Government agencies with counterterrorist responsibilities. No one at FBI headquarters apparently connected Moussaoui, the Phoenix memo, the possible presence of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi in the United States, or the flood of warnings about possible terrorist attacks during the summers of 2001.

The Joint Inquiry Staff has determined that Moussaoui contacted the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma by e-mail on September 29, 2000 and expressed interest in taking lessons to fly a small Cessna aircraft. On February 23, 2001, he entered the United States at Chicago's O'Hare Airport. He was traveling on a French passport and this allowed him to stay in the United States without a visa for 90 days, until May 22, 2001. On February 26, 2001, he began flight lessons at Airman Flight School.

On August 11, 2001, Moussaoui and his roommate, Hussein al-Attas, arrived in Egan, Minnesota and checked into a hotel. Moussaoui began classes at Pam Am Flight School there on August 13, 2001.

While Airman Flight School provided flight lessons in piloting Cessnas and similar small aircraft, Pan Am Flight School provided ground training and access to a Boeing 747 flight simulator used by professional pilots. Most of Pan AM's students are either newly hired airline pilots who use the flight simulator for initial training or are active airline pilots who use the equipment for an update or refresher training. Although anyone can sign up for lessons at Pan Am, the typical student has a pilot's license, is employed by an airline, and has several thousand flight hours. Moussaoui had none of these qualifications.

Based on concerns expressed by a private citizen, the FBI's Minneapolis Field Office opened an international terrorism investigation of Moussaoui on August 15, 2001.

The FBI's Minneapolis Field Office hosts and is part of a Joint Terrorism Task Force, of JTTF. Agents of the INS share space and work closely with the FBI in Minneapolis and were able to immediately determine that Moussaoui had been authorized to stay in the United States only until May 22, 2001. Thus, Moussaoui was 'out of status' at the time—August—that the FBI began investigating him.

On the same day the Minneapolis field office learned about Moussaoui, it asked both the CIA and the FBI's legal attaché in Paris for any information they had or could get on Moussaoui. At the same time, they also informed FBI headquarters of the investigation. The supervisory agent in Minneapolis told the Joint Inquiry Staff that FBI headquarters had suggested that Moussaoui be put under surveillance, but that Minneapolis did not have enough agents to do that. Furthermore, the Minneapolis agents believed that it was more important to prevent Moussaoui from getting any additional flight training.

After conducting several interviews, the FBI agents, along with two INS agents, went to Moussaoui's hotel. The INS agents temporarily detained Moussaoui and his roommate, Hussein al-Attas, while checking to determine if they were legally in the United States. Al-Attas showed the INS that he had a valid student visa and agreed to allow the agents to search his property in the hotel room. The INS agents determined that Moussaoui had not received an extension to allow him to stay in the United States beyond May 22, 2001, so they took him into custody. The agents packed Moussaoui's belongings, noticing that he had a laptop computer among his possessions.

After Moussaoui's detention, the Minneapolis supervisory agent called the office's legal counsel and asked if there was any way to search Moussaoui's possessions without his consent. He was told he had to obtain a search warrant.

Over the ensuing days, the Minneapolis agents considered several alternatives, including trying to obtain a criminal search warrant, seeking a search warrant under the FISA, and deporting Moussaoui to France after arranging for the French authorities to search Moussaoui's possessions and share their findings with the FBI. Adding to the sense of urgency, a supervisor in the INS's Minneapolis office told the FBI that INS typically does not hold visa waiver violators like Moussaoui for more than 24 hours before returning them to their home countries. Under the circumstances, however, the INS said it would hold Moussaoui for seven to ten days.

On Saturday, August 18, Minneapolis sent a detailed memorandum to FBI headquarters. That memorandum described the Moussaoui investigation and stated that it believed that Moussaoui posed a threat.

The Joint Inquiry Staff has been told in interviews with the Minneapolis agents that FBI headquarters advised against trying to obtain a criminal search warrant as that might prejudice any subsequent efforts to get a search warrant under FISA. Under FISA, a search warrant could be obtained if they could show there was probable cause to believe Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power and either engaged in terrorism or was preparing to engage in terrorism. FBI headquarters was concerned that if a criminal warrant was denied and then the agents tried to get a warrant under FISA, the court would think the agents were trying to use authority for an intelligence investigation to pursue a criminal case.

During this time frame an attorney in the National Security Law Unit of FBI headquarters asked the counsel in the Minneapolis field office if she had considered trying to obtain a criminal warrant and she replied that a FISA warrant would be the safer course. Minneapolis also wanted to notify the Criminal Division about Moussaoui through the local U.S. Attorney's Office, believing it was obligated to do so under Attorney General guidelines that required notification when there is a "reasonable indication" of a felony. FBI headquarters advised that Minneapolis did not have enough evidence to warrant notifying the Criminal Division.

The FBI case agent in Minneapolis had become increasingly frustrated with what he perceived as a lack of assistance from the Radical Fundamentalist Union (RFU) at FBI headquarters. He had had previous conflicts with the RFU agent over FISA issues and believed headquarters was not being responsive to the threat Minneapolis had identified. At the suggestion of a Minneapolis supervisor, the Minneapolis case agent contacted an FBI official who was detailed to the CTC. The Minneapolis agent shared the details of the Moussaoui investigation with him and provided the names of associates that had been connected to Moussaoui. The Minneapolis case agent has told the Joint Inquiry Staff that he was looking for any information that CTC could provide that would strengthen the case linking Moussaoui to international terrorism.

On August 21, 2001, the Minneapolis case agent sent an e-mail to the supervisory special agent in the RFU who was handling this matter urging that the U.S. Secret Service in Washington, D.C. be apprised of the threat potential there indicated by the evidence. In an interview with the Joint Inquiry Staff, the RFU agent to whom the e-mail was addressed said that he told the Minneapolis agent that he was working on a notification to the entire Intelligence Community, including the Secret Service, about the threat presented by Moussaoui.

The RFU supervisory special agent sent a teletype on September 4, 2001, recounting the FBI's interviews of Moussaoui and al-Attas, and other information it had obtained in the meantime. The teletype, however, merely recounted the steps in the investigation. It did not place Moussaoui's actions in the context of the increased level of terrorist threats during the summer of 2001, nor did it provide its recipients with any analysis of Moussaoui's actions or plans, or information about what type of threat he may have presented.

A CIA officer detailed to FBI headquarters learned of the Moussaoui investigation from CTC in the third week of August 2001. The officer was alarmed about Moussaoui for several reasons. CIA stations were advised of the known facts regarding Moussaoui and al-Attas and were asked to provide any relevant information they might have.

On Wednesday, August 22, the FBI legal attaché's office in Paris provided its report. That report began a series of discussion between Minneapolis and the RFU at FBI headquarters focusing on whether a specific group of Chechen rebels were a "recognized" foreign power, one that was on the State Department's list of terrorist groups and for which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had previously granted orders. The RFU agent believed that the Chechen rebels were not a "recognized" foreign power and that, even if Moussaoui were to be linked to them, the FBI could not obtain a search warrant under FISA. Thus, the RFU agent told the Minneapolis agents that they needed to somehow connect Moussaoui to al-Qa'ida, which he believed was a "recognized" foreign power. This led the Minneapolis agents to attempt to gather information showing that the Chechen rebels were connected to al-Qa'ida.

Unfortunately this dialogue was based on a misunderstanding of FISA. The FBI's Deputy General Counsel told the Joint Inquiry Staff that the term "recognized foreign power" has no meaning under FISA and that the FBI can obtain a search warrant under FISA for an agent of any international terrorist group, including the Chechen rebels. But because of the misunderstanding Minneapolis spent the better part of three weeks trying to connect the Chechen group to al-Qa'ida.

The Minneapolis case agent contacted CTC, asking for additional information concerning connections between the group and al-Qa'ida; he also suggested that the RFU agent contact CTC for assistance on the issues. The RFU agent responded that he had all the information he needed and requested that Minneapolis work through FBI headquarters when contacting CTC. Ultimately, the RFU agent agreed to submit Minneapolis' FISA request to the attorneys in the FBI's National Security Law Unit (NSLU) for review.

The Joint Inquiry staff interviewed several FBI attorneys with whom the RFU agent consulted about Moussaoui. All have confirmed that they advised the RFU agent that the evidence was insufficient to link Moussaoui to a foreign power. One of the attorneys also told the RFU agent that the Chechen and his rebels were not a "recognized foreign power". The attorneys also told the Staff that, if they had been aware of the Phoenix memo, they would have forwarded the FISA request to the Justice Department's Office of Intelligence Policy Review (OIPR). They reasoned that the particulars of the Phoenix memo changed the context of the Moussaoui investigation and made a stronger case for the FISA warrant. None of them saw the Phoenix memo before September 11.

Two FBI agents assigned to the Oklahoma City Field Office's international terrorism squad visited Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma on August 23. In September of 1999, one of the agents had been assigned a lead from the Orlando Field Office to visit the flight school concerning another individual who had been identified as Usama Bin Ladin's personal pilot and who had received flight training at Airman. The agent had not been given any background information about this individual. Although he told us that he thought that this lead had been the most significant information he had seen in Oklahoma City, the agent did not remember the lead when he returned to the flight school two years later to ask questions about Moussaoui. He told the Joint Inquiry Staff that he should have connected the two visits but that he did not have the time to do so.

During a conversation on August 27, 2001, the RFU agent told the Minneapolis supervisor that the supervisor was getting people "spun up" over Moussaoui. According to his notes and his statement to the Joint Inquiry Staff, the supervisor replied that he was trying to get people at FBI headquarters "spun up" because he was trying to make sure that Moussaoui "did not take control of a plane and fly it into the World Trade Center." The Minneapolis agent said that the headquarters agent told him, "[T]hat's not going to happen; we don't know he's a terrorist. You don't have enough to show he is a terrorist. You have a guy interested in this type of aircraft—that is it." The headquarters agent does not remember this exchange. The Minneapolis supervisor told the Joint Inquiry Staff that he had no reason to believe that Moussaoui was planning an attack on the World Trade Center; he was merely trying to get headquarters' attention.

In a subsequent conference call with FBI headquarters, the chief of the RFU Unit told Minneapolis that a specific recognized foreign power, such as HAMAS, was necessary to get a FISA search warrant.

On August 28, 2001, after reviewing the request for a search warrant, the RFU agent edited it and returned the request to Minneapolis for comment. The RFU agent says that it was not unusual for headquarters agents to make changes to field submissions in addition to changes made by the NSLU and OIPR. The major substantive change that was made was the removal of information about connections

between the Chechen rebels and al-Qa'ida. The RFU agent said he removed it because he believed this information was insufficient and that, if he received approval from the NSLU to use the Chechen rebels as a foreign power, he would have added it back to an expanded section about Chechnya.

After the edit was complete, the RFU agent briefed the FBI Deputy General Counsel. The Deputy General Counsel told the Joint Inquiry Staff that he agreed with the RFU agent that there was insufficient information to show that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power, but that the issue of a 'recognized' foreign power did not come up. After that briefing, the RFU agent sent an e-mail to Minneapolis saying that the information was even less sufficient than he had previously thought because Moussaoui would actually have to be shown to be a part of a movement or organization.

After concluding that there was insufficient information to show that Moussaoui was an agent of any foreign power, the FBI's focus shifted to arranging for Moussaoui's planned deportation to France on September 17. French officials would search his possessions and provide the results to the FBI. Although the FBI was no longer considering a search warrant under FISA, no one revisited the idea of attempting to obtain a criminal search warrant, even though the only reasons for not attempting to obtain a criminal search warrant—the concern that it would prejudice a request under FISA—no longer existed.

On Thursday, September 4, 2001, FBI headquarters sent a teletype to the Intelligence Community and other U.S. Government agencies, including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), providing information about the Moussaoui investigation. The teletype noted that Moussaoui was being held in custody but did not describe any particular threat that the FBI thought he posed, for example, whether he might be connected to a larger plot. The teletype also did not recommend that the addressees take any action or look for any additional indicators of a terrorist attack, nor did it provide any analysis of a possible hijacking threat or provide any specific warnings. The following day the Minneapolis case agent handcarried the teletype to two employees of the FAA's Bloomington, Minnesota office and orally briefed them on the status of the investigation. The two FAA employees told the Joint Inquiry Staff that the FBI agent did not convey any sense of urgency about the teletype and did not ask them to take any specific action regarding Moussaoui. He just wanted to be sure the FAA had received the cable.

Prior to September 11, 2001, no one at the FBI canvassed other individuals in the custody of and cooperating with the U.S. Government in connection with past terrorism cases to see if any of those individuals knew Moussaoui.

The final preparations for Moussaoui's deportation were underway when the September 11 attacks occurred.

Source: Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. Senate and the Permanent Select Committee of Intelligence House of Representatives, *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of Sept. 11, 2001* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), vol.1, pp. 450–456.

Document 31

Testimony of Richard A. Clarke before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (March 24, 2004)

Richard A. Clarke was the leading counterterrorism expert for both the Clinton and Bush administrations. After he left office in 2003, Clarke became the leading critic of the Bush administration's handling of terrorism before September 11. Clarke is also famous for being the only U.S. government official who apologized to the families of the victims for the failures of government to prevent September 11. In this testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Clarke outlines the basics of the policies toward terrorism held by both the Clinton and Bush administrations. The following is an excerpt from that testimony.

I am appreciative of the opportunity the Commission is offering for me to provide my observations about what went wrong in the struggle against al Qida, both before and after 9-11. I want the families of the victims to know that we tried to stop those attacks, that some people tried very hard. I want them to know why we failed and what I think we need to do to insure that nothing like that ever happens again.

I have testified for twenty hours before the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Committee and before this Commission in closed hearings. Therefore, I will limit my prepared testimony to a chronological review of key facts and then provide some conclusions and summary observations, which may form the basis for further questions. My observations and answers to any questions are limited by my memory, because I do not have access to government files or classified information for purposes of preparing for this hearing.

I was assigned to the National Security Council staff in 1992 and had terrorism as part of my portfolio until late 2001. Terrorism became the predominant part of my duties during the mid-1990s and I was appointed National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism in 1998.

1. *Terrorism without US Retaliation in the 1980s:* In the 1980s, Hezbollah killed 278 United States Marines in Lebanon and twice destroyed the US embassy. They kidnapped and killed other Americans, including the CIA Station chief. There was no direct US military retaliation. In 1989, 259 people were killed on Pan Am 103. There was no direct US military retaliation. The George H.W. Bush administration did not have a formal counter-terrorism policy articulated in an NSC Presidential decision document.
2. *Terrorism Early in the Clinton Administration:* Within the first few weeks of the Clinton administration, there was terrorism in the US: the attack on the CIA gatehouse and the attack on the World Trade Center. CIA and FBI concluded at the time that there was no organization behind those attacks. Similarly, they did not report at the time that al Qida was involved in the planned attack on Americans in Yemen in 1992 or the Somali attacks on US and other peacekeepers in 1993. Indeed, CIA and FBI did not report the existence of an organization named al Qida until the mid-1990s, seven years after it was apparently created. Nonetheless, the 1993 attacks and then the terrorism in the Tokyo subway and the Oklahoma City bombing caused the Clinton Administration to increase its focus on terrorism and to expand funding for counter-terrorism programs.

   As a result of intelligence and law enforcement operations, most of those involved in the World Trade Center attack of 1993, the planned attacks on the UN and New York tunnels, the CIA gatehouse shootings, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the attempted assassination of former President Bush were successfully apprehended.

   The Clinton Administration responded to Iraqi terrorism against the US in 1993 with a military retaliation and against Iranian terrorism against the US in 1996 at Khobar Towers with a covert action. Both US responses were accompanied by warning that further anti-US terrorism would result in greater retaliation. Neither Iraq nor Iran engaged in anti-US terrorism subsequently. (Iraqis did, of course, later engage in anti-US terrorism in 2003–4.)
3. *Identifying the al Qida Threat:* The White House urged CIA in 1994 to place greater focus on what the Agency called "the terrorist financier, Usama bin Ladin." After the creation of a "virtual station" [Alec Station] to examine bin Ladin, CIA identified a multi-national network of cells and of affiliated terrorist organizations. That network was attempting to wage "jihad" in Bosnia and planned to have a significant role in a new Bosnian government. US and Allied actions halted the war in Bosnia and caused most of the al Qida related jihadists to leave. The White House asked CIA and DOD to develop plans for operating against al Qida in Sudan, the country of its headquarters. Neither department was able successfully to develop a plan to do so. Immediately following Usama bin Ladin's move to Afghanistan, the White House requested that plans be developed to operate against al Qida there. CIA developed ties to a group which reported on al Qida activity, but which was unable to mount successful operations against al Qida in Afghanistan. CIA opposed using its own personnel to do so.

4. *Sudan:* While bin Ladin was in Sudan, he was hosted by its leader Hasan Turabi. Under Turabi, Sudan had become a safe haven for many terrorist groups, but bin Ladin had special status. He funded many development programs such as roads and dined often with Turabi and his family. Turabi and bin Ladin were ideological brethren. Following the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarek, the US and Egypt successfully proposed UN sanctions on Sudan because of its support of terrorism. Because of the growing economic damage to Sudan due to its support of terrorism, bin Ladin offered to move to Afghanistan. Sudan at no time detained him, nor was there ever a credible offer by Sudan to arrest and render him. This is in contrast to Sudan's arrest of the terrorist known as Carlos the Jackal, who the Sudanese then handed over in chains to French authorities.
5. *1998 Turning Point:* In 1996, CIA had been directed to develop its capability to operate against al Qida in Afghanistan and elsewhere. CIA operations identified and disrupted al Qida cells in several countries. In 1997, a federal grand jury began reviewing evidence against al Qida and in 1998 indicted Usama bin Ladin. Several terrorists, including bin Ladin, issued a fatwa against the United States.

   In August, al Qida attacked two US embassies in East Africa. Following the attacks, the United States responded militarily with cruise missile attacks on al Qida facilities. President Clinton was widely criticized for doing so. A US Marine deployment combined with CIA activity, disrupted a third attack planned in Tirana, Albania.

   President Clinton requested the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to develop follow-on military strike plans, including the use of US Special Forces. The Chairman recommended against using US forces on the ground in Afghanistan, but placed submarines with cruise missile off shore awaiting timely intelligence of the location of Usama bin Ladin.

   The President also requested CIA to develop follow-on covert action plans. He authorized lethal activity in a series of directives which progressively expanded the authority of CIA to act against al Qida in Afghanistan.

   Diplomatic activity also increased, including UN sanctions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and pressure on Pakistan to cooperate further in attempts to end the Taliban support for al Qida.
6. *National Coordinator:* In 1998, I was appointed by the President to a newly created position of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism. Although the Coordinator was appointed to the Cabinet level NSC Principals Committee, the position was limited at the request of the departments and agencies. The Coordinator had no budget, only a dozen staff, and no ability to direct actions by the departments or agencies. The President authorized ten security and counter-terrorism programs and assigned leadership on each program (e.g. Transportation Security) to an agency lead.
7. *1999:* The Clinton Administration continued to pursue intelligence, including covert action, military, law enforcement, and diplomatic activity to disrupt al Qida.

   CIA was unable to develop timely intelligence to support the planned follow-on military strikes. On three occasions, CIA reported it knew

where Usama bin Ladin was, but all three times the Director of Central Intelligence recommended against military action because of the poor quality of the intelligence. Eventually, the US submarines on station for the military operation returned to normal duties. CIA's assets in Afghanistan were unable to utilize the lethal covert action authorities and CIA recommended against placing its own personnel in Afghanistan to carry out the operations. Captures of al Qida personnel outside of Afghanistan continued.

In December 1999 intelligence and law enforcement information indicated that al Qida was planning attacks against the US. The President ordered the Principals Committee to meet regularly to prevent the attacks. That Cabinet level committee met throughout December, 1999 to review intelligence and develop counter-measures. The planned al Qida attacks were averted.

Despite our inability to locate Usama bin Ladin in one place long enough to launch an attack, I urged that we engage in a bombing campaign of al Qida facilities in Afghanistan. That option was deferred by the Principals Committee.

8. *Terrorists in the US:* FBI had the responsibility for finding al Qida related activities or terrorists in the US. In the 1996–1999 timeframe, they regularly responded to me and to the National Security Advisor that there were no known al Qida operatives or activities in the US. On my trips to FBI offices, I found that al Qida was not a priority (except in the New York office). Following the Millennium Alert, FBI Executive Assistant Director Dale Watson attempted to have the field offices act more aggressively to find al Qida related activities. The Bureau was, however, less than proactive in identifying al Qida related fund raising, recruitment, or other activities in the United States. Several programs to increase our ability to respond to terrorism in the US were initiated both in the FBI and in other departments, including programs to train and equip first responders.
9. *2000:* The President, displeased with the inability of CIA to eliminate the al Qida leadership, asked for additional options. The NSC staff proposed that the Predator, unmanned aerial vehicle, be used to find the leadership. CIA objected. The National Security Advisor, however, eventually obtained Agency agreement to fly the Predator on a "proof of concept" mission without any link to military or CIA forces standing by. CIA wanted to experiment with the concept before developing a command and control system that incorporated Predator information with attack capabilities. The flights ended when the high winds of winter precluded the operation of the aircraft. The experiment had proved successful in locating the al Qida leadership.

In October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked in Yemen. Following the attack, the Principals considered military retaliation. CIA and FBI were, however, unwilling to state that those who had conducted the attack were al Qida or related to the facilities and personnel in Afghanistan. The Principals directed that the Politico-Military Plan against al Qida be updated with additional options. Among those options were aiding Afghan factions to fight the Taliban and al Qida and creating an armed version of the Predator unmanned aircraft to use against the al Qida leadership.

Military strike options, including cruise missiles, bombing, and use of US Special Forces were also included.

As the Clinton Administration came to an end, three attacks on the US had been definitively tied to al Qida (the World Trade Center 1993, the Embassies in 1998 and the Cole in 2000), in which a total of 35 Americans had been killed over eight years.

To counter al Qida's growing threat, a global effort had been initiated involving intelligence activities, covert action, diplomacy, law enforcement, financial action, and military capability. Nonetheless, the organization continued to enjoy a safe haven in Afghanistan.

10. *2001:* On January 24, 2001 I requested in writing an urgent meeting of the NSC Principals committee to address the al Qida threat. That meeting took place on September 4, 2001. It was preceded by a number of Deputies Committee meetings, beginning in April. Those meetings considered proposals to step up activity against al Qida, including military assistance to anti-Taliban Afghan factions.

    In June and July, intelligence indicated an increased likelihood of a major al Qida attack against US targets, probably in Saudi Arabia or Israel. In response, the interagency Counter-terrorism Security Group agreed upon a series of steps including a series of warning notices that an attack could take place in the US. Notices were sent to federal agencies (Immigration, Customs, Coast Guard, FAA, FBI, DOD, and State), state and local police, airlines, and airports.

    In retrospect, we know that there was information available to some in the FBI and CIA that al Qida operatives had entered the United States. That information was not shared with the senior FBI counter-terrorism official (Dale Watson) or with me, despite the heightened state of concern in the Counter-terrorism Security Group.

Observations and Conclusions

Although there were people in the FBI, CIA, Defense Department, State Department, and White House who worked very hard to destroy al Qida before it did catastrophic damage to the US, there were many others who found the prospect of significant al Qida attacks remote. In both CIA and the military there was reluctance at senior career levels to fully utilize all of the capabilities available. There was risk aversion. FBI was, throughout much of this period, organized, staffed, and equipped in such a way that it was ineffective in dealing with the domestic terrorist threat from al Qida.

At the senior policy levels in the Clinton Administration, there was an acute understanding of the terrorist threat, particularly al Qida. That understanding resulted in a vigorous program to counter al Qida including lethal covert action, but it did not include a willingness to resume bombing of Afghanistan. Events in the Balkans, Iraq, the Peace Process, and domestic politics occurring at the same time as the anti-terrorism effort played a role.

The Bush Administration saw terrorism policy as important but not urgent, prior to 9-11. The difficulty in obtaining the first Cabinet level (Principals) policy meeting on terrorism and the limited Principals' involvement sent unfortunate signals to the bureaucracy about the Administration's attitude toward the al Qida threat.

The US response to al Qida following 9-11 has been partially effective. Unfortunately, the US did not act sufficiently quickly to insert US forces to capture or kill the al Qida leadership in Afghanistan. Nor did we employ sufficient US and Allied forces to stabilize that country. In the ensuing 30 months, al Qida has morphed into a decentralized network, with its national and regional affiliates operating effectively and independently. There have been more major al Qida related attacks globally in the 30 months since 9-11 than there were in the 30 months preceding it. Hostility toward the US in the Islamic world has increased since 9-11, largely as a result of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Thus, new terrorist cells are likely being created, unknown to US intelligence.

To address the continuing threat from radical Islamic terrorism, the US and its allies must become increasingly focused and effective in countering the ideology that motivates that terrorism.

Source: Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004), pp. 293–297.

Document 32

Testimony of Mary Fetchet, Founding Director, Voices of September 11th, on the Need for Reform in a Hearing of the Senate's Committee on Government Affairs (August 17, 2004)

Members of the families of victims of September 11 testified before various Senate and House committees. Perhaps the most poignant was the testimony of Mary Fetchet, who lost a son on September 11. She was the founding director of the Voices of September 11th and appeared before the Senate's Committee on Government Affairs on August 17, 2004. This is a transcript of her statement before the Committee, in which she demanded reform.

Honorable Chairman Collins. Senator Lieberman and other distinguished members of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I am honored to be here today to testify on behalf of the 9/11 families. My name is Mary Fetchet. I am a member of the 9/11 Families Steering Committee and founding director and president of Voices of September 11th, a 9/11 family advocacy group. More importantly, I am the mother of Brad Fetchet, who tragically lost his life at the age of 24 in the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11th.

We appreciate your urgency in holding this hearing to address the critical task of implementing the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission. We are equally indebted to the 9/11 commissioners and their staff who worked tirelessly in a bipartisan manner over the last year to examine those events that led to the attacks and to develop recommendations to prevent future tragedies. The commission may not have answered all our questions but its report does offer a much needed overall strategy to develop a comprehensive foundation for creating a safer America.

The challenge now before all of us is whether we have the national will to combat our political bureaucracy, general inertia and the influence of special interest groups in order to enact the comprehensive set of recommendations to improve

our national security. The work will not be easy. It is, however, essential, if we are to protect our families and our country.

The last three years have been a painful education for me. It began on September 11th, 2001 when my husband contacted me at work to let me know Brad had called him shortly after the first plane hit Tower One. Brad was on the 89th floor of Tower Two and he wanted to reassure us that he was okay. He was shaken because he had seen someone fall from the 91st floor, quote, "all the way down." But Brad told my husband he expected to remain at work for the remainder of the day. The Port Authority, after all, had used the PA system to ensure everyone in Tower Two that they were safe and directed them to remain in the building. Brad remained with his co-workers in their office as they were told. Other individuals who attempted to evacuate Tower Two at that time were ordered back up to their offices. Shortly after my husband's call, I witnessed the plane hit Tower Two on television. The image is forever etched in my mind as it was at that movement that I knew our country was under attack and that my son Brad was trapped in a high-rise building that he wouldn't be able to escape.

I never had the opportunity to speak with Brad. We later learned from a message he left his girlfriend at 9:20 a.m. that he was attempting to evacuate after his building was hit by the second plane.

Obviously, Brad and his co-workers never made it out. He and nearly 600 other individuals in Tower Two who should have survived if they had been directed to evacuate died senselessly because of unsound directions. As a mother, it didn't make sense to me that they were directed to remain in a 110-story building after the high rise building next door had been hit by a plane, had a gaping hole in its side and was engulfed in flames.

Since that day, I have come to recognize the inadequacies in our overall preparedness as well as the grave responsibilities and the inexcusable inertia of our political system. As with many who worked on the 9/11 Commission's Family Steering Committee, I came to Washington as a political novice, unfamiliar with politics of the political system, without a party affiliation. Every election day, I voted for individuals irrespective of political party who I thought would best represent our country.

However, my political involvement ended as I cast my ballot assuming, like most, that my elected officials would act in my best interest, ensure my family's safety and counter any terrorist attacks. I believed that my government was a comprehensive organization whose officials and agencies, in the best interest of national security would share intelligence, collaborate and coordinate their counterterrorism efforts. Sadly, I was wrong.

I, like others, have also tried to make sense of my son's death and those of the nearly 3,000 other innocent victims by collecting and scrutinizing newspaper reports on 9/11 issues. Two important themes quickly became apparent. One system didn't fail our country. Virtually all systems failed. They failed to follow existing procedures and failed to have protocols or effective lines of communication in place, leading to widespread breakdowns in our preparedness, defense and emergency response. The other painful realization is that our government is often paralyzed by partisanship and complacent to a fault.

Our sad and frightening pre-9/11 history includes pervasive failures and shortcomings within and amongst government agencies due to breakdowns in

communication on all levels, lack of direction and overall strategic plan and a disconnect between policy, priorities and allocation of funds. More specifically, failures occurred due to intelligence agencies not sharing information within and amongst their organizations despite their common responsibility to protect our country. Not leveraging or updating technology already in place, which would have helped identify and stop these terrorists from entering out country or passing through domestic airport security point checks, ultimately preventing them from turning passenger planes into weapons

Inadequate or failed procedures in communications systems that prevented emergency response teams from effectively working with each other, connecting to workers in the World Trade Center and communicating with outside agencies such as airports and buildings that had already been identified as targets. The failure of the North American Air Defense Command and the FAA to have a protocol in place to rapidly identify and respond to hijacked planes. Failure of the FBI to process and act on Colleen Rowley's report in the Phoenix memo which would have identified terrorists and the potential for planes to be used as weapons.

Failure of the legislators to act on earlier recommendations to address the threat of terrorism such as those proposed by the Hart-Rudman Commission and those related to airline security by the Gore Commission. Allowing special interest groups to undermine and block preventative safety measures that could have prevented 9/11 attacks in an effort to save money. Failure of our government and its intelligence agencies to have an overall strategy to establish and coordinate policies, priorities and procedures based on the escalating threat of terrorism.

Colonel Randall Larsen and Ruth A. Davis of the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security summed up the situation facing pre-9/11 America in an article published in *Strategic Review* in the spring of 2001, obviously before 9/11. Quote, "What is needed now is leadership from the administration," they wrote. "There is widespread concern that threats to our homeland are both real and growing. However, one of the most troubling questions yet to be answered is whether substantial changes, such as those recommended by Hart-Rudman or Collins-Horowitz, can be made unless America experiences a tragic wakeup call." Ultimately, Larsen and David asked, "Will the administration and Congress have the vision and courage to act before we experience another Pearl Harbor or something far worse that could change the course of history?"

We all recognize that we have experienced another Pearl Harbor, now known as September 11th. The administration and Congress did not have the vision or the courage to act on previous information. Now, three years after this tragic event and the death of nearly 3,000 innocent victims, it is apparent that the status quo is unacceptable and reform is necessary. The questions we now face are two-fold: Are we prepared and if not, are we ready to move decisively to embrace a comprehensive overhaul such as the ones presented by the 9/11 Commission?

As a nation, we remain amazingly ill-prepared to prevent an attack or at least minimize its impact. This is specially frightening since we are under a greater threat than ever.

Consider for a moment, we live under a heightened national terrorist alert. And yet, three years later, systems have not been put in place to educate our families,

our schools, our communities on how to prepare for another attack. Several initiatives have been put in place since 9/11. Yet many of the core problems within and amongst government agencies have not been addressed.

Communication systems are still inadequate. Community- and citywide preparedness plans have not been effectively established or communicated; government agencies and legislative groups do not effectively share or leverage intelligence and general information or even readily accept it from the public as I know firsthand. An effective government-wide control center for all intelligence has yet to be established. Crucial congressional oversight and budgetary control of this effort is not in place. No one is in charge.

Some in Washington have warned that it may take three to five years to enact all the measures needed. That is not acceptable to the 9/11 families or the American people. Our enemies are preparing to strike us now and the longer we wait to move decisively, the greater advantages and opportunities they have to harm us.

Former Defense Secretary William Cohen put the impact of unchecked aggression into perspective six years ago in speaking to New York's Council on Foreign Relations. Quote, "No government can permit others to attack its citizens with impunity if it hopes to retain the loyalty and confidence of those it's charged to protect." End quote. Americans have lost faith in our government and its ability to protect us. You have to act now to restore it.

I recognize the challenge with moving a federal bureaucracy, however well meaning, in a new direction. Like any system, change and restructuring are difficult. Special interest groups, turf battles and simple fear of an unknown can all work against reform. Yet, when American lives are at stake, indifference or inertia is unacceptable. I am confident you will recognize what is at stake and are up to the challenge. We must embrace a complete and interlinking set of recommendations proposed by the 9/11 Commission.

This plan should include the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center and the appointment of a National Intelligence Director who reports directly to the White House. The NID should oversee all national intelligence and counterterrorism activities, develop an overall strategy to promote national and regional preparedness, coordinate policies, priorities and protocols among the 15 intelligence agencies, authorize and allocate the budget and resources to execute the strategy, ensure qualified individuals are appointed to key posts and have the ability to hire, fire and more importantly promote individuals who are proactive in the fight against the war on terrorism.

The aim is simple. A coordinated and comprehensive approach to gathering information and operating our intelligence agencies. I recognize that this committee is charged with solely examining intelligence issues. But we must not allow ourselves to become shortsighted or piecemeal in our approach to America's safety. We must examine and embrace all the commission's 41 recommendations for they are interconnected.

As Governor Kean has mentioned, the success of the reorganization is also dependent upon changes made in foreign policy, public diplomacy, border and transportation security and national preparedness. Effective implementation is reliant on legislation, executive order and a willingness to maintain a consistent strategy in each of these areas. Is there a risk in transition? Absolutely.

Governor Kean, chairman of the 9/11 Commission, acknowledged as much in his report. He warned, however, that there is even more risk in doing nothing. We cannot afford to continue with the status quo. We must act now.

Ultimately, I want to do what I wasn't able to do on September 11th. I want to protect my children and keep them safe. I can't bring my son Brad back but I can, in his memory, push for a safer America. When critical reforms are implemented to make our country safer, I'll know that neither Brad's life nor the lives of nearly 3,000 others who perished on September 11th were lost in vain.

As a result of research into the horrific circumstances of my son's death, I came to realize that our country was unprepared for the threat of terrorism despite forewarning. I now recognize that I can't just be an observer but have an obligation and a responsibility as an American citizen to be educated and aware of the larger issues that impact the safety of my family and friends. I encourage all Americans to read the 9/11 Commission report and to contact their elected officials to urge them to act expeditiously in a nonpartisan fashion to enact reform.

Again, I want to thank you for this opportunity to express my views. My hope is that these hearings will lead to critical reforms. We now look to you, our elected officials, for leadership, courage and fortitude to embrace the recommendations. The safety of our families, our communities and our country rests in your hands.

Source: U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, *Voicing the Need for Reform: The Families of 9/11* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), pp. 5–9.

Document 33

Assessment of the FBI on Pre-9/11 Intelligence (August 18, 2004)

In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on August 18, 2004, Slade Gorton, a commissioner on the 9/11 Commission gave his interpretation of the FBI's record on dealing with domestic intelligence on terrorism leading up to the events of September 11. The list of deficiencies had led the members of the commission and its staff to consider the formation of an American version of the British MI5, but they decided against it in favor of reforming the FBI.

The FBI has, for several decades, performed two important but related functions. First, it serves as our premier federal law enforcement agency investigating possible violations of federal criminal statutes and working with federal prosecutors to develop and bring cases against violators of those laws. Second, it is an important member of the intelligence community, collecting information on foreign intelligence or terrorist activities within the United States. That information can be used either for additional counterintelligence or counter-terrorism investigation, or to bring criminal prosecutions.

We focused on the FBI's performances as an intelligence agency, combating the al Qaeda threat within the United States before 9/11. And like the joint inquiry of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees before us, we found that performance seriously deficient.

Finally, when FBI agents did develop important information about possible terrorist related activities, that information often did not get effectively communicated either within the FBI itself or in the intelligence community as a whole.

Within the FBI itself, communication of important information was hampered by the traditional case-oriented approach of the agency and the possessive case file mentality of FBI agents. As this committee is only too familiar with the information technology problems that have long hampered the FBI's ability to "know what it knows." Even when information was communicated to the field from

headquarters, it didn't always come to the attention of the director or other top officials who should have seen it. This was the case in the now-famous incident of the summer of 2001 of the Phoenix electronic communication about Middle Eastern immigrants and flight schools, and the Minneapolis field office's report to headquarters about the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui.

The other internal barrier to the communication information between the FBI intelligence officials and the FBI criminal agents and the federal prosecutors was the wall between intelligence and law enforcement that developed in the 1980s and reinforced in the 1990s. Through a combination of court decisions, pronouncements from the Department of Justice and its Office of Intelligence Policy and Review and risk-averse interpretations of those pronouncements by the FBI, the flow of information between the intelligence and criminal sides of the FBI and the Justice Department was significantly choked off, a phenomenon that continued until after 9/11, when the Congress enacted the PATRIOT Act and when the Justice Department successfully appealed a FISA court decision that effectively reinstated the wall.

These failures in internal communications were exacerbated by a reluctance of the FBI to share information with its sister agencies in the intelligence community, with the National Security Council at the White House, and with state and local law enforcement agencies. This culture of non-sharing was by no means unique to the FBI, but the FBI was surely one of the worst offenders.

The FBI, under the leadership of its current director, Robert Mueller, has undertaken significant reforms to try to deal with these deficiencies and build a strong capability in intelligence and counterterrorism. These include the establishment of an Office of Intelligence, headed by an Associate Director, Maureen Baginski, who is an experienced manager of intelligence systems. The FBI has embarked on an ambitious program to recruit qualified analysts, to train all agents in counterterrorism, and to develop career tracks for agents who want to specialize in counterterrorism or intelligence. The agency is also making progress, albeit slowly, in upgrading its internal information technology system. But, as Director Mueller himself has recognized, much more remains to be done before the FBI reaches its full potential as an intelligence agency.

Because of the history of serious deficiencies and because of lingering doubts about whether the FBI can overcome its deep-seated law enforcement culture, the commission gave serious consideration to proposals to move the FBI's intelligence operation to a new agency devoted exclusively to intelligence collection inside the United States, a variant of the British security service popularly known as MI5.

We decided not to make such a recommendation for several reasons, set forth in our Report. Chief among them were the disadvantages of separating domestic intelligence from law enforcement and losing the collection resources of FBI field offices around the country, supplemented by their relationships with state and local law enforcement agencies. Another major reason was civil liberties concerns that would arise from creating outside of the Justice Department an agency whose focus is on collecting information from and about American citizens, residents, and visitors. The rights and liberties of Americans will be better safeguarded, we believe, if this sensitive function remains in an agency trained and experienced in following the law and the Constitution, and subject to the supervision of the Attorney General.

We also believe that while the jury is still out on the ultimate success of the reforms initiated by Director Mueller, the process he has started is promising. And many of the benefits might be realized by creating a new agency will be achieved, we're convinced, if our important recommendations on restructuring the Intelligence Community—creation of a National Counterterrorism Center and a National Intelligence Director with real authority to coordinate and direct the activities of our intelligence agencies—are implemented. An FBI that is an integral part of the NCTC and is responsive to the leadership of the National Intelligence Director will work even more effectively with CIA and other intelligence agencies, while retaining the law enforcement tools that continue to be an essential weapon in combating terrorism.

What the commission recommends therefore is that further steps be taken by the president, the Justice Department and the FBI itself to build on the reforms that have been undertaken already and to institutionalize those reforms so that the FBI is permanently transformed into an effective intelligence and counterterrorism agency. The goal, as our report states, is to create within the FBI a specialized and integrated national security workforce of agents, analysts, linguists and surveillance specialists who create a new FBI culture of expertise in national security and intelligence. This Committee will have a vital oversight role in monitoring progress by the FBI and ensuring that this new capacity so critical to our nation is created and maintained.

Source: U.S. Judiciary Committee, *The 9/11 Commission and Recommendations for the Future of Federal Law Enforcement and Border Security* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), pp. 5–12.

Document 34

Testimony by Lee Hamilton, Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, before the House of Representatives' Financial Services Committee (August 22, 2004)

One weapon against terrorist plots is to attack terrorist financing. This approach had only been tentatively used before September 11. In testimony before the House of Representatives' Financial Services Committee Lee Hamilton, the vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission, outlined the difficulty of and potential problems with cutting off the finances of terrorist groups. He also traced the history of al-Qaeda's support for the September 11th conspiracy.

While commissioners have not been asked to review or approve this staff report—indeed, I first saw it only a few hours ago—we believe the work of the staff on terrorist finance issues will be helpful to your own consideration of these issues.

After the September 11 attacks, the highest-level U.S. government officials publicly declared that the fight against al Qaeda financing was as critical as the fight against al Qaeda itself. It was presented as one of the keys to success in the fight against terrorism: If we choke off the terrorists' money, we limit their ability to conduct mass-casualty attacks.

In reality, stopping the flow of funds to al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups has proved to be essentially impossible. At the same time, tracking al Qaeda financing is an effective way to locate terrorist operatives and supporters, and to disrupt terrorist plots. Our government's strategy on terrorist financing thus has changed significantly from the early post-9/11 days. Choking off the money remains the most visible and important—it's an important aspect of our approach, but it is not our only, or even most important, goal. Making it harder for terrorists to get money is a necessary, but insufficient, component of the overall strategy.

Following the money to identify terrorist operatives and sympathizers provides a particularly powerful tool in the fight against terrorist groups. Use of this tool almost

always remains invisible to the general public, but it is a critical part of the overall campaign against al Qaeda. Today, the United States government recognizes—appropriately, in our view—that terrorist-financing measures are simply one of many tools in the fight against al Qaeda.

The September 11 hijackers used U.S. and foreign financial institutions to hold, move and retrieve their money. The hijackers deposited money into U.S. accounts, primarily by wire transfers and deposits of cash or travelers checks brought from overseas. Additionally, several of them kept funds in foreign accounts, which they accessed in the United States through ATM and credit card transactions. The hijackers received funds from facilitators in Germany and the United Arab Emirates or directly from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, KSM, as they transited Pakistan before coming to the United States. The plot cost al Qaeda somewhere in the range of $400,000 to $500,000, of which approximately $300,000 passed through the hijackers' bank accounts in the United States.

While in the United States, the hijackers spent money primarily for flight training, travel and living expenses; extensive investigation has revealed no substantial source of domestic financial support. Neither the hijackers nor their financial facilitators were experts in the use of the international financial system. They created a paper trail linking them to each other and their facilitators. Still, they were adept enough to blend into the vast international financial system easily without doing anything to reveal themselves as criminals, let alone terrorists bent on mass murder.

The money-laundering controls in place at the time were largely focused on drug trafficking and large-scale financial fraud. They could not have detected the hijackers' transactions. The controls were never intended to, and could not, detect or disrupt the routine transactions in which the hijackers engaged.

There is no evidence that any person with advance knowledge of the impending terrorist attacks used that information to profit by trading securities. Although there has been consistent speculation that massive al Qaeda-related "insider trading" preceded the attacks, exhaustive investigation by federal law enforcement and the securities industry has determined that unusual spikes in the trading of certain securities were based on factors unrelated to terrorism.

Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden obtained money from a variety of sources. Contrary to common belief, Bin Laden did not have access to any significant amounts of personal wealth, particularly after his move from Sudan to Afghanistan. He did not personally fund al Qaeda, either through an inheritance or businesses he was said to have owned in Sudan.

Al Qaeda's funds, approximately $30 million per year, came from the diversion of money from Islamic charities. Al Qaeda relied on well-placed financial facilitators who gathered money from both witting and unwitting donors, primarily in the Gulf Region.

No persuasive evidence exists that al Qaeda relied on the drug trade as an important source of revenue, had any substantial involvement with conflict diamonds, or was financially sponsored by any foreign government. The United States is not, and has not been, a substantial source of al Qaeda funding, although some funds raised in the United States may have found their way to al Qaeda and its affiliate groups.

Before 9/11, terrorist financing was not a priority for either domestic or foreign intelligence collection. Intelligence reporting on this issue was episodic, insufficient, and often inaccurate.

Although the National Security Council considered terrorist financing important in its campaign to disrupt al Qaeda, other agencies failed to participate to the NSC's satisfaction. There was little interagency strategic planning or coordination. Without an effective interagency mechanism, responsibility for the program was dispersed among a myriad of agencies, each working independently.

The FBI gathered intelligence on a significant number of organizations in the United States suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. The FBI, however, did not develop an endgame for its work. Agents continued to gather intelligence, with little hope that they would be able to make a criminal case or otherwise disrupt the operations of these organizations.

The FBI could not turn these investigations into criminal cases because of insufficient international cooperation, a perceived inability to mingle criminal and intelligence investigations due to the wall between intelligence and law enforcement matters, sensitivities to overt investigations of Islamic charities and organizations, and the sheer difficulty of prosecuting most terrorist-financing cases. Nonetheless, FBI street agents had gathered significant intelligence on specific groups.

On a national level, the FBI did not systematically gather and analyze the information its agents developed. It lacked a headquarters unit focusing on terrorist financing. Its overworked counterterrorism personnel lacked time and resources to focus specifically on financing. The FBI as an organization therefore failed to understand the nature and extent of the jihadist fund-raising problem within the United States or to develop a coherent strategy for confronting the problem. The FBI did not and could not fulfill its role to provide intelligence on domestic terrorist financing to government policymakers. The FBI did not contribute to national policy coordination.

The Department of Justice could not develop an effective program for prosecuting terrorist finance cases. Its prosecutors had no systematic way to learn what evidence of prosecutable crimes could be found in the FBI's intelligence files, to which it did not have access.

The U.S. intelligence community largely failed to comprehend al Qaeda's methods of raising, moving, and storing money. It devoted relatively few resources to collecting the financial intelligence that policymakers were requesting or that would have informed the larger counterterrorism strategy.

The CIA took far too long to grasp basic financial information that was readily available—such as the knowledge that al Qaeda relied on fundraising, not bin Laden's personal fortune. The CIA's inability to grasp the true source of bin Laden's funds frustrated policymakers. The U.S. government was unable to integrate potential covert action or overt economic disruption into the counterterrorism effort.

The lack of specific intelligence about al Qaeda financing, and intelligence deficiencies, persisted through 9/11. The Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Treasury organization charged by law with searching out, designating, and freezing bin Laden assets, did not have access to much actionable intelligence.

Before 9/11, a number of significant legislative and regulatory initiatives designed to close vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial system failed to gain traction. They did not gain the attention of policymakers. Some of these, such as a move to control foreign banks with accounts in the United States, died as a result of banking industry pressure. Others, such as a move to regulate money remitters, were mired in bureaucratic inertia and a general anti-regulatory environment.

It is common to say the world has changed since 9/11. This conclusion is especially apt in describing U.S. counterterrorist efforts regarding financing. The U.S. government focused for the first time on terrorist finance and devoted considerable energy and resources to the problem. As a result, we now have a far better understanding of the methods by which terrorists raise, move, and use money. We have employed this knowledge to our advantage.

With a new sense of urgency post 9/11, the intelligence community, including the FBI, created new entities to focus on and bring expertise to the question of terrorist fund-raising and the clandestine movement of money. The intelligence community uses money flows to identify and locate otherwise unknown associates of known terrorists, and has integrated terrorist-financing issues into the larger counterterrorism effort.

Equally important, many of the obstacles hampering investigations have been stripped away. The current intelligence community approach appropriately focuses on using financial transactions, in close coordination with other types of intelligence, to identify and track terrorist groups rather than to starve them of funding.

Still, understanding al Qaeda's money flows and providing actionable intelligence to policymakers present ongoing challenges because of the speed, diversity, and complexity of the means and methods for raising and moving money, the commingling of terrorist money with legitimate funds, the many layers and transfers between donors and the ultimate recipients of the money, the existence of unwitting participants, including donors who give to generalized jihadist struggles rather than specifically to al Qaeda, and the U.S. government's reliance on foreign government reporting for intelligence.

Bringing jihadist fund-raising prosecutions remains difficult in many cases. The inability to get records from other countries, the complexity of directly linking cash flows to terrorist operations or groups, and the difficulty of showing what domestic persons knew about illicit foreign acts or actors all combine to thwart investigations and prosecutions.

The domestic financial community and some international financial institutions have generally provided law enforcement and intelligence agencies with extraordinary cooperation. This cooperation includes providing information to support quickly developing investigations, such as the search for terrorist suspects at times of emergency. Much of this cooperation is voluntary and based on personal relationships.

It remains to be seen whether such cooperation will continue as the memory of 9/11 fades. Efforts to create financial profiles of terrorist cells and terrorist fundraisers have proved unsuccessful, and the ability of financial institutions to detect terrorist financing remains limited.

Since the September 11 attacks and the defeat of the Taliban, al Qaeda's budget has decreased significantly. Although the trend line is clear, the U.S. Government still has not determined with any precision how much al Qaeda raises or from whom or how it spends its money. It appears that the al Qaeda attacks within Saudi Arabia in May and November 2003 have reduced, some say drastically, al Qaeda's ability to raise funds from Saudi sources. There has been both an increase in Saudi enforcement and a more negative perception of al Qaeda by potential donors in the Gulf.

However, as al Qaeda's cash flows have decreased, so, too, have its expenses, generally owing to the defeat of the Taliban and the disbursement of al Qaeda.

Despite our efforts, it appears that al Qaeda can still find money to fund terrorist operations. Al Qaeda now relies to an even greater extent on the physical movement of money and other informal methods of value transfer, which can pose significant challenges for those attempting to detect and disrupt money flows.

Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Financial Services Committee, *9/11 Commission Report: Identifying and Preventing Terrorist Financing* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), pp. 5–13.

Document 35

The Aviation Security System and the 9/11 Attacks (2004)

The staff of the 9/11 Commission did an in-depth analysis of the aviation security system as it operated on September 11, 2001. Staff members built upon the investigative work completed by other federal agencies to trace the deficiencies that allowed the al-Qaeda operatives to seize four commercial aircraft and use them as weapons against the United States. Material in this document comes from Staff Statement No. 3.

THE ENEMY VIEW

We approach the question of how the aviation security system failed on September 11 by starting from the perspective of the enemy, asking, "What did al Qaeda have to do to complete its mission?"

Some time during the late 1990s, the al Qaeda leadership made the decision to hijack large, commercial, multi-engine aircraft and use them as a devastating weapon as opposed to hijacking a commercial aircraft for use as a bargaining tool. To carry out that decision would require unique skill sets:

- terrorists trained as pilots with the specialized skill and confidence to successfully fly large, multi-engine aircraft, already airborne, into selected targets;
- tactics, techniques, and procedures to successfully conduct in-flight hijackings; and
- operatives willing to die.

To our knowledge, 9/11 was the first time in history that terrorists actually piloted a commercial jetliner in a terrorist operation. This was new. This could not happen overnight and would require long term planning and sequenced operational training.

The terrorists had to determine the tactics and techniques needed to succeed in hijacking an aircraft within the United States. The vulnerabilities of the U.S. domestic commercial aviation security system were well advertised through numerous unclassified reports from agencies like the General Accounting Office and the Department of Transportation's Inspector General. The News media had publicized those findings.

The al Qaeda leadership recognized the need for more specific information. Its agents observed the system first-hand and conducted surveillance flights both internationally and with the United States. Over time, this information allowed them to revise and refine the operational plan. By the spring of 2001, the September 11 operation had combined intent with capabilities to present a real and present threat to the civil aviation system. As long as operational security was maintained, the plan had a high probability of success in conducting multiple, near simultaneous attacks on New York City and Washington, DC.

Let us turn now to a more specific look at the security system in place on September 11 related to anti-hijacking.

INTELLIGENCE

The first layer of defense was intelligence. While the FAA was not a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the agency maintained a civil aviation intelligence division that operated 24 hours per day. The intelligence watch was the collection point for a flow of threat related information from federal agencies, particularly the FBI, CIA, and State Department. FAA intelligence personnel were assigned as liaisons to work within these three agencies to facilitate the flow of aviation related information to the FAA and to promote inter-departmental cooperation. The FAA did not assign liaisons to either the National Security Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency but maintained intelligence requirements with those agencies.

Intelligence data received by the FAA went into preparing Intelligence Case Files. These files tracked and assessed the significance of aviation security incidents, threats and emerging issues. The FAA's analysis of this data informed its security policies, including issuance of FAA Information Circulars, Security Directives, and Emergency Amendments. Such Security Directives and Emergency Amendments are how the FAA ordered air carriers and/or airports to undertake certain extraordinary security measures that were needed immediately above the established baseline.

While the staff has not completed its review and analysis as to what the FAA knew about the threat posed by al Qaeda to civil aviation, including the potential use of aircraft as weapons, we can say:

First, no documentary evidence reviewed by the Commission or testimony we have received to this point has revealed that any level of the FAA possessed any credible and specific intelligence indicating that Osama Bin Ladin, al Qaeda, al Qaeda affiliates or any other group were actually plotting to hijack commercial planes in the United States and use them as weapons of mass destruction.

Second, the threat posed by Osama Bin Ladin, al Qaeda, and al Qaeda affiliates, including their interest in civil aviation, was well known to key civil aviation security officials. The potential threat of Middle Eastern terrorist groups to civil aviation security was acknowledged in many different official FAA documents. The FAA possessed information claiming that associates with Osama Bin Ladin in the 1990s were interested in hijackings and the use of an aircraft as a weapon.

Third, the potential for terrorist suicide hijacking in the United States was officially considered by the FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security dating back to at least March 1998. However in a presentation the agency made to air carriers and airports in 2000 and early 2001 the FAA discounted the threat because, "fortunately, we have no indication that any group is currently thinking in that direction."

It wasn't until well after the 9/11 attacks that the FAA learned of the "Phoenix EC"—an internal FBI memo written in July of 2001 by an FBI agent in the Phoenix field office suggesting steps that should be taken by the Bureau to look more closely at civil aviation education schools around the country and the use of such programs by individuals who may be affiliated with terrorist organizations.

Fourth, the FAA was aware prior to September 11, 2001, of the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui in Minnesota, a man arrested by the INS in August of 2001 following reports of suspicious behavior in flight school and the determination that he had overstayed his visa waiver period. Several key issues remain regarding what the FAA knew about Moussaoui, when they knew it, and how they responded to the information supplied by the FBI, which we are continuing to pursue.

Fifth, the FAA did react to the heightened security threat identified by the Intelligence Community during the summer of 2001, including issuing alerts to air carriers about the potential for terrorist acts against civil aviation. In July 2001, the FAA alerted the aviation community to reports of possible near-term terrorist operations . . . particularly on the Arabian Peninsula and/or Israel. The FAA informed the airports and air carriers that it had no credible evidence of specific plans to attack U.S. civil aviation. The agency said that some of the currently active groups were known to plan and train for hijackings and had the capability to construct sophisticated improvised explosive devices concealed exercise prudence and demonstrate a high degree of alertness.

Although several civil aviation security officials testified that the FAA felt blind when it came to assessing the domestic threat because of the lack of intelligence on what was going on the American homeland as opposed to overseas, FAA security analysts did perceive an increasing terrorist threat to U.S. civil aviation at home. FAA documents, including agency accounts published in the Federal Register on July 17, 2001, expressed the FAA's understanding that terrorist groups were active in the United States and maintained an historic interest in targeting aviation, including hijacking. While the agency was engaged in an effort to pass important new regulations to improve checkpoint screener performance, implement anti-sabotage measures and conduct ongoing assessments of the system, no major increases in anti-hijacking security measures were implemented in response to the heightened threat levels in the spring and summer of 2001, other than general warnings to the industry to be more vigilant and cautious.

Sixth, the civil aviation security system in the Untied States during the summer of 2001 stood, as it had for quite some time, at an intermediate aviation security alert level—tantamount to a permanent Code Yellow. This level, and its corresponding security measures, was required when:

> Information indicates that a terrorist group or other hostile entity with a known capability of attacking civil aviation is likely to carry out attacks against U.S. targets; or civil disturbances with a direct impact on civil aviation have begun or are imminent.

Without actionable intelligence information to uncover and interdict a terrorist plot in the planning stages or prior to the perpetrator gaining access to the aircraft in the lead-up to September 11, 2001, it was up to the other layers of aviation security to counter the threat.

We conclude this section with a final observation. The last major terrorist attack on a U.S. flagged airliner had been with smuggled explosives, in 1988, in the case of Pan Am 103. The famous Bojinka plot broken up in Manila in 1995 had principally been a plot to smuggle explosives on airliners. The Commission on Aviation Safety and Security created by President Clinton in 1996, named the Gore Commission for its chairman, the Vice President, had focused overwhelmingly on the danger of explosives on aircraft. Historically, explosives on aircraft had taken a heavy death toll, hijackings had not. So, despite continued foreign hijackings leading up to 9/11, the U.S. aviation security system worried most about explosives.

PRESCREENING

If intelligence fails to interdict the terrorist threat, passenger prescreening is the next layer of defense. Passenger prescreening encompasses measures applied prior to the passenger's arrival at the security checkpoint. Prescreening starts with the ticketing process, and generally concludes with passenger check-in at the airport ticket counter.

The hijackers purchased their tickets for the 9/11 flights in a short period of time at the end of August 2001, using credit cards, debit cards, or cash. The ticket record provides the FAA and the air carrier with passenger information for the prescreening process.

The first major prescreening element in place on 9/11 was the FAA listing of individuals known to pose a threat to commercial aviation. Based on information provided by the Intelligence Community, the FAA required air carriers to prohibit listed individuals from boarding aircraft or, in designated cases, to assure that the passenger received enhanced screening before boarding. None of the names of the 9/11 hijackers were identified by the FAA to the airlines in order to bar them from flying or subject them to extra security measures. In fact, the number of individuals subject to such special security instructions issued by the FAA was less than 20 compared to the tens of thousands of names identified in the State Department's TIPOFF watch list.

The second component of prescreening was a program to identify those passengers on each flight who may pose a threat to aviation. In 1998, the FAA required air carriers to implement a FAA-approved computer-assisted passenger prescreening program (CAPPS) designed to identify the pool of passengers most likely in need of additional security scrutiny. The program employed customized, FAA-approved criteria derived from a limited set of information about each ticketed passenger in order to identify "selectees."

FAA rules required that the air carrier only screen each selectee's checked baggage for explosives using various approved methods. However, under the system in place on 9/11, selectees—those who were regarded as a risk to the aircraft—were not required to undergo any additional screening of their person or carry-on baggage at the checkpoint.

The consequences of selection reflected FAA's view that non-suicide bombing was the most substantial risk to domestic aircraft. Since the system in place on

9/11 confined the consequences of selection to the screening of checked bags for explosives, the application of CAPPS did not provide any defense against the weapons and tactics employed by the 9/11 hijackers.

On American Airlines Flight 11, CAPPS chose three of the five hijackers as selectees. Since Waleed al Shehri checked no bags, his selection had no consequences. Wail al Shehri and Satam al Suqami had their checked bags scanned for explosives before they were loaded onto the plane.

None of the Flight 175 hijackers were selected by CAPPS.

All five of the American Airlines Flight 77 hijackers were selected for security scrutiny. Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were chosen via the CAPPS criteria, while Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi were made selectees because they provided inadequate identification information. Their bags were held until it was confirmed that they had boarded the aircraft.

Thus, for the hijacker selectees Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al Hazmi, and Khalid al Mihdhar, who checked no bags on September 11, there were no consequences for their selection by the CAPPS system. For Salem al Hazmi, who checked two bags, and Majed Moqed, who checked one bag, the sole consequence was that their baggage was held until after their boarding on Flight 77 was confirmed.

Ahmad al Haznawi was the sole CAPPS selectee among the Flight 93 hijackers. His checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded on the plane.

CHECKPOINT SCREENING

With respect to checkpoint screening, Federal rules required air carriers "to conduct screening . . . to prevent or deter the carriage aboard airplanes of any explosive, incendiary, or a deadly or dangerous weapon on or about each individual's person or accessible property, and the carriage of any explosive or incendiary in check baggage." Passenger checkpoint screening is the most obvious element of aviation security.

At the checkpoint, metal detectors were calibrated to detect guns and large knives. Government-certified x-ray machines capable of imaging the shapes of items possessing a particular level of acuity were used to screen carry-on items. In most instances, these screening operations were conducted by security companies under contract with the responsible air carrier.

As of 2001 any confidence that checkpoint screening was operating effectively was belied by numerous publicized studies by the General Accounting Office and the Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General. Over the previous twenty years they had documented repeatedly serious, chronic weakness in the systems deployed to screen passenger and baggage for weapons or bombs. Shortcomings with the screening process had also been identified internally by the FAA's assessment process.

Despite the documented shortcomings of the screening system, the fact that neither a hijacking nor a bombing had occurred domestically in over a decade was perceived by many within the system as confirmation that it was working. This explains, in part, the view of one transportation security official who testified to the Commission that the agency thought it had won the battle against hijacking. In fact, the Commission received testimony that one of the primary reasons to restrict the consequences of CAPPS "selection" was because officials thought that checkpoint screening was working.

The evolution of checkpoint screening illustrates many of the systemic problems that faced the civil aviation security system in place on 9/11. The executive and legislative branches of government, and the civil aviation industry were highly reactive on aviation security matters. Most of the aviation security system's features had developed in response to specific incidents, rather than in anticipation. Civil aviation security was primarily accomplished through a slow and cumbersome rulemaking process—a reflection of the agency's conflicting missions of both regulating and promoting the industry. A number of FAA witnesses said this process was the "bane" of civil aviation security. For example, the FAA attempted to set a requirement that it would certify screening contractors. The FAA Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 directed the FAA to take such action, which the 1997 Gore Commission endorsed. But the process of implementing this action had still not been completed by September 11, 2001.

Those are systemic observations. But, to analyze the 9/11 attack, we had to focus on which items were prohibited and which were allowed to be carried into the cabin of an aircraft. FAA guidelines were used to determine what objects should not be allowed into the cabin of an aircraft. Included in the listing were knives with blades 4 inches long or longer and/or knives considered illegal by local law; and tear gas, mace, and similar chemicals.

These guidelines were to be used by screeners, to make a reasonable determination of what items in the possession of a person should be considered a deadly or dangerous weapon. The FAA told the air carriers that common sense should prevail.

Hence the standards of what constituted a deadly or dangerous weapon were somewhat vague. Other than for guns, large knives, explosives and incendiaries, determining what was prohibited and what was allowable was up to the common sense of the carriers and their screening contractors.

To write out what common sense meant to them, the air carriers developed, through their trade associations, a Checkpoint Operations Guide. This document was approved by the FAA. The edition of this guide in place on September 11, 2001, classified "box cutters," for example, as "Restricted" items that were not permitted in the passenger cabin of an aircraft. The checkpoint supervisor was required to be notified if an item in this category was encountered. Passengers would be given the option of having those items transported as checked baggage. "Mace," "pepper spray," as well as "tear gas" were categorized as hazardous materials and passengers could not take items in that category on an airplane without the express permission of the airline.

On the other hand, pocket utility knives (less than 4 inch blade) were allowed. The Checkpoint Operations Guide provided no further guidance on how to distinguish between "box cutters" and "pocket utility knives."

One of the checkpoint supervisors working at Logan International Airport on September 11, 2001, recalled that as of that day, while box cutters were not permitted to pass through the checkpoint without the removal of the blade, any knife with a blade of less than four inches was permitted to pass through security.

In practice, we believe the FAA's approach of admonishing air carriers to use common sense about what items should not be allowed on an aircraft, while also approving the air carrier's checkpoint operations guidelines that defined the industry's "common sense," in practice, created an environment where both parties could deny responsibility for making hard and most likely unpopular decisions.

What happened at the checkpoints? Of the checkpoints used to screen the passengers of Flights 11, 77, 93 and 175 on 9/11, only Washington Dulles International Airport had videotaping equipment in place. Therefore the most specific information that exists about the processing of the 9/11 hijackers is information about American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon. The staff has also reviewed testing results for all the checkpoints in question, scores of interviews with checkpoint screeners and supervisors who might have processed the hijackers, and FAA and FBI evaluations of the available information. There is no reason to believe that the screening on 9/11 was fundamentally different at any of the relevant airports.

Return again to the perspective of the enemy. The plan required all of the hijackers to successfully board the assigned aircraft. If several of their number failed to board, the operational plan might fall apart or their operational security might be breached. To have this kind of confidence, they had to develop a plan they felt would work anywhere they were screened, regardless of the quality of the screener. We believe they developed such a plan and practiced it in the months before the attacks, including in text flights, to be sure their tactics would work. In other words, we believe they did not count on a sloppy screener. All 19 hijackers were able to pass successfully through checkpoint screening to board their flights. They were 19 for 19. They counted on beating a weak system.

Turning to the specifics of Flight 77 checkpoint screening, at 7:18 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on the morning of September 11, 2001, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar entered one of the security screening checkpoints at Dulles International Airport. They placed their carry-on bags on the x-ray machine belt and proceeded through the first magnetometer. Both set off the alarm and were subsequently directed to a second magnetometer. While al Mihdhar did not alarm the second magnetometer and was permitted through the checkpoint, Moqed failed once more and was then subjected to a personal screening with a metal detection hand wand. He passed this inspection and then was permitted to pass through the checkpoint.

At 7:35 a.m. Hani Hanjour placed two carry-on bags on the x-ray belt in the Main Terminal checkpoint, and proceeded, without alarm, through the magnetometer. He picked up his carry-on bags and passed through the checkpoint. Salem al Hazmi successfully cleared the magnetometer and was permitted through the checkpoint. Nawaf al Hazmi set off the alarms for both the first and second magnetometers and was then hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, his shoulder-strap carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector and then passed.

Our best working hypothesis is that a number of the hijackers were carrying permissible utility knives or pocket knives. One example of such a utility knife is the "Leatherman" item. We know that at least two knives like this were actually purchased by hijackers and have not been found in the belongings the hijackers left behind. The staff will pass this around. Please be careful. The blade is open. It locks into position. It is very sharp.

According to the guidelines on 9/11, if such a knife were discovered in the possession of an individual who alarmed either the walk-through metal detector or the hand wand, the item would be returned to the owner and permitted to be carried on the aircraft.

ONBOARD SECURITY

Once the hijackers were able to get through the checkpoints and board the plane, the last layer of defense was onboard security. That layer was comprised of two main components: the presence of law enforcement on the flights and the so-called "Common Strategy" for responding to in-flight security emergencies, including hijacking, devised by the Federal Aviation Administration in consultation with industry and law enforcement.

But on the day of September 11, 2001, after the hijackers boarded, they faced no significant security obstacles. The Federal Air Marshal Program was almost exclusively directed to international flights. Cockpit doors were not hardened. Gaining access to the cockpit was not a particularly difficult challenge.

Flight crews were trained not to attempt to thwart or fight the hijackers. The object was to get the plane to land safety. Crews were trained, in fact, to dissuade passengers from taking precipitous or "heroic" actions against hijackers.

CONCLUSION

From all of the evidence staff has reviewed to date, we have come to the conclusion that on September 11, 2001, would-be hijackers of domestic flights of U.S. civil aviation faced these challenges:

- avoiding prior notice by the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities;
- carrying items that could be used as weapons that were either permissible or not detectable by the screening systems in place; and
- understanding and taking advantage of the in-flight hijacking protocol of the Common Strategy.

A review of publicly available literature and/or the use of "test runs" would likely have improved the odds of achieving those tasks.

The "no-fly" lists offered an opportunity to stop the hijackers, but the FAA had not been provided any of their names, even though two of them were already watchlisted in TIPOFF. The prescreening process was effectively irrelevant to them. The on-board security efforts, like the Federal Air Marshal program, had eroded to the vanishing point. So the hijackers really had to beat just one layer of security—the security checkpoint process.

Plotters who were determined, highly motivated individuals, who escaped notice on no-fly lists, who studied publicly available vulnerabilities of the aviation security system, who used items with a metal content less than a handgun and most likely permissible, and who knew to exploit training received by aircraft personnel to be non-confrontational were likely to be successful in hijacking a domestic U.S. aircraft.

Source: Steven Strasser (ed.), *The 9/11 Investigations* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 9-11 Commission Staff Statement No. 3. pp. 34–46.

Document 36

Letter from Brian F. Sullivan to Thomas Kean, Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004)

Brian F. Sullivan, former FAA Special Agent, wrote this letter to Thomas Kean, the Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, toward the end of the commission's investigation of September 11. He was still concerned over the state of aviation security and the lack of accountability of those in charge at the time of the attacks. Not only were there reprimands for bad decisions, but many of those receiving such reprimands had been subsequently promoted to higher commands. Sullivan was worried about the culture of bureaucracy within the federal aviation security.

Thomas Kean, Chairman
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street SW
Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407

Dear Chairman Kean:

I recently had an opportunity to review FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmunds's open letter to you as chairman of the 9/11 Commission and felt compelled to write in support of her observations. She was spot on when she spoke to failed transparency, the lack of accountability and information provided yet inexplicably left out of your final report, I see the same omissions vis a vis aviation security, as she has cited regarding the FBI and intelligence.

First and foremost is the question of accountability. Not a single FAA manager, responsible for the insecurities of 9/11 has been held accountable for allowing our last line of defense to be so vulnerable on that fateful day, instead, some of the

same people were transferred into and in some instances promoted into key positions within the Transportation Security Administration.

The end result is that the culture of bureaucracy within federal aviation security didn't change and we've ended up with expected result. Two examples would be failed leadership in the development of CAPPII and the GAO's recent report on how poorly federal screeners are performing. The *Seattle Times* recently completed a series on just how porous our aviation security remains today. The bottom line is that the American taxpayer is not getting what we paid for in terms of enhanced aviation security and the TSA is not all it can be.

Let's look for a moment at information, which was provided to the Commission, but left out of your report. Perhaps this information will be included in your updated/revised staff statements or in assessments of the individual airports exploited on 9/11 (Boston's Logan Airport, Dulles and Newark); but in order to insure some level of transparency and provide the media with some focus for national review. I'll list just a few here.

1. The Massachusetts Governor's Carter Commission report, with its findings relative to FAA, airline and Massport security.
2. The April '01 memorandum from Massport's Director of Security, Joe Lawless to his leadership, which cited terrorist ties to Logan Airport and the need to address known vulnerabilities there.
3. The Counter Technology Inc report on Logan's security, six pages of which were critical of Massport leadership vis a vis security, but were removed from the original report after a meeting with Massport's General Counsel.
4. The Logan Airline Managers Council (LAMCO), in conjunction with the FAA's Federal Security Manager at Logan rejecting Joe Lawless's proposal for the Mass State Police to begin undercover testing of screening checkpoints in July '01.
5. Jan Garvey, the head of the FAA, failing to react after an FAA Administrator's Hotline complaint in the summer of '01 regarding security concerns at Logan, which included a hand delivered tape of the local FOX affiliate's April '01 expose of security shortcomings, to include the very same screening checkpoints which would be exploited by the terrorists on 9/11.
6. Reported sighting of Mohammed Atta at Logan in May and early September involved in suspicious activity in the Operations Area and surveillance of checkpoints.

These are but a few issues reported to the Commission, but for some reason, left out of the final report. Probably the most significant of all was the Office of Special Counsel's Report and DOT OIG response, which stated how FAA's leadership failed to manage its own Red Team and take action on its findings.

The Commission made a couple of generic recommendations regarding aviation security, but in failing to address accountability left the action in the hands of the TSA. The problem here is that until the Commission recognizes and holds accountable those failed FAA Civil Aviation Security managers, who gave us the insecurities of 9/11 and then were transferred into and some cases promoted into key positions within the TSA, that organization will remain dysfunctional and unable to enact the Commission's aviation security recommendations.

Accountability must be established first if there is to be any reasonable expectation that those recommendations will be brought to fruition.

The Commissioners must address the TSA's shortcomings, in order to change the prevailing culture within aviation security. Layers of bureaucracy must be eliminated, incompetents replaced by competents and local autonomy granted, in as much as is possible, to the Federal Security Directors at our airports. The TSA as it now stands, is a bloated bureaucracy made dysfunctional by overcentralization.

Somehow the media euphoria and infatuation with the 9/11 Commission in the aftermath of its report must be replaced with some critical analysis regarding accountability and aviation security. Both were given short shift in the Commission's final report.

I am not willing to see the façade of aviation security, as promulgated by the TSA continue on unabated and I'm hopeful that we can enlist the support of the 9/11 Commissioners to help address the accountability issue, particularly if you are serious about your aviation security recommendations being effectively implemented.

A response, open or closed, would be appreciated.

Respectfully submitted:

Brian F. Sullivan
FAA Special Agent (Retired)
New England Region

Source: Brian F. Sullivan, "An Open Letter to Thomas Kean," *Scoop Independent News* [New Zealand] (August 13, 2004), p. 1. Letter reprinted with the permission of Brian F. Sullivan.

Document 37

Comments of Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) on Saudi Financial Support for Al-Qaeda before the House of Representatives' Financial Services Committee (August 22, 2004)

One of the controversial aspects of financial support for al-Qaeda has been the role of the Saudis. Saudi financial support played a role in the success of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and later in other regimes that advanced Wahhadism. Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) used the House Financial Services Committee to challenge the 9/11 Commission's conclusion that there was no money funneled by Saudis to al-Qaeda. Lee Hamilton then made a measured reply to the congresswoman's points.

REP. MAXINE WATERS (D-CA): I'd like to commend Chairman Kean, Vice Chairman Hamilton and other members of the 9/11 Commission and the Commission staff for the care and attention that obviously went into these documents. And I thank all of them for their work. They have certainly performed an exceptional public service.

Mr. Chairman and members, I'm going to take a line of questioning that may be a little bit uncomfortable, but I think it is absolutely necessary.

First of all, I'd like to note that as it is reported, the 9/11 commission confirmed last month that it had found no evidence that the government of Saudi Arabia funded al Qaeda terrorist network and the 9/11 hijackers received funding from Saudi citizen Omar al-Bayoumi or Princess Haifa Faisal, wife of Ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar Sultan. I'd like to ask what went into that investigation that would lead you to that conclusion.

And the reason I would like to ask that is there are so many reports. *Time* magazine, for example, reported that the Saudis still appear to be protecting charities associated with the royal family which funnel money to terrorists.

Also, as you know, there has been a lot written lately about the relationship of both President Bush and his father to the Saudis, not only their personal friendships but their money relationships—relationships that include the Harken Energy, Halliburton and the Carlyle Group. And of course a lot has been written about the $1 million that was funded to the Bush library by the Saudis.

Also, it is noted that in this cozy relationship that this administration has with the—have with the Saudis, it goes so far as to identify that Robert Jordan, the ambassador that was appointed to Saudi Arabia, had no diplomatic experience, does not speak Arabic and cannot be considered a serious diplomat as it relates to representing our interests in a country where many of us have very, very serious concerns.

So I would like to know how did the commission reach the conclusion or find no evidence that the government of Saudi Arabia funded—furnished al Qaeda or the network with any funds, or that they're not still funding these charities. Did you have CIA information that helped you to document that? As a matter of fact, it appears that before 9/11, according to *U.S. News*—a 1996 CIA report found that a third of the 50 Saudi-backed charities it studied were tied to terrorist groups.

Similarly, a 1998 report by the National Security Council had identified the Saudi government as the epicenter of terrorist funding, becoming the single greatest force in spreading Islamic fundamentalism and funneling hundreds of millions of dollars to jihad groups and al Qaeda cells around the world.

Now I must admit that this information that I'm reading to you now came from the Center for American Progress.

I won't go on any further, I think you get the picture. What I'm trying to say to you is, if you've come to this conclusion that the Saudi government had no—is not responsible for continuing to fund these charities, where dollars ended up with some of the 9/11 hijackers, how did you come to this conclusion? And what have you explored about this relationship of this administration to the Saudi government? Obviously it's very cozy. They helped to escort members of Osama bin Laden's family out of the country. The princess who was found to have been giving money to charities associated with 9/11 hijackers—all leads us to a conclusion that this cozy relationship has to be broken up, and there's something to this funding.

LEE HAMILTON: Thank you very much, Congressman Waters. The Saudi connection with al Qaeda is a very, very important matter to look at.

And you really do have to make a distinction between the activities of the Saudi government prior to the spring of 2003, when they were attacked themselves, and then again later I think in November in 2003; that time frame, pre-attacks in Saudi Arabia and post-attacks in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a key part of any international effort to fight terrorist financing.

You asked us how we reached the conclusion. The conclusion was that we found no evidence, as you have stated correctly, that the Saudi government, as an institution or as individual senior officials of the Saudi government, supported al Qaeda. Now we sent investigators to Saudi Arabia. We reviewed all kind of information and documents with regard to—that are available in the intelligence community. We listened to many, many people who talked to us about these things. We followed every lead that we could. This is an ongoing investigation. I think it will continue; we're not going to have the final word on it.

We did find in this—the pre-attack period, pre-Saudi Arabia attack period, that there was a real failure to conduct oversight in the Saudi government. There was a lack of awareness of the problem, and a lot of financing activity we think flourished. We think that Saudi cooperation was ambivalent and selective, and we were not entirely pleased with it. Then along came those attacks, and in the spring of 2003 and after that period we believe the performance of the Saudi government improved quite a bit, and a number of deficiencies were corrected.

The Saudi government needs to continue its activities to strengthen their capabilities to stem the flow from Saudi sources to al Qaeda, and we have to work very, very closely with the Saudis in order to get that done. But we do not have any evidence that the government itself or senior officials of the government were involved in al Qaeda financing, and I think our diplomatic efforts there over a period of time have been helpful. But no one, I think, would say that we have resolved all of the problems with the Saudis. So we have to continue to send a message to the Saudi government that the Saudis must do everything within their power—everything within their power—to eliminate al Qaeda financing from Saudi sources.

Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Financial Services Committee, *9/11 Commission Report: Identifying and Preventing Terrorist Financing* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), pp. 12–13.

Document 38

Curt Weldon's Testimony about Able Danger (September 20, 2005)

In 2005, shortly after the final report of the 9/11 Commission appeared, news about a secret military project with the name Able Danger surfaced, and a controversy ensued. This project had supposedly identified Mohamed Atta and others as al-Qaeda operatives well before the events of September 11, 2001. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), member of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, has led the campaign to disclose information about Able Danger. On September 20, 2005, Weldon gave testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing. His remarks follow.

Mr. Chairman [Senator Arlen Spector], I am dismayed and frustrated, however, with the response of our government to information about the program Able Danger. The Defense Department has acknowledged that a program, Able Danger, existed and operated during the 1999–2000 time period, authorized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and carried out by SOCOM, with the help of the Army. DOD has stated publicly that five individuals, including an Army lieutenant colonel, recipient of the Bronze Star, who's in the room today, and a Navy Annapolis graduate ship commander, have emphatically claimed that they worked on or ran Able Danger and identified Mohammed Atta and three other 9/11 terrorists over 1 year prior to the Trade Center attack.

These five individuals have told me, your staff, and others, that Able Danger amassed significant amounts of data, primarily from open sources about al Qaeda operations worldwide, and that this data continued to be used through 2001 in briefings prepared for the Chairman of the Joint chiefs of Staff and others.

These two brave military officers have risked their careers to come forward to simply tell the truth and to help America fully understand all that happened prior to 9/11 that had or might have had an impact on the most significant attack ever against our country and our citizens. These individuals have openly expressed their

willingness to testify here today without subpoenas, but have been silenced by the Pentagon. They have been prevented from testifying, according to the Pentagon, due to concerns regarding classified information, in spite, Mr. Chairman, of the Pentagon's claims to members of the House Armed Services Committee two weeks ago that the bulk of the data used by Able Danger was open-source, which was why the DOD lawyers claim that no certificates were needed to certify the destruction of massive amounts of data that had been collected. Mr. Chairman, you can't have it both ways. It's either classified or it's not. But what the Pentagon has done the last two weeks is they've contradicted themselves.

Another former DOD official (J. D. Smith) told me and your staff, and was prepared to testify today—and he's in the room—that he worked on the data collection and analysis used to support Able Danger. He was prepared to state, as he told us, that he had an Able Danger chart, with Mohamed Atta identified, on his office wall at Andrews Air Force Base until DOD Investigative Services removed it. At risk to his current employment, he has told us, and is prepared to testify under oath, in direct rebuttal to the claims of the 9/11 commissioners that he was aware of the purchase of Mohamed Atta's photograph from a California contractor, not from the U.S. legal identity documents. He was prepared to discuss the extensive amount of data collected and analyzed about al Qaeda. Underscoring the fact that Able Danger was never about one chart or one photograph but, rather, was and is about massive data collected and assembled against what Madeleine Albright declared to be, in 1999, an international terrorist organization. He, too, has been silenced. Another former DOD official will testify today that he was ordered to destroy up to 2.5 terabytes of data. Now, I don't know what a terabyte of data is, so we contacted the Library of Congress. It's equal to one-fourth of all the entire written collection that the Library of Congress maintains. This information was amassed through Able Danger that could still be useful today. He will name the individual who ordered him to destroy that data, and will state for the record that the customer for that data, General Lambert of SOCOM, was never consulted about that destruction and expressed his outrage upon learning that the destruction had taken place.

An FBI employee that I identified has met with your committee staff, and was prepared to testify today that she arranged three meetings with the FBI Washington Field office in September of 2000 for the specific purpose of transferring al Qaeda Brooklyn cell/Able Danger information to the FBI for their use. In each instance, she has stated that meetings were canceled at the last minute by DOD officials. She has not been allowed to testify publicly today.

The 9/11 commission was created by Congress with my full support. I have publicly championed many of their recommendations. On four separate occasions, I attempted to brief the commission on specifics related to intelligence problems, lack of intelligence collaboration, the NOA concept—the national operations analysis (hub) that I had pursued in '99 and 2000—and the work of the LIWA and Able Danger. Except for one five-minute telephone call with Tom Kean, I was unable to meet with 9/11 commissioners and/or staff. In fact, I had my chief of staff hand-deliver questions to be asked of George Tenet, and others, to the commission on March the 24th of 2004, which I will enter into the record. They were never used and the questions were never asked. It was, in fact, a member of the 9/11 commission who encouraged me to pursue the Able Danger story after I briefed him on June 29th of 2005.

He informed me that the 9/11 commission staff had never briefed the commission members on Able Danger. He said that the facts had to be brought out. When the 9/11commission first responded to questions about Able Danger, they changed their story and spin three times in three days. This is not what Congress intended. All the people involved with Able Danger should have been interviewed by the 9/11 commission.

Because Able Danger ceased to formally exist before the administration came into office, I understand why there might have been a lack of knowledge about the program and its operations. In fact, when I first met with Steve Cambone—and I'm the one that introduced him to Tony Shaffer, who is here today—he told me that he was at a significant disadvantage, that I knew more about Able Danger than he did.

But that is not an excuse to not pursue the complete story of Able Danger. In fact, Mr. Chairman, DOD never conducted an actual investigation. And this came up in our Armed Services meeting two weeks ago. No oaths were given, no subpoenas were issued; rather, an informal inquiry was initiated.

A thorough review of Able Danger, its operations and data collected and analyzed, and recommendations for data transfer to other agencies, could have and should have been completed by more than one member of Congress using one staffer. Instead, over the past three months, I have witnessed denial, deception, threats to DOD employees, character assassination, and now silence. This is not what our constituents want. It is unacceptable to the families and friends of the victims of 9/11 and flies in the face of every ideal upon which this country was founded.

Over the past six weeks, some have used the Able Danger story to make unfair public allegations, to question the intentions or character of 9/11 commissioners or to advance conspiracy theories. I have done none of this. When I learned details of Able Danger in June, I talked to 9/11commissioners personally and staff. I delivered a comprehensive floor speech on June 27th of 2005 and methodically briefed the House chairs of Armed Services, Intelligence, Homeland Security and Justice Appropriations.

This story only became public—even though significant portions were first reported in a Heritage Foundation speech that I gave, still available online, on January 28, 2003—when Government Security News ran a story on August the 1st of 2005, followed by a front-page story in the *New York Times* on August the 2nd of 2005.

My goal now, Mr. Chairman, is the same as it was then—the full and complete truth for the American people about the run-up to 9/11. Many Americans lost family and friends on 9/11. Michael Horrocks was a neighbor of mine in Pennsylvania, a former Navy pilot, graduate of Westchester, like myself. He was at the controls of one of the planes on 9/11.

He left behind a wife and two kids. We built a playground in his honor at his kids' school. Ray Downey was a personal friend. As a New York deputy fire officer, he took me through the garage of the Trade Center towers in 1993, the first time bin Laden hit us. We worked together. In fact, he gave me the idea for the creation of the Gilmore Commission, which I authorized—which I authored and added to the Defense Authorization Bill in 1997.

On September 11th, 2001, he was a New York City Fire Department chief of all rescue. The 343 firefighters, including Ray, who were all killed were under

Ray's command as he led the largest and most successful rescue effort in the history of mankind.

I promised Michael's wife and kids and Ray's wife and kids and grandkids that we would not stop until the day that we had learned all the facts about 9/11. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, that day has not yet arrived. We must do better.

Source: *Congressional Record* (Oct. 20, 2005) Page H8979, Page H8981, Page H8982, and Page H8983.

Document 39

Essay by Ward Churchill (September 11, 2001)

The essay "'Some People Push Back': On the Justice of Roosting Chickens," by University of Colorado professor Ward Churchill, was written shortly after September 11, 2001, but there was little reaction to it until 2004, when it became notorious. Many people became outraged, and politicians began threatening both Churchill and the university. Besides defending the motives of the hijackers, Churchill made charges about the guilt of the victims, calling them "little Eichmanns." Churchill's provocative prose led to demands that he be fired from his tenured position. The university administration first defended his academic freedom rights and then instituted a panel to investigate his research. This panel concluded that Churchill should be fired or suspended for academic misconduct with regard to his research. Churchill has since lost his job, and legal proceedings are about to commence that should take several years. The complete text of Churchill's essay is included, and he sometimes uses unconventional spelling.

When queried by reporters concerning his views on the assassination of John F. Kennedy in November 1963, Malcolm X famously—and quite charitably, all things considered—replied that it was merely a case of 'chickens coming home to roost.'

On the morning of September 11, 2001, a few more chickens—along with some half-million dead Iraqi children—came home to roost in a very big way at the twin towers of New York's World Trade Center. Well, actually, a few of them seem to have nestled in at the Pentagon as well.

The Iraqi youngsters, all of them under 12, died as a predictable—in fact, widely predicted—result of the 1991 US 'surgical' bombing of their country's water purification and sewage facilities, as well as other 'infrastructural' targets upon which Iraq's civilian population depends for its very survival.

If the nature of the bombing were not already bad enough—and it should be noted that this sort of 'aerial war' constitutes a Class 1 Crime Against Humanity,

entailing myriad gross violations of international law, as well as every conceivable standard of 'civilized' behavior—the death toll has been steadily ratcheted up by US-imposed sanctions for a full decade now. Enforced all the while by a massive military presence and periodic bombing raids, the embargo has greatly impaired the victims' ability to import the nutrients, medicines and other materials necessary to saving the lives of even their toddlers.

All told, Iraq had a population of about 18 million. The 500,000 kids lost to date thus represent something on the order of 25 percent of their age group. Indisputably, the rest have suffered—are still suffering—a combination of physical debilitation and psychological trauma severe enough to prevent their ever fully recovering. In effect, an entire generation has been obliterated.

The reason for this holocaust was/is rather simple, and stated quite straightforwardly by President George Bush, the 41st 'freedom-loving' father of the freedom-lover currently filling the Oval Office, George the 43rd: "The world must learn that what we say, goes," intoned George the Elder to the enthusiastic applause of freedom-loving Americans everywhere. How Old George conveyed his message was certainly no mystery to the US public. One need only recall the 24-hour-per-day dissemination of bombardment videos on every available TV channel, and the exceedingly high ratings of these telecasts, to gain a sense of how much they knew.

In trying to affix a meaning to such things, we would do well to remember the wave of elation that swept America at reports of what was happening along the so-called Highway of Death; perhaps 100,000 "towel-heads" and "camel jockeys"—or was it "sand niggers" that week?—in full retreat, routed and effectively defenseless, many of them conscripted civilian laborers, slaughtered in a single day by jets firing the most hyper-lethal types of ordnance. It was a performance worthy of the Nazis during the early months of their drive into Russia. And it should be borne in mind that Good Germans gleefully cheered that butchery, too. Indeed, support for Hitler suffered no serious erosion among Germany's "innocent civilians" until the defeat at Stalingrad in 1943.

There may be a real utility to reflecting further, this time upon the fact that it was pious Americans who led the way in assigning the onus of collective guilt to the German people as a whole, not for things they as individuals had done, but for what they had allowed—nay, empowered—their leaders and their soldiers to do in their name.

If the principle was valid then, it remains so now, as applicable to Good Americans as it was the Good Germans. And the price exacted from the Germans for the faultiness of their moral fiber was truly ghastly. Returning now to the children, and to the effects of the post–Gulf War embargo—continued bull force by Bush the Elder's successors in the Clinton administration as a gesture of its 'resolve' to finalize what George himself had dubbed the 'New World Order' of American military/economic domination—it should be noted that not one but two high United Nations officials attempting to coordinate delivery of humanitarian aid to Iraq resigned in succession as protests against US policy.

One of them, former U.N. Assistant Secretary General Denis Halladay, repeatedly denounced what was happening as "a systematic program . . . of deliberate genocide." His statements appeared in the *New York Times* and other papers during the fall of 1998, so it can hardly be contended that the American

public was 'unaware' of them. Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Madeline Albright openly confirmed Halladay's assessment. Asked during the widely-viewed TV program Meet the Press to respond to his 'allegations,' she calmly announced that she'd decided it was 'worth the price' to see that U.S. objectives were achieved.

The Politics of a Perpetrator Population

As a whole, the American public greeted these revelations with yawns. There were, after all, far more pressing things than the unrelenting misery/death of a few hundred thousand Iraqi tikes to be concerned with. Getting 'Jeremy' and 'Ellington' to their weekly soccer game, for instance, or seeing to it that little 'Tiffany' and 'Ashley' had just the right roll-neck sweaters to go with their new cords. And, to be sure, there was the yuppie holy war against ashtrays—for 'our kids,' no less—as an all-absorbing point of political focus.

In fairness, it must be admitted that there was an infinitesimally small segment of the body politic who expressed opposition to what was/is being done to the children of Iraq. It must also be conceded, however, that those involved by-and-large contented themselves with signing petitions and conducting candle-lit prayer vigils, bearing 'moral witness' as vast legions of brown-skinned five-year-olds sat shivering in the dark, wide-eyed in horror, whimpering as they expired in the most agonizing ways imaginable.

Be it said as well, and this is really the crux of it, that the 'resistance' expended the bulk of its time and energy harnessed to the systemically-useful task of trying to ensure, as a 'principle of moral virtue' that nobody went further than waving signs as a means of 'challenging' the patently exterminatory pursuit of Pax Americana. So pure of principle were these 'dissidents,' in fact, that they began literally to supplant the police in protecting corporations profiting by the carnage against suffering such retaliatory 'violence' as having their windows broken by persons less 'enlightened'—or perhaps more outraged—than the self-anointed 'peacekeepers.'

Property before people, it seems—or at least the equation of property to people—is a value by no means restricted to America's boardrooms. And the sanctimony with which such putrid sentiments are enunciated turns out to be nauseatingly similar, whether mouthed by the CEO of Standard Oil or any of the swarm of comfort zone 'pacifists' queuing up to condemn the black block after it ever so slightly disturbed the functioning of business-as-usual in Seattle.

Small wonder, all-in-all, that people elsewhere in the world—the Mideast, for instance—began to wonder where, exactly, aside from the streets of the US itself, one was to find the peace America's purportedly oppositional peacekeepers claimed they were keeping.

The answer, surely, was plain enough to anyone unblended by the kind of delusions engendered by sheer vanity and self-absorption. So, too, were the implications in terms of anything changing, out there, in America's free-fire zones.

Tellingly, it was at precisely this point—with the genocide in Iraq officially admitted and a public response demonstrating beyond a shadow of a doubt that there were virtually no Americans, including most of those professing otherwise, doing anything tangible to stop it—that the combat teams which eventually commandeered the aircraft used on September 11 began to infiltrate the United States.

Meet the 'Terrorists'

Of the men who came, there are a few things demanding to be said in the face of the unending torrent of disinformational drivel unleashed by George Junior and the corporate 'news' media immediately following their successful operation on September 11.

They did not, for starters, 'initiate' a war with the US, much less commit 'the first acts of war of the new millennium.'

A good case could be made that the war in which they were combatants has been waged more-or-less continuously by the 'Christian West'—now proudly emblematized by the United States—against the 'Islamic East' since the time of the First Crusade, about 1,000 years ago. More recently, one could argue that the war began when Lyndon Johnson first lent significant support to Israel's dispassion/displacement of Palestinians during the 1960s, or when George the Elder ordered 'Desert Shield' in 1990, or at any of several points in between. Any way you slice it, however, if what the combat teams did to the WTC and the Pentagon can be understood as acts of war—and they can—then the same is true of every US 'overflight' of Iraqi territory since day one. The first acts of war during the current millennium thus occurred on its very first day, and were carried out by U.S. aviators acting under orders from their then-commander-in-chief, Bill Clinton. The most that can honestly be said of those involved on September 11 is that they finally responded in kind to some of what this country has dispensed to their people as a matter of course.

That they waited so long to do so is, notwithstanding the 1993 action at the WTC, more than anything a testament to their patience and restraint.

They did not license themselves to 'target innocent civilians.'

There is simply no argument to be made that the Pentagon personnel killed on September 11 fill that bill. The building and those inside comprised military targets, pure and simple. As to those in the World Trade Center . . .

Well, really. Let's get a grip there, shall we? True enough they were civilians of a sort. But innocent? Gimme a break. They formed a technocratic corps at the very heart of America's global financial empire—the 'mighty engine of profit' to which the military dimension of U.S. policy has always been enslaved—and they did so both willingly and knowingly—recourse to 'ignorance'—a derivative, after all, of the word 'ignore'—counts as less than an excuse among this relatively well-educated elite. To the extent that any of them were unaware of the costs and consequences to others of what they were involved in—and in many cases excelling at—it was because of their absolute refusal to see. More likely, it was because they were too busy braying, incessantly and self-importantly, into their cell phones, arranging power lunches and stock transactions, each of which translated conveniently out of sight, mind and smelling distance, into the starved and rotting flesh of infants. If there was a better, more effective, or in fact any other way of visiting some penalty befitting their participation upon the little Eichmanns inhabiting the sterile sanctuary of the twin towers, I'd really be interested in hearing about it.

The men who flew the missions against the WTC and Pentagon were not 'cowards.' That distinction properly belongs to the 'firm-jawed lads' who delighted in flying stealth aircraft through the undefended airspace of Baghdad dropping payload after payload of bombs on anyone unfortunate enough to be below—including tens of thousands of genuinely innocent civilians—while

themselves incurring all the risk one might expect during a visit to the local video arcade. Still more, the world describes all those 'fighting men and women' who sat in computer consoles aboard ships in the Persian Gulf, enjoying air-conditioned comfort while launching cruise missiles into neighborhoods filled with random human beings. Whatever else can be said of them, the men who struck on September 11 manifested the courage of their convictions, willingly expending their own lives in attaining their objectives.

Nor were they 'fanatics' devoted to 'Islamic fundamentalism.'

One might rightly describe their actions as 'desperate.' Feelings of desperation, however, are a perfectly reasonable—one is tempted to say 'normal'—emotional response among persons confronted by the mass murder of their children, particularly when it appears that nobody else really gives damn (ask a Jewish survivor about this one, or even more poignantly, for all the attention paid them, a Gypsy). That desperate circumstances generate desperate responses is no mysterious or irrational principle, of the sort motivating fanatics. Less is it one peculiar to Islam. Indeed, even the FBI's investigative reports on the combat teams' activities during the months leading up to September 11 make it clear that the members were not fundamentalist Muslims. Rather, it's pretty obvious at this point that they were secular activists—soldiers, really—who, while undoubtedly enjoying cordial relations with the clerics of their countries, were motivated far more by the grisly realities of the U.S. war against them than by a set of religious beliefs.

And still less were they/their acts 'insane.'

Insanity is a condition readily associable with the very American idea that one—or one's country—holds what amounts to a 'divine right' to commit genocide, and thus to forever do so with impunity. The term might also be reasonably applied to anyone suffering genocide without attempting in some material way to bring the process to a halt. Sanity itself, in this frame of reference, might be defined by a willingness to try and destroy the perpetrators and/or the sources of their ability to commit their crimes. (Shall we now discuss the US 'strategic bombing campaign' against Germany during World War II, and the mental health of those involved in it?)

Which takes us to official characterizations of the combat teams as an embodiment of 'evil.'

Evil—for those inclined to embrace the banality of such a concept—was perfectly incarnated in that malignant toad known as Madeline Albright, squatting in her studio chair like Jaba the Hutt, blandly spewing the news that she'd imposed a collective death sentence upon the unoffending youth of Iraq. Evil was to be heard in that great American hero 'Stormin Norman' Schwartzkopf's utterly dehumanizing dismissal of their systematic torture and annihilation as mere 'collateral damage.' Evil, moreover, is a term appropriate to describing the mentality of a public that finds such perspectives and policies attending them acceptable, or even momentarily tolerable.

Had it not been for these evils, the counterattacks of September 11 would never have occurred. And unless 'the world is rid of such evil,' to lift a line from George Junior, September 11 may well end up looking like a lark.

There is no reason, after all, to believe that the teams deployed in the assaults on the WTC and the Pentagon were the only such, that the others are composed of 'Arabic-looking individuals'—America's indiscriminately lethal arrogance and

psychotic sense of self-entitlement have long since given the great majority of the world's peoples ample cause to be at war with it—or that they are in any way dependent upon the seizure of civilian airliners to complete their missions.

To the contrary, there is every reason to expect that there are many other teams in place, tasked to employ altogether different tactics in executing operational plans at least as well-crafted as those evident on September 11, and very well equipped for their jobs. This is to say that, since the assaults on the WTC and Pentagon were acts of war—not 'terrorist incidents'—they must be understood as components in a much broader strategy designed to achieve specific results. From this, it can only be adduced that there are plenty of other components ready to go, and that they will be used, should this become necessary in the eyes of the strategists. It also seems a safe bet that each component is calibrated to inflict damage at a level incrementally higher than the one before (during the 1960s, the Johnson administration employed a similar policy against Vietnam, referred to as 'escalation').

Since implementation of the overall plan began with the WTC/Pentagon assaults, it takes no rocket scientist to decipher what is likely to happen next, should the U.S. attempt a response of the inexcusable variety to which it has long entitled itself.

About Those Boys (and Girls) in the Bureau

There's another matter begging for comment at this point. The idea that the FBI's 'counterterrorism task forces' can do a thing to prevent what will happen is yet another dimension of America's delusional pathology. The fact is that, for all its publicly-financed 'image-building' exercises, the Bureau has never shown the least aptitude for anything of the sort.

Oh, yeah, FBI counterintelligence personnel have proven quite adept at framing anarchists, communists and Black Panthers, sometimes murdering them in their beds or the electric chair. The Bureau's SWAT units have displayed their ability to combat child abuse in Waco by burning babies alive, and its vaunted Crime Lab has been shown to pad its 'crime-fighting' statistics by fabricating evidence against many an alleged car thief. But actual 'heavy-duty bad guys' of the sort at issue now—this isn't a Bruce Willis/Chuck Norris/Sly Stallone movie, after all. And J. Edgar Hoover doesn't get to approve either the script or the casting.

The number of spies, saboteurs and bona fide terrorists apprehended, or even detected by the FBI in the course of its long and slimy history, could be counted on one's fingers and toes. On occasion, its agents have even turned out to be the spies, and, in many instances, the terrorists as well.

To be fair once again, if the Bureau functions as at best a carnival of clowns where its 'domestic security responsibilities' are concerned, this is because—regardless of official hype—it has none. It is now, as it's always been, the national political police force, an instrument created and perfected to ensure that all Americans, not just the consenting mass, are 'free' to do exactly as they're told.

The FBI and 'cooperating agencies' can thus be relied upon to set about 'protecting freedom' by destroying whatever rights and liberties were left to U.S. citizens before September 11 (in fact, they've already received authorization to begin). Sheeplike, the great majority of Americans can also be counted upon to bleat their approval, at least in the short run, believing as they always do that the nasty implication of what they're doing will pertain only to others.

Oh Yeah, and 'The Company,' Too

A possibly even sicker joke is the notion, suddenly in vogue, that the CIA will be able to pinpoint 'terrorist threats,' 'rooting out their infrastructure' where it exists and/or 'terminating' it before it can materialize, if only it's allowed to beef up its 'human intelligence gathering capacity' in an unrestrained manner (including full-bore operations inside the U.S., of course).

Yeah, right.

Since America has a collective attention-span of about 15 minutes, a little refresher seems in order: 'The Company' had something like a quarter-million people serving as 'intelligence assets' by feeding it information in Vietnam in 1968, and it couldn't even predict the Tet Offensive. God knows how many spies it was fielding against the USSR at the height of Ronald Reagan's version of the Cold War, and it was still caught flatfooted by the collapse of the Soviet Union. As to destroying 'terrorist infrastructure,' one would do well to remember Operation Phoenix, another product of its open season in Vietnam. In that one, the CIA enlisted elite US units like the Navy Seals and Army Special Forces, as well as those of friendly countries—the south Vietnamese Rangers, for example, and Australian SAS—to run around 'neutralizing' folks targeted by the The Company's legion of snitches as 'guerrillas' (as those now known as 'terrorists' were then called).

Sound familiar?

Upwards of 40,000 people—mostly bystanders, as it turns out—were murdered by Phoenix hit teams before the guerrillas, stronger than ever, ran the US and its collaborators out of their country altogether. And these are the guys who are gonna save the day, if unleashed to do their thing in North America?

The net impact of all this 'counterterrorism' activity upon the combat teams' ability to do what they came to do, of course, will be nil.

Instead, it's likely to make it easier for them to operate (it's worked that way in places like Northern Ireland). And, since denying Americans the luxury of reaping the benefits of genocide in comfort was self-evidently a key objective of the WTC/Pentagon assaults, it can be stated unequivocally that a more overt display of the police state mentality already pervading this country simply confirms the magnitude of their victory.

On Matters of Proportion and Intent

As things stand, including the 1993 detonation of the WTC, 'Arab terrorists' have responded to the massive and sustained American terror bombing of Iraq with a total of four assaults by explosives inside the US. That's about 1% of the 50,000 bombs the Pentagon announced were rained on Baghdad alone during the Gulf War (add Oklahoma City and you'll get something nearer an actual 1%).

They've managed in the process to kill about 5,000 Americans, or roughly 1% of the dead Iraqi children (the percentage is far smaller if you factor in the killing of adult Iraqi civilians, not to mention troops butchered as/after they'd surrendered and/or after the 'war-ending' ceasefire had been announced).

In terms undoubtedly more meaningful to the property/profit-minded American mainstream, they've knocked down a half-dozen buildings—albeit some very well-chosen ones—as opposed to the 'strategic devastation' visited upon the whole of Iraq, and punched a $100 billion hole in the earnings outlook of major corporate shareholders, as opposed to the U.S. obliteration of Iraq's entire economy.

With that, they've given Americans a tiny dose of their own medicine.

This might be seen as merely a matter of 'vengeance' or 'retribution,' and, unquestionably, America has earned it, even if it were to add up only to something so ultimately petty.

The problem is that vengeance is usually framed in terms of 'getting even,' a concept which is plainly inapplicable in this instance. As the above data indicate, it would require another 49,996 detonations killing 495,000 more Americans, for the 'terrorists' to 'break even' for the bombing of Baghdad/extermination of Iraqi children alone. And that's to achieve 'real number' parity. To attain an actual proportional parity of damage—the US is about 15 times as large as Iraq in terms of population, even more in terms of territory—they would, at a minimum, have to blow up about 300,000 more buildings and kill something on the order of 7.5 million people.

Were this the intent of those who've entered the US to wage war against it, it would remain no less true that America and Americans were only receiving the bill for what they'd already done. Payback, as they say, can be a real motherfucker (ask the Germans). There is, however, no reason to believe that retributive parity is necessarily an item on the agenda of those who planned the WTC/Pentagon operation. If it were, given the virtual certainty that they possessed the capacity to have inflicted far more damage than they did, there would be a lot more American bodies lying about right now.

Hence, it can be concluded that ravings carried by the 'news' media since September 11 have contained at least one grain of truth: The peoples of the Mideast 'aren't like' Americans, not least because they don't 'value life' in the same way. By this, it should be understood that Middle-Easterners, unlike Americans, have no history of exterminating others purely for profit or on the basis of racial animus. Thus, we can appreciate the fact that they value life—all lives, not just their own—far more highly than do their U.S. counterparts.

The Makings of a Humanitarian Strategy

In sum one can discern a certain optimism—it might even be called humanitarianism—imbedded in the thinking of those who presided over the very limited actions conducted on September 11.

Their logic seems to have devolved upon the notion that the American people have condoned what has been/is being done in their name—indeed, are to a significant extent actively complicit in it—mainly because they have no idea what it feels like to be on the receiving end.

Now they do.

That was the 'medicinal' aspect of the attacks.

To all appearances, the idea is now to give the tonic a little time to take effect, jolting Americans into the realization that the sort of pain they're now experiencing first-hand is no different from—or the least bit more excruciating than—that which they've been so cavalier in causing others, and thus to respond appropriately.

More bluntly, the hope was—and maybe still is—that Americans, stripped of their presumed immunity from incurring any real consequences for their behavior, would comprehend and act upon a formulation as uncomplicated as 'stop killing our kids, if you want your own to be safe.'

Either way, it's kind of a 'reality therapy' approach, designed to afford the American people a chance to finally 'do the right thing' on their own, without further coaxing.

Were the opportunity acted upon in some reasonable good faith fashion—a sufficiently large number of Americans rising up and doing whatever is necessary to force an immediate lifting of the sanctions on Iraq, for instance, or maybe hanging a few of America's abundant supply of major war criminals (Henry Kissinger comes quickly to mind, as do Madeline Albright, Colin Powell, Bill Clinton and George the Elder)—there is every reason to expect that military operations against the US on its domestic front would be immediately suspended.

Whether they would remain so would of course be contingent upon follow-up. By that, it may be assumed that American acceptance of onsite inspections by international observers to verify destruction of its weapons of mass destruction (as well as dismantlement of all facilities in which more might be manufactured), Nuremberg-style trials in which a few thousand US military/corporate personnel could be properly adjudicated and punished for their Crimes Against Humanity, and payment of reparations to the array of nations/people whose assets the US has plundered over the years, would suffice.

Since they've shown no sign of being unreasonable or vindictive, it may even be anticipated that, after a suitable period of adjustment and reeducation (mainly to allow them to acquire the skills necessary to living within their means), those restored to control over their own destinies by the gallant sacrifices of the combat teams the WTC and Pentagon will eventually (re)admit Americans to the global circle of civilized societies. Stranger things have happened.

In the Alternative

Unfortunately, noble as they may have been, such humanitarian aspirations were always doomed to remain unfulfilled. For it to have been otherwise, a far higher quality of character and intellect would have to prevail among average Americans than is actually the case. Perhaps the strategists underestimated the impact a couple of generations-worth of media indoctrination can produce in terms of demolishing the capacity of human beings to form coherent thoughts. Maybe they forgot to factor in the mind-numbing effects of the indoctrination passed off as education in the US. Then again, it's entirely possible they were aware that a decisive majority of American adults have been reduced by this point to a level much closer to the kind of immediate self-gratification entailed in Pavlovian stimulus/response patterns than anything accessible by appeal to higher loci, and still felt morally obliged to offer the dolts an option to quit while they were ahead.

What the hell? It was worth a try.

But it's becoming increasingly apparent that the dosage of medicine administered was entirely insufficient to accomplish its purpose.

Although there are undoubtedly exceptions, Americans for the most part still don't get it.

Already, they've desecrated the temporary tomb of those killed in the WTC, staging a veritable pep rally atop the mangled remains of those they profess to honor, treating the whole affair as if it were some bizarre breed of contact sport. And, of course, there are the inevitable pom-poms shaped like American flags, school colors worn as little red-white-and-blue ribbons affixed to lapels, sportscasters in the form

of 'counterterrorism experts' drooling mindless color commentary during the pregame warm-up.

Refusing the realization that the world has suddenly shifted its axis, and that they are therefore no longer 'in charge,' they have by-and-large reverted instantly to type, working themselves into their usual bloodlust on the now obsolete premise that the bloodletting will 'naturally' occur elsewhere and to someone else.

'Patriotism,' a wise man once observed, 'is the last refuge of scoundrels.'

And the braided, he might of added.

Braided Scoundrel-in-Chief, George Junior, lacking even the sense to be careful what he wished for, has teamed up with a gaggle of fundamentalist Christian clerics like Billy Graham to proclaim a 'New Crusade' called 'Infinite Justice' aimed at 'ridding the world of evil.'

One could easily make light of such rhetoric, remarking upon how unseemly it is for a son to threaten his father in such fashion—or a president to so publicly contemplate the murder/suicide of himself and his cabinet—but the matter is deadly serious.

They are preparing once again to sally forth for the purpose of roasting brown-skinned children by the scores of thousands. Already, the B-1 bombers and the aircraft carriers and the missile frigates are en route, the airborne divisions are gearing to.

To where? Afghanistan?

The Sudan?

Iraq, again (or still)?

How about Grenada (that was fun)?

Any of them or all. It doesn't matter.

The desire to pummel the helpless runs rabid as ever.

Only, this time it's different.

This time the helpless aren't, or at least are not so helpless as they were.

This time, somewhere, perhaps in an Afghani mountain cave, possibly in a Brooklyn basement, maybe another locale altogether—but somewhere, all the same—there's a grim-visaged (wo)man wearing a Clint Eastwood smile.

'Go ahead, punks,' s/he's saying, 'Make my day.'

And when they do, when they launch these airstrikes abroad—or maybe a little later—it will be at a time conforming to the 'terrorists' own schedule, and at a place of their choosing—the next more intensive dose of medicine will be administered here 'at home.'

Of what will it consist this time? Anthrax? Mustard gas? Sarin? A tactical nuclear device?

That, too, is their choice to make.

Looking back, it will seem to future generations inexplicable why Americans were unable on their own and in time to save themselves, to accept a rule of nature so basic that it could be mouthed by an actor, Laurence Fishburne, in a movie, *The Cotton Club*.

'You've got to learn,' the line went, 'that when you push people around, some people push back.'

As they should.

As they should.

As they must.

And as they undoubtedly will.
There is justice in such symmetry.

Source: "'Some People Push Back': On the Justice of Roosting Chickens" (http://www.kersplebedeb.com/mystuff/s11/churchill.html). Ward Churchill has given permission to reprint this essay.

Document 40

Selected Excerpts from the Testimony of FBI Agent Harry Samit in the Zacarias Moussaoui Trial on March 9, 2006

FBI agent Harry Samit was stationed at the FBI's Minneapolis field office at the time when Zacarias Moussaoui was reported to be acting suspiciously. Samit also became suspicious; he suspected that Moussaoui was planning to use an aircraft for a terrorist act. This testimony reveals Samit's actions and the lack of response from FBI headquarters on obtaining a warrant to search Moussaoui's possessions. He tried for both a criminal warrant and a FISA warrant but was turned down on both. His testimony expresses his frustrations in dealing with his superiors in FBI headquarters. The questions in this testimony come from Mr. Novak, a federal prosecutor in the Moussaoui trial, and the answers come from Harry Samit. The trial testimony of Mr. Samit took up 196 pages, so only about a third of his testimony is recorded here, but it covers most of the major points of his testimony.

Q. And could you tell the good folks on what—what kind of assignment do you have as a special agent with the FBI up there in Minneapolis?

A. I'm an investigator assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force.

Q. Tell the folks what the Joint Terrorism Task Force is.

A. The Joint Terrorism Task Force is an organization of law enforcement agents and officers who investigate international terrorism under the framework set up by the FBI. It's got personnel from a variety of different law enforcement agencies.

Q. Do you want to list some of the different agencies that work with you on that Joint Terrorism Task Force?

A. Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Secret Service, local police officers, sheriff's deputies, a variety of different investigators.

Q. Beyond your assignment to the JTFF, can you tell us what else you do there as a special agent up there in Minnesota?

A. At the time in 1999, I was assigned as a pilot with the FBI as well.

Q. We're going to talk about your pilot training in a second, but your squad that you're assigned to is squad what?

A. Squad 5.

Q. And squad 5 up there includes the investigation of what types of crime?

A. In 2001, it included the investigation of international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and foreign counterintelligence.

Q. And would it be fair to say that since your inception into the FBI, your initial assignment up there in Minneapolis, you've basically been working full-time on terrorism investigations?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, could you tell us, have you received any type of specialized training in the world of terrorism?

A. I have. During the FBI academy, the new agent training, there was a terrorism integrated case scenario which I participated in along with my class. I also attended a basic international terrorism in-service after graduating the FBI academy, and then later a double agent and recruitment in-service as well.

Q. Agent Samit, on August the 15th of 2001, were you assigned still as the special agent to the FBI in Minneapolis?

A. I was.

Q. And at that time did you have occasion to get assigned to the investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui?

A. I was.

Q. And at that time who was your supervisor?

A. I had an acting supervisor, Gregory Jones.

Q. And was there a fellow special agent by the name of Dave Rapp that also worked with you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was he relatively new?

A. He was very new, yes, sir.

Q. Do you want to tell us how it is that you—how the investigation into Zacarias Moussaoui began?

A. Special Agent Rapp had complaint duty that day. It is a rotating shift. All the agents in the office have to answer phone calls from the public and other law enforcement agencies. Special Agent Rapp had occasion to take a call from Pan Am, and the person, the caller, Tim Nelson, provided some fairly significant information.

Q. What was the initial information that you-all received there from Pan Am?

A. That they had a student they were training at the flight academy on simulators for 747-400 series aircraft who was very unusual.

Q. Okay. Did they give you the student's name?

A. They did.

Q. And did they tell you why it is that the student was unusual?

A. Yes, sir. They said that he didn't have any ratings, any aviation ratings or licenses.

Q. What does that mean to you as a criminal investigator?

A. It means that for a person to want to do expensive aviation training, typically it is going to lead somewhere, to a job opportunity or to a job enhancement.

Q. And by not pursuing the ratings, that means they are just not doing it for the—benefit themselves financially; is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Not worth the investment, right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did they tell you whether the student, Mr. Moussaoui, was employed by an airline?

A. They did. They said he was not. He had no affiliation with any airline.

Q. Was that unusual?

A. It was.

Q. Why was that unusual?

A. Because the typical student, as was explained to us, is an airline pilot or is seeking employment with an airline and is already qualified to do so.

Q. Why would that be unusual?

A. Because the airlines typically would pay for the student, or the student would be making an investment in their own training in order to become eligible to be hired by an airline.

Q. Okay. Did they tell you how much the training for Mr. Moussaoui cost?

A. The caller didn't know for sure, but said it was between 8- and 9,000 dollars.

Q. Okay, And what, if any, information did you get about the amount of hours or licensing that Mr. Moussaoui had?

A. It was low. It was less than 60 hours of flight time.

Q. All right. Did you receive information about what type of plane it was that Mr. Moussaoui was pursuing the training on?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What type of plane was that?

A. 747-400 series airliner.

Q. All right. And could you tell us, are you familiar with the notion of a glass cockpit?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Could you tell us what the glass cockpit means to you and the investigatory significance of that?

A. What it means to me as a pilot is the way the information is displayed to the pilot in the cockpit is different. Older airplanes, as compared to glass cockpit airplanes, have individual gauges that display the information, critical information that the pilot needs. When an airplane is said to have a glass cockpit, it relies on a much smaller number of multi-function displays, television screens in the cockpit.

Q. What, if any, impact did that have in terms of your thinking about whether criminality was afoot?

A. My initial thought was that it's a simpler interface for a relative novice, so that if someone had illegitimate purposes in mind for wanting to receive the flight training, that would be an ideal type of aircraft, because they wouldn't need as much training and experience if they were to try and fly it.

Q. And what if any impact would the glass cockpit have on the number of—if there was criminality afoot, the number of accomplices that would have to be involved?

A. The other issue would pertain to the number of crew members in the cockpit. Because the glass cockpit airplanes typically have increased automation, they

need fewer people in the cockpit. And so in order to take over an airplane, it would be the difference between having to overwhelm one or two people as opposed to three or four.

Q. All right. Now, in addition to that information, did you ask for and receive any additional background information, identifiers or anything like that from the defendant?

A. We were able to get his name, his date of birth, and the fact that he was, said he lived in England and was from France, at least initially.

Q. Now, once you got that information, did you open up a case, an investigation?

A. We did.

Q. Could you explain to the ladies and gentlemen what kind of case that you opened up?

A. Within probably 30 minutes of receiving that telephone call we opened an intelligence investigation.

Q. Back in August of 2001, could you tell us what type of investigatory cases that you could open up?

A. During that time we had the intelligence investigation, which we did actually open on Mr. Moussaoui, and we also had a criminal investigation.

Q. All right. I want to ask you to explain the difference. Starting with the criminal, what is—criminal investigation, what was your goal back in 2001 if you were to open up just a standard criminal investigation?

A. Like any other type of crime that the FBI investigates, the goal of a criminal investigation pertaining to terrorism is to collect evidence of a crime relating to international terrorism.

Q. And would that—with a mind-set towards what?

A. Towards prosecution.

Q. All right. Now, contrast that with opening up an intelligence investigation, what's, what do you do there?

A. An intelligence investigation is designed to generate intelligence, intelligence whose goal would be to safeguard national security.

Q. And by safeguarding national security, what does that mean? What would you try to accomplish towards that goal?

A. We would attempt to use any information derived from a case, an intelligence investigation, to strengthen our ability to deal with threats to national security, whether it be espionage or terrorists, ways to implement countermeasures to deny them their objectives, without necessarily prosecuting anybody, but we would still take steps, countermeasures to prevent them from accomplishing their goals.

Q. Explain to us, if you are not going to arrest somebody, how is it that you could end up protecting national security during your investigation? What are the types of things you can do?

A. We can use that intelligence to deny personnel access to the United States, to certain classified information; we can use that intelligence to implement countermeasures, security countermeasures to make whole sectors safer. Any time information comes of a threat, or intelligence comes regarding a threat, the countermeasures which would counter that.

Q. Okay. Now, what if during the course of an investigation, an intelligence investigation, you decide that you have gathered enough information to charge somebody criminally? Are you allowed to do that?

A. Yes, sir. At the time we could, there was a mechanism by which a criminal investigation and prosecution could occur, but there were a number of steps that needed to be gone through before that could happen.

Q. Could you explain to us what those steps were?

A. There was a term called the wall. And the wall was supposed to be a barrier between intelligence and criminal investigations wherein information developed on the intelligence investigation could not be supplied at the wall to those working the criminal investigation.

Q. What was the purpose of the wall?

A. To prevent abuse, to prevent people in the FBI and law enforcement from utilizing information gathered under the auspices of national security to be used to prosecute someone, without safeguards and checks imposed on that.

Q. Now, we were talking about the wall there. Again, could you explain to us the amount of safeguards that you had to, or oversight that you had to go through, if you were working on the intelligence side versus the criminal side?

A. We could—the system was set up whereby there could be a group of, separate group of agents within the same office who were working criminal investigation against the same subject. It was important, especially for the people working the intelligence case against that person, to be very cognizant that they not share information that was derived directly. Instead what we were required to do during that time period was apply to our headquarters, who would then apply to the Department of Justice for authority to do that.

Q. Okay. And was there a particular unit within the Department of Justice that you needed approval from in order to switch the case from an intelligence to a criminal case?

A. Not to switch, not to switch the cases.

Q. Or share the information.

A. It was the Office of Intelligence Policy Review, OIPR.

Q. In a criminal case, who are the attorneys that you would normally deal with if you were to pursue a criminal investigation?

A. Assistant United States attorneys in the District of Minnesota.

Q. And if you opened an intelligence case, were you able to deal with the assistant United States attorneys that were located there in Minneapolis?

A. No, that would fall under the heading of our needing to go to the Office of Intelligence Policy Review first for authority.

Q. And they would have to approve that before you could share information with them; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, in addition to finding out that he was French, did Agent [John] Weess [special agent with the Immigration and Naturalization Service] determine, along with you, what Mr. Moussaoui's status was in terms of being an immigrant into the United States?

A. He did. He was able to determine very quickly that Mr. Moussaoui was out of status.

Q. Well, out of status means what?

A. Out of status means illegally in the United States.

Q. Can you tell us what it is that Mr. [Clancy] Prevost [Moussaoui ground school instructor] told you at that time?

A. Mr. Prevost was able to elaborate on his contact with Mr. Moussaoui, to describe his interest in aviation but his utter lack of experience and knowledge. He discussed the fact that they talked about Mr. Moussaoui was a resident of the U.K., originally from France. When we asked Mr. Prevost what sparked his suspicion that's when he related a story about Mr. Moussaoui's interest in the aircraft doors, the fact that he was surprised to learn that they couldn't be opened in flight, and then that led into the discussion about Mr. Moussaoui's religion.

Q. Okay, Now, after you interviewed Mr. Prevost, could you tell us if you made any decision about how to proceed with your investigation?

A. We did. Special Agent Weess and I consulted and we decided that on the basis of the suspicious behavior discussed, provided to us by the school, that we were going to arrest Mr. Moussaoui.

Q. Okay. And why was that? You were going to arrest him for what?

A. We were going to arrest him on his visa waiver overstay.

Q. But were you focused upon that or were you focused on other concerns?

A. We were obviously focused on learning more about his plans. And we saw that as a way of preventing him from getting any simulator training, any meaningful aircraft training before we had the opportunity to talk to him and sort things out.

Q. Okay. Now, at the time that you arrested him, did you notice if Mr. Moussaoui had any other bags or any other items that were in the hotel room on the left side?

A. He did. The room was full of household goods, of clothing, of bags, backpacks, suitcases, and I noticed a considerable quantity of clothing and other materials like that on the left side of the room.

Q. Okay. And at that time did you search those items?

A. No, we did not.

Q. Okay. Why not?

A. We asked Mr. Moussaoui for permission to search. He became very upset at being informed he was being placed under arrest. He again noted to us that he had expensive flight training, urgent flight training he needed to attend. And I suggested to him that maybe there was a reply to that, that he had received—

Q. Reply to what?

A. To his request to adjust status.

Q. Okay.

A. That there might be other documents which would show that he was, in fact, in status.

Q. And what was his response to that?

A. His response was no, you may not search my things, you can't go through anything else. He was very insistent that we not do that.

Q. Why didn't you search them anyhow?

A. Because we're not allowed to do that under the law. Mr. Moussaoui was in custody. He had been patted down. He was, he was subsequently searched, his person was searched, but under the Fourth Amendment we're not allowed to search his room.

Q. All right. Now, could you tell us on August 17 of 2001, did you make some kind of notification to your headquarters?

A. We did.

Q. And could you tell us—first of all—would you explain to the ladies and gentlemen what ITOS is in the world of FBI?

A. ITOS stands for the International Terrorism Operations Section. It's a group of supervisors and analysts at headquarters . . ., who are assigned to oversee and support investigations in the field, like in Minneapolis.

Q. And within ITOS, are there various units dealing with particular groups of terrorists?

A. There are.

Q. Could you just summarize what some of the units are there that are within the ITOS division of the FBI?

A. Two important ones for this are the Usama Bin Laden Unit that deals with al Qaeda, or UBLU is the acronym, and the Radical Fundamentalist Unit, or RFU.

Q. And what do they deal with?

A. The Usama bin Laden Unit deals with al Qaeda. The Radical Fundamentalist Unit at the time dealt with Sunni extremists who are not al Qaeda, various other groups.

Q. And as a field agent out there, are you supposed to go to the, to the unit that deals with the particular terrorist that you're looking at?

A. Exactly.

Q. And—now, you believed that Mr. Moussaoui was a terrorist, and you've—you confronted him with, as you've testified; is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you know which terrorist organization he was a member of?

A. We did not.

Q. And so how did you know which unit to go to in the ITOS?

A. Well, we didn't originally, and the one that most logically fitted it was the Radical Fundamentalist Unit.

Q. And why is this that you went to the Radical Fundamentalist Unit?

A. We knew that Mr. Moussaoui was a Sunni Muslim, he was an extremist, and we believed he was involved in an ongoing plot. The Radical Fundamentalist Unit was the logical unit.

Q. Okay. And now could you tell us how is it that a field agent communicates with the headquarters? Do you just call them up on the telephone, or do you do something else.

A. Informal communications can be via telephone or e-mail, but in the FBI world, formalized communications were through a document that we call an electronic communication.

Q. Okay.

A. Or an EC is how we abbreviate it.

Q. This EC, did you send it then to the RFU unit?

A. Initially it was sent to the Iran unit and then routed to the RFU unit.

Q. Why did you go to the Iran unit then?

A. Because before speaking with Mr. Moussaoui, FBI database checks indicated that his name might be connected to Iran.

Q. Okay. And what happened when your EC got to Iran? Did you get kicked over to the RFU unit?

A. We did. By then there had been enough of a delay, the interviews had occurred, and we were well aware that it was not under the purview of the Iran unit but in fact the Radical Fundamentalist Unit.

Q. Where you should have been in the first place, all right. Now, could you tell us who was your contact in the RFU unit?

A. The supervisor who was assigned oversight and support responsibilities for Minneapolis was Supervisory Special Agent Mike Maltbie.

Q. Okay. And when you sent that electronic communication to Mr. Maltbie, what was it that your initial request was that you wanted to do?

A. My request to Mr. Maltbie was to apply to the Office of Intelligence Policy Review, to OIPR—

Q. That's in the Department of Justice. You talked about them before, right?

A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

Q. What did you want them—what did you want to occur?

A. I wanted them to grant permission to go to the United States Attorney's Office in the District of Minnesota so that we could pursue criminal charges.

Q. Are you trying to overcome the wall, so to speak?

A. Not overcome it. I'm trying to get permission to release selected information over it. The wall will still exist, and that will still be, certainly in August of 2001 will be a factor, but what I'm trying to do is pass information to criminal investigators so they can begin pursuing that type of investigation.

Q. Okay. And were you given permission to do that?

A. I was not.

Q. Okay. And why is it—were you told why it is you were not given permission?

A. I was told that, that our headquarters, FBI headquarters, Radical Fundamentalist Unit did not believe that sufficient evidence of a crime existed, and also there was a fear that if we were to try and go for a criminal case, to pursue a criminal search initially, and then we had to go back and use techniques under the intelligence world, that it might taint that.

Q. Could you tell us what the—would you describe for us what the process was then for you to go about procuring a FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] warrant back in August of 2001?

A. Once my investigation had convinced myself and supervisors, other agents working the case with me, that probable cause existed to believe that the subject of that warrant—of that search was acting as an agent of a foreign power, then I would prepare an electronic communication, an EC, and supporting documentation that would go to the Radical Fundamentalist Unit, or the FBI headquarters unit that was overseeing that investigation. They would, they would take that information, they would add whatever type—whatever information they could to amplify their request, and then they would take it to a headquarters unit, FBI headquarters unit called the National Security Law Unit, comprised of lawyers whose expertise is in the area of national security law. They would review it to ensure that probable cause did, in fact, exist to establish that that person was acting as an agent of a foreign power. When that was in agreement and the FBI agreed that the application had merit, it would then go to the Department of Justice, OIPR, Office of Intelligence Policy Review, where it would again be reviewed by attorneys, this time in the Department of Justice outside the FBI, and again, when all parties agreed that

probable cause existed, it would go forward to the FISA court in the form of a declaration.

Q. Okay.

A. Which a judge would sign or not.

Q. Is the FISA court a local judge then in Minnesota, or is that somewhere else?

A. It's somewhere else.

Q. All right. And is it generally headquartered somewhere in the Washington area, with affiliates around the country?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And, and even when the application goes to the FISA judge, the FISA judge still has the decision whether to approve it or disapprove it; is that right?

A. That's correct. There's many points along the way where it can be forwarded and not forwarded. The ultimate person who decides is a FISA court judge.

Q. After you were denied the authority to seek a criminal search warrant, did you take steps to try to get a FISA warrant?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Could you explain what it is that—the steps that you took in order to do so?

A. We, we shifted—I personally shifted gears slightly, because now the nature of the information that I need is different. I no longer need to establish that, in fact, the person is engaged in an ongoing crime, but rather that they're doing any actions on behalf of a foreign power, that they are now acting as an agent of a foreign power, and so the focus changed slightly to that. The substance of the interviews was still useful to some extent and misleading to other extents, but the objective was the same, was the search of those belongings.

Q. Well, and specifically factually, are you trying to connect Mr. Moussaoui to a terrorist organization?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. Now, directing your attention to August 23, earlier on in your testimony, you had told us that you had made a request to your—to Jay Abbott, one of the French legats that the FBI has; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir, the assistant legal attaché in the Paris office.

Q. All right. And on August 23, did you get some information back from your French legat?

A. I did.

Q. All right. And did you get information from Mr. Abbott connecting Mr. Moussaoui to a dead Chechen fighter?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Could you tell the folks what a Chechen fighter is?

A. Yes, sir. There was a conflict then going on in the former Soviet—the former Soviet, now Russian, region of Chechnya. They were seeking independence from the Russian Federation and, in fact, had seen an influx in the late '90s of foreign fighters from various Muslim countries. A number of these soldiers were trained in Afghanistan. They reported into Chechnya and began engaging the Russians in military combat.

Q. Well, let me ask you this: You had told us that al Qaeda was identified on a State Department list as a foreign terrorist organization. Were Chechen rebels identified as a foreign terrorist organization?

A. No, sir, they weren't.

Q. Now, on August 30, did you get additional information back through your French legat?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did you get specific information about Mr. Moussaoui's fundamentalism?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you describe what the extent of the information was about his religious views?

A. That he was extreme, that he was—had espoused violence, that he attempted to recruit and convert others to both the extreme view of Islam and to violence, and that he had followed closely the Wahhabi sect of Islam.

Q. And on August 19, did you send a request to the English government asking them to do investigation on your behalf?

A. To our legal attaché in London, yes, sir.

Q. Same type of thing you have in France, you've got one over there in England?

A. Correct.

Q. And what type of information was it that you were trying to gather in England?

A. The same type of information regarding associates, sources of funding. The one that was sent to London to our legal attaché carried particular weight and detail because those are the items not only that Mr. Moussaoui had disclosed to the associate, Ahmed Atif, but he had done so in such a way in the interview that made me believe that that was a person of significance.

Q. Now, on August 22, did you have—receive information from the Central Intelligence Agency?

A. I did.

Q. Well, what information did you get back from—summarizing what you got from the CIA at that time?

A. I received information from them that Mr. Moussaoui's dead associate was connected to the leader of the Chechen rebels by name, and that that—

Q. Who is the—what name did you receive of the leader of the Chechen rebels?

A. Ibn Khattab.

Q. Okay. Did you receive any other information about Ibn Khattab, the leader of the Chechen rebels?

A. From the Central Intelligence Agency I learned that Ibn Khattab and Usama Bin Laden had had a relationship based on their past history.

Q. Okay. Did you receive any information about Mr. Moussaoui being a member of al Qaeda?

A. No.

Q. Now, did you continue to try to accumulate the information that you had gotten through your French legat and from the Central Intelligence Agency in terms of pursuing your FISA warrant?

A. Yes. It was, it was the obsession of our squad, of the Joint Terrorism Task Force, was doing just that.

Q. When you say obsession, could you tell us what do you mean by that?

A. I mean that on the basis of the interviews that Special Agent Weess and myself had done on the 16th and the 17th, we were convinced that Mr. Moussaoui was involved in some type of plot, and so all of our energies were directed at accumulating whatever was required, evidence or intelligence, to get into his belongings and search them for information as to what was going to happen.

Q. Now, at some point, your request to get a FISA search warrant was denied by your headquarters; is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Do you know approximately when that was?

A. Approximately August 28.

Q. All right. At the time that your request for a search warrant was denied, could you explain to us what was the extent of the information that you had available that connected you to a terrorist organization?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Or Mr. Moussaoui, I'm sorry.

A. Yes, sir. We had information from our legat in Paris that Mr. Moussaoui had recruited this fighter for the Chechens who had since been killed in Chechnya, that that fighter, in fact, was connected to Ibn Khattab, who was the leader of the Chechen fighters. The CIA was able to confirm that information and also to provide information that Ibn Khattab and Usama Bin Laden had a relationship.

Q. Let me ask you this: At any point, were you able to satisfy your headquarters' demands as to the proof as to what the foreign power was?

A. No.

Q. All right. Now, after your headquarters denied your efforts to try to get a FISA warrant, did you come up with a different plan in order to try to get a search into Mr. Moussaoui's bags, at least his bags that he had with him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what was that plan?

A. Through consultation with our legal attaché's office in Paris, we learned that the French government had an interest in Mr. Moussaoui and, in fact, that they were willing to accept his being deported there with the provision of French law that his belongings could be searched upon his arrival.

Q. Now, you could lawfully deport him already based upon his overstay in the visa waiver program; is that right?

A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

Q. And through this series of days thereafter, did you set up plans in order to do so?

A. We did. We worked—that became the primary focus. We kept the other options, obviously mindful of the criminal and of the intelligence, the FISA option as well, but our primary focus then became the deportation of Mr. Moussaoui to France in order to allow his goods to be—his property to be—property to be searched.

Q. And when was that finally approved by all parties, that that was—that that could occur?

A. On the afternoon of September 10, 2001.

Q. And, and Mr. Moussaoui obviously as of September 11 had not been sent back to France; is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. When was that to occur, do you know?

A. In the very near future. We had received authority to begin planning for that on the afternoon of September 10. Obviously, the time difference being what it was, the legal attaché's office in Paris was closed, so that next morning, we were going to set up the logistics, but it was going to be a matter of days.

Q. Now, in addition to taking those precautions, at any point did you ask your headquarters to notify the FAA about the threat that Mr. Moussaoui posed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And on August 31, did you send what is known as an LHM to Mr. Maltbie in the RFU unit?

A. I did.

Q. Do you want to tell the folks what an LHM is in the jargon of the FBI?

A. An LHM stands for letterhead memorandum, and a letterhead memorandum is a document authored by someone in the FBI that is intended to be released outside of the FBI, whether it's to another law enforcement agency in the United States, to another member of the intelligence community, or to a friendly foreign government.

Q. And why is that you wanted your headquarters to notify FAA about what was happening with Mr. Moussaoui?

A. Because of the, our investigative theory that he was involved in a plan to hijack a commercial airliner.

Q. And on September 5 of 2001, do you know if your headquarters did, in fact, make that notification?

A. They did. In fact, our headquarters issued a teletype, a message to a number of other government agencies, to include the FAA.

Q. Now, in addition to what you requested your headquarters to do, were you so concerned about the FAA being notified that you took steps on your own as a local guy on the ground out in Minnesota to make sure the FAA knew what was going on with Mr. Moussaoui?

A. Yes, sir, Special Agent Weess and myself on September 5 went to the FAA investigators in the Twin Cities, in Minneapolis-St. Paul, and provided them a personal briefing on the contents of the teletype, as well as case agent perspective on what we believed was actually going on.

Q. And as a result of those attacks [September 11], those crimes occurring, were you then authorized to go get a criminal search warrant?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did you go that very day, September 11, to the United States Attorney's Office in Minneapolis and procure a search warrant?

A. Within minutes of our being granted permission, I was on my way to the United States Attorney's Office at full speed, yes, sir.

Q. And did the U.S. Attorney's Office help you and your brother agents to get a search warrant then signed by a United States magistrate judge?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, after you got a search warrant, now you had the legal ability to go in and search Mr. Moussaoui's items; is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did you do so?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you tell the folks what it is that you did finally with those bags that he had stored in INS for those three weeks?

A. Special Agent Weess went down to Immigration and was, was responding lights and sirens to bring those bags to the FBI office at full speed. The warrant was signed, and I had an FBI organization within our office call the evidence

response team, agents who are specially trained in evidence recovery, standing by. When the goods arrived, when the personal property arrived and the warrant arrived, the evidence response team under my direction immediately began executing the search warrant.

Source: Testimony of FBI Agent Harry Samit in the Zacarias Moussaoui Trial (March 9, 2006): transcript pages 794–795, 802–818, 827–828, 845–846, and 922–952. (http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/moussaoui/zmsami/).

Document 41

Testimony of the American Red Cross before the Management, Integration, and Oversight Subcommittee of the House Homeland Security (July 12, 2006)

In testimony before the Management, Integration, and Oversight Subcommittee of the House Homeland Security, Leigh A. Bradley, Senior Vice President, Enterprise Risk of the American Red Cross, outlined steps taken by the American Red Cross to assist the victims and their families in the aftermath of September 11.

Chairman Rogers, Congressmen Meek, and Members of the Committee, my name is Leigh Bradley and I am the Senior Vice President for Enterprise Risk at the American Red Cross. I want to thank you for providing me with the opportunity to appear before you today to talk about the American Red Cross response to the attacks of September 11th—work that is ongoing to this very day. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you our lessons learned regarding fraud prevention, detection, and controls.

The attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001, tested the American Red Cross and America in ways we had not experienced as an organization or as a nation. It is a day that will remain burned into the minds of all who witnessed on national television two of our nation's tallest and proudest buildings fall more than 100 stories, a massive inferno at the Pentagon and a plane crash in a remote field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Thousands of innocent people died on September 11, including members of the first response community who put their lives at risk to save others. Since September 11, thousands more have suffered from the physical and emotional stress of responding to these vicious attacks. All who witnessed this day will remember where they were, what they were doing, and will always recount their feelings and emotions as we, as a nation, were overcome with grief.

The American Red Cross had been America's partner in disaster preparedness, prevention and response for nearly 120 years on that fateful day in September. In our long history, we have aided soldiers on the battlefield, supported victims of all disasters, and provided support to first responders.

Our experience in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City Bombings in 1995 helped to prepare us for this day. Almost immediately after the first plane struck the World Trade Center, Red Cross volunteers and personnel were on the scene ready to aid in the response.

I want to acknowledge the work of Alan Goodman, who is with me today. Alan is the Executive Director of the American Red Cross September 11th Recovery Program (SRP). For the past four years, Alan has been at the helm of this program, which has provided longer term recovery to tens of thousands of individuals and families, including families of the deceased, the physically injured rescue and recovery workers and their families, and people who were living or working in the areas of the attacks.

Response to September 11, 2001

One year after the terrorist attacks occurred on 9/11, the American Red Cross issued a report to the American people regarding the activities of the Red Cross, the Liberty Disaster Relief Fund, and the execution of the September 11th Recovery Program. Included in this report was a chronology of our response, which is attached to my testimony. (Appendix I) Before I discuss the Red Cross response to 9/11 and some of the lessons learned, it is important that I briefly share what the Red Cross traditionally does during times of disaster and how this response differed.

The American Red Cross responds to disasters in communities across the nation each and every day. In fact, we respond to more than 70,000 disasters each year. The vast majority of disasters we respond to are single family home fires. We also respond to large-scale disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and man-made events. There is one constant in all of our response operations and that is to ensure the immediate emergency needs of our clients are met. Individual client assistance has been provided by the American Red Cross for as long as the organization has been in existence. Red Cross individual client assistance includes much more than just financial support. In fact, traditional individual client assistance has been based on a cadre of services to ensure that the health and welfare needs of our clients are met. This includes feeding and sheltering operations, mental health assistance, first aid, and relief and recovery referrals. We partner with other nongovernmental organizations, the for profit community, and with all levels of government to ensure that the emergency needs of disaster victims are met. In each response, our first priority is to ensure that those affected by disaster have a safe shelter and are provided with the basic necessities of life.

The next priority is to assist families in taking the first steps toward recovery. This is the purpose and concern that individual client assistance is designed to serve. It has long been the case that while shelter, feeding and the distribution of critical items are sufficient to stabilize individuals and families, it is not sufficient to meet all short term emergency needs necessary for disaster victims to begin their individual road to recovery. Critical items of assistance such as resources for food, changes of clothing and bedding bridge the gap between mass care activities and

the receipt of state and federal recovery assistance. This allows a family a modicum of independence and a flexible resource for the types of essential items mentioned above. Ultimately, within the framework of disaster assistance provided by other agencies, as well as state and federal programs, individual client assistance helps bridge the gap between mass care activities and loans, temporary housing, and other assistance.

The response of the American public in the wake of 9/11 was extraordinary. When thousands of Americans needed help following the attacks, tens of thousands volunteered with the Red Cross, and tens of thousands made financial contributions. The American Red Cross received more than $1 million in contributions. While the Red Cross often provides financial assistance for the immediate emergency needs of our clients, the intent of our donors was to ensure this money was earmarked for the victims of 9/11.

To that end, we created the Liberty Disaster Relief Fund as a distinct and segregated fund for those financial donations and to assist those directly affected by the September 11th attacks. Former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell was appointed as the independent overseer of the fund. Under the distribution plan, and consistent with the Red Cross mission of providing immediate emergency disaster relief, the majority of funds were to be distributed to the families of those who were killed in the September 11 attacks, those who were seriously injured, and others directly affected by the disaster.

For an organization that is accustomed to providing de minimus amounts of financial assistance—money that is meant to provide for immediate emergency needs such as a change of clothes, toiletries, or diapers for children—this meant providing much larger sums of money. The American Red Cross had two phases of response to the tragic events of September 11. Phase One represents the immediate response to the terrorist attacks, dating from September 11, 2001, through October 1, 2002, and is referred to as the Relief Operation Phase. Phase Two encompasses the long term recovery effort, dating from October 2, 2002, to the present, and is referred to as September 11th Recovery Program (SRP) Relief Operation Phase.

- Family Gift Program #1 (FGP I)—The FGP I provided three months of rent, food, utilities and other ongoing expenses to family members of those missing, deceased, or injured from the World Trade Center (WTC), Pentagon, or Shanksville, Pennsylvania events.
- Family Gift Program #2 (FGP II)—The FGP II began on December 6, 2001, and provided six months of living expenses to family members and injured clients who received FGP I and nine months of expenses to clients who initially sought financial assistance after December 2002.
- Family Gift #3 (FGP III)—FGP I and FGP II met the early financial needs for the victims covered under the Family Gift Program. The first two gifts were designed to cover the first nine months of living expenses and these gifts were all disbursed prior to June 30, 2002. In January 2002, the Red Cross determined that the Family Gift Program should also cover unmet essential living expenses for an entire year through September 11, 2002. The third Family Gift (FGP III) was created to cover expenses for the months ending on September 11, 2002. No funds were distributed for FGP III until

July of 2002. Specifically, FGP III granted expenses, depending on whether or not clients received the previous two gifts, to financially dependent immediate and extended family members of decedents, child guardians, and the 'seriously injured.' The 'seriously injured' were defined as individuals who were in the immediate vicinity of the WTC, the Pentagon or the Pennsylvania crash site on 9/11 and as a result suffered a verifiable, serious physical injury or illness for which they were admitted to a hospital for at least 24 hours between 9/11 and 9/18/01. The FGP III ended on June 15, 2004.

Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Management, Integration, and Oversight Subcommittee of the House Homeland Security, *Reaction of the American Red Cross and Fraud in 9/11 Assistance* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), pp. 140–146.

Document 42

Confession of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed at the Combatant Status Review Tribunal at Guantánamo Detention Camp (March 10, 2007)

This testimony by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed at the Combatant Status Review Tribunal at Guantánamo Detention Camp on March 10, 2007, answers many questions about the September 11, 2001, attacks. He takes complete responsibility for the planning and implementation for the attacks. In fact, Mohammed almost glorifies his role. He also takes responsibility for a number of other initiatives and operations of al-Qaeda, including some that never materialized. His confession of responsibility for the Bali nightclub bombing and the murder of Daniel Pearl are new bits of information. Mohammed considers his operations to be part of an ongoing war between the Muslim and Western worlds. Earlier in the proceedings Mohammed complains about the use of torture on him. His personal statement is often in broken English, but it is important to read his justification for his actions in his own words.

I hereby admit and affirm without duress to the following:

1. I swore Bayaat (i.e., allegiance) to Sheikh Usama Bin Laden to conduct Jihad of self and money, and also Hijrah (i.e., expatriation to any location in the world where Jihad is required).
2. I was a member of the Al Qaida Council.
3. I was the Media Operations Director for Al-Sahab, or 'The Clouds,' under Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Al-Sahab is the media outlet that provided Al-Qaida-sponsored information to Al Jazeera.
4. I was the Operation Director for Sheikh Usama Bin Laden for the organizing, planning, follow-up, and execution of the 9/11 Operation under the Military Commander, Sheikh Abu Hafs Al-Masri Subhi Abu Sittah (Mohammad Atef).

5. I was the Military Operational Commander for all foreign operations around the world under the direction of Sheikh Usama Bin Laden and Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri.
6. I was directly in charge, after the death of Sheikh Abu Hafs Al-Masri Subhi Abu Sittah, of managing and following up on the Cell for the Production of Biological Weapons, such as anthrax and others, and following up on Dirty Bomb Operations on American soil.
7. I was Emir (i.e., commander) of Beit Al Shuhada (i.e., the Martyrs House) in the state of Kandahar, Afghanistan, which housed the 9/11 hijackers. There I was responsible for their training and readiness for the execution of the 9/11 Operation.

Also, I hereby admit and affirm without duress that I was a responsible participant, principal planner, trainer, financier (via the Military Council Treasury), executor, and/or a personal participant in the following:

1. I was responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center Operation.
2. I was responsible for the 9/11 Operation, from A to Z.
3. I decapitated with my blessed right hand the head of the American Jew, Daniel Pearl, in the city of Karachi, Pakistan. For those who would like to confirm, there are pictures of me on the Internet holding his head.
4. I was responsible for the Shoe Bomber Operation to down two American airplanes.
5. I was responsible for the Filka Island Operation in Kuwait that killed two American soldiers.
6. I was responsible for the bombing of a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, which was frequented by British and Australian nationals.
7. I was responsible for planning, training, surveying, and financing the New (or Second) Wave attacks against the following skyscrapers after 9/11:
   a. Library Tower, California.
   b. Sears Tower, Chicago.
   c. Plaza Bank, Washington state.
   d. The Empire State Building, New York City.
8. I was responsible for planning, financing, & follow-up of operations to destroy American military vessels and oil tankers in the Straights of Hormuz, the Straights of Gibraltar, and the Port of Singapore.
9. I was responsible for planning, training, surveying, and financing for the Operation to bomb and destroy the Panama Canal.
10. I was responsible for surveying and financing for the assassination of several former American Presidents, including president Carter.
11. I was responsible for surveying, planning, and financing for the bombing of suspension bridges in New York.
12. I was responsible for planning to destroy the Sears Tower by burning a few fuel or oil tanker trucks beneath it or around it.
13. I was responsible for planning, surveying, and financing for the operation to destroy Heathrow Airport, the Canary Wharf Building, and Big Ben on British soil.

14. I was responsible for planning, surveying, and financing for the destruction of many night clubs frequented by American and British citizens on Thailand soil.
15. I was responsible for planning, surveying and financing for the destruction of the New York Stock Exchange and other financial targets after 9/11.
16. I was responsible for planning, financing, and surveying for the destruction of buildings in the Israeli city of Elat by using airplanes leaving from Saudi Arabia.
17. I was responsible for planning, surveying, and financing for the destruction of American embassies in Indonesia, Australia, and Japan.
18. I was responsible for surveying and financing for the destruction of the Israeli embassy in India, Azerbaijan, the Philippines, and Australia.
19. I was responsible for surveying and financing for the destruction of an Israeli 'El-Al' Airlines flight on Thailand soil departing from Bangkok Airport.
20. I was responsible for sending several Mujahadeen into Israel to conduct surveillance to hit several strategic targets deep in Israel.
21. I was responsible for the bombing of the hotel in Mombasa that is frequented by Jewish travelers via El-Al airlines.
22. I was responsible for launching a Russian-made SA-7 surface-to-air missile on El-Al or other Jewish airliner departing from Mombasa.
23. I was responsible for planning and surveying to hit American targets in South Korea, such as American military bases and a few night clubs frequented by American soldiers.
24. I was responsible for financial, excuse me, I was responsible for providing financial support to hit American, Jewish, and British targets in Turkey.
25. I was responsible for surveillance needed to hit nuclear power plants that generate electricity in several U.S. states.
26. I was responsible for planning, surveying, and financing to hit NATO Headquarters in Europe.
27. I was responsible for the planning and surveying needed to execute the Bojinka Operation, which was designed to down twelve American airplanes full of passengers. I personally monitored a round-trip, Manila-to-Seoul, Pan Am flight.
28. I was responsible for the assassination attempt against President Clinton during his visit to the Philippines in 1994 or 1995.
29. I shared responsibility for the assassination attempt against Pope John Paul the second while he was visiting the Philippines.
30. I was responsible for the training and financing for the assassination of Pakistan's President Musharraf.
31. I was responsible for the attempt to destroy an American oil company owned by the Jewish former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, on the Island of Sumatra, Indonesia.

Personal Representative: Sir, that concluded the written portion of the Detainee's final statement and as he has alluded to earlier he has some additional comments he would like to make.

President: Alright. Before you proceed, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the statement that was just read by the Personal Representative, were those your words?

Khalid Sheik Muhammad: Yes, and I want to add some of this one just for some verification. It like some operations before I join al Qaida. Before I remember al Qaida which is related to Bojinka Operation I went to destination involve to us in 94, 95. Some Operations which means out of al Qaida. It's like beheading Daniel Pearl. It's not related to al Qaida. It was shared in Pakistani, other group, Mujahadeen. The story of Daniel Pearl, because he stated for the Pakistanis group, that he was working with the both. His mission was in Pakistan to track about Richard Reed trip to Israel. Richard Reed, do you have trip? You send it Israel to make set for targets in Israel. His mission in Pakistan from Israeli intelligence, Mosad, to make interview to ask about when he was there. Also, he mention to them he was both. He have relation with CIA people and were the Mosad. But he was not related to al Qaida at all or UBL. It is related to the Pakistan Mujahadeen group. Other operations mostly are some word I'm not accurate in saying. I'm responsible but if you read the heading history. The line there 'Also, hereby admit and affirm without duress that I was a responsible participant, principle planner, trainer, financier.'

In the name of God the most compassionate the most merciful, and if any fail to retaliation by way of charity and . . . I apologize. I will start again. And if any fail to judge by the light of Allah has revealed, they are no better than wrong doers, unbelievers, and the unjust.

For this verse, I not take the oath. Take an oath is part of your Tribunal and I'll not accept it. To be or accept the Tribunal as to be, I'll accept it. That I'm accepting American constitution, American law or whatever you are doing here. This is shy religiously I cannot accept anything you do. Just to explain for this one, does not mean I'm not saying that I'm lying. When I not take oath does not mean I'm lying. You know very well peoples take oath and they will lie. You know the President he did this before he just makes his oath and he lied. So sometimes when I'm not making oath does not mean I'm lying.

Second thing. When I wrote this thing, I mean, the PR he told me that President may stop you at anytime and he don't like big mouth nor you to talk too much. To be within subject. So, I will try to be within the enemy combatant subject.

What I wrote here, is not I'm making myself hero, when I said I was responsible for this or that. But you are military man. You know very well there are language for any war. So, there are, we are when I admitting these things I'm not saying I'm not do it. I did it but this the language of any war. If America they want to invade Iraq they will not send for Saddam roses or kisses they send for a bombardment. This is the best way if I want. If I'm fighting for anybody admit to them I'm American enemies. For sure, I'm American enemies. Usama bin Laden, he did his best press conference in American media. Mr. John Miller he been there when he made declaration against Jihad, against America. And he said it is not no need for me now to make explanation of what he said but mostly he said about military presence in Arabian peninsula and aiding Israel and many things. So when we made any war against America we are jackals fighting in the nights. I consider myself, for what you are doing, a religious thing as you consider us fundamentalist. So, we derive from religious leading that we consider we and George

Washington doing same thing. As consider George Washington as hero, Muslims many of them are considering Usama bin Laden. He is doing same thing. He is just fighting. He needs his independence. Even we think that, or not me only. Many Muslims, that al Qaida or Taliban they are doing. They have been oppressed by America. This is the feeling of the prophet. So when we say we are enemy combatant, that right. We are. But I'm asking you again to be fair with many Detainees which are not enemy combatant. Because many of them have been unjustly arrested. Many, not one or two or three. Cause the definition which you wrote even from my view it is not fair. Because if I was in the first Jihad times Russia. So I have to be Russian enemy. But America supported me in this because I'm their alliances when I was fighting Russia. Same job I'm doing. I'm fighting. I was fighting there Russia now I'm fighting America. So, many people who been in Afghanistan never live. Afghanistan stay in but they not share Taliban or al Qaida. They been Russian time and they cannot go back to their home with their corrupted government. They stayed there when America invaded Afghanistan parliament. They had been arrest. They never have been with Taliban or the others. So many people consider them as enemy but they are not. Because definitions are very wide definition so people they came after October of 2002, 2001. When America invaded Afghanistan, they just arrive in Afghanistan cause they hear there enemy. They don't know what it means al Qaida or Usama bin Laden or Taliban. They don't care about these things. They heard they were enemy in Afghanistan they just arrived. As they heard first time Russian invade Afghanistan. They arrive they fought when back than they came. They don't know what's going on and Taliban they been head of government. You consider me even Taliban even the president of whole government. Many people they join Taliban because they are the government. When Karzai they came they join Karzai when come they join whatever public they don't know what is going on. So, many Taliban fight even then be fighters because they just because public. The government is Taliban then until now CIA don't have exactly definition well who is Taliban, who is al Qaida. Your Tribunal now are discussing he is enemy or not and that is one of your jobs. So this is why you find many Afghanis people, Pakistanis people even, they don't know what is going on they just hear they are fighting and they help Muslim in Afghanistan. Then what. There are some infidels which they came here and they have to help them. But then there weren't any intend to do anything against America. Taliban themselves between Taliban they said Afghanistan which they never again against 9/11 operation. The rejection between senior of Taliban of what al Qaida are doing. Many of Taliban rejected what they are doing. Even many Taliban, they not agree about why we are in Afghanistan. Some of them they have been with us. Taliban never in their life at all before America invade the intend to do anything against America. They never been with al Qaida. Does not mean we are here as American now. They gave political asylum for many countries. They gave for Chinese oppositions or a North Korean but that does not mean they are with them same thing many of Taliban. They harbor us as al Qaida does not mean we are together. So, this is why I'm asking you to be fair with Afghanis and Pakistanis and many Arabs which had been in Afghanistan. Many of them been unjustly. The funny story they been Sunni government they sent some spies to assassinate UBL then we arrested them sent them to Afghanistan/Taliban. Taliban put them into prison. Americans they came and arrest them as enemy combatant.

They brought them here. So, even if they are my enemy but not fair to be there with me. That is what I'm saying. The way of war, you know, very well, any country waging war against their enemy the language of the war are killing. If man and woman they be together as a marriage that is up to the kids, children. But if you and me, two nations, will be together in war the others are victims. This is the way of the language. You know 40 million people were killed in World War One. Ten million kill in World War. You know that two million four hundred thousand be killed in Korean War. So this language of the war. Any people who, when Usama bin Laden say I'm waging war because such reason, now he declared it. But when you said I'm terrorist, I think it is deceiving peoples. Terrorists, enemy combatant. All these definitions as CIA you can make whatever you want. Now, you told me when I ask about the witnesses, I'm not convinced that this related to the matter. It is up you. Maybe I'm convinced you are head and he [gesturing to Personal Representative] is not responsible, the other, because you are head of the committee. So, finally it's your war but the problem is no definitions of many words. It would be widely definite that many people be oppressed. Because war, for sure, there will be victims. When I said I'm not happy that three thousand been killed in America. I feel sorry even. I don't like to kill children and the kids. Never Islam are, give me green light to kill peoples. Killing, as in the Christianity, Jews, and Islam, are prohibited. But there are exception of rule when you are killing people in Iraq. You said we gave have to do it. We don't like Saddam. But this is the way to deal with Saddam. Same thing you are saying. Same language you use, I use. When you are invading two-thirds of Mexican, you call your war manifest destiny. It up to you to call it what you want. But other side are calling you oppressors. If now George Washington. If now we were living in the Revolutionary War and George Washington he being arrested through Britain. For sure he, they would consider him enemy combatant. But American they consider him as hero. This right the any Revolutionary War they will be as George Washington or Britain. So we are considered American Army bases which we have from seventies in Iraq. Also, in Saudi Arabian, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. This kind of invasion, but I'm not here to convince you. Is not or not but mostly speech is ask you to be fair with people. I'm don't have anything to say that I'm not enemy. This is why the language of any war in the world is killing. I mean the language of the war is victims. I don't like to kill people. I feel very sorry they been killed kids in 9/11. What I will do? This is the language. Sometime I want to make great awakening between American to stop foreign policy in our land. I know American people are torturing us from seventies. I know they talking about human rights. And I know it is against American Constitution, against American laws. But they said every law, they have exceptions, this is your bad luck, you been part of the exception of our laws. They got have something to convince me but we are doing same language. But we are saying we have Sharia law, but we have Koran. What is enemy combatant in my language?

Allah forbids you not with regards to those who fight you not for your faith nor drive you out of your homes from dealing kindly and justly with them. For Allah love those who are just. There is one more sentence. Allah only forbids you with regards to those who fight you for your faith and drive you out of your homes and support others in driving you out from turning to them for friendship and protection. It is such as turn to them in these circumstances that do wrong.

So we are driving from whatever deed we do we ask about Koran or Hadith. We are not making up for us laws. When we need Fatwa from the religious we have to go back to see what they said scholar. To see what they said yes or not. Killing is prohibited in all what you call the people of the book, Jews, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. You know the Ten Commandments very well. The Ten Commandments are shared between all of us. We all are serving one God. Then now kill you know very well. But war language also we have language for the war. You have to kill. But you have to care if unintentionally or intentionally target if I have if I'm not at the Pentagon. I consider it is okay. If I target now when we target in USA we choose them military target, economical, and political. So, war central victims mostly means economical target. So if now American they know UBL. He is in this house they don't care about his kids and his. They will just bombard it. They will kill all of them and they did it. They kill wife of Dr. Ayman Zawahiri and his two daughters and his son in one bombardment. They receive a report that is his house be. He had not been there. They killed them. They arrested my kids intentionally. They are kids. They been arrested for four months they had been abused. So, for me I have patience. I know I'm not talk about what's come to me. The American have human right. So, enemy combatant itself, it flexible word. So I think God knows that many who have arrested, they been unjustly arrested. Otherwise, military throughout history know very well. They don't war will never stop. War start from Adam when Cain he killed Abel until now. It's never gonna stop killing of people. This is the way of the language. American start the Revolutionary War then they starts the Mexican then Spanish War then World War One, World War Two. You read the history. You know never stopping war. This is life. But if who is enemy combatant and who is not? Finally, I finish statement. I'm asking you to be fair with other people.

Source: Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 Homeland Security (can be found at http:/www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2007/khalid-sheikh-muhammad_transcript. htm/).

Annotated Bibliography

The controversy surrounding the events of September 11, 2001, rivals that of Pearl Harbor and the John F. Kennedy assassination as a source of conflicting views. Besides the usual partisan infighting between the adherents of the Clinton presidency and those of the George W. Bush administration, there is a growing industry of authors eager to cast doubt on the official version. They examine each incident and come up with a conspiracy theory to explain any discrepancies. Some of the most extreme authors have charged that the Bush administration orchestrated 9/11 to erode constitutional liberties. The reader of this encyclopedia needs to approach each book on 9/11 listed in this bibliography with an understanding of the author's concentration and/or bias. Most of the works here are authoritative and objective, but several are efforts to cast doubts on the facts of the September 11 attacks. Consequently, each book listed has an annotation to help the reader understand the background and point of view of the author. It is estimated that there are around 3,000 books that deal with one aspect or another of September 11. This bibliography is selective, as it cannot accommodate all of them.

Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq, *The War on Freedom: How and Why America Was Attacked September 11, 2001* (Joshua Tree, CA: Tree of Life Publications, 2002).

Nafeez M. Ahmed, a British political scientist and executive director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development in Brighton, England, advances the theory that the U.S. government instigates terrorism as a pretext to justify an aggressive foreign policy. He claims that the Bush administration allowed September 11 to happen so that the American government would have an excuse to invade Afghanistan. The author poses some tantalizing conjectures, but his treatment lacks objectivity.

Atwan, Abdel Bari, *The Secret History of Al Qaeda* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006).

The author is a Palestinian journalist and the editor-in-chief of the influential *Al-Quds al-Arabi* publication. He has lived in London for over thirty years. He suggests that al-Qaeda is becoming bigger and stronger because of current

American foreign policy. There is considerable material in this book that contributes to the understanding of the strategy and tactics of both Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

Ausmus, David W., *In the Midst of Chaos: My 30 Days at Ground Zero* (Victoria, Canada: Trafford, 2004).

The author is a construction safety official who was working at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, when word came that he was needed at the World Trade Center site. He recorded his impression of the site and related safety issues. Although Ausmus spent only thirty days at the World Trade Center site, he was able to record the horrors of the debris pile and the hazards of those working in that environment.

Aust, Stefan, et al., *Inside 9/11: What Really Happened* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001).

Nineteen reporters, writers, and editors of the German magazine *Der Spiegel* combined their talents to write a narrative of the events leading to September 11 and the events of the day. Emphasis of the authors is on the human interest aspects of 9/11. This book is an excellent introduction to the state of knowledge in the months following September 11.

Barbash, Tom, *On Top of the World: The Remarkable Story of Howard Lutnick, Cantor Fitzgerald and the Twin Towers Attack* (London: Headline, 2003).

The author, a former newspaper reporter, recounts the story of the brokerage firm Cantor Fitzgerald and its loss of 658 employees on September 11. This company is a huge international brokerage firm that handled most of the bond activity for the New York Stock Exchange. This book tells of its resurrection as a company and its efforts to compensate the families of employees lost on September 11.

Barrett, Jon, *Mark Bingham: Hero of Flight 93* (Los Angeles, CA: Advocate Books, 2002).

This laudatory biography explains the complex personality of Mark Bingham, a passenger on United Airlines Flight 93. His participation in the attempt to overthrow the flight's hijackers placed him on a hero's pedestal.

Barrett, Wayne, and Adam Fifield, *Rudy! An Investigative Biography of Rudolph Giuliani* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

Wayne Barrett, senior editor at the *Village Voice,* has written a critical biography of Rudolph "Rudy" Giuliani. Although the biography ends before September 11, it gives a critical analysis of his lengthy career as mayor of New York City. This book provides background on one of the leading figures in New York City during and after September 11.

Beamer, Lisa, and Ken Abraham, *Let's Roll! Ordinary People, Extraordinary Courage* (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale Publishing, 2002).

The author is the widow of Todd Beamer, one of the heroes of United Airlines Flight 93. She explains the background of Todd Beamer and why he was one of the leaders of the attempt to regain control of the cockpit on September 11, 2001.

She subscribes to the theory that it was his religious faith and his desire to return to his family that motivated Todd Beamer to do what he did.

Bell, J. Bowyer, *Murders on the Nile: The World Trade Center and Global Terror* (San Francisco: Encounters Books, 2003).

J. Bowyer Bell, an adjunct professor at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, has used his lifetime of research on terrorism to examine the origins of Jihadi terrorism that led to September 11. It is his thesis that the origin of Jihadi terrorism was in Egypt, and the expansion to the rest of the Middle East has been led by Egyptians such as Sayyid Qutb, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, and Ayman al-Zawahiri. This book is a good introductory source on the personalities and events surrounding the September 11 attacks.

Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004).

Two former Clinton administration officials in Richard Clarke's National Security Council's Directorate of Transnational Threats have written this book on the terrorist threat to the United States before September 11. As key members of Clarke's staff they participated in most of the decisions regarding counterterrorist operations. This book is a good source for actions taken by the Clinton administration.

Bergen, Peter L., *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda's Leader* (New York: Free Press, 2006).

The author is CNN's terrorism analyst and an adjunct professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He has used his extensive contacts in the Middle East to produce an oral history of the career of Osama bin Laden. Bergen interviewed bin Laden once, but the strength of the book is the interviews with the associates of bin Laden. This book is a gold mine of information about bin Laden and how he is viewed by Muslims both inside and outside of al-Qaeda.

Bernstein, Richard, *Out of the Blue: The Story of September 11 2001, From Jihad to Ground Zero* (New York: Times Books, 2002).

The author, a journalist with the *New York Times*, has, with the help of the staff of the *Times*, produced this history of the conspirators of September 11 and the impact of the attack on the lives of Americans. He followed the lives of heroes, victims, and terrorists in considerable detail. This survey is strong on human interest stories that give perspective to the tragedy of September 11.

Bin Laden, Osama, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005).

An American professor at Duke University, Bruce Lawrence, and a British specialist on Arab affairs and language, James Howarth, united to compile a book on the messages, writings, and interviews of Osama bin Laden, the head of al-Qaeda. In this work all of bin Laden's principal messages appear, including the famous August 23, 1996, *Declaration of Jihad* and the equally famous February 23, 1998,

The World Islam Front. This book is an indispensable tool for the understanding of Osama bin Laden and his worldview.

Breitweiser, Kristen, *Wake-Up Call: The Political Education of a 9/11 Widow* (New York: Warner Books, 2006).

Kristen Breitweiser lost her husband on September 11, 2001, in the North Tower of the World Trade Center. She allied with three other New Jersey widows to form the Jersey Girls, whose mission was to find out what happened on September 11 and hold people accountable. To do this Breitweiser and her allies joined the Family Steering Committee to help form and guide the 9/11 Commission.

Bull, Chris, and Sam Erman (eds.), *At Ground Zero: 25 Stories from Young Reporters Who Were There* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002).

The editors have compiled the stories from reporters and photographers who were active at the World Trade Center complex on September 11, 2001, and afterward. Most of the accounts came from young news professionals fresh to the field of journalism and concern how they coped with the disaster. Each of them attests to the fact that they experienced a range of emotions from anger and excitement to terror and depression covering September 11 and the victims' families.

Burnett, Deena, and Anthony Giombetti, *Fighting Back: Living Life beyond Ourselves* (Altamonte Springs, FL: Advantage Books, 2006).

The widow of Tom Burnett, a passenger on United Airlines Flight 93 on September 11, 2001, recounts her life with her husband and the events of September 11. He was one of those who fought for control of the cockpit on that fateful day. She recounts her cell phone conversations with her husband until the moment when he participated with the other passengers to regain control of the airliner.

Butler, Gregory A., *Lost Towers: Inside the World Trade Center Cleanup* (New York: iUniverse, 2006).

Gregory Butler is a carpenter in New York City, and in this book he has compiled his impressions about the cleanup at Ground Zero. His tidbits of information give a somewhat different perspective on the cleanup. Butler's insights on work at Ground Zero make this book a valuable resource on the aftermath of September 11.

Calhoun, Craig, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer (eds.), *Understanding September 11* (New York: New Press, 2002).

Three editors with support from the Social Science Research Council, New York, have united a host of experts on terrorism and international security to produce a book that attempts to understand why September 11 happened. The authors of the articles tackle such topics as Islamic radicalism, globalism, and terrorism as part of their analysis. This book's value is in the quality of the contributions by experts in the field.

Caran, Peter, *The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing: Foresight and Warning* (London: Janus Publishing, 2001).

Peter Caran had been a detective and antiterrorist officer with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey at the World Trade Center complex until 1998.

Caran was one of the investigators at the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, and he was critical of the lack of security that allowed terrorists to plant a bomb at the World Trade Center complex so easily. It was his thesis before September 11, 2001, that the terrorists had bungled the first bombing, and they were going to come back for another try.

Chomsky, Noam, *9-11* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001).

In a series of questions and answers, the noted critic of the U.S. government and its policies Noam Chomsky gives his views on the events surrounding the September 11 attacks. He believes the U.S. government view on al-Qaeda's responsibility for the attacks is correct, but in his eyes the attacks are also a product of American support for repressive Middle Eastern regimes, which has allowed al-Qaeda to constitute a danger to the United States. This book shows his fear that the Bush administration would take advantage of the desire for revenge to worsen the situation in the Middle East by invading Iraq.

Clarke, Richard A., *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004).

The author was the counterterrorism expert in both the Clinton and Bush administrations before and after September 11, and in this post he could evaluate each administration's efforts against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Although a lifetime Republican, Clarke is more critical of the Bush administration's counterterrorism actions than those of the Clinton administration. He also maintains that the Iraq War has emboldened terrorists because most of the leadership of al-Qaeda and the Taliban remain at large to exploit the chaos of war.

Clinton, Bill, *My Life* (New York: Vintage Books, 2005).

President Bill Clinton (1993–2001) presents in this memoir his version of the events in his life and his presidency. He chronicles his efforts to fight terrorism before September 11, including his clashes with a Republican Congress and his rocky relationship with the FBI.

Cole, David, and James X. Dempsey, *Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security* (New York: New Press, 2002).

David Cole, a professor of law at Georgetown University, and James X. Dempsey, deputy director at the Center for Democracy and Technology, have collaborated on a book that shows how the war on terrorism threatens civil liberties. They are critical of how the FBI has acted in the past and present in dealing with those suspected of terrorism. Their thesis is that even after September 11 curtailing civil liberties does not enhance security.

Coll, Steve, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).

The author won the 2005 Pulitzer Prize for this balanced treatment of the history of the CIA's war against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. He starts his story with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and ends with the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud on September 10, 2001. This book is the best source

available for understanding the complexities of dealing with terrorism in the modern world.

Corbin, Jane, *Al-Qaeda: The Terror Network That Threatens the World* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002).

Jane Corbin, a senior reporter for the BBC's (British Broadcasting Corporation) current affairs program Panorama, traveled around the Middle East interviewing former associates of Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda operatives in an attempt to understand how al-Qaeda operates. Besides these interviews, she depended heavily on the testimony of former al-Qaeda member Jamal al-Fadl. This book gives an excellent background treatment of al-Qaeda's role in the September 11 attacks.

Danieli, Yael, and Robert L. Dingman (eds.), *On the Ground after September 11: Mental Health Responses and Practical Knowledge Gained* (New York: Haworth Maltreatment and Trauma Press, 2005).

The editors, one a clinical psychologist and the other a retired professor of counseling at Marshall University, have compiled a book that contains the experiences of medical and health professionals who worked at the various sites of the September 11 attacks. These responses show the intensity of feeling and the stress felt even from health professionals. This book fills a necessary void in understanding the psychological impact of September 11.

Davis, Mike, *Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb* (London: Verso, 2007).

Mike Davis, a freelance writer of numerous nonfiction titles, turns his attention to the use of car bombings as a terrorist weapon. He begins with the bombing by an Italian anarchist in 1920 and continues to the use of car bombs in Iraq. His treatment of Ramzi Yousef's truck bomb at the World Trade Center Complex in 1993, and al-Qaeda's 1998 African Embassy bombings, makes this book a valuable resource on how al-Qaeda conducted operations before September 11, 2001.

Drumheller, Tyler, and Elaine Monaghan, *On the Brink: An Insider's Account of How the White House Compromised American Intelligence* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2006).

Tyler Drumheller was a senior CIA operations officer for more than twenty-five years before retiring in 2005. He uses this book to defend the CIA's intelligence-gathering efforts and criticize how the intelligence information was misused by the Bush administration. Although much of the material in the book covers the post–September 11 era, there are valuable insights into intelligence-gathering problems in the CIA that led up to the September 11 attacks.

Dudziak, Mary L. (ed.), *September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

The editor has recruited a group of cross-disciplinary scholars to examine the question of whether the September 11, 2001, attacks have changed American politics and society as a seminal event in history. They question this assumption in various ways, and they conclude that there is more continuity than change.

This book is a good counterweight against much current political opinion about September 11.

Dunbar, David, and Brad Reagan, *Debunking 9/11 Myths: Why Conspiracy Theories Can't Stand Up to the Facts* (New York: Hearst Books, 2006).

The investigative staff of the magazine *Popular Mechanics*, under the two editors, tackle the myths coming out of the 9/11 conspiracy movement. They consulted more than 300 experts in aviation and scientific fields before publishing this book. This book is the best source available to counter some of the wild theories coming out the conspiracy theorists.

Dwyer, Jim, and Kevin Flynn, *102 Minutes: The Untold Story of the Fight to Survive inside the Twin Towers* (New York: Times Books, 2005).

Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn are both reporters for the *New York Times*, and they spent four years researching the story of what happened between the time the first commercial aircraft hit the North Tower of the World Trade Center and the collapse of the twin towers. They give a personalized picture of the dilemmas facing the 14,000 or so workers faced with the chaos of an unfolding disaster. This book also discusses New York City's institutions and their handling of the emergency.

Emerson, Steven, *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living among Us* (New York: Free Press, 2002).

The author is an investigative journalist and executive director of the Investigative Project, which specializes in the study of Islamic militants. In this book Emerson traces the control of the mosques in the United States by partisans of militant Islamist groups—Abu Sayyaf, Algerian Armed Islamic Group, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and al-Qaeda. He warns that these terrorists living in the United States constitute a constant danger because they consider the United States to be the enemy, and September 11, 2001, is an example of what they want to do.

Farren, Mick, *CIA: Secrets of "The Company"* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2004).

This book is an expose of the history of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It has a chapter on how the CIA was hampered in the 1990s by poor leadership, low morale, and the departure of key personnel with experience in intelligence. It is critical of intelligence chiefs in the organization who, it asserts, did not properly heed early warnings about al-Qaeda and terrorist threats.

Fink, Mitchell, and Louis Mathias, *Never Forget: An Oral History of September 11, 2001* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002).

A husband and wife team from New York City conducted a series of nearly eighty interviews of survivors of the events of September 11. These interviews began just days after September 11, and each story gives a different personal perspective of what happened on that day. This book gives a view of September 11 that most books only attempt to do.

Fouda, Yosri, and Nick Fielding, *Masterminds of Terror: The Truth behind the Most Devastating Terrorist Attack the World Has Ever Seen* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2003).

Yosri Fouda, a journalist with the Arab television service al-Jazeera, and Nick Fielding, a journalist with the British newspaper *The Sunday Times*, combined to write a book on the operational heads of the September 11 attacks in the United States: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh. In a series of interviews in Pakistan in 2002, Mohammed and Bin al-Shibh confessed to their role as planners of the attacks. This is an important book because of Fouda's interviews with Mohammed and Bin al-Shibh.

Freeh, Louis J., and Howard Means, *My FBI: Bringing Down the Mafia, Investigating Bill Clinton, and Fighting the War on Terror* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005).

Louis Freeh, the head of the FBI during the Clinton administration and the early Bush administration, gives his interpretation of the events during his tour of duty. He recounts his successes and offers his own explanation for the failures of the FBI before September 11. His blaming of Congress for the FBI's outdated computer system is only one of the symptoms of the FBI's malaise in the years before September 11.

Gerges, Fawaz A., *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Fawaz Gerges, a professor of international affairs and Middle Eastern studies at Sarah Lawrence College, uses his contacts among followers of jihad to explain why al-Qaeda declared war on the West. It is his thesis that there are two competing jihadist schools: those that want to overthrow Arab regimes and those that want to expand the war against the West. In this excellent and informative book, the author concludes that al-Qaeda's attack on September 11 was not universally approved of by the jihadists who want to overthrow Arab regimes and are fearful of a war with the United States.

Gertz, Bill, *Breakdown: The Failure of American Intelligence to Defeat Global Terror*, rev. ed. (New York: Plume Book, 2003).

The author is the defense and national security reporter for the *Washington Times*. In this book Gertz uses his inside connections in the American intelligence community to back his thesis that American security was compromised by failures of the American bureaucracies and by political blunders. He traces what he perceives to be past failures and argues that unless significant reforms take place, another September 11–type of terrorist event will take place.

Gohari, M. J., *The Taliban: Ascent to Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

M. J. Gohari teaches Islam and Middle Eastern cultures at Oxford University. In this book, Gohari traces the ascendancy to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Particularly important is his treatment of Osama bin Laden's relationship with the Taliban, and the negotiations between the United States and the Taliban over bin Laden before September 11.

Goldberg, Alfred, et al., *Pentagon 9/11* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007).

This book is the official U.S. government version of what happened in the attack on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. A team of historians interviewed 1,300 survivors and had access to government sources to write the definitive account on what happened on that day.

Graham, Bob, *Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America's War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2004).

Former Senator Robert Graham (D–FL) was the chair of the Senate's Committee on Intelligence, and he was instrumental in the setting up of the Senate-House Joint Inquiry on Intelligence that studied American intelligence failures leading up to September 11. It remains his thesis that systemic failure in the U.S. government contributed to the intelligence failures. He also criticizes the Bush administration for trying to evade responsibility for September 11 and for taking the United States into the Iraq War before wiping out al-Qaeda.

Griffin, David Ray, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions* (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2005).

Dr. Griffin, a retired and respected postmodernist theology professor, has gathered a number of so-called experts to challenge the official treatment of the events surrounding September 11. It is their contention that the U.S. government, rather than hijackers, planned and implemented the attacks on September 11. This book, much as other works by conspiracy theorists, is of limited value except to study the thought processes of conspiracy advocates.

Gunaratna, Rohan, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

Rohan Gunaratna, a terrorist scholar who has contacts with both the United Nations and several scholarly institutions, spent five years in the field researching the al-Qaeda organization from its beginnings in 1989 to September 11, 2001. This book covers information from al-Qaeda's financial infrastructure to how it trains its soldiers and operatives. Although the research in this book predates September 11, it is an indispensable source in understanding how al-Qaeda operated in the decade before September 11.

Habeck, Mary, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006).

Habeck, a professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, gives an analysis of the jihadist political thought that led to the September 11 attacks. The jihadists around al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups are the extremist wing of the Islamist movement, but they constitute a danger to the West. She maintains that it is necessary to understand jihadist ideology to be able to fight it.

Hagen, Susan, and Mary Carouba, *Women at Ground Zero: Stories of Courage and Compassion* (New York: Alpha Books, 2002).

The authors, who have backgrounds in professional writing and investigative social work, rushed to New York to interview women who had worked at Ground Zero in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. They interviewed thirty

women from different organizations. At the end of the book, the authors pay tribute to the three women who lost their lives on September 11 while performing their duties: Captain Kathy Mazza, Yamel Merino, and Moira Smith.

Halberstam, David, *Firehouse* (New York: Hyperion, 2002).

David Halberstam, a Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist-author, wrote this study of the firefighters of Fire House 40/35 in mid-Manhattan. This Fire House became famous for the loss of twelve out of thirteen of its firefighters sent to the World Trade Center on September 11, and a serious injury to the thirteenth. This book is full of human interest, and how the loss of these men affected their families and others.

Hayes, Stephen F., *The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004).

Stephen Hayes, a staff writer for the *Weekly Standard* and a frequent commentator on CNN, Fox News, and The McLaughlin Group, has compiled information to support his argument that Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda collaborated to attack American interests. He asserts that the Saddam Hussein regime had no role in the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, but that there had been contact between the Hussein regime and al-Qaeda over training and others issues.

Henshall, Ian, and Rowland Morgan, *9/11 Revealed: Challenging the Facts behind the War on Terror* (London: Robinson, 2005).

Two British journalists question both the official version of the September 11, 2001, attacks, and the report from the 9/11 Commission. They believe that certain facts do not make sense, and they wonder why no one has been held accountable for misjudgments. This book does not fall into the realm of the 9/11 conspiracy movement, but it gives considerable ammunition to the conspiracy theorists for often unsupported theories and theses.

Hersh, Seymour M., *Chain of Command: The Road From 9/11 to Abu Ghraib* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004).

Seymour M. Hersh is a Pulitzer Prize–winning author for *The New Yorker*, and this book is his treatment of the decision-making processes in the Bush administration. In his eyes the Bush administration has been so blinded by neoconservative ideology that it has made a series of blunders. Hersh argues that it took political momentum from the September 11 attacks to pursue policies that have made the United States more vulnerable to terrorism, rather than less.

Jacquard, Roland, *In the Name of Osama bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).

In a book that has been updated since it made its appearance the week before September 11, Roland Jacquard, terrorist expert and president of the Paris-based International Observatory on Terrorism, gives an assessment of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. He presents evidence that bin Laden has been interested in acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, making him and his organization an ongoing danger to the Western world. Jacquard has collected forty key documents, including a British intelligence report on extremist base camps in Afghanistan in 2000.

Jefferson, Lisa, and Felicia Middlebrooks, *Called: "Hello, My Name Is Mrs. Jefferson. I Understand Your Plane Is Being Hijacked?"—9:45 AM, Flight 93. September 11, 2001* (Chicago: Northfield Publishing, 2006).

Lisa Jefferson was the Verizon Airfone supervisor whom Todd Beamer talked to during the last twenty minutes of his life on September 11, 2001. It gave Beamer an opportunity to tell authorities what was going on during the hijacking but also to pass on his love for his family. The author also spends a considerable amount of the book explaining what an impact this conversation had on her life and religious beliefs.

Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, *Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives*, 2 volumes (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004).

The reports of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, provide the best source for understanding the actions and, in some cases, perceived failure of American intelligence agencies before September 11. These reports and the testimony of leaders of the intelligence community show that the most serious deficiency was the failure of the various intelligence agencies to communicate with each other.

Kashurba, Glenn J., *Quiet Courage: The Definitive Account of Flight 93 and Its Aftermath* (Somerset, PA: SAJ Publishing, 2006).

The author is a Board Certified Child and Adolescent Psychiatrist who wrote this book to bring closure to the families of the victims of the hijacking of United Airlines Flight 93 on September 11, 2001. He counseled and interviewed the families of the victims and the inhabitants of Somerset County, where the plane crashed. His goal is to establish an accurate picture of the events of that day and to build a lasting memorial to those who lost their lives on that fateful day.

Kean, Thomas H., Lee H. Hamilton, and Benjamin Rhodes, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Knopf, 2006).

The co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, recount their trials and tribulations during the start, middle, and end of the life of the 9/11 Commission. From the beginning of the 9/11 Commission, they believed that the commission had been set up to fail. Kean and Hamilton refused to allow the 9/11 Commission to fail, but it was a long, hard struggle that is told in this book.

Keegan, William Jr., and Bart Davis, *Closure: The Untold Story of the Ground Zero Recovery Mission* (New York: Touchstone Books, 2006).

William Keegan is a lieutenant in the Port Authority police department, and he served as the night swing supervisor at Ground Zero for nine months. He recounts in depth the search and recovery efforts at the World Trade Center site during those months. His treatment is balanced, but he does display some resentment over how the Port Authority police were ignored in the early days of the cleanup.

Kepel, Gilles, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004).

Gilles Kepel, professor at the Institute for Political Studies in Paris and an eminent scholar on Middle East politics, gives his assessment of the motivation of the planners of September 11. In his eyes they considered it the initial blow in an ongoing battle, leading ultimately to the West's submission to Islam. Kepel is one of the leading authorities in the West on Islamist studies, and his work is an indispensable source for understanding the jihadist Muslim mind.

Kessler, Ronald, *The CIA at War: Inside the Secret Campaign against Terror* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2003).

The author, a former *Washington Post* and *Wall Street Journal* investigative reporter now affiliated with the *New York Times*, has compiled a book that is a defense of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its war against terrorism. He is critical of the Clinton administration for its inaction against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda but has nothing but praise for the actions of the Bush administration in its attempts to combat terrorism. The author also expresses criticism of the FBI.

Kushner Harvey, and Bart Davis, *Holy War on the Home Front: The Secret Islamic Terror Network in the United States* (New York: Sentinel, 2004).

Harvey Kushner, an academic and chairman of a university department of criminal justice, uses his expertise as a scholar of terrorism to survey secret Islamic terrorist activities in the United States. Little of the material in this book refers directly to the conspiracy of September 11, but it does show the motivations of those who consider martyrdom missions. This book has value in that it traces many of the organizations in the United State that sponsor terrorist activities.

Lance, Peter, *1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI—the Untold Story* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003).

Lance is an award-winning investigative reporter who has intertwined the careers of FBI agent Nancy Floyd, New York City Fire Department fire marshal Ronnie Bucca, and the terrorist Ramzi Yousef to tell the story of the events leading up to September 11, 2001. The author presents Floyd's and Bucca's attempts to warn authorities about the dangers of terrorism. This book is well researched and is well worth reading for anyone interested in the history of September 11.

Langewiesche, William, *American Ground: Unbuilding the World Trade Center* (New York: North Point Press, 2002).

William Langewiesche, a writer for the *Atlantic Monthly* and author of several nonfiction books, has written a detailed story of his six months covering the cleanup of the World Trade Center site. An accurate and objective treatment, his account of all of the ups and downs of the cleanup nonetheless caused some controversy among those involved.

Ledeen, Michael A., *The War against the Terror Masters: Why It Happened, Where We Are Now, How We'll Win* (New York: Truman Talley Books, 2002).

The author is a member of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank. He has written his version of why something like September 11

happened. In his treatment, the Clinton administration was at fault for the events of September 11.

Longman, Jere, *Among the Heroes: United Flight 93 and the Passengers and Crew Who Fought Back* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002).

The author is a journalist at the *New York Times* who conducted hundreds of interviews in an attempt to re-create the events on United Airlines Flight 93 on September 11, 2001. His thesis is that the reaction of the passengers was a heroic act that saved lives in the long run. The strength of the book is that it covers the human side of the story.

Markham, Ian, and Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi (eds.), *11 September: Religious Perspectives on the Causes and Consequences* (Oxford: One World, 2002).

Religious leaders attempt in this book to bring together the moral and religious aspects of September 11. This book of readings by religious scholars gives insight into the moral dimension of September 11 but offers no conclusions regarding the events of the day. This book is for those looking at how the events of September 11 fit into a moral and religious context.

Marrs, Jim, *The Terror Conspiracy: Deception, 9/11, and the Loss of Liberty* (New York: Disinformation, 2006).

Jim Marrs, a former investigative journalist and now a freelance writer, is a veteran conspiracy theorist going back to the John F. Kennedy assassination conspiracy. Much as in his other books, Marrs believes that there was a U.S. government conspiracy leading to September 11. This book has marginal value except as an example of how conspiracy advocates look for any discrepancies to prove their points.

McCole, John, *The Second Tower's Down* (London: Robson Books, 2002).

John McCole, a lieutenant in the Fire Department of New York, recounts his experience at the World Trade Center complex beginning on September 11 and for the six months afterward. He tells of the emotional toll on the firefighters with the loss of 343 of their colleagues. This book is another of the personal accounts of the aftermath of September 11 that should be read to understand the impact of September 11.

McDermott, Terry, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: Harper, 2005).

Terry McDermott, a journalist for the *Los Angeles Times*, has compiled extensive information about the conspirators of the September 11, 2001, attacks. He conducted interviews in twenty countries in the course of writing this book. This book is the best source available on the backgrounds of the al-Qaeda conspirators leading up to September 11.

Miller, John, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2002).

Three veteran journalists produced this book as an explanation for the failure of the American intelligence community to stop the 9/11 plot. Their explanation is that it was a combination of risk-averse bosses and a bureaucratic structure that

prevented information from being shared and coordinated. They cover the 9/11 plot from its conception to its execution.

Mohamedou, Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War* (London: Pluto Press, 2007).

Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, the associate director of the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, traces the development of al-Qaeda from its beginnings. It is his contention that from the beginning the leaders of al-Qaeda have had a plan to challenge the West but that the West has been slow to understand. The attacks on September 11, 2001, were only one stage of this plan to confront the West.

Moussaoui, Abd Samad, and Florence Bouquillat, *Zacarias, My Brother: The Making of a Terrorist* (New York Seven Stories Press, 2003).

The author is the brother of the al-Qaeda operative Zacarias Moussaoui, and in this book he traces the change of a French-born Moroccan secularist into an Islamist extremist. Abd Samad Moussaoui is a moderate Muslim, and he has difficulty in understanding how his younger brother could make this transition into an extremist, but he tries. This book is an excellent source for understanding why young Muslims are attracted to extremist causes.

Murphy, Dean E., *September 11: An Oral History* (New York: Doubleday, 2002).

Dean Murphy has compiled a lengthy list of oral histories from the survivors of September 11. These oral histories help give context to the events of that day. This book is an invaluable source to understand how some survived while others did not, and the serendipity of survival.

Murphy, Tom, *Reclaiming the Sky: 9/11 and the Untold Story of the Men and Women Who Kept America Flying* (New York: AMACOM, 2007).

The author, an aviation trainer for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's aviation division, recounts the impact on aviation caused by the September 11 attacks. He describes what happened at the airports and on the airliners that day, and how members of the aviation industry responded to the tragedy. This book provides a valuable insight into how the aviation industry dealt with the aftermath of September 11.

Naftali, Timothy, *Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

The author, a professor at the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs and a contractor for the 9/11 Commission, has written a survey of American counterterrorism efforts since 1945. He traces his assertion that American counterterrorism policy has lurched from one crisis to another as American presidents have failed to recognize the dangers of terrorism. This book is a strong source for the study of American counterterrorism.

Office of Inspector General, *EPA's Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improvement: Evaluation Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003).

A team from the Office of Inspector General investigated the successes and failures of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during its supervision of the cleanup of the World Trade Center complex site and the Pentagon. This team concluded that the press statements issued by the EPA to reassure the cleanup crew and the public were misleading because at the time the air-monitoring data were lacking for several pollutants of concern, especially for particulate matter and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). This report is also critical of the influence of the White House Council on Environmental Quality on statements issued by the EPA.

Picciotto, Richard, *Last Man Down: A Firefighter's Story of Survival and Escape from the World Trade Center* (New York: Berkley Books, 2002).

The author was a Battalion Commander of FDNY 11 in New York City on September 11, 2001. Responding to the aircraft crash into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, he was busy leading the evacuation when the tower began to show signs that it was about to come down. His miraculous escape allowed the death toll for the New York Fire Department to stay at 343.

Posner, Gerald, *Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003).

Gerald Posner, a former Wall Street lawyer who is now a freelance journalist, gives his assessment why American agencies and government failed to prevent the September 11 attacks. He is critical of all the agencies, and in particular the Clinton administration, but is kinder to the Bush administration. This book presents the material in a rapid-fire fashion, and some of its instant assessments have been overtaken by further research.

Powers, Richard Gid, *Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI* (New York: Free Press, 2004).

Richard Gid Powers, a professor of history at CUNY Graduate Center and the College of Staten Island, and an acknowledged expert on the FBI, writes a history of the FBI from its beginnings until September 11, 2001. He posits the question of whether the FBI can handle the intelligence burden of combating terrorism when its entire culture has been reactive to solving crimes rather than proactive in preventing them. The section on the FBI during the Freeh administration is particularly valuable.

Randal, Jonathan, *Osama: The Making of a Terrorist* (New York: Knopf, 2004).

The author, a former correspondent for the *Washington Post*, used his extensive contacts in the Middle East to write this biography/analysis of Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden has been able to build a legend in the Muslim world mostly because of the ineptness of the Americans. He concludes that even the capture or death of bin Laden will not end terrorism from al-Qaeda or similar organizations.

Reuters, *After September 11: New York and the World* (New York: Prentice Hall, 2003).

Reuters, the international wire service, commissioned members of its staff to produce this combination of text and photography. It chronicles the weeks and months of the recovery in New York City through commentary and photos.

Although this work adds little to the information surrounding September 11, it does add visual evidence to show the recovery following September 11.

Ridgeway, James, *The 5 Unanswered Questions about 9/11: What the 9/11 Commission Report Failed to Tell Us* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005).

James Ridgeway, Washington correspondent for the *Village Voice* and a prolific writer in newspapers, magazines, and books, posed five key questions that he believes were not covered adequately by the 9/11 Commission. These questions are fundamental to answering the ultimate question of accountability for failure to uncover and stop the September 11 plot.

Risen, James, *State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration* (New York: Free Press, 2006).

James Risen, a journalist specializing in national security for the *New York Times*, has investigated the relationship between the Bush administration and the CIA. He argues that the Bush administration pressured the CIA to comply with the administration's agenda. A valuable feature of the book is its discussion of the activities of the National Security Administration (NSA).

Robinson, Adam, *Bin Laden: Behind the Mask of the Terrorist* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2001).

This biography of Osama bin Laden appeared shortly after September 11, 2001, but the author, a veteran Middle East journalist, had been working on this book for over a year at that time. Because he had already concluded that bin Laden was an imminent danger to the United States, the events of September 11 did not surprise him. This book is an important look at bin Laden and his ambitions, but the author is sometimes a little sloppy with his facts.

Rubin, Barry, and Judith Colp Rubin (eds.), *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Barry Rubin, the director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center and editor of *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, and Judith Colp Rubin, a journalist specializing in the Middle East, compiled a documentary reader that covers the variety of anti-American opinion in the Middle East. The editors filled this book with primary documents, many of which were hard to find, that scholars studying Middle East studies will find useful. Several of these are part of the September 11 story, and they need to be read for understanding September 11.

Ruthven, Malise, *A Fury for God: The Islamist Attack on America* (London: Granta Books, 2002).

The author, a PhD from Cambridge University with extensive teaching and writing experience on Islamic subjects, has written this book to explain the motivation in the Islamic world for September 11. He believes that the lack of democracy in the Middle East has made the United States a convenient target for Islamist militants as they are unable to overturn the regimes of their own countries. This book is a balanced assessment from a scholar with expertise on Muslim culture and society.

Saar, Erik, and Viveca Novak, *Inside the Wire: A Military Intelligence Soldier's Eyewitness Account of Life at Guantánamo* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).

Erik Saar, an enlisted linguist specialist in the U.S. Army, tells about his stay at the Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp as an Arab linguist dealing with detainees there. He documents tensions between the Military Police and the linguists, and he discusses what he perceived as problems in the handling of detainees.

Sageman, Marc, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

The author, a former Foreign Service officer and forensic psychiatrist, traces the terrorist network of al-Qaeda and how it operated in carrying out the September 11 attacks. He concludes that the Hamburg Cell was part of a cluster of four terrorist cells—Central Staff Cluster Cell (Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda central command), Core Arab Cluster Cell (Hamburg Cell and other Arab groups), Southeastern Asian Cluster Cell (Jemaah Islamiyya in Indonesia), and the Maghreb Arab Cluster Cell (North African groups). This book is an invaluable study in the type of terrorist networking that produced September 11.

Scheuer, Michael, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2004).

Michael Scheuer continued his assessment of the American war on terror in this book written after he left the CIA. His thesis is that the U.S. government needs to change its foreign policy to undercut the appeal that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda have in the Muslim world. Unless it does so, there is the possibility that the United States will lose its war on terrorism.

Scheuer, Michael, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002).

The author was the former head of the CIA's Alec Station, a unit charged with capturing or assassinating Osama bin Laden. In this CIA-vetted book Scheuer tries to inform the American public how bin Laden and the leaders of al-Qaeda view the United States and the West. This book became so controversial that the CIA revamped its policy on CIA officials writing books.

Simpson, David, *9/11: The Culture of Commemoration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

David Simpson, a professor of English at the University of California–Davis, examines the way America commemorated the dead on and after September 11, 2001. He puts the process of commemorating the dead into a historical context of how the dead have been handled in previous wars and catastrophes. His thesis is that the 9/11 commemorations have been overtaken by ideas of revenge.

Smith, Ennis, *Report from Ground Zero: The Story of the Rescue Efforts at the World Trade Center* (New York: Viking, 2002).

Dennis Smith, a former firefighter and founder of *Firehouse Magazine*, gives his insight on what the New York Fire Department's (NYFD) firefighters went through on September 11. As an eighteen-year veteran of the NYFD, he had access to information that the firefighters were reluctant to share with outsiders.

This book gives a good picture of the firefighters on September 11 and later, and it is recommended reading.

Stewart, James B., *Heart of a Soldier: A Story of Love, Heroism, and September 11th* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002).

The author, a Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist, has written a biography of Rick Rescorla from his birth in Hayle, Cornwall, England, to his death on September 11, 2001, in the World Trade Center complex. Rescorla was a heavily decorated Vietnam veteran of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, but he was also a writer and security specialist with a law degree. He died heroically, evacuating people from the South Tower, and his body was never found.

Stout, Glenn, Charles Vitchers, and Robert Gray, *Nine Months at Ground Zero: The Story of the Brotherhood of Workers Who Took on a Job Like No Other* (New York: Scribner, 2006).

A journalist and two construction workers compiled this book from their experiences working at Ground Zero of the World Trade Center. In the months that Vitchers and Gray worked there, they developed a close working relationship with the New York City Fire Department. At the end they considered the nine months spent at Ground Zero working seven twelve-hour days per week "the most precious and most painful time of their lives."

Suskind, Ron, *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies since 9/11* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007).

Ron Suskind is a former Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist who uses his contacts in the Washington, D.C., area to write about the war between the U.S. government and the terrorists in the aftermath of 9/11. The title of the book comes from Vice President Dick Cheney's remark that, if there is a 1 percent chance of a threat to the security of the United States, then it is necessary to take action against that threat.

Sweet, Christopher (ed.), *Above Hallowed Ground: A Photographic Record of September 11, 2001* (New York: Viking Studio, 2002).

The photographers of the New York City Police Department took photos of the World Trade Center complex from minutes after the first aircraft hit the North Tower until the last steel beam was removed in May 2002. These never-before-published photos give a sense of reality about what happened on September 11 and its aftermath. It is a tribute to the loss of twenty-three members of the New York City Police Department and to all the others who died that day.

Sylvester, Judith, and Suzanne Huffman, *Women Journalists at Ground Zero: Covering Crisis* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

Two journalism professors, Sylvester at Louisiana State University and Huffman at Texas Christian University, were intrigued at how many women journalists risked their lives over the September 11, 2001, story. They decided to interview twenty-four women journalists ranging from TV reporters to newspaper journalists. These journalists recorded their horror at the loss of life and the devastation, but they believed that they were just doing their jobs.

Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).

George Tenet, the head of the CIA for most of the Clinton and Bush administrations, uses this book to counter what he considers misrepresentations of how the CIA operated during his years in command. Although Tenet admits mistakes on the part of the CIA and himself, he maintains that the CIA has been used as a scapegoat by the Bush administration. Though there has been debate over some of the details, this is a must-read for anybody interested in how the CIA operated and its limitations in the period before September 11.

Thomas, R. Andrew, *Aviation Insecurity: The New Challenges of Air Travel* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books 2003).

Thomas, a global business expert and an aviation security analyst, uses his expertise on aviation matters to expose the inadequacies of commercial airline security. It is his thesis that the FAA's weaknesses in regulating security compliance by the commercial airline industry contributed to what happened on September 11. This book is an invaluable resource on security issues before and after September 11.

Thompson, Paul, *The Terror Timeline: Chronicle of the Road to 9/11—And America's Response* (New York: ReganBooks, 2004).

Paul Thompson, a political activist and the founder of the Center for Cooperative Research, has combed newspapers and reports on events before and after September 11. His analysis of more than five thousand articles and reports points out the contradictions in the media. This book is also the most detailed chronology of the events surrounding September 11, and it is marred only by the author's acceptance of sometimes dubious sources.

Trento, Susan B., and Joseph J. Trento, *Unsafe at Any Altitude: Failed Terrorism Investigations, Scapegoating 9/11, and the Shocking Truth about Aviation Security Today* (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2006).

This husband and wife team with experience in investigative journalism has produced a book on commercial airline security before and after September 11. The authors assert that the airline industry and other lobbyists worked against improved airline security before September 11, and that private security companies have since been used as scapegoats.

Von Essen, Thomas, with Matt Murray, *Strong of Heart: Life and Death in the Fire Department of New York* (New York: ReganBooks, 2002).

Thomas Von Essen was the Commissioner of the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) on September 11. As a former firefighter and firefighter union official, he traces the events of September 11 and how the loss of 343 firefighters impacted the FDNY. Von Essen's viewpoint and his close association with Mayor Giuliani make this book a valuable source.

Weiss, Murray, *The Man Who Warned America: The Life and Death of John O'Neill, the FBI's Embattled Counterterror Warrior* (New York: ReganBooks, 2003).

The author traces the colorful career of FBI counterterrorism expert John O'Neill through its ups and downs. Weiss traces O'Neill's clashes with the upper levels of the FBI hierarchy and his position as head of security at the World Trade Center complex.

Woodward, Bob, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).

Bob Woodward has been a longtime investigative journalist for the *Washington Post* and the author of many books on American politics. In this book he examines the reaction to September 11 by President George W. Bush and the Bush administration. It covers the period from September 11 through the overthrow of the Taliban to the eve of the invasion of Iraq.

Wright, Lawrence, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Knopf, 2006).

The author is a freelance journalist with extensive contacts in the Middle East that he used to write this book, which traces the origins of the September 11 conspiracy. The strength of the book is the numerous interviews of people close to the leaders of al-Qaeda. This book is an excellent treatment of al-Qaeda's role in the conspiracy, and it won the 2007 Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction.

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